Sedgwick's movements towards his chief were certainly more rapid than those of Sickles on Sat.u.r.day, and no one has undertaken to criticise the latter. Nor would Lee be lightly accused of tardiness for not attacking Sedgwick in force until Monday at six P.M., as will shortly be detailed, when he had despatched his advance towards him shortly after noon on Sunday, and had but a half-dozen miles to march. And yet Lee, precious as every moment was to him, consumed all these hours in preparing to a.s.sault Sedgwick's position in front of Banks's Ford.

In order to do justice to all sources of information, and show how unreliable our knowledge often was, it may be well to quote from Gen. b.u.t.terfield's testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War. "From the best information I had at the time the order came, there was not over a brigade of the enemy in the vicinity of Fredericksburg. This information was confirmed afterwards by prisoners taken on Sunday by Gen. Sedgwick. They told me they were left there with orders, that, if they did not receive re-enforcements by a certain time, to withdraw; that they did withdraw about eleven o'clock on Sat.u.r.day night, but met re-enforcements coming up, and turned back and re-occupied the works. The statement may have been false, or may have been true." It was clearly Early's march under his mistaken instructions, which the prisoners referred to. "If true, it would show that a bold movement of Gen. Sedgwick's command on Sat.u.r.day night, would have taken Marye's heights, and put him well on the road towards Gen. Hooker before daylight." To the question whether the order could have been actually carried out: "There was a force of the enemy there, but in my judgment not sufficient to have prevented the movement, if made with a determined attack. Night attacks are dangerous, and should be made only with very disciplined troops. But it seemed to me at the time that the order could have been executed."

Gibbon, on the contrary, is of opinion that the strict execution of the order was impracticable, but that probably an a.s.sault could have been made at daylight instead of at eleven A.M. He recollects being very impatient that morning about the delay,-not, however, being more specific in his testimony.

XXVIII. SEDGWICK MARCHES TOWARDS HOOKER.

So soon as Sedgwick had reduced the only formidable works in his front, he made dispositions to push out on the plank road. Gibbon was left in Fredericksburg to prevent the enemy from crossing to the north side of the river, and to shield the bridges.

"Gen. Brooks's division was now given the advance, and he was farthest in the rear, not having got moved from the crossing-place." Brooks had so extensive a force in his front, that he was constrained to withdraw with extreme caution. "This necessarily consumed a considerable time, and before it was completed the sound of the cannonading at Chancellorsville had ceased." (Warren.)

This postponement of an immediate advance might well, under the stringency of the orders, have been avoided, by pushing on with the then leading division. Not that it would have been of any ultimate a.s.sistance to Hooker at Chancellorsville. At the time the storming columns a.s.saulted Marye's heights, Hooker had already been driven into his lines at White House. And though none of his strictures upon Sedgwick's tardiness, as affecting his own situation, will bear the test of examination, time will not be considered wholly ill-spent in determining where Sedgwick might have been more expeditious. It no doubt accords with military precedents, to alternate in honoring the successive divisions of a corps with the post of danger; but it may often be highly improper to arrest an urgent progress in order to accommodate this principle. And it was certainly inexpedient in this case, despite the fact that Newton and Howe had fought their divisions, while Brooks had not yet been under fire.

"The country being open, Gen. Brooks's division was formed in a column of brigade-fronts, with an extended line of skirmishers in the front and flank in advance, and the artillery on the road." (Warren.) The New Jersey brigade marched on the right, and Bartlett's brigade on the left, of the road. This disposition was adopted that the enemy might be attacked as soon as met, without waiting for deployment, and to avoid the usual manoeuvres necessary to open an action from close column, or from an extended order of march.

Gen. Newton followed, marching by the flank along the road. This "greatly extended the column, made it liable to an enfilading fire, and put it out of support, in a measure, of the division in advance." (Warren.) Howe brought up the rear.

Meanwhile Wilc.o.x, having arrested Sedgwick at Guest's, as long as his slender force enabled him to do, moved across country to the River road near Taylor's. But Sedgwick's cautious advance gave him the opportunity of sending back what cavalry he had, some fifty men, to skirmish along the plank road, while he himself moved his infantry and artillery by cross-roads to the toll-house, one-half mile east of Salem Church. Here he took up an admirable position, and made a handsome resistance to Sedgwick, until, ascertaining that McLaws had reached the crest at that place, he withdrew to the position a.s.signed him in the line of battle now formed by that officer.

When Early perceived that Sedgwick was marching his corps up the plank road, instead, as he expected, of attacking him, and endeavoring to reach the depots at Hamilton's, he concentrated at c.o.x's all his forces, now including Hays, who had rejoined him by a circuit, and sent word to McLaws, whom he ascertained to be advancing to meet Sedgwick, that he would on the morrow attack Marye's heights with his right, and extend his left over to join the main line.

XXIX. SALEM CHURCH.

It was about noon before Lee became aware that Sedgwick had captured his stronghold at Fredericksburg, and was where he could sever his communications, or fall upon his rear at Chancellorsville. Both Lee and Early (the former taking his cue from his lieutenant) state that at first Sedgwick advanced down the Telegraph road, with an a.s.sumed purpose to destroy the line in Lee's rear, but that he was checked by Early. The nature, however, of Sedgwick's orders precluded his doing this, and there is no mention of such a purpose among any of the reports. And it was not long before Lee heard that Sedgwick was marching out towards the battle-ground in the Wilderness, with only Wilc.o.x in his front.

McLaws, with his own three brigades, and one of Anderson's, was accordingly pushed forward at a rapid gait to sustain Wilc.o.x; while Anderson, with the balance of his division, and fourteen rifled guns, was sent to the junction of the River road and Mine road to hold that important position. McLaws arrived about two P.M., and found Wilc.o.x skirmishing, a trifle beyond Salem Church. He was drawn back a few hundred yards, while Kershaw and Wofford were thrown out upon Wilc.o.x's right, and Semmes and Mahone on his left. Wofford arrived somewhat late, as he had been temporarily left at the junction of the Mine and plank roads to guard them. McLaws's guns were concentrated on the road, but were soon withdrawn for lack of ammunition.

Some troops were thrown into Salem Church, and into a schoolhouse near by, in front of the woods, forming a salient; but the main Confederate line was withdrawn some three hundred yards within the wood, where a clearing lay at their back.

When Sedgwick's column reached the summit along the road, about a mile from Salem Church, Wilc.o.x's cavalry skirmishers were met, and a section of artillery opened with solid shot from a point near the church, where Wilc.o.x was hurrying his forces into line. The intervening ground was quite open on both sides the road. The heights at Salem Church are not considerable; but a ravine running north and south across its front, and as far as the Rappahannock, furnishes an excellent line of defence, and the woods come up to its edge at this point, and enclose the road.

Brooks was pushed in to attack the enemy, the main part of his division being on the left of the road, while Newton filed in upon his right, so soon as his regiments could be got up. Disposing his batteries (Rigby, Parsons, and Williston) along a crest at right angles to the road, not far from the toll-gate, where good shelter existed for the caissons and limbers, Brooks sharply advanced his lines under a telling fire, and, pa.s.sing the undergrowth, penetrated the edge of the woods where lay Wilc.o.x and Semmes and Mahone. Wilc.o.x's skirmishers and part of his line gave way before Brooks's st.u.r.dy onset, which created no little confusion; but Wilc.o.x and Semmes in person headed some reserve regiments, and led them to the charge. An obstinate combat ensues. Bartlett has captured the schoolhouse east of the church, advances, and again breaks for a moment the Confederate line. Wilc.o.x throws in an Alabama regiment, which delivers a fire at close quarters, and makes a counter-charge, while the rest of his brigade rallies on its colors, and again presses forward. The church and the schoolhouse are fought for with desperation, but only after a heroic defence can the Confederates recapture them. Bartlett withdraws with a loss of two-fifths of his brigade, after the most stubborn contest. The line on the north of the road is likewise forced back. A series of wavering combats, over this entire ground, continues for the better part of an hour; but the enemy has the upper hand, and forces our line back towards the toll-house.

Though obstinately fighting for a foothold near the church, Brooks had thus been unable to maintain it, and he has fallen back with a loss of nearly fifteen hundred men. Reaching his guns, where Newton has meanwhile formed in support of his right, and where part of Howe's division later falls in upon his left, the enemy, which has vigorously followed up his retreat, is met with a storm of grape and canister at short range, the distance of our batteries from the woods being not much over five hundred yards. So admirably served are the guns, as McLaws states, that it is impossible to make head against this new line; and the Confederates sullenly retire to their position near the church, which they had so successfully held against our gallant a.s.saults, followed, but not seriously engaged, by a new line of Brooks's and Newton's regiments.

Wheaton's brigade manages to hold on in a somewhat advanced position on the right, where Mahone had been re-enforced from Wofford's line; but our left, after the second unsuccessful attempt to wrest more advanced ground from the enemy, definitely retires to a line a short mile from Salem Church.

The Confederate artillery had been out of ammunition, and unable to engage seriously in this conflict. Their fighting had been confined to the infantry regiments. But our own guns had borne a considerable share in the day's work, and had earned their laurels well.

It was now dark, and both lines bivouacked in line of battle.

Gen. Russell was placed in command of our front line.

The Union wounded were sent to Fredericksburg.

Gen. Warren, before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, pa.s.ses the following comment upon this action:-

"Gen. Sedgwick carried the heights at Fredericksburg, and then moved on about three miles farther, and had a fight at Salem heights, but could not carry them. I think that by fighting the battle at Salem heights differently, we might have won that place also."

"Gen. Brooks carried Salem heights, but not being closely enough supported by other troops, he could not hold the heights. It was just one of those wavering things that a moment settles. If we had been stronger at that moment, we would have won; not being so, they won."

It is probable, that, had Brooks's attack been delayed until Newton and Howe could reach the scene, their support might have enabled him to keep possession of the ground he came so near to holding single-handed. But it was a dashing fight, deserving only praise; and it is doubtful whether the capture of Salem heights would have materially altered the event. It was the eccentric handling of the Chancellorsville wing which determined the result of this campaign. Sedgwick's corps could effect nothing by its own unaided efforts.

x.x.x. SEDGWICK IN DIFFICULTY.

So soon as Wilc.o.x had retired from Banks's Ford to oppose Sedgwick's advance towards Chancellorsville, Gen. Benham threw a pontoon bridge, and established communications with the Sixth Corps. Warren, who up to this time had remained with Sedgwick, now returned to headquarters, reaching Hooker at eleven and, as a result of conference with him, telegraphed Sedgwick as follows:-

"I find every thing snug here. We contracted the line a little, and repulsed the last a.s.sault with ease. Gen. Hooker wishes them to attack him to-morrow, if they will. He does not desire you to attack again in force unless he attacks him at the same time. He says you are too far away for him to direct. Look well to the safety of your corps, and keep up communication with Gen. Benham at Banks's Ford and Fredericksburg. You can go to either place if you think best. To cross at Banks's Ford would bring you in supporting distance of the main body, and would be better than falling back to Fredericksburg."

And later:-

"I have reported your situation to Gen. Hooker. I find that we contracted our lines here somewhat during the morning, and repulsed the enemy's last a.s.sault with ease. The troops are in good position. Gen. Hooker says you are separated from him so far that he cannot advise you how to act. You need not try to force the position you attacked at five P.M. Look to the safety of your corps. You can retire, if necessary, by way of Fredericksburg or Banks's Ford: the latter would enable you to join us more readily."

The former communication reached Sedgwick about four P.M. next day, and was the only one which up till then he had received. Warren, in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, rather apologizes for the want of clear directions in this despatch, on the score of being greatly exhausted; but its tenor doubtless reflects the ideas of Gen. Hooker at the time, and is, indeed, in his evidence, fathered by Hooker as his own creation. It shows conclusively that there was then no idea of retiring across the river.

And it is peculiarly noteworthy, that, at this time, Hooker does not, in tone or by implication, reflect in the remotest degree upon Sedgwick, either for tardiness or anything else. Hooker was wont to speak his mind plainly. Indeed, his bluntness in criticism was one of his pet failings. And had he then felt that Sedgwick had been lacking in good-will, ability, or conduct, it is strange that there should not be some apparent expression of it. It was only when he was driven to extremity in explaining the causes of his defeat, that his after-wit suggested Sedgwick as an available scapegoat.

During the night, Lee came to the conclusion that he must absolutely rid himself of Sedgwick, before he could again a.s.sault Hooker's defences. And, trusting to what he had already seen, in this campaign, of his opponent's lack of enterprise, he detailed Anderson's remaining three brigades to the forces opposing Sedgwick's wing, leaving only Jackson's corps, now numbering some nineteen thousand men, to keep Hooker, with his eighty thousand, penned up behind his breastworks, while himself repaired to the battle-ground of Monday at Salem Church, with the intention of driving Sedgwick across the river, so that he might again concentrate all his powers upon our forces near Chancellorsville.

By daylight Monday morning, Early advanced from his position at c.o.x's, and with very little difficulty recaptured the heights, held by only a few of Gibbon's men. Barksdale was again posted in the trenches, and instructed to keep Gibbon in check. Early meanwhile moved out to join McLaws, feeling our position with Smith's brigade, and ascertaining the left of our line to lie near Taylor's, and to extend from there down to the plank road.

At an early hour on Monday morning, it came to Sedgwick's knowledge, that the Confederates had re-occupied the heights in his rear, and cut him off from Fredericksburg, thus leaving him only Banks's Ford as a possible outlet in case of disaster. An attempt was made by Early to throw a force about Howe's left, and seize the approaches to the ford; but it was timely met, and repulsed by our men, who captured in this affair two hundred prisoners and a battle-flag. And, to forestall any serious movement to cut him off from Banks's Ford, Sedgwick had already formed Howe's division in line to the rear, extending, as we have seen, from the river to the plank road.

In his report, and particularly in his testimony before the Committee on the Conduct of the War, Howe speaks as if he had received from Sedgwick only general-in fact, vague-and rare instructions, as to the dispositions to be made of his division; and that all his particular manoeuvres were originated and completed on his own responsibility, upon information, or mere hints, from headquarters of the corps. His line, over two miles long, was covered by less than six thousand men.

The despatch from Warren reached Sedgwick while matters were in this condition. To retire to Fredericksburg was impossible; to retire across Banks's Ford, except by night, equally so, unless he chose to hazard a disastrous attack from the superior force in his front. For Sedgwick had scarce twenty thousand men left to confront Lee's twenty-five thousand, and imagined the odds to be far greater. Our line was formed with the left on the river, midway between Fredericksburg and Banks's Ford, running southerly to beyond the plank road, following this on the south side for nearly two miles, and then turning north to the crest which Wheaton had held the night before. This was a long, weak position, depending upon no natural obstacles; but it was, under the circ.u.mstances, well defended by a skilful disposition of the artillery, under charge of Col. Tompkins. Gen. Newton's division held the right of this line, facing west; Gen. Brooks had Russell's brigade, also posted so as to face west, on the left of Newton, while Bartlett and Torbert faced south, the former resting his left somewhere near Howe's right brigade. This portion of the line was, on Monday afternoon, re-enforced by Wheaton's brigade of Newton's division, withdrawn from the extreme right; and here it rendered effective service at the time the attack was made on Howe, and captured a number of prisoners. The bulk of Howe's division lay facing east, from near Guest's house to the river. The whole line of battle may be characterized, therefore, as a rough convex order,-or, to describe it more accurately, lay on three sides of a square, of which the Rappahannock formed the fourth. This line protected our pontoon-bridges at Scott's Dam, a mile below Banks's Ford.

No doubt Sedgwick determined wisely in preferring to accept battle where he lay, if it should be forced upon him, to retiring to Banks's Ford, and attempting a crossing in retreat by daylight.

Under these hara.s.sing conditions, Sedgwick determined to hold on till night, and then cross the river; having specially in view Hooker's caution to look well to the safety of his corps, coupled with the information that he could not expect to relieve him, and was too far away to direct him with intelligence.

Subsequent despatches instructed Sedgwick to hold on where he was, till Tuesday morning. These despatches are quoted at length on a later page.

Having re-occupied Fredericksburg heights, in front of which Hall's brigade of Gibbon's division was deployed as a skirmish-line, and occasionally exchanged a few shots with the enemy, Early communicated with McLaws, and proposed an immediate joint a.s.sault upon Sedgwick; but McLaws, not deeming himself strong enough to attack Sedgwick with the troops Early and he could muster, preferred to await the arrival of Anderson, whom he knew to be rapidly pushing to join the forces at Salem Church.

Anderson, who, prior to the receipt of his new orders, had been making preparations for a demonstration against Hooker's left at Chancellorsville, and had there amused himself by sh.e.l.ling a park of supply-wagons across the river, broke up from his position at the crossing of the Mine and River roads, headed east, and arrived about eleven A.M. at the battle-ground of Sunday afternoon. In an hour he was got into line on Early's left, while McLaws retained the crest he had so stubbornly defended against Brooks.