[145] Ibid. 47.

[146] 307 U.S. 496, 515, 516 (1939).

[147] 334 U.S. 558 (1948).

[148] Kovacs _v._ Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949).

[149] Public Utilities Commission _v._ Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952). The decision overruled the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia. Here Judge Edgerton, speaking for himself and two a.s.sociates, said: "Exploitation of this audience through a.s.sault on the unavertible sense of hearing is a new phenomenon. It raises 'issues that were not implied in the means of communication known or contemplated by Franklin and Jefferson and Madison.' But the Bill of Rights, as appellants say in their brief, can keep up with anything an advertising man or an electronics engineer can think of. * * *

"If Transit obliged its pa.s.sengers to read what it liked or get off the car, invasion of their freedom would be obvious. Transit obliges them to hear what it likes or get off the car. Freedom of attention, which forced listening destroys, is a part of liberty essential to individuals and to society. The Supreme Court has said that the const.i.tutional guarantee of liberty 'embraces not only the right of a person to be free from physical restraint, but the right to be free in the enjoyment of all his faculties * * *.' One who is subjected to forced listening is not free in the enjoyment of all his faculties." He quoted with approval Justice Reed's statement in Kovacs _v._ Cooper, "The right of free speech is guaranteed every citizen that he may reach the minds of willing listeners."--191 F. 2d 450, 456 (1951).

[150] Lovell _v._ Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Schneider _v._ State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Largent _v._ Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943).

[151] Schneider _v._ State, 308 U.S. 147 (1930); Jamison _v._ Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943).

[152] Marsh _v._ Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946).

[153] Tucker _v._ Texas, 326 U.S. 517 (1946).

[154] Valentine _v._ Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942).

[155] Martin _v._ Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943).

[156] Breard _v._ Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622 (1951).

[157] 221 U.S. 418, 439 (1911). _See_ below. [Transcriber's Note: Reference is to Section FEDERAL RESTRAINTS ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND PRESS, above.]

[158] Near _v._ Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).

[159] Drivers Union _v._ Meadowmoor Co., 312 U.S. 287 (1941); Carpenters Union _v._ Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).

[160] 315 U.S. 568 (1942).

[161] 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

[162] 315 U.S. 568, 571, 572 (1942).

[163] 319 U.S. 624, 633 (1943).

[164] Lovell _v._ Griffin, 303 U.S. 444, 451 (1938).

[165] Chaplinsky _v._ New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942); c.o.x _v._ New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569 (1941).

[166] Lovell _v._ Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938); Hague _v._ C.I.O., 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939); Schneider _v._ State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Cantwell _v._ Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Largent _v._ Texas, 318 U.S. 418 (1943); Thomas _v._ Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 538 (1945); Saia _v._ New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948).

[167] Radio Comm'n _v._ Nelson Bros. Co., 289 U.S. 266 (1933); Communications Comm'n. _v._ N.B.C., 319 U.S. 239 (1943).

[168] Mutual Film Corp. _v._ Ohio Indus'l Comm., 236 U.S. 230, 244 (1915).

[169] 334 U.S. 131 (1948).

[170] Ibid. 166.

[171] Joseph Burstyn, Inc. _v._ Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952).

[172] Ibid. 502. Justice Frankfurter, concurring for himself and Justices Jackson and Burton, elaborates upon the vagueness of connotation of the New York Court's use of the word "sacrilegious."

_See_ Appendix to his opinion, Ibid. 533-40. Justice Reed, in his concurring opinion, suggests that the Court will now have the duty of examining "the facts of the refusal of a license in each case to determine whether the principles of the First Amendment have been honored." Ibid. 506-507.

[173] 314 U.S. 252 (1941).

[174] Ibid. 263.

[175] 323 U.S. 516 (1945).

[176] Ibid. 529-530.

[177] Palko _v._ Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 327 (1937).

[178] United States _v._ Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152, fn. 4 (1938).

[179] 328 U.S. 331 (1946).

[180] Ibid. 353.

[181] Kovacs _v._ Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 88 (1949).

[182] Ibid. 90.

[183] Brinegar _v._ United States, 338 U.S. 160, 180 (1949).

[184] Terminiello _v._ Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949).

[185] Kunz _v._ New York, 340 U.S. 290, 302.

[186] Ibid. 309. In a footnote Justice Jackson points to the peculiarly protected position of the Court today, thanks to ch. 479, Public Law 250, 81st Congress, approved August 18, 1949. This makes it unlawful to "make any harangue or oration, or utter loud, threatening, or abusive language in the Supreme Court Building or grounds." -- 5. It also forbids display of any "flag, banner, or device designed or adapted to bring into public notice any party, organization, or movement." -- 6. Moreover, it authorizes the marshal to "prescribe such regulations approved by the Chief Justice of the United States, as may be deemed necessary for the adequate protection of the Supreme Court Building and grounds and of persons and property therein, and for the maintenance of suitable grounds." -- 7. Violation of these provisions or regulations is an offense punishable by fine and imprisonment.

[187] Grosjean _v._ American Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 246 (1936).

[188] Ibid. 250.

[189] Ibid.

[190] Murdock _v._ Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943); Jones _v._ Opelika, 319 U.S. 103 (1943); Follett _v._ McCormick, 321 U.S. 573 (1944).

[191] a.s.sociated Press _v._ United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). A newspaper publisher who enjoyed a substantial monopoly of ma.s.s distribution of news was enjoined from refusing advertising from persons advertising over a competing radio station. The Court sustained the injunction against the objection that it violated freedom of the press, holding that appellant was guilty of attempting to monopolize interstate commerce. Lorain Journal _v._ United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).

[192] a.s.sociated Press _v._ Labor Board, 301 U.S. 103, 133 (1937).

[193] Okla. Press Pub. Co. _v._ Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1946).