_Yachting Monthly_]

The escorting flotilla then cruised about in the vicinity of the rendezvous until an incoming convoy appeared. These ships were then taken over from their mid-ocean cruiser guard and escorted back through the danger zone to port, and so the game of war continued until months became years.

All this may sound straightforward and quite simple, but there were difficulties, to say nothing of dangers, which made it a most arduous operation. First came the speed problem. Every merchant ship differed in this important respect, so the speed of the slowest unit became the speed of the entire fleet, and this reduction made an attack by under-water craft much easier of accomplishment. Hence the call for "standard ships," which is a point that should be borne in mind by future generations as a safeguard against blockade. Then came the question of destination, which increased the number of escorting flotillas, and especially ocean cruiser guards, required for a given number of cargo ships. Next there was the loading and unloading to be considered, involving long hours and hard work by the men on the quaysides. This great difficulty was one of the reasons for the formation of docker battalions. Coaling such big fleets by given times caused many grey hairs to appear where otherwise they would not have been. Finally there was the danger of mines having been laid in the fair-ways leading to the port, which necessitated every convoy being met by special vessels to sweep the seas in front of each incoming and outgoing fleet.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 19.--Diagram showing the convoy system.]

All this and more had to be contended with and overcome before each convoy was able to sail. Then danger and difficulty came hand-in-hand.

On a bright morning, with probably a fresh breeze blowing and a choppy sea, the work of the escorting flotilla was easy, but with such climatic conditions the risk of attack was so great in the waters around the coasts that troopships usually left harbour under cover of night. No lights were then allowed, and it will not be difficult for readers to imagine what it meant to be pounding through a black void in a fast-moving destroyer, against, possibly, a heavy head sea, with some twenty or thirty big ships in the darkness and spray around. Thick sea-mists were the cause of endless trouble, for the safety of an invisible fleet depended on the vigilance of a half-blind escort. Winter gales scattered the ships and rendered signals invisible. Attacks came from the most unexpected quarters and often from more than one point of the compa.s.s at the same time. However, relief came at last, on that never-to-be-forgotten morning when Sir David Beatty and his admirals accepted the unconditional surrender of the German fleet and its unsunk submarines.

Were this chapter to end with the foregoing description of the convoy system the reader would not be in possession of the full facts from which to gauge the importance of the work. Something must be said of what was accomplished. First in order of importance came the transport of many millions of soldiers not only from England to France, but also to and from every colony and dominion of the world-wide Empire. By August, 1915, the British navy had transported, across seas infested with submarines and mines, a million men without the loss of a single life or a single troopship.[5] The first Canadian army of 33,000 men crossed the Atlantic in one big fleet of forty liners, under the escort of four cruisers and a battleship, in October, 1914, without accident.

Transports to the number of 60 were required to convey the first Australian army over the 14,000 miles of sea to Europe, and it was while convoying this huge fleet that the cruiser _Sydney_ chased and destroyed the German raider _Emden_. The Russian force which rendered valuable service in France was safely convoyed over the 9000 miles of sea from Dalny to Ma.r.s.eilles. Never once during the four and a half years of war was the supply of food, munitions and reinforcements, or the return of the wounded--to and from the many theatres of land operations--seriously hindered by the German, Austrian or Turkish navies.

Turning to the gigantic task of guarding England's food supply, we find, in one notable case, an example of the good work performed almost daily for nearly five years. Over 4500 merchant ships had been escorted across the North Sea to Scandinavian ports alone before the disaster of 14th October 1917 befell the convoy on that route. On that occasion the anti-submarine escort of three destroyers were intercepted, midway between the Shetland Islands and Norway, by two heavily armed German cruisers. The destroyers fought to the last to save their charges, but unfortunately only three merchant ships succeeded in getting safely away. Five Norwegian ships, three Swedish and one Danish ship were sunk.

From this it will be observed that not only British merchantmen were protected by escorts.

The second attack on the Scandinavian convoy occurred on 12th December.

The escort consisted of two destroyers, the _Partridge_ and _Pellew_, with four armed trawlers. Fortunately the convoy was comparatively a small one, for it was attacked and almost totally destroyed in the North Sea by four of the largest German destroyers. H.M.S. _Pellew_, although badly damaged, succeeded in returning to England.

It may be rightly thought that in both these cases the escorting flotilla was not strong enough, but it should be remembered that if heavier ships had been employed they would have been much less able to cope with a submarine attack. The escort in both cases was purely an anti-submarine defence, and only on the Scandinavian and Netherlands routes was a surface attack at all possible, because all exits from the North Sea were securely closed by the strategic positions occupied by the Grand Fleet and the battle cruiser squadrons, in conjunction with subsidiary fleets at Harwich and extensive mine-fields.

When it became apparent that surface as well as submarine attacks on the North Sea convoys had to be provided against, other means were promptly adopted, and no further disasters occurred.

The strong escort accompanying the transports bringing to Europe the first American army were attacked at night by a submarine, but succeeded in avoiding the torpedoes fired. This was due to the smartness with which the United States warships were manoeuvred. Three subsequent attacks on the same convoy route also failed.

The Report of the War Cabinet for the year 1917 gives some remarkable figures in support of the convoy system. On the Atlantic routes about 90 per cent. of the ships were formed into fleets and escorted. From the inauguration of this system the loss on these routes from all causes was 0.82 per cent., and if all the trade routes to and from the United Kingdom are included, the loss was only 0.58 per cent. With these figures in mind, who will deny that the navy is the surest form of national as well as Imperial insurance?

FOOTNOTE:

[5] When writing of the navy in this connection due praise should be given to the Mercantile Marine, which this war has proved to be a very important part of the _true_ sea power of Great Britain.

CHAPTER X

THE MYSTERIES OF SUBMARINE HUNTING EXPLAINED

WHEN all is said and done, anti-submarine warfare is very like big-game hunting. Success depends entirely on the initiative, skill and resource of the individual hunter. Contrary to general belief, there is, at present, no sovereign remedy for the depredations of under-water craft with their torpedoes and mines. There are, however, several recognised methods of attack and defence employed by surface ships in this newest form of naval warfare.

When the new navy took the seas in 1914-1915, bases were established not only round the coasts of the British Isles, but also in the more distant seas. The princ.i.p.al danger zones were, however, the North Sea, the English Channel, the Irish Sea, the Mediterranean and the eastern portion of the North Atlantic. It was through these waters that every hostile submarine must pa.s.s on its voyage out and home.

This geographical factor restricted the theatre of major operations to some 180,000 square miles of sea. Minor offensive measures might have to be adopted against individual U-boats cruising at long distances from their bases, as actually occurred off the United States coast, but the fact of Germany possessing large submarine bases only along her own North Sea coast, and temporary ones on the Flanders littoral, enabled a concentration of Allied anti-submarine craft to be made in the narrow seas which afforded the only means of entry and exit to and from those bases.

The same may be said of Austria in the Adriatic and of Turkey behind the Dardanelles.

This favourable combination of circ.u.mstances would not occur if (however unthinkable) England, France or the United States were ever to wage a rigorous war against shipping. The large number of oversea naval bases possessed by these Powers would cause every sea to become a danger zone within a few hours of the commencement of hostilities. No effective concentration of hostile surface craft would be possible with the zone of operations spread over the water surface of the entire globe, and if the bases themselves were secured by predominant battle fleets, or numbers of heavily armed monitors, the seas would quickly become impossible for purposes of hostile transport.

This geographical restriction of the German and Austrian danger zones made effective concentration of the Allied anti-submarine fleets and their devices possible. The 180,000 square miles of sea, forming the theatre of major operations, was, on special charts, divided into areas, comprising a few hundred square miles of sea. Each area was given a distinctive number, and a base was established for its own patrol and minesweeping fleet.

The areas themselves were again subdivided on special charts into squares or sections. Each square covered a few leagues of sea and was known by an alphabetical sign. In this way the waters of the submarine danger zone were divided into areas, with their bases and protective fleets, and squares with their respective squadrons or ships.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 20.--Diagram showing division of sea into anti-submarine patrol areas.]

Each square of sea was covered once or twice daily by its own patrol ship or flotilla. Where the danger was less the patrol was not so frequent and the squares were almost indefinite in size, but where the chances of successful operations were exceptional, as in the Straits of Dover, additional offensive measures were employed (see under _Mine Barrages_).

This, then, was the chess-board on which the game of submarine warfare was played. To facilitate communication between the different patrols spread over the squares of sea, wireless was fitted in many ships, and war signal stations were erected on prominent points of land. Each base was able to communicate by wireless with any of its ships out on patrol duty, and was also connected by land-line telegraph, telephone and wireless with _naval centres_.

These latter were head intelligence offices, usually situated at the great bases of the battle fleets. In this way any concentration of hostile surface warships noticed by the patrols (sometimes submarines were employed, especially in the Heligoland Bight) could be communicated in a few minutes to the admirals commanding the Grand Fleet, the Battle Cruiser Squadron or other large fighting organisations.

At the naval centres the movements of hostile submarines were recorded on charts. If, for example, it was reported from a patrol boat that the U16 had torpedoed a ship in square "C," area 41, at 10 A.M. (G.M.T.[6]) on 4th August, and the patrol had arrived on the scene too late to be of any service, a warning could be wirelessed to hundreds of vessels on the seas surrounding the scene of outrage to keep a careful look-out for the U16.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 21.--Diagram showing how an area is covered by patrols. _A_. Unit or flotilla of ships may proceed out from the base on course indicated by arrows _B_, which would be called the "Northern Inner Beat," and return to harbour on course _A_, "Northern Outer Beat."

Other units of ships would simultaneously follow the course _E_. These and adjacent squares of sea would be covered daily by one or more ships of each unit. The southern half of the area would be patrolled in the same way. The "Outer Beat" is shown by the arrows _C_, and the "Inner Beat" by the arrows _D_. The points _+F_ show the possible positions of armed patrols acting independently of any unit or flotilla.]

Subsequently a further message might come to the naval centre that the same submarine had been chasing a merchantman in square "D," "E" or "F"

in the adjoining area. A concentration of fast ships, such as destroyers, M.L.'s or coastal motor boats, could then be made so as to intercept the raider or enclose her in a circle while other vessels hunted her down.

In a like manner important convoys coming down the coast, or entering a danger zone from the open sea, could be met by a local flotilla and escorted to a _rendezvous_ with a flotilla from the adjoining area. In this way they were pa.s.sed through the submarine and mine infested seas to and from their harbour terminus.

Almost the same methods were employed in dealing with the thousands of German mines. But to describe that part of anti-submarine warfare here would be to encroach on the subject of a succeeding chapter.

PATROLS

The _method_ of patrolling the areas and squares of sea was comparatively simple, though the same cannot be said of the actual work.

The lines of patrol were called "beats," and there was usually an "inner" and an "outer" beat for each unit or flotilla of ships. If when a ship (or a unit) reached her allotted square, from which the line of patrol extended, she elected to proceed on the _inner beat_, she would generally accomplish the return journey to the point of departure on the _outer beat_, thus covering her respective zone of patrol, but leaving the exact route to the discretion of the commanding officer. In this way no hostile submarine with a knowledge of the system could be sure of when or where a patrol ship would be met. In the same way it was left to the commander of a flotilla to either divide his ships into pairs, single units, or to maintain them as a h.o.m.ogeneous fleet, so that any combination of hostile submarines could not be made which would be sure of being able to attack a _single_ patrol. Such an enemy combination might encounter a single ship, but it might also walk into the arms of a whole flotilla; or it might attack a single ship only to find itself surrounded by a following fleet.

[Ill.u.s.tration: FIG. 22.--Diagram ill.u.s.trating the operations of a hydrophone flotilla composed of armed motor launches. Each vessel is given a number, and the flotilla proceeds in line-abreast along the course shown by the dotted lines. Each vessel is one mile from the other, and the whole line stops by signal at the point marked with a cross. Hydrophones are put in operation, and after a period of listening the flotilla continues on its course, as no submarine sounds are heard.

The flotilla turns to head south, and a stop is again made to listen on the hydrophones. This time the sound of a hostile submarine is heard by vessel No. 1, bearing S.W. This report is confirmed by vessel No. 2 hearing the same sound, bearing a few degrees farther W. The two bearings _A_ and _B_ are then drawn on a chart, and the point where the two lines cross is the approximate position of the invisible submarine.

The attack with depth charges is then ordered.]

The beats which were most distant from the base were given to the largest ships. This was done because it was often impossible for the more distant patrols to reach a place of shelter before one of the fierce gales which swept the northern seas was upon them. Trawlers, large steam yachts and converted merchantmen were usually employed on squares more than one hundred miles distant from a harbour of refuge, while motor launches kept watch and ward on the seas closer insh.o.r.e.

The duration of patrols varied according to their position. Some lasted three weeks and others only a few days or hours. When the ships returned to their base after a spell at sea they were given a corresponding "rest" in harbour. A three weeks' patrol meant several days'

"stand-off," while a two or three days' patrol ent.i.tled the ship to twenty-four hours in the comparative comfort of a harbour.

It must not be imagined, however, that a stand-off meant entire idleness or thorough rest. There were duties to perform which robbed it of much that it was intended to give. Ships had to be coaled, provisioned, painted or repaired. Engines had to be overhauled, sentries posted ash.o.r.e, a guard to be furnished, and every day one ship in each unit that was in harbour had to be manned and in readiness for emergencies.

HYDROPHONE FLOTILLAS

We now come to the actual methods employed by surface craft when attacking submarines. Although, as previously stated, much was left to individual initiative, there were, nevertheless, certain recognised methods.

Taking as an example the operations of a hydrophone flotilla of armed motor launches, the number of vessels forming the unit was usually five.

When out scouting for the enemy they proceeded in line-abreast for about one sea mile, then stopped their engines and listened on their hydrophones for the noise of a submarine cruising in the vicinity. If nothing was heard the mile-long line of miniature warships advanced another mile and again stopped to listen. This manoeuvre was repeated until one or other of the ships heard the familiar sound of a U-boat.

Nothing might be visible on the surface of the sea, but if this was the case and the noise came up from the ocean depths over the electrified wires of the detector, it was conclusive proof that a submarine was in the near vicinity.