[154:6] Spinoza: _Ethics_, Part V, Proposition XLII. Translation by Elwes, p. 270.

[155:7] Descartes: _Meditations_, I. Translation by Veitch, p. 97.

[155:8] Leibniz: _New System of the Nature of Substances_. Translation by Latta, pp. 299, 300.

[157:9] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, p. 42.

[159:10] No little ambiguity attaches to the term "monism" in current usage, because of its appropriation by those who maintain that the universe is unitary and h.o.m.ogeneous in _physical terms_ (cf. - 108). It should properly be used to emphasize the unity of the world in any terms.

[161:11] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 358.

[162:12] Burnet: _Op. cit._, p. 284.

[167:13] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 161. Translation by Jowett. References to Plato are to the marginal paging.

[168:14] Burnet: _Early Greek Philosophy_, pp. 184, 187.

[171:15] Plato: _Theaetetus_, 150 B. Translation by Jowett.

[173:16] Much ambiguity attaches to the terms "realism" and "idealism"

in current usage. The first had at one time in the history of philosophy a much narrower meaning than that which it now possesses. It was used to apply to those who, after Plato, believed in the independent reality of ideas, universals, or general natures. _Realists_ in this sense were opposed to _nominalists_ and _conceptualists_. Nominalism maintained the exclusive reality of individual substances, and reduced ideas to particular signs having, like the _name_, a purely symbolical or descriptive value. Conceptualism sought to unite realism and nominalism through the conception of mind, or an individual substance whose meanings may possess universal validity. Though this dispute was of fundamental importance throughout the mediaeval period, the issues involved have now been restated. Realism in the old sense will, if held, come within the scope of the broader epistemological realism defined above. Nominalism is covered by empirical tendencies, and conceptualism by modern idealism.

The term _idealism_ is sometimes applied to Plato on account of his designation of ideas as the ultimate realities. This would be a natural use of the term, but in our own day it has become inseparably a.s.sociated with the doctrine which attributes to being a dependence upon the activity of mind. It is of the utmost importance to keep these two meanings clear. In the preferred sense Plato is a realist, and so opposed to idealism.

The term _idealism_ is further confused on account of its employment in literature and common speech to denote the control of ideals. Although this is a kindred meaning, the student of philosophy will gain little or no help from it, and will avoid confusion if he distinguishes the term in its technical use and permits it in that capacity to acquire an independent meaning.

[175:17] See _note_, p. 173.

[176:18] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Part I, Fraser's edition, p. 259.

[176:19] To be distinguished from the religious sect which bears the same name.

[178:20] Quoted from Professor Josiah Royce's _The World and the Individual, First Series_, pp. 426-427.

CHAPTER VII

THE NORMATIVE SCIENCES AND THE PROBLEMS OF RELIGION

[Sidenote: The Normative Sciences.]

- 73. There are three sets of problems whose general philosophical importance depends upon the place which metaphysics a.s.signs to the _human critical faculties_. Man pa.s.ses judgment upon that which claims to be _true_, _beautiful_, or _good_, thus referring to ideals and standards that define these values. Attempts to make these ideals explicit, and to formulate principles which regulate their attainment, have resulted in the development of the three so-called _normative sciences_: _logic_, _aesthetics_, and _ethics_. These sciences are said to owe their origin to the Socratic method, and it is indeed certain that their problem is closely related to the general rationalistic att.i.tude.[180:1] In Plato's dialogue, "Protagoras," one may observe the manner of the inception of both ethics and logic. The question at issue between Socrates and the master sophist Protagoras, is concerning the possibility of teaching virtue. Protagoras conducts his side of the discussion with the customary rhetorical flourish, expounding in set speeches the tradition and usage in which such a possibility is accepted. Socrates, on the other hand, conceives the issue quite differently. One can neither affirm nor deny anything of virtue unless one knows _what is meant by it_. Even the possession of such a meaning was scarcely recognized by Protagoras, who was led by Socrates's questions to attribute to the various virtues an external grouping a.n.a.logous to that of the parts of the face. But Socrates shows that since justice, temperance, courage, and the like, are admittedly similar in that they are all virtues, they must have in common some essence, which is virtue in general. This he seeks to define in the terms, _virtue is knowledge_. The interest which Socrates here shows in the reduction of the ordinary moral judgments to a system centering in some single fundamental principle, is the ethical interest. But this is at the same time a particular application of the general rationalistic method of definition, and of the general rationalistic postulate that one knows nothing until one can form unitary and determinate conceptions. The recognition which Socrates thus gives to criteria of knowledge is an expression of the logical interest. In a certain sense, indeed, the whole labor of Socrates was in the cause of the logical interest. For he sought to demonstrate that belief is not necessarily knowledge; that belief may or may not be true. In order that it shall be true, and const.i.tute knowledge, it must be well-grounded, and accompanied by an understanding of its object. Socrates thus set the problem of logic, the discovery, namely, of those characters by virtue of the possession of which belief is knowledge.

[Sidenote: The Affiliations of Logic.]

- 74. Logic deals with the ground of belief, and thus distinguishes itself from the psychological account of the elements of the believing state.[182:2] But it is not possible sharply to sunder psychology and logic. This is due to the fact that the general principles which make belief true, may be regarded quite independently of this fact. They then become the _most general truth_, belonging to the absolute, archetypal realm, or to the mind of G.o.d.[182:3] When the general principles of certainty are so regarded, logic can be distinguished from metaphysics only by adding to the study of the general principles themselves, the study of the special conditions (mainly psychological) under which they may be realized among men. In the history of human thought the name of logic belongs to the study of this _attainment_ of truth, as the terms aesthetics and ethics belong to the studies of the attainment of beauty and goodness.[183:4] It is evident that logic will have a peculiar importance for the rationalist. For the empiricist, proposing to report upon things as they are given, will tend on the whole to maintain that knowledge has no properties save those which are given to it by its special subject-matter. One cannot, in short, define any absolute relationship between the normative sciences and the other branches of philosophy.

[Sidenote: Logic Deals with the Most General Conditions of Truth in Belief.]

- 75. _Logic is the formulation, as independently as possible of special subject-matter, of that which conditions truth in belief._ Since logic is concerned with truth only in so far as it is predicated of belief, and since belief in so far as true is knowledge, logic can be defined as the formulation of the most general principles of knowledge. The principles so formulated would be those virtually used to _justify_ belief or to disprove the imputation of error.

[Sidenote: The Parts of Formal Logic. Definition, Self-evidence, Inference, and Observation.]

- 76. What is called _formal logic_ is animated with the hope of extracting these formulations directly from an a.n.a.lysis of the procedure of thought. The most general logical principles which have appeared in the historical development of formal logic are _definition_, _self-evidence_, _inference_, and _observation_. Each of these has been given special study, and each has given rise to special issues.

_Definition_ has to do with the _formation of concepts_, or determinate and unequivocal meanings. The universality of such concepts, and their consequent relation to particular things, was, as we have seen, investigated at a very early date, and gave rise to the great realistic-nominalistic controversy.[184:5] A large part of the logical discussion in the Platonic dialogues is an outgrowth of the earlier "eristic," a form of disputation in favor with the sophists, and consisting in the adroit use of ambiguity.[184:6] It is natural that in its first conscious self-criticism thought should discover the need of definite terms. The perpetual importance of definition has been largely due to the great prestige in modern philosophy of the method of geometry, which was regarded by Descartes and Spinoza as the model for systems of necessary truth.

_Self-evidence_ is the principle according to which _conviction of truth follows directly from an understanding of meaning_. In the practice of his intellectual midwifery, Socrates presupposed that thought is capable of bringing forth its own certainties. And rationalism has at all times regarded truth as ultimately accredited by internal marks recognizable by reason. Such truth arrived at antecedent to acquaintance with instances is called _a priori_, as distinguished from _a posteriori_ knowledge, or observation after the fact. There can be no principles of self-evidence, but logicians have always been more or less concerned with the enumeration of alleged self-evident principles, notably those of _contradiction_ and _ident.i.ty_. A philosophical interest in the mathematical method has led to a logical study of axioms, but with a view rather to their fruitfulness than their intrinsic truth. Indeed, the interest in self-evident truth has always been subordinate to the interest in systematic truth, and the discovery of first principles most commonly serves to determine the relative priority of definite concepts, or the correct point of departure for a series of inferences.

The greater part of the famous Aristotelian logic consists in a study of _inference_, or _the derivation of new knowledge from old knowledge_.

Aristotle sought to set down and cla.s.sify every method of advancing from premises. The most important form of inference which he defined was the _syllogism_, a scheme of reasoning to a conclusion by means of two premises having one term in common. From the premises "all men are mortal" and "Socrates is a man," one may conclude that "Socrates is mortal." This is an instance not only of the syllogism in general, but of its most important "mood," the subsumption of a particular case under a general rule. Since the decline of Aristotle's influence in philosophy there has been a notable decrease of interest in the different forms of inference; though its fundamental importance as the very bone and sinew of _reasoning_ or _deductive thinking_ has never been challenged. Its loss of preeminence is in part due to the growth of empiricism, stimulated by the writings of Lord Bacon in the seventeenth century, and fostered by the subsequent development of experimental science.

_Observation_ is the fundamental logical principle of empiricism. For a radical empiricism, knowledge would consist of descriptive generalizations based upon the summation of instances. That branch of logic which deals with _the advance from individual instances to general principles_, is called _inductive logic_. It has resulted in the announcement of canons of accuracy and freedom from preconception, and in the methodological study of hypothesis, experiment, and verification.

Rules for observation directed to the end of discovering causes, const.i.tute the most famous part of the epoch-making logic of J. S.

Mills.[187:7]

[Sidenote: Present Tendencies. Theory of the Judgment.]

- 77. There are two significant tendencies in contemporary logic.

_Theories of the judgment_ have arisen in the course of an attempt to define the least complexity that must be present in order that thought shall come within the range of truth and error. It is evident that no one either knows or is in error until he takes some att.i.tude which lays claim to knowledge. Denoting by the term _judgment_ this minimum of complexity in knowledge, an important question arises as to the sense in which the judgment involves the subject, predicate, and copula that are commonly present in its propositional form.

[Sidenote: Priority of Concepts.]

- 78. But a more important logical development has been due to the recent a.n.a.lysis of definite accredited systems of knowledge. The study of the fundamental conceptions of mathematics and mechanics, together with an examination of the systematic structure of these sciences, furnishes the most notable cases. There are two senses in which such studies may be regarded as logical. In the first place, in so far as they bring to light the inner coherence of any body of truth, the kind of evidence upon which it rests, and the type of formal perfection which it seeks, they differ from formal logic only in that they derive their criteria from cases, rather than from the direct a.n.a.lysis of the procedure of thought. And since formal logic must itself make experiments, this difference is not a radical one. The study of cases tends chiefly to enrich _methodology_, or the knowledge of the special criteria of special sciences. In the second place, such studies serve to define the relatively few simple truths which are common to the relatively many complex truths. A study of the foundations of arithmetic reveals more elementary conceptions, such as _cla.s.s_ and _order_, that must be employed in the very definition of number itself, and so are implied in every numerical calculation. It appears similarly that the axioms of geometry are special axioms which involve the acceptance of more general axioms or indefinables.[189:8] Logic in this sense, then, is the enumeration of conceptions and principles in the order of their indispensableness to knowledge. And while it must be observed that the most general conceptions and principles of knowledge are not necessarily those most significant for the existent world, nevertheless the careful a.n.a.lysis which such an enumeration involves is scarcely less fruitful for metaphysics than for logic.

[Sidenote: aesthetics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Beauty.

Subjectivistic and Formalistic Tendencies.]

- 79. _aesthetics is the formulation, as independently as possible of special subject-matter, of that which conditions beauty._ As logic commonly refers to a judgment of truth, so aesthetics at any rate _refers_ to a judgment implied in appreciation. But while it is generally admitted that truth itself is by no means limited to the form of the judgment, the contrary is frequently maintained with reference to beauty. The aphorism, _De gustibus non est disputandum_, expresses a common opinion to the effect that beauty is not a property belonging to the object of which it is predicated, but a property generated by the appreciative consciousness. According to this opinion there can be no beauty except in the case of an object's presence in an individual experience. Investigators must of necessity refuse to leave individual caprice in complete possession of the field, but they have in many cases occupied themselves entirely with the _state of aesthetic enjoyment_ in the hope of discovering its constant factors. The opposing tendency defines certain _formal characters which the beautiful object must possess_. Evidently the latter school will attribute a more profound philosophical importance to the conception of beauty, since for them it is a principle that obtains in the world of being. This was the first notable contention, that of Plato. But even with the emphasis laid upon the subjective aspect of the aesthetic experience, great metaphysical importance may be attached to it, where, as in the case of the German Romanticists, reality is deliberately construed as a spiritual life which is to be appreciated rather than understood.

As in the case of logic, a strong impulse has manifested itself in aesthetics to deal with groups of objects that lie within its province, rather than directly with its concepts and principles. The first special treatise on aesthetics, the "Poetics" of Aristotle, belongs to this type of inquiry, as does all criticism of art in so far as it aims at the formulation of general principles.

[Sidenote: Ethics Deals with the Most General Conditions of Moral Goodness.]

- 80. _Ethics_, the oldest and most popular of the normative sciences, _is the formulation, as independently as possible of special subject-matter, of that which conditions goodness of conduct_. Ethics is commonly concerned with goodness only in so far as it is predicated of conduct, or of character, which is a more or less permanent disposition to conduct. Since conduct, in so far as good, is said to const.i.tute moral goodness, ethics may be defined as the formulation of the general principles of _morality_. The principles so formulated would be those virtually employed to _justify_ conduct, or to disprove the imputation of immorality.

[Sidenote: Conceptions of the Good. Hedonism.]

- 81. The student of this science is confronted with a very considerable diversity of method and differentiation of problems. The earliest and most profound opposition of doctrine in ethics arose from the differences of interpretation of which the teaching of Socrates is capable. His doctrine is, as we have seen, verbally expressed in the proposition, _virtue is knowledge_. Socrates was primarily concerned to show that there is no real living without an understanding of the significance of life. To live well is to know the end of life, the good of it all, and to govern action with reference to that end. Virtue is therefore the practical wisdom that enables one to live consistently with his real intention. But what is the real intention, the end or good of life? In the "Protagoras," where Plato represents Socrates as expounding his position, virtue is interpreted to mean prudence, or foresight of pleasurable and painful consequences. He who knows, possesses all virtue in that he is qualified to adapt himself to the real situation and to gain the end of pleasure. All men, indeed, seek pleasure, but only virtuous men seek it wisely and well.

"And do you, Protagoras, like the rest of the world, call some pleasant things evil and some painful things good?--for I am rather disposed to say that things are good in as far as they are pleasant, if they have no consequences of another sort, and in as far as they are painful they are bad."[192:9]

According to this view painful things are good only when they lead eventually to pleasure, and pleasant things evil only when their painful consequences outweigh their pleasantness. Hence moral differences reduce to differences of skill in the universal quest for pleasure, and _sensible gratification is the ultimate standard of moral value_. This ancient doctrine, known as _hedonism_, expressing as it does a part of life that will not suffer itself for long to be denied, is one of the great perennial tendencies of ethical thought. In the course of many centuries it has pa.s.sed through a number of phases, varying its conception of pleasure from the tranquillity of the wise man to the sensuous t.i.tillations of the sybarite, and from the individualism of the latter to the universalism of the humanitarian. But in every case it shows a respect for the natural man, praising morality for its disciplinary and instrumental value in the service of such human wants as are the outgrowth of the animal instinct of self-preservation.

[Sidenote: Rationalism.]