[Sidenote: The Meaning of Abstractness in Truth.]

- 52. But though the abstractness involved in scientific description is open and deliberate, we must come to a more precise understanding of it, if we are to draw any conclusion as to what it involves. In his "Principles of Human Knowledge," the English philosopher Bishop Berkeley raises the question as to the universal validity of mathematical demonstrations. If we prove from the image or figure of an isosceles right triangle that the sum of its angles is equal to two right angles, how can we know that this proposition holds of all triangles?

"To which I answer, that, though the idea I have in view whilst I make the demonstration be, for instance, that of an isosceles rectangular triangle whose sides are of a determinate length, I may nevertheless be certain it extends to all other rectilinear triangles, of what sort or bigness soever. And that because neither the right angle, nor the equality, nor determinate length of the sides are at all concerned in the demonstration. It is true the diagram I have in view includes all these particulars; but then there is not the least mention made of them in the proof of the proposition."[140:6]

Of the total conditions present in the concrete picture of a triangle, one may in one's calculations neglect as many as one sees fit, and work with the remainder. Then, if one has clearly distinguished the conditions used, one may confidently a.s.sert that whatever has been found true of them holds regardless of the neglected conditions. These may be missing or replaced by others, provided the selected or (for any given investigation) essential conditions are not affected. That which is true once is true always, provided time is not one of its conditions; that which is true in one place is true everywhere, provided location is not one of its conditions. But, given any concrete situation, the more numerous the conditions one ignores in one's calculations, the less adequate are one's calculations to that situation. The number of its inhabitants, and any mathematical operation made with that number, is true, but only very abstractly true of a nation. A similar though less radical abstractness appertains to natural science. Simple qualities of sound or color, and distinctions of beauty or moral worth, together with many other ingredients of actual experience attributed therein to the objects of nature, are ignored in the mechanical scheme. There is a subst.i.tution of certain mechanical arrangements in the case of the first group of properties, the simple qualities of sense, so that they may be a.s.similated to the general scheme of events, and their occurrence predicted. But their intrinsic qualitative character is not reckoned with, even in psychology, where the physiological method finally replaces them with brain states. Over and above these neglected properties of things there remain the purposive activities of thought.

It is equally preposterous to deny them and to describe them in mechanical terms. It is plain, then, that natural science calculates upon the basis of only a fraction of the conditions that present themselves in actual experience. Its conclusions, therefore, though true so far as they go, and they may be abstractly true of everything, are completely true of nothing.

[Sidenote: But Scientific Truth is Valid for Reality.]

- 53. Such, in brief, is the general charge of inadequacy which may be urged against natural science, not in the spirit of detraction, but for the sake of a more sound belief concerning reality. The philosopher falls into error no less radical than that of the dogmatic scientist, when he charges the scientist with untruth, and attaches to his concepts the predicate of unreality. The fact that the concepts of science are selected, and only inadequately true of reality, should not be taken to mean that they are sportive or arbitrary. They are not "devices" or abbreviations, in any sense that does not attach to such symbolism as all thought involves. Nor are they merely "hypothetical," though like all thought they are subject to correction.[142:7] The scientist does not merely a.s.sert that the equation for energy is true if nature's capacity for work be measurable, but _that such is actually the case_.

The statistician does not arrive at results contingent upon the supposition that men are numerable, but declares his sums and averages to be categorically true. Similarly scientific laws are true; only, to be sure, so far as they go, but with no condition save the condition that attaches to all knowledge, viz., that it shall not need correction.

The philosophy of science, therefore, is not the adversary of science, but supervenes upon science in the interests of the ideal of final truth. No philosophy of science is sound which does not primarily seek by an a.n.a.lysis of scientific concepts to understand science on its own grounds. Philosophy may understand science better than science understands itself, but only by holding fast to the conviction of its truth, and including it within whatever account of reality it may be able to formulate.

[Sidenote: Relative Practical Value of Science and Philosophy.]

- 54. Though philosophy be the most ancient and most exalted of human disciplines, it is not infrequently charged with being the most unprofitable. Science has ama.s.sed a fortune of information, which has facilitated life and advanced civilization. Is not philosophy, on the other hand, all programme and idle questioning? In the first place, no questioning is idle that is logically possible. It is true that philosophy shows her skill rather in the asking than in the answering of questions. But the formal pertinence of a question is of the greatest significance. No valid though unanswered question can have a purely negative value, and especially as respects the consistency or completeness of truth. But, in the second place, philosophy with all its limitations serves mankind as indispensably as science. If science supplies the individual with means of self-preservation, and the instruments of achievement, philosophy supplies the ideals, or the objects of deliberate construction. Such reflection as justifies the adoption of a fundamental life purpose is always philosophical. For every judgment respecting final worth is a judgment _sub specie eternitatis_. And the urgency of life requires the individual to pa.s.s such judgments. It is true that however persistently reflective he may be in the matter, his conclusion will be premature in consideration of the amount of evidence logically demanded for such a judgment. But he must be as wise as he can, or he will be as foolish as conventionality and blind impulse may impel him to be. Philosophy determines for society what every individual must practically determine upon for himself, the most reasonable plan of reality as a whole which the data and reflection of an epoch can afford. It is philosophy's service to mankind to compensate for the enthusiasm and concentration of the specialist, a service needed in every "present day." Apart from the philosopher, public opinion is the victim of sensationalism, and individual opinion is further warped by accidental propinquity. It is the function of philosophy to interpret knowledge for the sake of a sober and wise belief. The philosopher is the true prophet, appearing before men in behalf of that which is finally the truth. He is the spokesman of the most considerate and comprehensive reflection possible at any stage in the development of human thought. Owing to a radical misconception of function, the man of science has in these later days begun to regard himself as the wise man, and to teach the people. Popular materialism is the logical outcome of this determination of belief by natural science.

It may be that this is due as much to the indifference of the philosopher as to the forwardness of the scientist, but in any case the result is worse than conservative loyalty to religious tradition. For religion is corrected surely though slowly by the whole order of advancing truth. Its very inflexibility makes it proof against an over-emphasis upon new truth. It has generally turned out in time that the obstinate man of religion was more nearly right than the adaptable intellectual man of fashion. But philosophy, as a critique of science for the sake of faith, should provide the individual religious believer with intellectual enlightenment and gentleness. The quality, orderliness, and inclusiveness of knowledge, finally determine its value; and the philosopher, premature as his synthesis may some day prove to be, is the wisest man of his own generation. From him the man of faith should obtain such discipline of judgment as shall enable him to be fearless of advancing knowledge, because acquainted with its scope, and so intellectually candid with all his visions and his inspirations.

FOOTNOTES:

[120:1] Ernst Mach: _Science of Mechanics_. Translation by McCormack, p.

464. No one has made more important contributions than Professor Mach to a certain definite modern philosophical movement. Cf. - 207.

[129:2] Whewell: _History of the Inductive Sciences_, Vol. I, p. 289.

Quoted from Kepler: _Mysterium Cosmographic.u.m_.

[129:3] Quoted by Sidgwick in his _Philosophy, its Scope and Relations_, p. 89.

[132:4] The reader is referred to Mr. Bertrand Russell's chapters on _matter_ and _motion_ in his _Principles of Mathematics_, Vol. I.

Material particles he defines as "many-one relations of all times to some places, or of all terms of a continuous one-dimensional series _t_ to some terms of a continuous three-dimensional series _s_." Similarly, "when different times, throughout any period however short, are correlated with different places, there is motion; when different times, throughout some period however short, are all correlated with the same place, there is rest." _Op. cit._, p. 473.

[137:5] That the scientist still permits himself to teach the people a loose exoteric theory of reality, is proven by Professor Ward's citation of instances in his _Naturalism and Agnosticism_. So eminent a physicist as Lord Kelvin is quoted as follows: "You can imagine particles of something, the thing whose motion const.i.tutes light. This thing we call the luminiferous ether. That is the only substance we are confident of in dynamics. One thing we are sure of, and that is the reality and substantiality of the luminiferous ether." Vol. I, p. 113.

[140:6] Berkeley: _Principles of Human Knowledge_, Introduction. Edition of Fraser, p. 248.

[142:7] The reader who cares to pursue this topic further is referred to the writer's discussion of "_Professor Ward's Philosophy of Science_" in the _Journal of Philosophy, Psychology and Scientific Methods_, Vol. I, No. 13.

PART II

THE SPECIAL PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY

CHAPTER VI

METAPHYSICS AND EPISTEMOLOGY

[Sidenote: The Impossibility of an Absolute Division of the Problem of Philosophy.]

- 55. The stand-point and purpose of the philosopher define his task, but they do not necessarily prearrange the division of it. That the task is a complex one, embracing many subordinate problems which must be treated _seriatim_, is attested both by the breadth of its scope and the variety of the interests from which it may be approached. But this complexity is qualified by the peculiar importance which here attaches to unity. That which lends philosophical quality to any reflection is a steadfast adherence to the ideals of inclusiveness and consistency.

Hence, though the philosopher must of necessity occupy himself with subordinate problems, these cannot be completely isolated from one another, and solved successively. Perspective is his most indispensable requisite, and he has solved no problem finally until he has provided for the solution of all. His own peculiar conceptions are those which _order_ experience, and reconcile such aspects of it as other interests have distinguished. Hence the compatibility of any idea with all other ideas is the prime test of its philosophical sufficiency. On these grounds it may confidently be a.s.serted that the work of philosophy cannot be a.s.signed by the piece to different specialists, and then a.s.sembled. There are no special philosophical problems which can be finally solved upon their own merits. Indeed, such problems could never even be named, for in their discreteness they would cease to be philosophical.

The case of _metaphysics_ and _epistemology_ affords an excellent ill.u.s.tration. The former of these is commonly defined as the theory of reality or of first principles, the latter as the theory of knowledge.

But the most distinctive philosophical movement of the nineteenth century issues from the idea that knowing and being are identical.[150:1] The prime reality is defined as a knowing mind, and the terms of reality are interpreted as terms of a cognitive process.

Ideas and logical principles _const.i.tute_ the world. It is evident that in this Hegelian philosophy epistemology embraces metaphysics. In defining the relations of knowledge to its object, one has already defined one's fundamental philosophical conception, while _logic_, as the science of the universal necessities of thought, will embrace the first principles of reality. Now, were one to divide and arrange the problems of philosophy upon this basis, it is evident that one would not have deduced the arrangement from the general problem of philosophy, but from a single attempted solution of that problem. It might serve as an exposition of Hegel, but not as a general philosophical programme.

Another case in point is provided by the present-day interest in what is called "_pragmatism_."[151:2] This doctrine is historically connected with Kant's principle of the "primacy of the practical reason," in which he maintained that the consciousness of duty is a profounder though less scientific insight than the knowledge of objects. The current doctrine maintains that thought with its fruits is an expression of interest, and that the will which evinces and realizes such an interest is more original and significant than that which the thinking defines. Such a view attaches a peculiar importance to the springs of conduct, and in its more systematic development[152:3] has regarded _ethics_ as the true propaedeutic and proof of philosophy. But to make ethics the key-stone of the arch, is to define a special philosophical system; for it is the very problem of philosophy to dispose the parts of knowledge with a view to systematic construction. The relation of the provinces of metaphysics, epistemology, logic, and ethics cannot, then, be defined without entering these provinces and answering the questions proper to them.

[Sidenote: The Dependence of the Order of Philosophical Problems upon the Initial Interest.]

- 56. Since the above terms exist, however, there can be no doubt but that important divisions within the general aim of philosophy have actually been made. The inevitableness of it appears in the variety of the sources from which that aim may spring. The point of departure will always determine the emphasis and the application which the philosophy receives. If philosophy be needed to supplement more special interests, it will receive a particular character from whatever interest it so supplements. He who approaches it from a definite stand-point will find in it primarily an interpretation of that stand-point.

[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Interpretation of Life.]

- 57. There are two sources of the philosophical aim, which are perennial in their human significance. He, firstly, who begins with the demands of life and its ideals, looks to philosophy for a reconciliation of these with the orderly procedure of nature. His philosophy will receive its form from its illumination of life, and it will be an ethical or religious philosophy. Spinoza, the great seventeenth-century philosopher who justified mysticism after the manner of mathematics,[153:4] displays this temper in his philosophy:

"After experience had taught me that all the usual surroundings of social life are vain and futile; seeing that none of the objects of my fears contained in themselves anything either good or bad, except in so far as the mind is affected by them, I finally resolved to inquire whether there might be some real good having power to communicate itself, which would affect the mind singly, to the exclusion of all else: whether, in fact, there might be anything of which the discovery and attainment would enable me to enjoy continuous, supreme, and unending happiness."[153:5]

In pursuance of this aim, though he deals with the problem of being in the rigorous logical fashion of his day, the final words of his great work are, "Of Human Freedom":

"Whereas the wise man, in so far as he is regarded as such, is scarcely at all disturbed in spirit, but, being conscious of himself, and of G.o.d, and of things, by a certain eternal necessity, never ceases to be, but always possesses true acquiescence of his spirit. If the way which I have pointed out as leading to this result seems exceedingly hard, it may nevertheless be discovered. Needs must it be hard, since it is so seldom found. How would it be possible if salvation were ready to our hand, and could without great labor be found, that it should be by almost all men neglected? But all things excellent are as difficult as they are rare."[154:6]

[Sidenote: Philosophy as the Extension of Science.]

- 58. On the other hand, one who looks to philosophy for the extension and correction of scientific knowledge will be primarily interested in the philosophical definition of ultimate conceptions, and in the method wherewith such a definition is obtained. Thus the philosophy of the scientist will tend to be logical and metaphysical. Such is the case with Descartes and Leibniz, who are nevertheless intimately related to Spinoza in the historical development of philosophy.

"Several years have now elapsed," says the former, "since I first became aware that I had accepted, even from my youth, many false opinions for true, and that consequently what I afterward based on such principles was highly doubtful; and from that time I was convinced of the necessity of undertaking once in my life to rid myself of all the opinions I had adopted, and of commencing anew the work of building from the foundation, if I desired to establish a firm and abiding superstructure in the sciences."[155:7]

Leibniz's mind was more predominantly logical even than Descartes's. He sought in philosophy a supreme intellectual synthesis, a science of the universe.

"Although," he says retrospectively, "I am one of those who have worked much at mathematics, I have none the less meditated upon philosophy from my youth up; for it always seemed to me that there was a possibility of establishing something solid in philosophy by clear demonstrations. . . .

I perceived, after much meditation, that it is impossible to find the _principles of a real unity_ in matter alone, or in that which is only pa.s.sive, since it is nothing but a collection or aggregation of parts _ad infinitum_."[155:8]

[Sidenote: The Historical Differentiation of the Philosophical Problem.]

- 59. Though these types are peculiarly representative, they are by no means exhaustive. There are as many possibilities of emphasis as there are incentives to philosophical reflection. It is not possible to exhaust the aspects of experience which may serve as bases from which such thought may issue, and to which, after its synthetic insight, it may return. But it is evident that such divisions of philosophy represent in their order, and in the sharpness with which they are sundered, the intellectual autobiography of the individual philosopher.

There is but one method by which that which is peculiar either to the individual, or to the special position which he adopts, may be eliminated. Though it is impossible to tabulate the empty programme of philosophy, we may name certain special problems that have appeared _in its history_. Since this history comprehends the activities of many individuals, a general validity attaches to it. There has been, moreover, a certain periodicity in the emergence of these problems, so that it may fairly be claimed for them that they indicate inevitable phases in the development of human reflection upon experience. They represent a normal differentiation of interest which the individual mind, in the course of its own thinking, tends to follow. It is true that it can never be said with a.s.surance that any age is utterly blind to any aspect of experience. This is obviously the case with the practical and theoretical interests which have just been distinguished.

There is no age that does not have some practical consciousness of the world as a whole, nor any which does not seek more or less earnestly to universalize its science. But though it compel us to deal abstractly with historical epochs, there is abundant compensation in the possibility which this method affords of finding the divisions of philosophy in the manifestation of the living philosophical spirit.

[Sidenote: Metaphysics Seeks a Most Fundamental Conception.]

- 60. To Thales, one of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, is commonly awarded the honor of being the founder of European philosophy. If he deserve this distinction, it is on account of the question which he raised, and not on account of the answer which he gave to it. Aristotle informs us that Thales held "water" to be "the material cause of all things."[157:9] This crude theory is evidently due to an interest in the totality of things, an interest which is therefore philosophical. But the interest of this first philosopher has a more definite character. It looks toward the definition in terms of some single conception, of _the const.i.tution_ of the world. As a child might conceivably think the moon to be made of green cheese, so philosophy in its childhood thinks here of all things as made of water. Water was a well-known substance, possessing well-known predicates. To define all nature in terms of it, was to maintain that in spite of superficial differences, all things have these predicates in common. They are the predicates which qualify for reality, and compose a community of nature from which all the individual objects and events of nature arise. The successors of Thales were evidently dissatisfied with his fundamental conception, because of its lack of generality. They seized upon vaguer substances like air and fire, for the very definiteness of the nature of water forbids the identification of other substances with it. But what is so obviously true of water is scarcely less true of air and fire; and it appeared at length that only a substance possessing the most general characters of body, such as shape, size, and mobility, could be thought as truly primeval and universal. In this wise a conception like our modern physical conception of matter came at length into vogue. Now the problem of which these were all tentative solutions is, in general, the problem of _metaphysics_; although this term belongs to a later era, arising only from the accidental place of the discussion of first principles _after physics_ in the system of Aristotle. _The attempt to secure a most fundamental conception which attaches some definite meaning to the reality including and informing every particular thing, is metaphysics._