The Romans, ever since their treaty with the Carthaginians, had behaved towards them with great justice and moderation. A slight quarrel, on account of some Roman merchants who were seized at Carthage for having supplied the enemy with provisions, had embroiled them a little. But these merchants being restored on the first complaint made to the senate of Carthage; the Romans, who prided themselves upon their justice and generosity on all occasions, made the Carthaginians a return of their former friendship; served them to the utmost of their power; forbade their merchants to furnish any other nation with provisions; and even refused to listen to the proposals made by the Sardinian rebels, when invited by them to take possession of the island.

But these scruples and delicacy wore off by degrees; and Caesar's advantageous testimony (in Sall.u.s.t) of their honesty and plain-dealing, could not with any propriety be applied here:(703) "Although," says he, "in all the Punic wars, the Carthaginians, both in peace and during truces, had committed a number of detestable actions, the Romans could never (how inviting soever the opportunity might be) be prevailed upon to retaliate such usage; being more attentive to their own glory, than to the revenge they might have justly taken on such perfidious enemies."

(M116) The mercenaries, who, as was observed, had retired into Italy, brought the Romans at last to the resolution of sailing over into Sardinia, to render themselves masters of it. The Carthaginians were deeply afflicted at the news, upon pretence that they had a more just t.i.tle to Sardinia than the Romans; they therefore put themselves in a posture to take a speedy and just revenge on those who had excited the people of that island to take up arms against them. But the Romans, pretending that these preparations were made not against Sardinia but their state, declared war against the Carthaginians. The latter, quite exhausted in every respect, and scarce beginning to breathe, were in no condition to sustain a war. The necessity of the times was therefore to be complied with, and they were forced to yield to a more powerful rival. A fresh treaty was thereupon made, by which they gave up Sardinia to the Romans; and obliged themselves to a new payment of twelve hundred talents, to keep off the war with which they were menaced. This injustice of the Romans was the true cause of the second Punic war, as will appear in the sequel.

_The second Punic War._(704)-The second Punic war, which I am now going to relate, is one of the most memorable recorded in history, and most worthy the attention of an inquisitive reader; whether we consider the boldness of the enterprises; the wisdom employed in the execution; the obstinate efforts of two rival nations, and the ready resources they found in their lowest ebb of fortune; the variety of uncommon events, and the uncertain issue of so long and b.l.o.o.d.y a war; or lastly, the a.s.semblage of the most perfect models in every kind of merit; and the most instructive lessons that occur in history, either with regard to war, policy, or government.

Never did two more powerful, or at least more warlike, states or nations make war against each other; and never had these in question seen themselves raised to a more exalted pitch of power and glory. Rome and Carthage were, doubtless, at that time, the two first states of the world.

Having already tried their strength in the first Punic war, and thereby made an essay of each other's power, they knew perfectly well what either could do. In this second war, the fate of arms was so equally balanced, and the success so intermixed with vicissitudes and varieties, that that party triumphed which had been most in danger of being ruined. Great as the forces of these two nations were, it may almost be said, that their mutual hatred was still greater. The Romans, on one side, could not without indignation see the vanquished presuming to attack them; and the Carthaginians, on the other, were exasperated at the equally rapacious and harsh treatment which they pretended to have received from the victor.

The plan which I have laid down does not permit me to enter into an exact detail of this war, whereof Italy, Sicily, Spain, and Africa, were the several seats; and which has a still closer connection with the Roman history than with that I am now writing. I shall confine myself therefore, princ.i.p.ally, to such transactions as relate to the Carthaginians: and endeavour, as far as I am able, to give my reader an idea of the genius and character of Hannibal, who perhaps was the greatest warrior that antiquity has to boast of.

_The remote and more immediate Causes of the second Punic War._-Before I come to speak of the declaration of war betwixt the Romans and Carthaginians, I think it necessary to explain the true causes of it; and to point out by what steps this rupture, betwixt these two nations, was so long preparing, before it openly broke out.

That man would be grossly mistaken, says Polybius,(705) who should look upon the taking of Saguntum by Hannibal as the true cause of the second Punic war. The regret of the Carthaginians for having so tamely given up Sicily, by the treaty which terminated the first Punic war; the injustice and violence of the Romans, who took advantage of the troubles excited in Africa, to dispossess the Carthaginians of Sardinia, and to impose a new tribute on them; and the success and conquests of the latter in Spain; these were the true causes of the violation of the treaty, as Livy(706) (agreeing here with Polybius) insinuates in few words, in the beginning of his history of the second Punic war.

And indeed Hamilcar, surnamed Barca, was highly exasperated on account of the last treaty, which the necessity of the times had compelled the Carthaginians to submit to; and he therefore meditated the design of taking just, though distant measures, for breaking it on the first favourable opportunity that should offer.

When the troubles of Africa were appeased, he was sent upon an expedition against the Numidians;(707) in which, giving fresh proofs of his courage and abilities, his merit raised him to the command of the army which was to act in Spain. Hannibal, his son, at that time but nine years of age, begged with the utmost importunity to attend him on this occasion;(708) and for that purpose employed all the soothing arts so common to children of his age, and which have so much power over a tender father. Hamilcar could not refuse him; and after having made him swear upon the altars, that he would declare himself an enemy to the Romans as soon as age would allow him to do it, he took his son with him.

Hamilcar possessed all the qualities which const.i.tute the great general.

To an invincible courage, and the most consummate prudence, he added a most engaging and insinuating behaviour. He subdued, in a very short time, the greatest part of the nations of Spain, either by the terror of his arms or his engaging conduct; and after enjoying the command there nine years, came to an end worthy his exalted character, dying gloriously in arms for the cause of his country.

(M117) The Carthaginians appointed Asdrubal, his son-in-law, to succeed him.(709) This general, to strengthen his footing in the country, built a city, which, by the advantage of its situation, the commodiousness of its harbour, its fortifications, and opulence occasioned by its great commerce, became one of the most considerable cities in the world. It was called New Carthage, and is at this day known by the name of Carthagena.

From the several steps of these two great generals, it was easy to perceive that they were meditating some mighty design which they had always in view, and laid their schemes at a great distance for the putting it in execution. The Romans were sensible of this, and reproached themselves for their indolence and torpor, which had thrown them into a kind of lethargy; at a time that the enemy were rapidly pursuing their victories in Spain, which might one day be turned against them. They would have been very well pleased to attack them by open force, and to wrest their conquests out of their hands; but the fear of another (not less formidable) enemy, the Gauls, whom they expected shortly to see at their very gates, kept them from showing their resentment. They therefore had recourse to negotiations; and concluded a treaty with Asdrubal, in which, without taking any notice of the rest of Spain, they contented themselves with introducing an article, by which the Carthaginians were not allowed to make any conquests beyond the Iberus.

Asdrubal, in the mean time, still pushed on his conquests;(710) still, however, taking care not to pa.s.s beyond the limits stipulated by the treaty; but by sparing no endeavours to win the chiefs of the several nations by a courteous and engaging behaviour, he furthered the interests of Carthage still more by persuasive methods than force of arms. But unhappily, after having governed Spain eight years, he was treacherously murdered by a Gaul, who took so barbarous a revenge for a private grudge he bore him.(711)

(M118) Three years before his death, he had written to Carthage, to desire that Hannibal, then twenty-two years of age, might be sent to him.(712) The proposal met with some difficulty, as the senate was divided betwixt two powerful factions, which, from Hamilcar's time, had began to follow opposite views in the administration and affairs of the state. One faction was headed by Hanno, whose birth, merit, and zeal for the public welfare, gave him great influence in the public deliberations. This faction proposed, on every occasion, the concluding of a safe peace, and the preserving the conquests in Spain, as being preferable to the uncertain events of an expensive war, which they foresaw would one day occasion the ruin of Carthage. The other, called the Barcinian faction, because it supported the interests of Barca and his family, had, to the credit and influence which it had long enjoyed in the city, added the reputation which the signal exploits of Hamilcar and Asdrubal had given it; and declared openly for war. When therefore Asdrubal's demand came to be debated in the senate, Hanno represented the danger of sending so early into the field a young man, who already possessed all the haughtiness and imperious temper of his father; and who ought, therefore, rather to be kept a long time, and very carefully, under the eye of the magistrates and the power of the laws, that he might learn obedience, and a modesty which should teach him not to think himself superior to all other men. He concluded with saying, that he feared this spark, which was then kindling, would one day rise to a conflagration. His remonstrances were not heard, so that the Barcinian faction had the superiority, and Hannibal set out for Spain.

The moment of his arrival there, he drew upon himself the eyes of the whole army, who fancied they saw Hamilcar his father revive in him. He seemed to dart the same fire from his eyes; the same martial vigour displayed itself in the air of his countenance, with the same features and engaging carriage. But his personal qualities endeared him still more. He possessed almost every talent that const.i.tutes the great man. His patience in labour was invincible, his temperance was surprising, his courage in the greatest dangers intrepid, and his presence of mind in the heat of battle admirable; and, a still more wonderful circ.u.mstance, his disposition and cast of mind were so flexible, that nature had formed him equally for commanding or obeying; so that it was doubtful whether he was dearer to the soldiers or the generals. He served three campaigns under Asdrubal.

(M119) Upon the death of that general, the suffrages of both the army and people concurred in raising Hannibal to the supreme command.(713) I know not whether it was not even then, or about that time, that the republic, to heighten his influence and authority, appointed him one of its Suffetes, the first dignity of the state, which was sometimes conferred upon generals. It is from Cornelius Nepos(714) that we have borrowed this circ.u.mstance of his life, who, speaking of the praetorship bestowed on Hannibal, upon his return to Carthage, and the conclusion of the peace, says, that this was twenty-two years after he had been nominated king.(715)

The moment he was created general, Hannibal, as if Italy had been allotted to him, and he had even then been appointed to make war upon the Romans, turned secretly his whole views on that side; and lost no time, for fear of being prevented by death, as his father and brother-in-law had been. In Spain he took several strong towns, and conquered many nations: and although the Spaniards greatly exceeded him in the number of forces, (their army amounting to upwards of a hundred thousand men,) yet he chose his time and posts so judiciously, that he entirely defeated them. After this victory, every thing submitted to his arms. But he still forbore laying siege to Saguntum,(716) carefully avoiding every occasion of a rupture with the Romans, till he should have taken every step which he judged necessary for so important an enterprise, pursuant to the advice given him by his father. He applied himself particularly to engage the affections of the citizens and allies, and to gain their confidence, by generously allotting them a large share of the plunder taken from the enemy, and by scrupulously paying them all their arrears:(717) a wise step, which never fails of producing its advantage at a proper season.

The Saguntines, on their side, sensible of the danger with which they were threatened, informed the Romans of the progress of Hannibal's conquests.(718) Upon this, deputies were nominated by the latter, and ordered to go and acquaint themselves with the state of affairs upon the spot; they commanded them also to lay their complaints before Hannibal, if it should be thought proper; and in case he should refuse to do justice, that then they should go directly to Carthage, and make the same complaints.

In the mean time Hannibal laid siege to Saguntum, foreseeing that great advantages would accrue from the taking of this city. He was persuaded, that this would deprive the Romans of all hopes of carrying on the war in Spain; that this new conquest would secure those he had already made; that as no enemy would be left behind him, his march would be more secure and unmolested; that he should find money enough in it for the execution of his designs; that the plunder of the city would inspire his soldiers with greater ardour, and make them follow him with greater cheerfulness; that, lastly, the spoils which he should send to Carthage, would gain him the favour of the citizens. Animated by these motives, he carried on the siege with the utmost vigour. He himself set an example to his troops, was present at all the works, and exposed himself to the greatest dangers.

News was soon carried to Rome that Saguntum was besieged. But the Romans, instead of flying to its relief, lost their time in fruitless debates, and in deputations equally fruitless. Hannibal sent word to the Roman deputies, that he was not at leisure to hear them; they therefore repaired to Carthage, but met with no better reception, the Barcinian faction having prevailed over the complaints of the Romans, and all the remonstrances of Hanno.

During all these voyages and negotiations, the siege was carried on with great vigour. The Saguntines were now reduced to the last extremity, and in want of all things. An accommodation was thereupon proposed; but the conditions on which it was offered appeared so harsh, that the Saguntines could not prevail upon themselves to accept them. Before they gave their final answer, the princ.i.p.al senators, bringing their gold and silver, and that of the public treasury, into the market-place, threw both into a fire lighted for that purpose, and afterwards rushed headlong into it themselves. At the same time, a tower, which had been long a.s.saulted by the battering rams, falling with a dreadful noise, the Carthaginians entered the city by the breach, soon made themselves masters of it, and cut to pieces all the inhabitants who were of age to bear arms. But notwithstanding the fire, the Carthaginians got a very great booty.

Hannibal did not reserve to himself any part of the spoils gained by his victories, but applied them solely to the carrying on his enterprises.

Accordingly, Polybius remarks, that the taking of Saguntum was of service to him, as it awakened the ardour of his soldiers, by the sight of the rich booty which they had just obtained, and by the hopes of more; and it reconciled all the princ.i.p.al persons of Carthage to Hannibal, by the large presents he made to them out of the spoils.

Words could never express the grief and consternation with which the melancholy news of the capture and cruel fate of Saguntum was received at Rome.(719) Compa.s.sion for this unfortunate city, shame for having failed to succour such faithful allies, a just indignation against the Carthaginians, the authors of all these calamities; a strong alarm raised by the successes of Hannibal, whom the Romans fancied they saw already at their gates; all these sentiments caused so violent an emotion, that during the first moments of their agitation, the Romans were unable to come to any resolution, or do any thing but give way to the torrent of their pa.s.sion, and sacrifice floods of tears to the memory of a city which fell the victim of its inviolable fidelity(720) to the Romans, and had been betrayed by their unaccountable indolence and imprudent delays. When they were a little recovered, an a.s.sembly of the people was called, and war was decreed unanimously against the Carthaginians.

_War proclaimed._-That no ceremony might be wanting, deputies were sent to Carthage, to inquire whether Saguntum had been besieged by order of the republic, and if so, to declare war; or, in case this siege had been undertaken solely by the authority of Hannibal, to require that he should be delivered up to the Romans.(721) The deputies perceiving that the senate gave no direct answer to their demands, one of them taking up the folded lappet of his robe, "I bring here," says he, in a haughty tone, "either peace or war; the choice is left to yourselves." The senate answering, that they left the choice to him: "I give you war then," says he, unfolding his robe. "And we," replied the Carthaginians, with the same haughtiness, "as heartily accept it, and are resolved to prosecute it with the same cheerfulness." Such was the beginning of the second Punic war.

If the cause of this war should be ascribed to the taking of Saguntum, the whole blame, says Polybius,(722) lies upon the Carthaginians, who could not, with any colourable pretence, besiege a city that was in alliance with Rome, and, as such, comprehended in the treaty, which forbade either party to make war upon the allies of the other. But, should the origin of this war be traced higher, and carried back to the time when the Carthaginians were dispossessed of Sardinia by the Romans, and a new tribute was so unreasonably imposed on them; it must be confessed, continues Polybius, that the conduct of the Romans is entirely unjustifiable on these two points, as being founded merely on violence and injustice; and that, had the Carthaginians, without having recourse to ambiguous and frivolous pretences, plainly demanded satisfaction upon these two grievances, and, upon their being refused it, had declared war against Rome, in that case, reason and justice had been entirely on their side.

The interval between the conclusion of the first, and the beginning of the second Punic war, was twenty-four years.

(M120) _The Beginning of the Second Punic War._-When war was resolved upon, and proclaimed on both sides, Hannibal, who then was twenty-six or twenty-seven years of age, before he discovered his grand design, thought it inc.u.mbent on him to provide for the security of Spain and Africa.(723) With this view, he marched the forces out of the one into the other, so that the Africans served in Spain and the Spaniards in Africa. He was prompted to this from a persuasion, that these soldiers, being thus at a distance from their respective countries, would be fitter for service; and more firmly attached to him, as they would be a kind of hostages for each other's fidelity. The forces which he left in Africa amounted to about forty thousand men, twelve hundred whereof were cavalry. Those of Spain were something above fifteen thousand, of which two thousand five hundred and fifty were horse. He left the command of the Spanish forces to his brother Asdrubal, with a fleet of about sixty ships to guard the coasts; and, at the same time, gave him the wisest directions for his conduct, whether with regard to the Spaniards or the Romans, in case they should attack him.

Livy observes, that Hannibal, before he set forward on this expedition, went to Cadiz to discharge some vows which he had made to Hercules; and that he engaged himself by new ones, in order to obtain success in the war he was entering upon. Polybius gives us,(724) in few words, a very clear idea of the distance of the several places through which Hannibal was to march in his way to Italy. From New Carthage, whence he set out to the Iberus, were computed two thousand two hundred furlongs.(725)(726) From the Iberus to Emporium, a small maritime town, which separates Spain from the Gauls, according to Strabo,(727) were sixteen hundred furlongs.(728) From Emporium to the pa.s.s of the Rhone, the like s.p.a.ce of sixteen hundred furlongs.(729) From the pa.s.s of the Rhone to the Alps, fourteen hundred furlongs.(730) From the Alps to the plains of Italy, twelve hundred furlongs.(731) Thus from New Carthage to the plains of Italy, were eight thousand furlongs.(732)

Hannibal had long before taken the prudent precaution of acquainting himself with the nature and situation of the places through which he was to pa.s.s;(733) of sounding how the Gauls stood affected to the Romans; of winning over their chiefs, whom he knew to be very greedy of gold, by his bounty to them;(734) and of securing to himself the affection and fidelity of one part of the nations through whose country his march lay. He was not ignorant that the pa.s.sage of the Alps would be attended with great difficulties; but he knew they were not unsurmountable, and that was enough for his purpose.

Hannibal began his march early in the spring, from New Carthage, where he had wintered.(735) His army then consisted of above a hundred thousand men, of which twelve thousand were cavalry, and he had near forty elephants. Having crossed the Iberus, he soon subdued the several nations which opposed him in his march; and lost a considerable part of his army in this expedition. He left Hanno to command all the country lying between the Iberus and the Pyrenean hills, with eleven thousand men, who were appointed to guard the baggage of those that were to follow him. He dismissed the like number, sending them back to their respective countries; thus securing to himself their affection when he should want recruits, and affording to the rest a sure hope that they should be allowed to return whenever they should desire it. He pa.s.sed the Pyrenean hills, and advanced as far as the banks of the Rhone, at the head of fifty thousand foot, and nine thousand horse; a formidable army, but less so from the number than from the valour of the troops that composed it; troops who had served several years in Spain, and learned the art of war, under the ablest captains that Carthage could ever boast.

_Pa.s.sage of the Rhone._-Hannibal, being arrived within about four days'

march from the mouth of the Rhone,(736) attempted to cross it, because the river in this place took up only the breadth of its channel.(737) He bought up all the ship-boats and little vessels he could meet with, of which the inhabitants had a great number, because of their commerce. He likewise built, with great diligence, a prodigious number of boats, little vessels, and rafts. On his arrival, he found the Gauls encamped on the opposite bank, and prepared to dispute the pa.s.sage. There was no possibility of his attacking them in front. He therefore ordered a considerable detachment of his forces, under the command of Hanno, the son of Bomilcar, to pa.s.s the river higher up; and in order to conceal his march, and the design he had in view, from the enemy, he obliged them to set out in the night. All things succeeded as he had planned; and they pa.s.sed the river(738) the next day without the least opposition.

They pa.s.sed the rest of the day in refreshing themselves, and in the night they advanced silently towards the enemy. In the morning, when the signals agreed upon had been given, Hannibal prepared to attempt the pa.s.sage. Part of his horses, completely harnessed, were put into boats, that their riders might, on landing, immediately charge the enemy. The rest of the horses swam over on both sides of the boats, from which one single man held the bridles of three or four. The infantry crossed the river, either on rafts, or in small boats, and in a kind of gondolas, which were only the trunks of trees, which they themselves had made hollow. The great boats were drawn up in a line at the top of the channel, in order to break the force of the waves, and facilitate the pa.s.sage to the rest of the small fleet. When the Gauls saw it advancing on the river, they, according to their custom, uttered dreadful cries and howlings; and clashing their bucklers over their heads, one against the other, let fly a shower of darts. But they were prodigiously astonished, when they heard a great noise behind them, perceived their tents on fire, and saw themselves attacked both in front and rear. They now had no way left to save themselves but by flight, and accordingly retreated to their respective villages. After this, the rest of the troops crossed the river quietly, and without any opposition.

The elephants alone occasioned a great deal of trouble. They were wafted over the next day in the following manner. From the bank of the river was thrown a raft, two hundred feet in length, and fifty in breadth; this was fixed strongly to the banks by large ropes, and quite covered over with earth; so that the elephants, deceived by its appearance, thought themselves upon firm ground. From this first raft they proceeded to a second, which was built in the same form, but only a hundred feet long, and fastened to the former by chains that were easily loosened. The female elephants were put upon the first raft, and the males followed after; and when they were got upon the second raft, it was loosened from the first, and, by the help of small boats, towed to the opposite sh.o.r.e. After this, it was sent back to fetch those which were behind. Some fell into the water, but they at last got safe to sh.o.r.e, and not a single elephant was drowned.

_The March after the Battle of the Rhone._-The two Roman consuls had, in the beginning of the spring, set out for their respective provinces;(739) P. Scipio for Spain with sixty ships, two Roman legions, fourteen thousand foot, and twelve hundred horse of the allies; Tiberius Semp.r.o.nius for Sicily, with a hundred and sixty ships, two legions, sixteen thousand foot, and eighteen hundred horse of the allies. The Roman legion consisted, at that time, of four thousand foot and three hundred horse.

Semp.r.o.nius had made extraordinary preparations at Lilybaeum, a seaport town in Sicily, with the design of crossing over directly into Africa. Scipio was equally confident that he should find Hannibal still in Spain, and make that country the seat of war. But he was greatly astonished, when, on his arrival at Ma.r.s.eilles, advice was brought him, that Hannibal was upon the banks of the Rhone, and preparing to cross it. He then detached three hundred horse, to view the posture of the enemy; and Hannibal detached five hundred Numidian horse for the same purpose; during which, some of his soldiers were employed in wafting over the elephants.

At the same time he gave audience, in the presence of his whole army, to one of the princes of that part of Gaul which is situated near the Po, who a.s.sured him, by an interpreter, in the name of his subjects, that his arrival was impatiently expected; that the Gauls were ready to join him, and march against the Romans, and he himself offered to conduct his army through places where they should meet with a plentiful supply of provisions. When the prince was withdrawn, Hannibal, in a speech to his troops, magnified extremely this deputation from the Gauls; extolled, with just praises, the bravery which his forces had shown hitherto; and exhorted them to sustain, to the last, their reputation and glory. The soldiers inspired with fresh ardour and courage, all at once raised their hands, and declared their readiness to follow whithersoever he should lead the way. Accordingly, he appointed the next day for his march; and, after offering up vows, and making supplications to the G.o.ds for the safety of his troops, he dismissed them; desiring, at the same time, that they would take the necessary refreshments.

Whilst this was doing, the Numidians returned. They had met with, and charged, the Roman detachment: the conflict was very obstinate, and the slaughter great, considering the small number of the combatants. A hundred and sixty of the Romans were left dead upon the spot, and more than two hundred of their enemies. But the honour of this skirmish fell to the Romans; the Numidians having retired and left them the field of battle.

This first action was interpreted as an omen(740) of the fate of the whole war, and seemed to promise success to the Romans, but which, at the same time, would be dearly bought, and strongly contested. On both sides, those who had survived this engagement, and who had been engaged in reconnoitring, returned to inform their respective generals of what they had discovered.

Hannibal, as he had declared, decamped the next day, and crossed through the midst of Gaul, advancing northward; not that this was the shortest way to the Alps, but only, as by leading him from the sea, it prevented his meeting Scipio; and, by that means, favoured the design he had, of marching all his forces into Italy, without having weakened them by a battle.

Though Scipio marched with the utmost expedition, he did not reach the place where Hannibal had pa.s.sed the Rhone, till three days after he had set out from it. Despairing therefore to overtake him, he returned to his fleet, and reimbarked, fully resolved to wait for Hannibal at the foot of the Alps. But, in order that he might not leave Spain defenceless, he sent his brother Cneius thither, with the greatest part of his army, to make head against Asdrubal; and himself set forward immediately for Genoa, with intention to oppose the army which was in Gaul, near the Po, to that of Hannibal.

The latter, after four days' march, arrived at a kind of island, formed by the conflux(741) of two rivers, which unite their streams in this place.

Here he was chosen umpire between two brothers, who disputed their right to the kingdom. He to whom Hannibal decreed it, furnished his whole army with provisions, clothes, and arms. This was the country of the Allobroges, by which name the people were called, who now inhabit the district of Geneva,(742) Vienne, and Gren.o.ble. His march was not much interrupted till he arrived at the Durance, and from thence he reached the foot of the Alps without any opposition.

_The Pa.s.sage of the Alps._-The sight of these mountains, whose tops seemed to touch the skies, and were covered with snow, and where nothing appeared to the eye but a few pitiful cottages, scattered here and there, on the sharp tops of inaccessible rocks; nothing but meagre flocks, almost perished with cold, and hairy men of a savage and fierce aspect; this spectacle, I say, renewed the terror which the distant prospect had raised, and chilled with fear the hearts of the soldiers.(743) When they began to climb up, they perceived the mountaineers, who had seized upon the highest cliffs, and were prepared to oppose their pa.s.sage. They therefore were forced to halt. Had the mountaineers, says Polybius, only lain in ambuscade, and after having suffered Hannibal's troops to entangle themselves in some difficult pa.s.sage, had then charged them on a sudden, the Carthaginian army would have been irrecoverably lost. Hannibal, being informed that they kept those posts only in the daytime, and quitted them in the evening, possessed himself of them by night. The Gauls returning early in the morning, were very much surprised to find their posts in the enemy's hand: but still they were not disheartened. Being used to climb up those rocks, they attacked the Carthaginians who were upon their march, and hara.s.sed them on all sides. The latter were obliged, at one and the same time, to engage with the enemy, and struggle with the ruggedness of the paths of the mountains, where they could hardly stand. But the greatest disorder was caused by the horses and beasts of burden laden with the baggage; who being frighted by the cries and howling of the Gauls, which echoed dreadfully among the mountains, and being sometimes wounded by the mountaineers, came tumbling on the soldiers, and dragged them headlong with them down the precipices which skirted the road. Hannibal, being sensible that the loss of his baggage alone was enough to destroy his army, ran to the a.s.sistance of his troops, who were thus embarra.s.sed; and having put the enemy to flight, continued his march without molestation or danger, and came to a castle, which was the most important fortress in the whole country. He possessed himself of it, and of all the neighbouring villages, in which he found a large quant.i.ty of corn, and cattle sufficient to subsist his army three days.

After a pretty quiet march, the Carthaginians were to encounter a new danger. The Gauls, feigning to take advantage of the misfortunes of their neighbours, who had suffered for opposing the pa.s.sage of Hannibal's troops, came to pay their respects to that general, brought him provisions, offered to be his guides; and left him hostages, as pledges of their fidelity. However, Hannibal placed no great confidence in them. The elephants and horses marched in the front, whilst himself followed with the main body of his foot, keeping a vigilant eye over all. They came at length to a very narrow and rugged pa.s.s, which was commanded by an eminence where the Gauls had placed an ambuscade. These rushing out on a sudden, a.s.sailed the Carthaginians on every side, rolling down stones upon them of a prodigious size. The army would have been entirely routed, had not Hannibal exerted himself in an extraordinary manner to extricate them out of this difficulty.

At last, on the ninth day, they reached the summit of the Alps. Here the army halted two days, to rest and refresh themselves after their fatigue, after which they continued their march. As it was now autumn, a great quant.i.ty of snow had lately fallen, and covered all the roads, which caused a consternation among the troops, and disheartened them very much.

Hannibal perceived it, and halting on a hill from whence there was a prospect of all Italy, he showed them the fruitful plains(744) watered by the river Po, to which they were almost come; adding, that they had but one effort more to make, before they arrived at them. He represented to them, that a battle or two would put a glorious period to their toils, and enrich them for ever, by giving them possession of the capital of the Roman empire. This speech, filled with such pleasing hopes, and enforced by the sight of Italy, inspired the dejected soldiers with fresh vigour and alacrity. They therefore pursued their march. But still the road was more craggy and troublesome than ever; and as they were now on a descent, the difficulty and danger increased. For the ways were narrow, steep, and slippery, in most places; so that the soldiers could neither keep upon their feet as they marched, nor recover themselves when they made a false step, but stumbled, and beat down one another.

They were now come to a worse place than any they had yet met with. This was a path naturally very rugged and craggy, which having been made more so by the late falling in of the earth, terminated in a frightful precipice above a thousand feet deep. Here the cavalry stopped short.

Hannibal, wondering at this sudden halt, ran to the place, and saw that it really would be impossible for the troops to advance. He therefore was for making a circuitous route, but this also was found impracticable. As, upon the old snow, which was grown hard by lying, there was some newly fallen that was of no great depth, the feet, at first, by their sinking into it, found a firm support; but this snow being soon dissolved, by the treading of the foremost troops and beasts of burden, the soldiers marched on nothing but ice, which was so slippery, that they had no firm footing; and where, if they made the least false step, or endeavoured to save themselves with their hands or knees, there were no boughs or roots to catch hold of. Besides this difficulty, the horses, striking their feet forcibly into the ice to keep themselves from falling, could not draw them out again, but were caught as in a gin. They therefore were forced to seek some other expedient.

Hannibal resolved to pitch his camp, and to give his troops some days'

rest on the summit of this hill, which was of a considerable extent; after they should have cleared the ground, and removed all the old as well as the new fallen snow, which was a work of immense labour. He afterwards ordered a path to be cut into the rock itself, and this was carried on with amazing patience and ardour. To open and enlarge this path, all the trees thereabouts were cut down, and piled round the rock; after which fire was set to them. The wind, by good fortune, blowing hard, a fierce flame soon broke out, so that the rock glowed like the very coals with which it was surrounded. Then Hannibal, if Livy may be credited, (for Polybius says nothing of this matter,) caused a great quant.i.ty of vinegar to be poured on the rock,(745) which piercing into the veins of it, that were now cracked by the intense heat of the fire, calcined and softened it. In this manner, taking a large compa.s.s about, in order that the descent might be easier, they cut away along the rock, which opened a free pa.s.sage to the forces, the baggage, and even to the elephants. Four days were employed in this work, during which the beasts of burden were dying with hunger; there being no food for them on these mountains buried under eternal snows. At last they came into cultivated and fruitful spots, which yielded plenty of forage for the horses, and all kinds of food for the soldiers.

_Hannibal enters Italy._-When Hannibal entered into Italy, his army was not near so numerous as when he left Spain, where we have seen it amounted to near sixty thousand men.(746) It had sustained great losses during the march, either in the battles it was forced to fight, or in the pa.s.sage of rivers. At his departure from the Rhone, it still consisted of thirty-eight thousand foot, and above eight thousand horse. The march over the Alps destroyed near half this number; so that Hannibal had now remaining only twelve thousand Africans, eight thousand Spanish foot, and six thousand horse. This account he himself caused to be engraved on a pillar near the promontory called Lacinium. It was five months and a half since his first setting out from New Carthage, including the fortnight he employed in marching over the Alps, when he set up his standards in the plains of the Po, at the entrance of Piedmont. It might then be September.