Mr. Lloyd George expressed his complete agreement. He thought they themselves should, in the first place, agree on the fundamental principles and then refer the matter to the Committee. When that Committee met they could take President Wilson's proposals as the basis of discussion.

(It was agreed that the question of appointing an International Committee, consisting of two members from each of the five Great Powers, to whom would be referred President Wilson's draft, with certain basic principles to guide them, should be considered at the next meeting.)

3. _Poland_.--M. Pichon called attention to the necessity for replying to the demand addressed by M. Paderewski to Colonel House, which had been read by President Wilson that morning, and asked that Marshal Foch should be present.

(It was agreed that this question should be discussed at the next Meeting.)

4. _Disarmament_.--Mr. Balfour called attention to the urgency of the question of disarmament, and said that he would shortly propose that a Committee should be appointed to consider this question.

VILLA MAJESTIC, Paris January 21st, 1919.

This is the minute of January 21, and the Prinkipos memorandum was written on January 22.

The instructions to the President were as follows:

It was agreed that President Wilson should draft a proclamation for consideration at the next meeting, inviting all organized parties in Russia to attend a meeting to be held at some selected place such as Salonika or Lemnos, in order to discuss with the representatives of the allied and a.s.sociated great powers the means of restoring order and peace in Russia. Partic.i.p.ation in the meeting should be conditional on a cessation of hostilities.

The President then wrote the Prinkipos proposition.

Senator KNOX. Did you make a written report of your mission?

Mr. BULLITT. I did, sir.

Senator KNOX. Have you it here?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir. I might read the report without the appendices.

Senator KNOX. The chairman wants you to read it.

The CHAIRMAN. I do not know whether it is very long. The report he made would be of some interest. You were the only official representative sent?

Mr. BULLITT. Yes, sir; except Capt. Pett.i.t, my a.s.sistant. The circ.u.mstances of my sending will perhaps require further elucidation.

I not only was acquainted with the minutes of the discussions of the council of ten, but in addition I had discussed the subject with each of the commissioners each morning and I had talked with many British representatives. After the Prinkipos proposal was made, the replies began to come in from various factions, that they would refuse to accept it for various reasons. The Soviet Government replied in a slightly evasive form. They said, "We are ready to accept the terms of the proposals, and we are ready to talk about stopping fighting." They did not say, "We are ready to stop fighting on such and such a date."

It was not made specific.

Senator KNOX. That was one of the conditions of the proposal?

FRANCE BLOCKS PRINKIPOS CONFERENCE

Mr. BULLITT. It was. That is why I say they replied in an evasive manner. The French--and particularly the French foreign office, even more than Mr. Clemenceau--and you can observe it from that minute were opposed to the idea, and we found that the French foreign office had communicated to the Ukrainian Government and various other antisoviet governments that if they were to refuse the proposal, they would support them and continue to support them, and not allow the Allies, if they could prevent it, or the allied Governments, to make peace with the Russian Soviet Government.

At all events, the time set for the Prinkipos proposal was February 15. At that time n.o.body had acted in a definite, uncompromising matter. It therefore fell to the ground.

There was a further discussion as to what should be done. The peace conference was still of the opinion that it was impossible to hope to conquer the Soviet Government by force of arms, because in the latter part of that report, which I did not read to the committee, there was expressed very forcibly the opinion of Mr. Lloyd George, that the populations at home would not stand it. Therefore they desired to follow up further the line of making peace.

About that time I was working particularly closely on the Russian affairs. I had had a number of discussions with everyone concerned in it, and on the very day that Col. House and Mr. Lansing first asked me to undertake this mission to Russia, I was dining at Mr. Lloyd George's apartment to discuss Russian affairs with his secretaries, so that I had a fair idea of the point of view of everyone in Paris.

I further, before I went, received urgent instructions from Secretary Lansing if possible to obtain the release of Consul Treadwell, who had been our consul in Petrograd and had been transferred to Tashkent, and had been detained by the local Soviet Government and had been kept there several months. He was one of our Government officers they had seized. Mr. Lansing ordered me to do everything I could to obtain his release.

I further, before I went, asked Col. House certain specific questions in regard to what, exactly, the point of view of our Government was on this subject, what we were ready to do, and I think it perhaps might be important to detail a brief resume of this conversation. The idea was this: Lloyd George had gone over to London on February 9, as I remember, to try to adjust some labor troubles. He, however, still insisted that the Prinkipos proposal must be renewed or some other peace proposal must be made, and I arranged a meeting between him and Col. House, which was to take place, I believe, on February 24, at which time they were to prepare a renewal of the Prinkipos proposal, and they were both prepared to insist that it be pa.s.sed against any opposition of the French.

I arranged this meeting through Mr. Philip Kerr, Mr. Lloyd George's confidential a.s.sistant. However, on the 19th day of the month, Mr.

Clemenceau was shot, and the next day Mr. Lloyd George telephoned over from London to say that as long as Clemenceau was wounded and was ill, he was boss of the roost, and that anything he desired to veto would be immediately wiped out and therefore it was no use for him and Col.

House, as long as Clemenceau was ill, to attempt to renew the Prinkipos proposal, as Clemenceau would simply have to hold up a finger and the whole thing would drop to the ground. Therefore, it was decided that I should go at once to Russia to attempt to obtain from the Soviet Government an exact statement of the terms on which they were ready to stop fighting. I was ordered if possible to obtain that statement and have it back in Paris before the President returned to Paris from the United States. The plan was to make a proposal to the Soviet Government which would certainly be accepted.

The CHAIRMAN. These orders came from the President?

Mr. BULLITT. These orders came to me from Col. House. I also discussed the matter with Mr. Lansing, and Mr. Lansing and Col. House gave me the instructions which I had.

Senator KNOX. You said a moment ago that you went to Col. House to get a statement of the American position.

WHAT AMERICA WANTED

Mr. BULLITT. Yes; I asked Col. House these questions [reading]:

1. If the Bolsheviki are ready to stop the forward movement of their troops on all fronts and to declare an armistice on all fronts, would we be willing to do likewise?

2. Is the American Government prepared to insist that the French, British, Italian, and j.a.panese Governments shall accept such an armistice proposal?

3. If fighting is stopped on all fronts, is the Government of the United States prepared to insist on the reestablishment of economic relations with Russia, subject only to the equitable distribution among all cla.s.ses of the population of supplies and food and essential commodities which may be sent to Russia?

In other words, a sort of Hoover Belgian distribution plan so that the Bolsheviki could not use the food we sent in there for propaganda purposes and to starve their enemies and to feed their friends.

The fourth question I asked him was as follows:

4. Is the United States Government, under these conditions, prepared to press the Allies for a joint statement that all Allied troops will be withdrawn from the soil of Russia as soon as practicable, on condition that the Bolsheviki give explicit a.s.surances that there will be no retaliation against persons who have cooperated with the allied forces?

Col. House replied that we were prepared to.

Further, I asked Col. House whether it was necessary to get a flat and explicit a.s.surance from the Soviet Government that they would make full payment of all their debts before we would make peace with them, and Col. House replied that it was not; that no such statement was necessary, however, that such a statement would be extremely desirable to have, inasmuch as much of the French opposition to making peace with the Soviet Government was on account of the money owed by Russia to France.

I further had an intimation of the British disposition toward Russia. As I said before, I had discussed the matter with Mr. Philip Kerr, and Sir Maurice Hankey and Col. House asked me to inform Mr. Kerr of my mission before I went. It was to be an entire secret from all except the British. The British and American delegations worked in very close touch throughout the conference, and there were practically no secrets that the American delegation had that were not also the property of the British delegation.

THE BRITISH TERMS

I was asked to inform Mr. Kerr of this trip. I told him all about it, and asked him if he could get Mr. Balfour and Mr. Lloyd George to give me a general indication of their point of view on peace with Russia; what they would be prepared to do in the matter.