James Adams, who conducted the interview, is also a good friend, and as Washington Bureau Chief of who conducted the interview, is also a good friend, and as Washington Bureau Chief of The Sunday London Times The Sunday London Times is one of the finest writers I know. He writes extensively on U.S. domestic and foreign policy and on such issues as nuclear proliferation and international terrorism. is one of the finest writers I know. He writes extensively on U.S. domestic and foreign policy and on such issues as nuclear proliferation and international terrorism.

James Adams: Tom, Doug, thank you very much for joining me today. Tom, a hallmark of your work is its reality-it's close to the truth, always on the cutting edge of the political scene. You two have chosen China for SSN as the principal antagonist. Do you see China as a threat to the stability of the world today? Tom, Doug, thank you very much for joining me today. Tom, a hallmark of your work is its reality-it's close to the truth, always on the cutting edge of the political scene. You two have chosen China for SSN as the principal antagonist. Do you see China as a threat to the stability of the world today?

Tom Clancy: Well, China is a country that doesn't really know what it wants to be. On the one hand they're trying to develop a free market economy and give their citizens economic freedom. On the other hand we had Tiananmen Square, where they decided that their citizens could have economic freedom, but not political freedom. This is a considerable imbalance. Moreover, in this particular case, we also have the Spratly Islands. There appear to be considerable deposits of oil there. And you'll recall that fourteen years ago that was the reason that Argentina went after the Falkland Islands-the thought that there might be oil there that they could exploit. Even though Argentina is currently self-sufficient in oil. Well, China is a country that doesn't really know what it wants to be. On the one hand they're trying to develop a free market economy and give their citizens economic freedom. On the other hand we had Tiananmen Square, where they decided that their citizens could have economic freedom, but not political freedom. This is a considerable imbalance. Moreover, in this particular case, we also have the Spratly Islands. There appear to be considerable deposits of oil there. And you'll recall that fourteen years ago that was the reason that Argentina went after the Falkland Islands-the thought that there might be oil there that they could exploit. Even though Argentina is currently self-sufficient in oil.

A war of aggression is really nothing much more than a large-scale armed robbery. Is this scenario plausible? I think it's quite plausible. Because nations are greedy. Particularly Marxist nations.

James Adams: Doug, you served out in the Far East as a submariner. Do you agree with that? Was the potential threat posed by China part of the war game that went on when you were out there? Doug, you served out in the Far East as a submariner. Do you agree with that? Was the potential threat posed by China part of the war game that went on when you were out there?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: I was out there in the mid '60s. That was at the time of the Indonesia confrontation, and we didn't really think much about China in those days. I was out there in the mid '60s. That was at the time of the Indonesia confrontation, and we didn't really think much about China in those days.

James Adams: Would you buy the general scenario as seeing China becoming a bigger player on the scene? Would you buy the general scenario as seeing China becoming a bigger player on the scene?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Oh, very much so. And I think this is an extremely good plot. Oh, very much so. And I think this is an extremely good plot.

James Adams: Tom, you talked briefly about the Spratlys. Tell me a bit more about them. We've read a lot about them, and we know that many nations claim them, and I think that China has landed ships on them. And so have other countries. What exactly is the status of those islands? Tom, you talked briefly about the Spratlys. Tell me a bit more about them. We've read a lot about them, and we know that many nations claim them, and I think that China has landed ships on them. And so have other countries. What exactly is the status of those islands?

Tom Clancy: The Spratly Islands are kind of like a dead grandfather with a heck of a big estate. And everybody wants to claim to be the number-one heir. In fact, I think that China's territorial claim to the Spratlys is fictitious. The Spratly Islands are kind of like a dead grandfather with a heck of a big estate. And everybody wants to claim to be the number-one heir. In fact, I think that China's territorial claim to the Spratlys is fictitious.

James Adams: Tenuous at best. Tenuous at best.

Tom Clancy: Especially given their location. But they're such inhospitable pieces of real estate that whoever can get there, plant a flag, and defend it is going to own them. Especially given their location. But they're such inhospitable pieces of real estate that whoever can get there, plant a flag, and defend it is going to own them.

James Adams: And you think that this scenario, where China is an aggressor because of political instability internally, might be a realistic driver in the near future? And you think that this scenario, where China is an aggressor because of political instability internally, might be a realistic driver in the near future?

Tom Clancy: Well, historically, a nation with internal problems will externalize. And nothing draws a country together like an external threat. Or a Well, historically, a nation with internal problems will externalize. And nothing draws a country together like an external threat. Or a perceived perceived external threat. It's the classical method historically to unite a country. external threat. It's the classical method historically to unite a country.

James Adams: Doug, you have tremendous experience in submarines. This is a story about submarines. We're in a post-Cold War world now. We devoted a great deal of energy to dealing with the potential threat from the Soviet submarine fleet. But now we're in a different environment. What do you think is the strategic and tactical role of submarines in the post-Cold War world? Doug, you have tremendous experience in submarines. This is a story about submarines. We're in a post-Cold War world now. We devoted a great deal of energy to dealing with the potential threat from the Soviet submarine fleet. But now we're in a different environment. What do you think is the strategic and tactical role of submarines in the post-Cold War world?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: It ranges right across the spectrum, starting obviously with the major strategic use of a submarine-which is to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. But in this situation, the submarine can be used strategically by taking up a position off an enemy area. Its existence is then made known to the enemy. We had a very good example of that in the '70s when Argentina was making noises about the Falklands. We dispatched an SSN down there, and we told them it was there. And that put off the business for a few years. It ranges right across the spectrum, starting obviously with the major strategic use of a submarine-which is to launch intercontinental ballistic missiles. But in this situation, the submarine can be used strategically by taking up a position off an enemy area. Its existence is then made known to the enemy. We had a very good example of that in the '70s when Argentina was making noises about the Falklands. We dispatched an SSN down there, and we told them it was there. And that put off the business for a few years.

James Adams: But in that particular situation, Argentina had no counter force to combat that. They weren't capable really of dealing with the submarines that we had. That's not the case with China, where they have a pretty extensive anti-submarine warfare capability. But in that particular situation, Argentina had no counter force to combat that. They weren't capable really of dealing with the submarines that we had. That's not the case with China, where they have a pretty extensive anti-submarine warfare capability.

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Well, they have an anti-submarine warfare capability. I don't think you can put it in the same league as the anti-submarine capability of NATO nations or, indeed, of the former Soviet Union. So for the game-and for reality-the technical superiority of the U.S. submarine force far outweighs the capability that China, on its own today, could put against them. Well, they have an anti-submarine warfare capability. I don't think you can put it in the same league as the anti-submarine capability of NATO nations or, indeed, of the former Soviet Union. So for the game-and for reality-the technical superiority of the U.S. submarine force far outweighs the capability that China, on its own today, could put against them.

James Adams: In other words, the submarines that the Americans can field are quieter and faster than the capability of the Chinese to find with their sonars and other technologies. In other words, the submarines that the Americans can field are quieter and faster than the capability of the Chinese to find with their sonars and other technologies.

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Yes. At this stage. But the world always moves on. Yes. At this stage. But the world always moves on.

I think that for the scenario that we're looking at here-which isn't cast in today's technological climate-the American submarines would have a pretty good time against their ASW forces.

James Adams: Tom, do you think that the Chinese Navy would have any realistic chance against the United States? They have a lot of numbers but not much capability, and there's a huge technological gap between the two. Tom, do you think that the Chinese Navy would have any realistic chance against the United States? They have a lot of numbers but not much capability, and there's a huge technological gap between the two.

Tom Clancy: One of the things you have to remember about combat is that it's not really a technical exercise. It's a human exercise, and a psychological exercise. It's not machine against machine, it's person against person. And we all too often overlook that. The difference between a good navy and a bad navy is the quality in the training of its personnel. You know, better to have good men in bad ships than bad men in good ships. If the Chinese decide to make it a national goal to upgrade their Navy-and, of course, they don't really have a Navy; it's the Naval Branch of the People's Liberation Army-but if they decided to really invest some time and money in it to develop the capabilities they need, they could indeed be quite formidable. One of the things you have to remember about combat is that it's not really a technical exercise. It's a human exercise, and a psychological exercise. It's not machine against machine, it's person against person. And we all too often overlook that. The difference between a good navy and a bad navy is the quality in the training of its personnel. You know, better to have good men in bad ships than bad men in good ships. If the Chinese decide to make it a national goal to upgrade their Navy-and, of course, they don't really have a Navy; it's the Naval Branch of the People's Liberation Army-but if they decided to really invest some time and money in it to develop the capabilities they need, they could indeed be quite formidable.

China does have a maritime history that we all too often forget.

James Adams: But they've been trying to upgrade land, sea, and air for some years now. They've invested a lot of money, and a lot of people. But they've not been able to bridge that technological gap between the United States and the NATO forces and what they currently have. They have a lot of things, but can they take that training and that technology and bring them together to make it effective, do you think? But they've been trying to upgrade land, sea, and air for some years now. They've invested a lot of money, and a lot of people. But they've not been able to bridge that technological gap between the United States and the NATO forces and what they currently have. They have a lot of things, but can they take that training and that technology and bring them together to make it effective, do you think?

Tom Clancy: The fundamental power base of any country is its economy. China has a very rapidly growing economy. They're making computers. They're making all manner of products, which can be sold worldwide. If they can do that, they can make damn near anything. The fundamental power base of any country is its economy. China has a very rapidly growing economy. They're making computers. They're making all manner of products, which can be sold worldwide. If they can do that, they can make damn near anything.

James Adams: So do you think that today we treat China with kid gloves that are perhaps inappropriate? Do you see them as a threat, as some people would argue, for the stability of the world? So do you think that today we treat China with kid gloves that are perhaps inappropriate? Do you see them as a threat, as some people would argue, for the stability of the world?

Tom Clancy: I don't know that I would go quite that far. Probably the country at greatest risk from Chinese aggression would be Russia, the former Soviet Union. I don't know that I would go quite that far. Probably the country at greatest risk from Chinese aggression would be Russia, the former Soviet Union.

Do we treat China in a way which causes me difficulty? Yes. When Deng Xiaoping stomped on the demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, we should have done something, for two reasons: First of all, America should not do business with countries that do such things to its own citizens. Moreover, and this is something frequently overlooked, that act was deliberately taken in the knowledge that Bernie Shaw and CNN were filming it-or sending it out live at the time-on global television. They were, indeed, therefore telling the world, "Drop dead. This is the way we do business and if you don't like it, that's too bad." I question the ethics of doing business as usual with a country that is so grossly repressive as the People's Republic of China.

James Adams: Doug, in Doug, in SSN SSN we have a very realistic portrayal of what it's like to be in command of a submarine. Something that you have done. Can you tell me a bit about what sort of training goes in to make a commander? What is looked for, psychologically and in practical terms, in somebody who can deliver? we have a very realistic portrayal of what it's like to be in command of a submarine. Something that you have done. Can you tell me a bit about what sort of training goes in to make a commander? What is looked for, psychologically and in practical terms, in somebody who can deliver?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: First of all, the game is designed to put the player outside the submarine, if you like, to envisage the tactical situation around him in his mind's eye. And to have a pictorial representation of that. That is where the game is unique. Nothing like this has been done before. As for what makes a good submarine commander, that is really almost impossible to quantify properly. First of all, the game is designed to put the player outside the submarine, if you like, to envisage the tactical situation around him in his mind's eye. And to have a pictorial representation of that. That is where the game is unique. Nothing like this has been done before. As for what makes a good submarine commander, that is really almost impossible to quantify properly.

James Adams: You go on a course in England called the Perisher Course, don't you? You go on a course in England called the Perisher Course, don't you?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Oh, yes. Oh, yes.

James Adams: What do they make you do in that course? What do they make you do in that course?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: First of all, there's a big weeding out process before you ever get to that point. Lots of people want to be submariners, but when they get there they find they don't like the way of life or the hours they have to keep. First of all, there's a big weeding out process before you ever get to that point. Lots of people want to be submariners, but when they get there they find they don't like the way of life or the hours they have to keep.

James Adams: What about claustrophobia? What about claustrophobia?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: I've only ever seen one member of a submarine who suffered from claustrophobia. In the main, you just don't experience it. Human beings are very adaptable. By the time what we call in the Royal Navy the submarine Perisher comes along, most people are well imbued into submarines. Then it's a question of whether they've got both the stamina and the mental acuity-the particular ability to remember a tactical picture after having glanced at it only very briefly. With the submarine tossing around, maneuvering all over the place, it's very difficult to still be able to know where the various components of that tactical picture are. I've only ever seen one member of a submarine who suffered from claustrophobia. In the main, you just don't experience it. Human beings are very adaptable. By the time what we call in the Royal Navy the submarine Perisher comes along, most people are well imbued into submarines. Then it's a question of whether they've got both the stamina and the mental acuity-the particular ability to remember a tactical picture after having glanced at it only very briefly. With the submarine tossing around, maneuvering all over the place, it's very difficult to still be able to know where the various components of that tactical picture are.

That is a particular type of spatial awareness although we didn't have that term when I did the course.

James Adams: That is very similar to the effect in That is very similar to the effect in SSN, SSN, where you're having to simulate essentially what the spatial picture looks like. where you're having to simulate essentially what the spatial picture looks like.

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Yes. And the player has got to be able to assimilate the information-which is not coming in as thick and fast as it does on a real submarine, but it's reasonably realistic. If he doesn't assimilate the information, if he can't put things in the right priority order and tackle them in a sensible way, then he will get caught. Yes. And the player has got to be able to assimilate the information-which is not coming in as thick and fast as it does on a real submarine, but it's reasonably realistic. If he doesn't assimilate the information, if he can't put things in the right priority order and tackle them in a sensible way, then he will get caught.

James Adams: Tom, Doug is a good friend of yours and has been for a number of years. You also know a number of American equivalents to Doug. What would you say is the difference between a British and an American submarine commander? Tom, Doug is a good friend of yours and has been for a number of years. You also know a number of American equivalents to Doug. What would you say is the difference between a British and an American submarine commander?

Tom Clancy: I've gotten into a lot of trouble on this. I've gotten into a lot of trouble on this.

Captain Doug Littlejohns: And you could get in trouble here, now. And you could get in trouble here, now.

Tom Clancy: I've been sufficiently propagandized by Doug and a few of his partners in crime in the Royal Navy that I once published an article suggesting that the Royal Navy trained its submarine skippers better than the U.S. Navy did. Which earned me the undying wrath of a certain senior officer in the United States Navy. I've been sufficiently propagandized by Doug and a few of his partners in crime in the Royal Navy that I once published an article suggesting that the Royal Navy trained its submarine skippers better than the U.S. Navy did. Which earned me the undying wrath of a certain senior officer in the United States Navy.

You can argue long and hard about the difference between having a specialist and a generalist. Generally speaking, I think the Royal Navy has a way of developing its officers and identifying its stars. It beats the hell out of them to winnow them out, and then it picks the absolute best of that group to command. It is able to award command at a much younger age than we do in the U.S. Navy.

I think that's a fundamentally healthy thing.

James Adams: So would you say that implies that the British commanders tend to be younger, more aggressive, and have more initiative? Or is it that it merely comes out in a different way? So would you say that implies that the British commanders tend to be younger, more aggressive, and have more initiative? Or is it that it merely comes out in a different way?

Tom Clancy: It's well within the range of personal variances-we have good ones, they have good ones, we have bad ones, they have bad ones. Generally speaking, I would say that their method for advancing their prospective commanding officers is somewhat better than ours. It's well within the range of personal variances-we have good ones, they have good ones, we have bad ones, they have bad ones. Generally speaking, I would say that their method for advancing their prospective commanding officers is somewhat better than ours.

James Adams: Do you agree with that, Doug? Do you agree with that, Doug?

Captain Doug Littlejohns: Yes, I do. I'm not so sure about the "we have bad ones," but I'll let Tom get away with that. Yes, I do. I'm not so sure about the "we have bad ones," but I'll let Tom get away with that.

To go back to something that Tom said earlier, a lot of the technical capability of the U.S. submarines is of higher quality than ours, but somehow or other we manage to achieve the same sort of results. And the two navies work very closely together. Particularly on the submarine front.

James Adams: And what about the Chinese? What do we know about how they train and perform in their navies? Do we have any sense of that really? And what about the Chinese? What do we know about how they train and perform in their navies? Do we have any sense of that really?

Tom Clancy: Well, it's a Communist country, and the Communists do not reward personal initiative ... except by execution. Well, it's a Communist country, and the Communists do not reward personal initiative ... except by execution.

Now, in Communist China, you have the odd situation where they're trying to develop a free market economy without political freedom. And that is ultimately going to fail. Because that doesn't work. But until such time as that happens, we do face a potential adversary, given the fact that they do have the industrial capability to produce just about anything they want, of high enough quality. If they can sell television sets throughout the world, then they can build a nuclear submarine. It's just a matter of quality control. And if they want the oil in the Spratly Islands all that badly, which they probably do, then it's simply a matter of establishing as a national priority to make a Navy which is competitive with the rest of the world. If they decide to do that, they can.