28 Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 27. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 27.

29 Unbeknownst to Tolkachev, the plan was modeled after the CIA's first successful exfiltration of an agent from the USSR three years earlier. Victor Sheymov, a Soviet communications security specialist, and his wife and young daughter were hidden in the back of a van and secretly transported from a site near Leningrad to freedom in May 1980. The daring escape story is told in Unbeknownst to Tolkachev, the plan was modeled after the CIA's first successful exfiltration of an agent from the USSR three years earlier. Victor Sheymov, a Soviet communications security specialist, and his wife and young daughter were hidden in the back of a van and secretly transported from a site near Leningrad to freedom in May 1980. The daring escape story is told in Tower of Secrets Tower of Secrets by Victor Sheymov. Then, an almost identical exfiltration plan was used in the summer of 1985 by MI6 (British Intelligence) to rescue their agent, KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, from inside the USSR. (see: Gordievsky, Oleg, by Victor Sheymov. Then, an almost identical exfiltration plan was used in the summer of 1985 by MI6 (British Intelligence) to rescue their agent, KGB Col. Oleg Gordievsky, from inside the USSR. (see: Gordievsky, Oleg, Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky Next Stop Execution: The Autobiography of Oleg Gordievsky ([London: Macmillan, 1985]).) ([London: Macmillan, 1985]).) 30 Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 33. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 33.

31 Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 5. Royden, "Tolkachev, A Worthy Successor to Penkovsky," 5.

CHAPTER ELEVEN.

1 p.r.o.nounced "See Kay Taw," this operational code name would have no meaning to anyone who had not been briefed on the activity. CK initials referred to the Soviet/East European Division that ran the operation. p.r.o.nounced "See Kay Taw," this operational code name would have no meaning to anyone who had not been briefed on the activity. CK initials referred to the Soviet/East European Division that ran the operation.

2 Jeffrey T. Richelson, Jeffrey T. Richelson, The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology The Wizards of Langley: Inside the CIA's Directorate of Science and Technology (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 239. (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 2001), 239.

3 Ibid., 29. Ibid., 29.

4 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 28. 28.

5 The specialized antennas and broad-spectrum radio monitors used from a listening post continuously searched the airwaves for three reasons: (1) to gain positive intelligence, (2) to monitor police and counterintelligence frequencies to identify levels of surveillance activity, and (3) to spot transmissions that might indicate the presence of hidden listening devices transmitting from within the Emba.s.sy. Once a signal of interest was spotted on the cathode ray display, every effort was made to locate and identify the source and purpose of the transmission. If the signal had intelligence value it would be tagged and recorded, otherwise the monitoring equipment ignored it and continued its search for new and unrecognized signals. The specialized antennas and broad-spectrum radio monitors used from a listening post continuously searched the airwaves for three reasons: (1) to gain positive intelligence, (2) to monitor police and counterintelligence frequencies to identify levels of surveillance activity, and (3) to spot transmissions that might indicate the presence of hidden listening devices transmitting from within the Emba.s.sy. Once a signal of interest was spotted on the cathode ray display, every effort was made to locate and identify the source and purpose of the transmission. If the signal had intelligence value it would be tagged and recorded, otherwise the monitoring equipment ignored it and continued its search for new and unrecognized signals.

6 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 28. 28.

7 Early satellites captured images on film that was jettisoned and recovered as it parachuted to earth. The film was then flown to a facility to be processed and a.n.a.lyzed. Depending on where the film was recovered, the process from satellite to a.n.a.lysis could take a week or longer. Real-time satellites, however, capture images digitally and then transmit them to ground stations where they are relayed back to intelligence headquarters for immediate a.n.a.lysis. Early satellites captured images on film that was jettisoned and recovered as it parachuted to earth. The film was then flown to a facility to be processed and a.n.a.lyzed. Depending on where the film was recovered, the process from satellite to a.n.a.lysis could take a week or longer. Real-time satellites, however, capture images digitally and then transmit them to ground stations where they are relayed back to intelligence headquarters for immediate a.n.a.lysis.

8 OTS designed a new type of "secure room" that improved the confidence of the CIA that their operational discussions were protected from KGB eavesdropping. The special room, including chairs and tables, was constructed entirely of clear plastic to expose any electronic listening devices, or "bugs." In theory, it was comparable to the fictional "cone of silence" from the 1960s television show OTS designed a new type of "secure room" that improved the confidence of the CIA that their operational discussions were protected from KGB eavesdropping. The special room, including chairs and tables, was constructed entirely of clear plastic to expose any electronic listening devices, or "bugs." In theory, it was comparable to the fictional "cone of silence" from the 1960s television show Get Smart Get Smart.

9 Edward Lee Howard was one of the officers who trained on the mock-up site at "The Farm." Edward Lee Howard was one of the officers who trained on the mock-up site at "The Farm."

10 Time in the manhole became an important consideration for every entry. Sufficient time had to be allocated to do the necessary work, but longer times meant greater risk. Time in the manhole became an important consideration for every entry. Sufficient time had to be allocated to do the necessary work, but longer times meant greater risk.

11 See: Polmar and Allen, See: Polmar and Allen, Spy Book, Spy Book, 529. The threat of "tagging" was a genuine concern. The KGB's infamously aggressive program code-named METKA, used a variety of covert tracking substances and techniques, the best-known was dubbed "spy dust." Discovered in the early 1970s, the use of spy dust was made public in the mid-1980s by the U.S. Amba.s.sador to the USSR. The chemical substance, when placed on door handles in cars or on other common objects, allowed the KGB to track those who touched the compound. When a.n.a.lyzed, the mysterious substance was found to be nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD) and luminol. 529. The threat of "tagging" was a genuine concern. The KGB's infamously aggressive program code-named METKA, used a variety of covert tracking substances and techniques, the best-known was dubbed "spy dust." Discovered in the early 1970s, the use of spy dust was made public in the mid-1980s by the U.S. Amba.s.sador to the USSR. The chemical substance, when placed on door handles in cars or on other common objects, allowed the KGB to track those who touched the compound. When a.n.a.lyzed, the mysterious substance was found to be nitrophenyl pentadien (NPPD) and luminol.

12 The capabilities of the counterintelligence services in countries covered by SE Division (USSR, East Germany, and the other Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe) posed increased risks for Agency operations. Case officers required additional training for that environment. The capabilities of the counterintelligence services in countries covered by SE Division (USSR, East Germany, and the other Soviet Bloc countries in Eastern Europe) posed increased risks for Agency operations. Case officers required additional training for that environment.

13 An SDR is a route of travel to the place where an operation will occur, including stops and varied modes of transportation and is selected to reveal surveillance to the case officer without him having to appear to be looking. The security of Moscow operations demanded that the case officer make an absolute determination that he was free of surveillance before conducting the clandestine act. An SDR is a route of travel to the place where an operation will occur, including stops and varied modes of transportation and is selected to reveal surveillance to the case officer without him having to appear to be looking. The security of Moscow operations demanded that the case officer make an absolute determination that he was free of surveillance before conducting the clandestine act.

14 Choke points referred to locations where vehicles or pedestrians are required to merge as they move from one to another area such as the only bridge connecting two sections of a city across a river. Anyone going from one to the other section must cross the bridge. Surveillance teams establish positions at choke points knowing that their target will eventually be compelled to pa.s.s through. Choke points referred to locations where vehicles or pedestrians are required to merge as they move from one to another area such as the only bridge connecting two sections of a city across a river. Anyone going from one to the other section must cross the bridge. Surveillance teams establish positions at choke points knowing that their target will eventually be compelled to pa.s.s through.

15 A "near field" receiver used a specially detuned antenna to ignore any transmission other than those very close to the receiver. A "near field" receiver used a specially detuned antenna to ignore any transmission other than those very close to the receiver.

16 KGB surveillance teams often communicated nonverbally using a series of clicks that were created by "keying their microphones" with the radio control unit carried in their pants or jacket pocket. With this technique they avoided possible detection that might happen if seen speaking into the microphone sewn under the lapel of their surveillance clothing. KGB surveillance teams often communicated nonverbally using a series of clicks that were created by "keying their microphones" with the radio control unit carried in their pants or jacket pocket. With this technique they avoided possible detection that might happen if seen speaking into the microphone sewn under the lapel of their surveillance clothing.

17 According to a former member of the Seventh Directorate, surveillance teams were known as According to a former member of the Seventh Directorate, surveillance teams were known as Naruzhnoye Nablyudeniye Naruzhnoye Nablyudeniye or the "NNs". Two different team configurations were employed depending on the target. For routine surveillance the team consisted of six officers, a team leader, and three cars. For special targets and suspected CIA officers the team was increased to eight officers, a team leader, and three cars. The additional officers were added in case the target was seen in contact with an unknown individual whereby they would detach from the main team and continue to follow the unidentified suspect. or the "NNs". Two different team configurations were employed depending on the target. For routine surveillance the team consisted of six officers, a team leader, and three cars. For special targets and suspected CIA officers the team was increased to eight officers, a team leader, and three cars. The additional officers were added in case the target was seen in contact with an unknown individual whereby they would detach from the main team and continue to follow the unidentified suspect.

18 The Russian clothing const.i.tuted a "light disguise" that affected external changes in appearance such as style and color of clothing and shoes, hats, wigs, beards and moustaches, eyegla.s.ses, walking canes and heel lifts that could be adopted quickly. Light disguises were primarily most effective at a distance. The Russian clothing const.i.tuted a "light disguise" that affected external changes in appearance such as style and color of clothing and shoes, hats, wigs, beards and moustaches, eyegla.s.ses, walking canes and heel lifts that could be adopted quickly. Light disguises were primarily most effective at a distance.

19 Counterintelligence services are usually more interested in identifying the spy than the case officer. Arresting a foreign intelligence officer is less important to the KGB than the opportunity to identify a possible traitor. Counterintelligence services are usually more interested in identifying the spy than the case officer. Arresting a foreign intelligence officer is less important to the KGB than the opportunity to identify a possible traitor.

20 The history of the Penkovsky case is detailed by Schecter and Deriabin in The history of the Penkovsky case is detailed by Schecter and Deriabin in The Spy Who Saved the World. The Spy Who Saved the World.

21 Because one never knew what products might appear in the market from day to day, Soviet women carried an empty bag thinking "perhaps" scarce items would be available. Because one never knew what products might appear in the market from day to day, Soviet women carried an empty bag thinking "perhaps" scarce items would be available.

22 One Moscow chief would not allow officers to use surveillance receivers during their first months in-country. He wanted the officer's observation and detection skills tested and proven lest the technology become a subst.i.tute for awareness and intuitive judgment. One Moscow chief would not allow officers to use surveillance receivers during their first months in-country. He wanted the officer's observation and detection skills tested and proven lest the technology become a subst.i.tute for awareness and intuitive judgment.

23 During Operation GOLD (Berlin, 1955-56) the KGB had protected their underground communications lines by placing them inside airtight cables that had been pressurized with nitrogen gas. Any penetration of the cable would lower the pressure and alert the KGB communication technicians. To overcome this KGB safeguard, the CIA constructed a "tapping chamber" around an underground section of the cable that was pressurized before the cable was opened and the taps placed on the lines. Because the pressure inside the "tapping chamber" was the same as that inside the cable, the alarm did not sound. During Operation GOLD (Berlin, 1955-56) the KGB had protected their underground communications lines by placing them inside airtight cables that had been pressurized with nitrogen gas. Any penetration of the cable would lower the pressure and alert the KGB communication technicians. To overcome this KGB safeguard, the CIA constructed a "tapping chamber" around an underground section of the cable that was pressurized before the cable was opened and the taps placed on the lines. Because the pressure inside the "tapping chamber" was the same as that inside the cable, the alarm did not sound.

24 H. Keith Melton, H. Keith Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War CIA Special Weapons and Equipment: Spy Devices of the Cold War (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1993), 37. A standard 35mm camera loaded with Kodak high-speed-infrared 2481 film and utilizing a flash unit fitted with an infrared filter over the lens (Kodak Wratten gelatin filters nos. 87, 87C, 88A, or 89B) allowed photographs to be taken in complete darkness without betraying the use of the flash. (New York: Sterling Publishing, 1993), 37. A standard 35mm camera loaded with Kodak high-speed-infrared 2481 film and utilizing a flash unit fitted with an infrared filter over the lens (Kodak Wratten gelatin filters nos. 87, 87C, 88A, or 89B) allowed photographs to be taken in complete darkness without betraying the use of the flash.

25 The remote interrogation allowed the CIA to transmit a signal to a transceiver built into CKTAW. It would then automatically reply with a signal indicating the operational status of the unit. The "tamper indicated" signal was sent if the CKTAW device had been tampered with, or compromised. If the CIA officer received this signal (or no signal) after the device was "interrogated," the operation would be aborted. The remote interrogation allowed the CIA to transmit a signal to a transceiver built into CKTAW. It would then automatically reply with a signal indicating the operational status of the unit. The "tamper indicated" signal was sent if the CKTAW device had been tampered with, or compromised. If the CIA officer received this signal (or no signal) after the device was "interrogated," the operation would be aborted.

26 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 29. 29.

27 Ibid., 30. Ibid., 30.

28 During an interview with coauthor Keith Melton in 1997 in Moscow, Vitaly Yurchenko stated that his formal rank was that of a naval Commander, not Colonel. During an interview with coauthor Keith Melton in 1997 in Moscow, Vitaly Yurchenko stated that his formal rank was that of a naval Commander, not Colonel.

29 Ronald Kessler, Ronald Kessler, Escape from the CIA: How the CIA Won and Lost the Most Important KGB Spy Ever to Defect to the U.S. Escape from the CIA: How the CIA Won and Lost the Most Important KGB Spy Ever to Defect to the U.S. (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), 45. (New York: Pocket Books, 1991), 45.

30 Ibid., 47. Ibid., 47.

31 David Wise, David Wise, The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, the CIA Agent Who Betrayed His Country's Secrets and Escaped to Moscow The Spy Who Got Away: The Inside Story of Edward Lee Howard, the CIA Agent Who Betrayed His Country's Secrets and Escaped to Moscow (New York: Random House, 1988), 19. (New York: Random House, 1988), 19.

32 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 83-84. 83-84.

33 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 40. 40.

34 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 83-85. 83-85.

35 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 59. 59.

36 Ibid., 59-60. Ibid., 59-60.

37 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 86. 86.

38 Ibid. Ibid.

39 Ibid. Ibid.

40 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 137. 137.

41 Ibid., 138-139. Ibid., 138-139.

42 Kessler, Kessler, Escape from the CIA, Escape from the CIA, 184. 184.

43 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 186-187. 186-187.

44 Ibid.,188. Ibid.,188.

45 Ibid., 113. Ibid., 113.

46 Ibid., 192. Ibid., 192.

47 Though polygraph examinations are not admissible in court, the FBI uses them routinely as an investigation tool and a way for a suspect to "prove his innocence." Howard, however, had a history of failing polygraph examinations and never considered submitting to the testing. Though polygraph examinations are not admissible in court, the FBI uses them routinely as an investigation tool and a way for a suspect to "prove his innocence." Howard, however, had a history of failing polygraph examinations and never considered submitting to the testing.

48 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 62. 62.

49 Ibid., 199. Ibid., 199.

50 Ibid., 204. Ibid., 204.

51 Ibid., 204-205. Ibid., 204-205.

52 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 115. 115.

53 Wise, Wise, The Spy Who Got Away, The Spy Who Got Away, 213. 213.

54 Bearden and Risen, Bearden and Risen, The Main Enemy, The Main Enemy, 83-85. 83-85.

55 Ibid., 84. Ibid., 84.

56 The CIA later learned that Howard had met Soviet intelligence officers during the fall of 1984 and again during the Spring of 1985. See: The CIA later learned that Howard had met Soviet intelligence officers during the fall of 1984 and again during the Spring of 1985. See: www.nacic.gov/pubs/misc/screen_backgrounds/spy_bios/edward_howard_bio.html.

57 In May 1985, Aldrich H. Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer, began spying for the USSR and also revealed the CKTAW operation. In May 1985, Aldrich H. Ames, a CIA counterintelligence officer, began spying for the USSR and also revealed the CKTAW operation.

58 Nikolai Brusnitsyn, Nikolai Brusnitsyn, Openness and Espionage Openness and Espionage (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1990). Soviet officials gave copies of the article to members of the U.S. delegation the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Geneva. (Moscow: Military Publishing House, 1990). Soviet officials gave copies of the article to members of the U.S. delegation the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks in Geneva.

59 Ibid., 32. Ibid., 32.

60 Kra.s.silnikov, Kra.s.silnikov, The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street Prizraki c Ulitsy Chaykovskogo The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street Prizraki c Ulitsy Chaykovskogo ( (The Phantoms of Tchaikovsky Street) (Moscow: GEYA Iterum, 1999).

61 Ibid., 179-187. Ibid., 179-187.

62 Ibid. Ibid.

CHAPTER TWELVE.

1 "What happens in the field stays in the field" was often repeated and applied, except when the stories were too good not to be retold at Headquarters. These stories became part of OTS's culture and lore. "What happens in the field stays in the field" was often repeated and applied, except when the stories were too good not to be retold at Headquarters. These stories became part of OTS's culture and lore.

2 TDY is a government acronym for "temporary duty" and refers to a.s.signments, usually less than 180 days, away from an employee's home area. TDY is a government acronym for "temporary duty" and refers to a.s.signments, usually less than 180 days, away from an employee's home area.

3 "Tech hotels" were not exclusively the culture of OTS. Officers from the Office of Communications, who managed the Agency's communications networks around the world, earned a similar reputation for knowing where to find cheap rooms. "Tech hotels" were not exclusively the culture of OTS. Officers from the Office of Communications, who managed the Agency's communications networks around the world, earned a similar reputation for knowing where to find cheap rooms.

4 See: U.S. Department of State web page: See: U.S. Department of State web page: moscow.usemba.s.sy.gov/emba.s.sy/emba.s.sy.php?record_id=spaso.

5 Ibid. Ibid.

6 The common listening devices of the time were phone taps or microphones hidden in ceilings and walls and hardwired to a manned listening post. The common listening devices of the time were phone taps or microphones hidden in ceilings and walls and hardwired to a manned listening post.

7 Sanche de Gramont, Sanche de Gramont, The Secret War: The Story of Espionage since World War II The Secret War: The Story of Espionage since World War II (New York: Putnam, 1962), 411. See also U.S. Department of State Web site: (New York: Putnam, 1962), 411. See also U.S. Department of State Web site: moscow.usemba.s.sy.gov/emba.s.sy.

8 George F. Keenan, George F. Keenan, Memoirs: 1925-1950 Memoirs: 1925-1950 (New York: Pantheon, 1967), 189. (New York: Pantheon, 1967), 189.

9 At the time, audio operations that were hardwired were state-of-the-art. In most cases they required only that a microphone be planted, with wires leading away to a nearby listening post. In this way, the listeners were a.s.sured of secure lines and a steady power source from the post or the target building's own power. The unit could be turned off and on at will. It was only later, when technology had developed sufficiently to provide small, reliable transmitters, that "wireless" audio operations came into being. At the time, audio operations that were hardwired were state-of-the-art. In most cases they required only that a microphone be planted, with wires leading away to a nearby listening post. In this way, the listeners were a.s.sured of secure lines and a steady power source from the post or the target building's own power. The unit could be turned off and on at will. It was only later, when technology had developed sufficiently to provide small, reliable transmitters, that "wireless" audio operations came into being.

10 See: See: www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/01/interviews/beria/ for excerpts of an interview with Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenty Beria (chief of the NKVD-the Soviet secret police) who partic.i.p.ated in the eavesdropping operations at Tehran and Yalta. for excerpts of an interview with Sergo Beria, the son of Lavrenty Beria (chief of the NKVD-the Soviet secret police) who partic.i.p.ated in the eavesdropping operations at Tehran and Yalta.

11 Ibid. Ibid.

12 Gary Kern, "How 'Uncle Joe' Bugged FDR," Gary Kern, "How 'Uncle Joe' Bugged FDR," Studies in Intelligence, Studies in Intelligence, Vol. 47:1, 2003, 19-31. Vol. 47:1, 2003, 19-31.

13 Peter Wright, Peter Wright, Spycatcher Spycatcher (New York: Viking, 1987), 20. (New York: Viking, 1987), 20.

14 Ibid. Ibid.

15 Peter Wright, Peter Wright, The Spycatcher's Encyclopedia of Espionage The Spycatcher's Encyclopedia of Espionage (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 238. and (Port Melbourne, Victoria: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 238. and Spycatcher Spycatcher (New York: Dell, 1987), 26, 28-29. (New York: Dell, 1987), 26, 28-29.

16 See: Melton, See: Melton, Ultimate Spy Ultimate Spy (New York: DK, 2002), 104, for a diagram of "the Thing," photos, and a description of its operation. (New York: DK, 2002), 104, for a diagram of "the Thing," photos, and a description of its operation.

17 Wright, Wright, Spycatcher, Spycatcher, 78-79. 78-79.

18 Ibid. Ibid.

19 Wright, Wright, The Spycatcher's Encyclopedia of Espionage The Spycatcher's Encyclopedia of Espionage (Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 212-213. (Port Melbourne, Victoria, Australia: William Heinemann Australia, 1991), 212-213.

20 Albert Glinsky, Albert Glinsky, Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage Theremin: Ether Music and Espionage (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 273. (Urbana and Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 2000), 273.

21 The developer, Soviet scientist Leon Sergeyevich Theremin, first caused the filament inside an incandescent light bulb to resonate as a microphone in 1943 before perfecting the eavesdropping device inside the carved wooden seal in 1945. In 1947 Theremin subsequently developed a system to eavesdrop on foreign emba.s.sies in Moscow using infrared light beams aimed at "points of architectural resonance" such as windowpanes. For this accomplishment he was awarded the Stalin Prize, 1st Cla.s.s, the equivalent at the time to the n.o.bel and Pulitzer Prizes combined. For more on Theremin see: Glinsky, The developer, Soviet scientist Leon Sergeyevich Theremin, first caused the filament inside an incandescent light bulb to resonate as a microphone in 1943 before perfecting the eavesdropping device inside the carved wooden seal in 1945. In 1947 Theremin subsequently developed a system to eavesdrop on foreign emba.s.sies in Moscow using infrared light beams aimed at "points of architectural resonance" such as windowpanes. For this accomplishment he was awarded the Stalin Prize, 1st Cla.s.s, the equivalent at the time to the n.o.bel and Pulitzer Prizes combined. For more on Theremin see: Glinsky, Theremin Theremin.

22 Glinsky, Glinsky, Theremin, Theremin, 263-264. 263-264.

23 "Finds" are systems, components, and devices made and used by a foreign (non-U. S.) intelligence service for clandestine operations and usually returned to the United States for examination and a.n.a.lysis. These include any spy gear such as communications, surveillance, and forgery equipment as well as special weapons and improvised explosives. "Finds" are systems, components, and devices made and used by a foreign (non-U. S.) intelligence service for clandestine operations and usually returned to the United States for examination and a.n.a.lysis. These include any spy gear such as communications, surveillance, and forgery equipment as well as special weapons and improvised explosives.

24 For examples of OSS equipment see: Melton, For examples of OSS equipment see: Melton, OSS Special Weapons & Equipment. OSS Special Weapons & Equipment.

25 Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Michael Riordan and Lillian Hoddeson, Crystal Fire Crystal Fire (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 211-212. (New York: W. W. Norton, 1997), 211-212.

26 "Contractors" is a generic term that describes private sector persons or companies that provide goods and services to the CIA, including OTS. "Contractors" is a generic term that describes private sector persons or companies that provide goods and services to the CIA, including OTS.

27 Audio would be a priority of OTS until 1966 when the audio program was moved to the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO). CITO existed until 2000 when most of its functions were absorbed by the Information Operations Center that drew staff from both the DS&T and the DO. Audio would be a priority of OTS until 1966 when the audio program was moved to the Clandestine Information Technology Office (CITO). CITO existed until 2000 when most of its functions were absorbed by the Information Operations Center that drew staff from both the DS&T and the DO.

28 OTS development or procurement programs usually had a nondescriptive name that served two purposes. First, all of the program's contracts and financial activities would carry the designation to a.s.sure controls, tracking, and audit functions could be performed. Secondly, the names offered a layer of security and compartmentation when programs were being discussed. EARWORT would mean nothing to one not briefed about the name and the activity. To ask, "What does EARWORT mean?" would convey that the individual had not been granted access to the program. OTS development or procurement programs usually had a nondescriptive name that served two purposes. First, all of the program's contracts and financial activities would carry the designation to a.s.sure controls, tracking, and audit functions could be performed. Secondly, the names offered a layer of security and compartmentation when programs were being discussed. EARWORT would mean nothing to one not briefed about the name and the activity. To ask, "What does EARWORT mean?" would convey that the individual had not been granted access to the program.

29 "Listening post" refers to the location, usually a safe house near the location under surveillance, where the covert audio feed is received, recorded and initially evaluated. Listening posts were commonly staffed by speakers of the targets' native language and equipped with headphones, amplifiers, and recorders that would capture the audio of operational relevance. The best of the "transcribers" or "monitors" could also provide cultural and emotional interpretation of the conversations they heard. "Listening post" refers to the location, usually a safe house near the location under surveillance, where the covert audio feed is received, recorded and initially evaluated. Listening posts were commonly staffed by speakers of the targets' native language and equipped with headphones, amplifiers, and recorders that would capture the audio of operational relevance. The best of the "transcribers" or "monitors" could also provide cultural and emotional interpretation of the conversations they heard.

30 All OTS audio operations required submission of a formal "survey" before the operation could commence. The survey included detailed information about the target, purpose, planned operational activities, equipment to be used, and antic.i.p.ated risk level. All OTS audio operations required submission of a formal "survey" before the operation could commence. The survey included detailed information about the target, purpose, planned operational activities, equipment to be used, and antic.i.p.ated risk level.

31 In the 1980s, many advertis.e.m.e.nts would no longer be "blind" and the CIA would be identified as the employer. For an example see: Melton, In the 1980s, many advertis.e.m.e.nts would no longer be "blind" and the CIA would be identified as the employer. For an example see: Melton, CIA Special Weapons and Equipment CIA Special Weapons and Equipment; 45.

32 Despite the many engineering and scientific achievements of TSD and OTS, the "tinkerer" reputation followed the techs. In 1996, more than three decades after Scoville's remark and twenty-three years after OTS had become an office in the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Deputy Director of Operations referred to OTS as "my blue-collar guys" at a DS&T senior staff meeting. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, who was also present, offered no objection to the characterization. Despite the many engineering and scientific achievements of TSD and OTS, the "tinkerer" reputation followed the techs. In 1996, more than three decades after Scoville's remark and twenty-three years after OTS had become an office in the Directorate of Science and Technology, the Deputy Director of Operations referred to OTS as "my blue-collar guys" at a DS&T senior staff meeting. The Deputy Director for Science and Technology, who was also present, offered no objection to the characterization.

33 Something that was "jerry-rigged" meant that it had been cobbled together quickly, usually from available parts; such solutions were often intended for use only in the short term. Something that was "jerry-rigged" meant that it had been cobbled together quickly, usually from available parts; such solutions were often intended for use only in the short term.