311/1 G.o.ddard v. Monitor Ins. Co., 108 Ma.s.s. 56.

313/1 See Cundy v. Lindsay, 3 App. Cas. 459, 469. Cf. Reg. v.

Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 55 et seq., 62 et seq.; Reg. v.

Davies, Dearsly, C.C. 640; Rex v. Mucklow, 1 Moody, O.C. 160; Reg. v. Jacobs, 12 c.o.x, 151.

313/2 "Praesentia corporis tollit errorem nominis." Cf. Byles, J., in Way v. Hearne, 32 L. J. N.S.C.P. 34, 40. But cf. the conflicting opinions in Reg. v. Middleton, L.R. 2 C.C. 38, 45, 57. It would seem that a proper name or other identification of an object or person as specific may have the same effect as an actual identification by the senses, because it refers to such an identification, although in a less direct way.

316/1 Brown v. Foster, 113 Ma.s.s. 136.

316/2 Leake, Dig. Contr. 13, 14, 637; Hunt v. Livermore, 5 Pick.

395, 397; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 36.

316/3 Leake, Dig. Contr. 638; Braunstein v. Accidental Death Ins.

Co., 1 B. & S. 782.

316/4 But cf. Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 29.

318/2 Bullen & Leake, Prec. of Plead. (3d ed.), 147, "Conditions Precedent."

319/1 Cf. Cort v. Ambergate, Nottingham & Boston & Eastern Junction Railway Co., 17 Q.B.127.

320/1 Goodman v. Poc.o.c.k, 15 Q.B.576 (1850).

325/1 Fisher v. Mellen, 103 Ma.s.s. 503.

325/2 Supra, p. 136.

327/1 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33.

328/1 See the explanation of Dimech v. Corlett, 12 Moo. P.C. 199, in Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 760.

329/1 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751.

329/2 Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 28, p. 1000.

329/3 See Lecture VIII.

330/1 Kennedy v. Panama, &c. Mail Co., L.R. 2 Q.B.580, 588; Lyon v. Bertram, 20 How. 149, 153. Cf. Windscheid, Pand., Section 76, nn. 6, 9.

330/2 Windscheid, Pand., Section 76(4). See, generally, Ibid., nn. 6, 7; Section 78, pp. 206, 207; Section 82, pp. 216 et seq.

331/1 Cr. Ihering, Geist d. Roem. Rechts, Section 48, III. p. 116 (Fr. transl.).

331/2 See, however, the language of Crompton, J. in S.C., I B. & S. 877. Cf. Kent, Comm. (12th ed.), 479, n. 1, A (c).

331/3 Behn v. Burness, 3 B. & S. 751, 755, 756.

334/1 Cf. Anglo-Egyptian Navigation Co. v. Rennie, L.R. 10 C.P.

271.

334/2 Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

335/1 Contracts (2d Ed.), Section 106, and pa.s.sim.

336/1 Chanter v. Hopkins, 4 M. & W. 399, 404. Possibly Behn v.

Burness, stated above, might have been dealt with in this way.

The ship tendered was not a ship which had been in the port of Amsterdam at the date of the contract. It was therefore not such a ship as the contract called for.

336/2 Heyworth v. Hutchinson, L.R. 2 Q.B.447, criticised in Benj.

Sales (2d ed.), pp. 742 et seq.

336/3 See Thomas v. Cadwallader, Willes, 496; Langd. Contr. (2d ed.), Sections 116, 140. This is put as a case of equivalence by Mr. Langdell (Contr., Section 116); but the above explanation is believed to be the true one. It will be noticed that this is hardly a true case of condition, but merely a limitation of the scope of the tenant's promise. So a covenant to serve as apprentice in a trade, which the other party covenants to teach, can only be performed if the other will teach, and must therefore be limited to that event. Cf. Ellen v. Topp, 6 Exch. 424.

337/1 Langdell, Contracts (2d ed.), Section 127. Cf. Roberts v.

Brett, 11 H. L. C. 337.

339/1 Graves v. Legg, 9 Exch. 709. Cf. Lang. Contr. (2d ed.), Section 33, p. 1004. Mr. Langdell says that a bought note, though part of a bilateral contract, is to be treated as unilateral, and that it may be presumed that the language of the contract relied on was that of a bought note, and thus a condition in favor of the defendant, who made it. I do not quite understand how this can be a.s.sumed when the declaration states a bilateral contract, and the question arose on demurrer to a plea, which also states that the plaintiff "was by the agreement bound to declare" the names. How remote the explanation is from the actual ground of decision will be seen.

341/1 Recht des Besitzes, Section 11, p. 184, n. 1 (7th ed.), Eng. tr. 124, n. t.

342/1 Inst. II. Section 157.

342/2 "In suis heredibus evidentius apparet continuationem dominii eo rem perdueere, ut nulla videatur hereditas fuisse, quasi olim hi domini essent, qui etiam vivo patre quodammodo domini existimantur, unde etiam filius familias appellatur sicut pater familias, sola nota hae adiecta, per quam distinguitur genitor ab eo qui genitus sit. itaque post mortem patris non hereditatem percipere videntur, sed magis liberam bonorum administrationem consequuntur hac ex causa licet non sint heredes inst.i.tuti, domini sunt: nec obstat, quod licet eos exheredare, quod et occidere licebat." D. 28.2. 11. Cf. Plato, Laws, [Greek characters]

343/1 Laveleye, Propriety, 24, 202, 205, 211, n. 1, 232; Norton, L.C. Hindu Law of Inheritance, p. 193.

343/2 D. 50. 16. 208.

343/3 D. 41. 1. 34. Cf. D. 41. 3. 40; Bract., fol. 8 a, 44 a.

343/4 D. 43. 24. 13, Section 5.

344/1 Germania, c. 20.

345/1 Littleton, Section 337; Co. Lit. 209, a, b; Y.B. 8 Ed. IV.

5, 6, pl. 1; Keilway, 44 a (17 Hen. VII.); Lord North v. b.u.t.ts, Dyer, 139 b, 140 a, top; Overton v. Sydall, Popham, 120, 121; Boyer v.

Rivet, 3 Bulstr. 317, 321; Bain v. Cooper, 1 Dowl. Pr. Cas. N. s.

11, 14.

345/2 Y.B. 48 Ed. III. 2, pl. 4.

346/1 Vermoegensrechtlichen Klagen, 88, 89.

346/2 Proc. de la Lex Salica, tr. Thevenin, p. 72 and n. 1.

347/1 Ethelred, II. 9; c.n.u.t, II. 73; Essays in Ang. Sax. Law, pp.

221 et seq.