Prepaid phone cards, first introduced in the United States in the early 1980s, have grown in popularity as a cost-saving convenience for students, travelers, and spies. Telecard companies began to flourish after telephone company deregulation, when advances in satellite and communications technology created excess system capacities. Rather than allowing their global telecom systems to remain idle, the large carriers sold hundreds of millions of minutes of system usage to Telecard companies for fractions of a cent per minute. Telecard companies resell these minutes (priced at pennies a minute) on phone cards at gas stations, airports, convenience stores, and chain stores in countries around the globe. Each prepaid phone card contains a concealed PIN number and allows the user to call at no additional charge to numbers within authorized countries up to the amount of minutes designated on the card.26 Phone cards provide travelers with an inexpensive means of calling home, but for illicit romances, criminals, and spies they eliminate records of the calls and provide complete anonymity. If a phone card is purchased for cash at a location not under the control of the host counterintelligence service, any call made using the card is anonymous and untraceable.27 Cuban agent Ana Belen Montes used phone cards and digital pagers as part of a covcom system for contact with her handler at the Cuban Mission to the United Nations in New York. To contact Montes, the handler would go to a remote public pay phone in New York City and use a prepaid phone card to dial the number of a digital pager she carried and transmit his message using a three-digit number code. Montes had also been instructed to anonymously purchase a prepaid phone card and proceed to a remote public pay phone in Washington, D.C. She was to enter the phone card's 800 number, touch-tone the card's unique PIN number, and dial a telephone number linked to a digital pager carried by the Cuban intelligence officer posing as a diplomat at the United Nations. With the connection made, Montes would enter a three-digit code to communicate secretly with her handler. Though the CuIS system provided anonymity to the users and the calls were un-traceable, her pattern of activity was alerting to FBI surveillance after she came under suspicion. Montes was known to carry a mobile phone, so there was no legitimate reason for her to seek out a remote pay phone to make a call after receiving a pager message. In this instance the covcom system was technically successful, but failed to mask the existence of the communication to well-trained counterintelligence officers.

Advancements in personal digital a.s.sistants (PDAs) in the late 1990s made it easier for information to be transmitted using SRAC techniques. FBI Special Agent Robert Hanssen, who "retired" from his role as a Russian spy when the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, reactivated himself in 1999 and wanted to incorporate the latest digital technology for his secret communications. In a message to his handlers dated June 8, 2000, Hanssen wrote: .

One of the commercial products currently available is the Palm VII organizer. I have a Palm III, which is actually a fairly capable computer. The VII version comes with wireless Internet capability built in. It can allow the rapid transmission of encrypted messages, which if used on an infrequent basis, could be quite effective in preventing confusions if the existence of the accounts could be appropriately hidden as well as the existence of the devices themselves. Such a device might even serve for rapid transmittal of substantial material in digital form.28 .

Advances in microelectronics and personal computers added to the capabilities and effectiveness of constantly improving covcom systems. Former MI6 officer Richard Tomlinson described a system known as "Garfield the Cat" issued only to long-term and highly trusted British agents in countries such as Russia and South Africa: .

The agent writes a message on a laptop computer, then downloads it into the SRAC transmitter, a small box about the size of a cigarette pack. The receiver is usually mounted in the British Emba.s.sy and continually sends out a low-power interrogation signal. When the agent is close enough, in his car or on foot, his transmitter is triggered and sends the message in a high-speed burst of VHF. The transmitter is disguised as an innocent object. For many years "Garfield" stuffed animals were popular, as their suction feet allowed the agent to stick the transmitter on the side window of his car, giving an extra car signal as he drove past the emba.s.sy.29 .

In 2006, a spokesman for Russia's Federal Counterintelligence Service announced on Moscow television that British diplomats had been photographed servicing an "electronic dead-letter box" hidden inside a fake, hollowed-out rock in a city park. A hidden video camera planted by the FSB photographed two men identified as British diplomats as they attempted to activate their nonworking "rock." Concealed inside the rock were a receiver, transmitter, computer, and power supply designed for secret communication with a Russian agent. To activate it, the agent would secretly input his reports using only the keypad of a standard cell phone or other personal electronic device. Once prepared, the PED was placed in a transmit mode by using a combination of key strokes known only to the agent. The PED would then continuously send out a low-power signal, similar to Bluetooth technology, until it was within the range of the rock. Then, without requiring any additional actions by the agent who was carrying the PED concealed inside his coat pocket, the device would receive a confirming signal from the rock and transmit its encrypted information in a quick burst of energy. If the rock contained any stored messages for the agent, they would automatically be transmitted to his concealed PED.

The clever device updated the SRAC technology developed by OTS more than a quarter century earlier and made it safer. The agent's PED appeared unaltered apart from an undetectable software modification. Even the low-power transmission to and from the PED had a range of only thirty feet, which made it difficult to detect. The agent's handlers transmitted and received stored messages from the rock in a manner identical to that used by the agent. Once the rock had been discovered by the FSB, it was intentionally disabled to lure its caretakers, in this instance MI6 officers posted to Moscow as emba.s.sy staff members, to the rock to make repairs. The FSB announced that following the discovery of the first rock they also found a second rock concealed in a mound of snow at another location.30 Whether using OWVL radio in World War II, scrambled SRAC during the Cold War, or Internet steganography for the war against terrorism, every clandestine covcom system must meet five objectives: * Break the transaction so if one end of the communication is discovered, it should not provide a link to compromise the person at the other end. The message content is secondary to the security of the agent.

* Use the best available physical or electronic hiding techniques. Covcom must always incorporate the most advanced technologies available at the time. Once a covcom system has been identified, the vulnerability of other agents being operated by the same intelligence service increases. The 1996 covcom techniques employed by Cuban agent Gerardo Hernandez and his Miami-based "Wasp" network proved helpful in recognizing similar tradecraft employed by Ana Belen Montes in 2001.31 * Employ strong encryption and ciphers to make the message so difficult to crack that, even if discovered, its contents are protected.

* Remain portable with capability to communicate with a variety of hardware platforms.

* Be backwards- and forwards-compatible, with sufficient flexibility to allow future security improvements to be incorporated while still allowing older communications to be read.

Jim Gosler concludes his essay "The Digital Dimension" in Transforming U.S. Intelligence Transforming U.S. Intelligence with words of reality, caution, and optimism. with words of reality, caution, and optimism.32 In Gosler's view, the reality facing the CIA is that intelligence services-allies and adversaries alike-have incorporated the "digital dimension" into their offensive and defensive operations. The caution for CIA operations is that defending against the sophisticated use of digital technology presents previously unknown and unaddressed gaps in its capabilities. The optimism is that twenty-first-century human and technical operations, when linked and mutually supportive, will solve problems otherwise intractable in either domain. A basis for such optimism can be seen in the history of OTS. The future effectiveness of American intelligence will depend on how well the lessons of that history are applied. In Gosler's view, the reality facing the CIA is that intelligence services-allies and adversaries alike-have incorporated the "digital dimension" into their offensive and defensive operations. The caution for CIA operations is that defending against the sophisticated use of digital technology presents previously unknown and unaddressed gaps in its capabilities. The optimism is that twenty-first-century human and technical operations, when linked and mutually supportive, will solve problems otherwise intractable in either domain. A basis for such optimism can be seen in the history of OTS. The future effectiveness of American intelligence will depend on how well the lessons of that history are applied.

EPILOGUE.An Uncommon Service by Robert Wallace For 50 years OTS [officers] stood ready to serve whenever and wherever America's leaders needed their talents.

-President George W. Bush, letter to CIA, August 24, 2001 John McMahon had more connections to OTS than any other senior CIA officer. In May 1973, he became its first director when TSD was moved from the Directorate of Operations to the Directorate of Science and Technology and renamed. McMahon relied on OTS for technical support as Deputy Director for Operations (1978-1981) and directed the CIA's technical programs as the Deputy Director of Central Intelligence (1981-1985). He was an informal advisor to OTS directors after leaving government service and served as the honorary chairman of the Fiftieth Anniversary Committee.

On September 7, 2001, McMahon addressed an audience of 500 retired and active CIA officers who gathered to celebrate OTS's golden anniversary in the Agency's auditorium. "Technical services [are] driven not just by advances in technology, but more importantly by the innovation of the technical officers to capture the potential of technology and bring it to application in operation," McMahon observed. Turning to how the CIA's operations officers used spy gear, McMahon said he detected a recurring fifty-year pattern: "Build it and they will try it-make it work and they will come back."

McMahon's remarks encompa.s.sed a half century of OTS contributions to clandestine operations. OTS forgers had fabricated doc.u.ments for agents to infiltrate the Soviet Union in the early 1950s and created alias cyber-ident.i.ties for case officers five decades later. OTS chemists made undetectable secret inks when writing was a primary means for clandestine communications, and its electrical engineers seized technology to develop radios whose millisecond transmissions were almost impossible to intercept. OTS psychologists evaluated the motivation and courage of a would-be agent. Mechanical engineers hid audio bugs in lamps to capture private conversations. These were the scientists, engineers, and craftsmen who built America's gadgets and disguises. They bugged emba.s.sies, trained saboteurs, and tracked down terrorists. When an operation went awry, they sat in foreign jails. When others were held hostage, they came to help.

From its beginning, OTS understood that supporting operations was its mission. Whether the operational requirement needed research, development, engineering, production, training, or deployment, OTS acted, driven by a philosophy of unapologetic responsiveness to national security needs. No constraints were placed on the imagination of the Agency's technical wizards. "If we can think it, we can do it. Our boundaries are the limits of what we can imagine, and, sometimes, the laws of physics," said a tech who devoted thirty-five years to OTS. This philosophy of limitless possibility produced an organization of a few thousand technical specialists who gave U.S. intelligence its decisive Cold War technical advantage and continue to equip the CIA for its battle against terrorism.

If not attempted during rush hour, the eight-mile drive from CIA Headquarters in Langley to Capitol Hill takes no more than fifteen minutes. The route, south along the George Washington Parkway across Memorial Bridge and down Const.i.tution Avenue, provides a tourist's view of famed landmarks-the Lincoln Memorial, the Vietnam Memorial, the White House, the Washington Monument, the Jefferson Memorial, and, finally, the Capitol dome.

On such trips, I found myself moved by the familiar yet singular symbolism of these monuments to liberty. I pa.s.sed those landmarks scores of times as Director of OTS to meet with the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. Responsible for congressional oversight of the CIA, these committees needed to know the requirements and problems of Agency components and I was determined that they hear about them firsthand from OTS. The conversations, held in secure rooms in the Hart Senate Building or the south wing of the Capitol, were frank, detailed, and not broadcast by C-SPAN or leaked to the newspapers.

Speaking with members of Congress and their staff, I defended and advocated funding for OTS programs. In some years, I sought survival money for critical capabilities and, under other circ.u.mstances, I made the case for resources to launch programs for new capabilities. I always carried OTS toys to show the latest innovations of the office. These devices were usually small enough to put in my coat pocket and briefcase, yet impressive in ill.u.s.trating the ingenuity and skill of OTS engineers, craftsman, and contractors. The toys might include dead drops or concealments, tiny batteries, prototypes of advanced beacons, or covert communications systems. Customarily, the devices were pa.s.sed among the committee members and their staffs, and each person wanted to examine the component or the gadget up close.

Invariably, the committees were amazed at the small size of the devices and that otherwise ordinary objects had been modified to perform extraordinary clandestine functions. It was not difficult to imagine how Stanley Lovell and other OTS directors similarly captivated Presidents, Senators, or Congressmen with examples of ingenious devices of their era. William Donovan, it was reported, was so proud of the silenced Hi-Standard Hi-Standard pistol produced by Lovell that he demonstrated it for President Roosevelt by firing into a sandbag in the Oval Office while the President talked on the phone. pistol produced by Lovell that he demonstrated it for President Roosevelt by firing into a sandbag in the Oval Office while the President talked on the phone.1 As remarkable as the technological progress of spy gear since World War II and the days of Penkovsky may seem, the impact of digital and materials technology on clandestine operations during my seven years at OTS was revolutionary. Paralleling the technology change was a dramatic shift in the intelligence battlefield from the dominance of a Soviet strategic threat to a demand for tactical intelligence to defeat terrorist plots and disable their weapons. In responding to post-Cold War operational requirements, OTS had adopted digital technologies that radically changed the size and capability of our equipment. By 2001, the seemingly limitless ingenuity of OTS and its contractors made many of the toys I had taken to Committee briefings in 1996 technological antiques.

On my final trip to Congress as Director of OTS in the summer of 2002, I displayed our most advanced tracking and communications equipment. My purpose was to talk about OTS's substantial role in operations against terrorism and al-Qaeda. As the committee members and staff looked over the devices, I pulled from my pocket another item that I believed spoke eloquently to the future of clandestine technical support.

"I fear that my successor OTS directors may no longer be able to show you so many neat gadgets and bugs," I said, as I held up a compact disc purchased at Radio Shack that morning. "I expect this is the spy gear you will be seeing in the future because the most significant espionage equipment will be embedded in software. This disc is spy gear, but it does not have much of a gee-whiz factor. It appears so everyday and common that its importance can be easily overlooked. We will need to learn to communicate to you and the American public that twenty-first-century digital 'spy gadgets' are as necessary as Buster Buster and the T-100 camera were for their time." and the T-100 camera were for their time."

Six years later, that compact disc is already obsolete.Appendix A U.S. Clandestine Services and OTS Organizational Genealogy, 1941-2008 Appendix B Selected Chronology of OTS 1942.

Office of Strategic Services is established with William J. Donovan as Director. OSS establishes Research & Development Branch under Stanley P. Lovell.

1947.

National Security Act establishes CIA.

1951 (September 7) CIA Technical Services Staff (TSS) created under James H. "Trapper" Drum.

1956.

First U-2 reconnaissance flight over Soviet Union.

1959.

Cornerstone laid for CIA Original Headquarters Building at Langley, Virginia.

1960.

First satellite photos of Soviet Union recovered. TSS renamed Technical Services Division (TSD). Three TSD audio techs arrested in Havana.

1961.

Invasion of Cuba by CIA-supported Cuban exiles.

1962.

Seymour Russell appointed Chief, TSD. Oleg Penkovsky arrested. Cuban Missile Crisis.

1963.

TSD audio techs released from Cuban jail.

1966.

Dr. Sidney Gottlieb appointed Chief, TSD. TSD relocated to former CIA Headquarters at 2430 E Street, NW, Washington, D.C.

1973 (May 4) TSD renamed Office of Technical Service and transferred from the Directorate of Operations to the Directorate of Science and Technology.

1975.

President Gerald Ford creates "Commission on CIA Activities within the United States" (Rockefeller Commission).

The Senate establishes a Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities (Church Committee).

1978.

OTS a.s.signed responsibility for all CIA covert communications.

1985.

Cornerstone laid for CIA's New Headquarters Building.

1988.

OTS moves from E Street to CIA's New Headquarters Building.

1989.

Berlin Wall destroyed.

1991.

Collapse of Soviet Union; nation of Russia restored.

1996.

Responsibility for clandestine audio operations transferred from OTS to the Clandestine Information Technology Office.

1997 (September 18) CIA's 50th anniversary. OTS officers honored as CIA Trailblazers.

2001 (September 7) OTS's fiftieth anniversary.

2001 (September 11) Al-Qaeda hijacking of four commercial airliners and terrorist attack on United States.Appendix C Directors of OTS TECHNICAL SERVICES STAFF, 1951-1960.

Col. James H. "Trapper" Drum, September 1951-October 1952 Dr. Willis A. "Gib" Gibbons, October 1952-April 1959 TECHNICAL SERVICES DIVISION, 1960 -1973.

Cornelius V. S. Roosevelt, May 1959-May 1962 Seymour Russell, August 1962-March 1966 Dr. Sidney Gottlieb, March 1966-May 1973 OFFICE OF TECHNICAL SERVICE, 1973 - PRESENT.

John N. McMahon, May 1973-July 1974 David S. Brandwein, July 1974-June 1980 Milton C. "Corley" Wonus, June 1980-July 1984 Peter A. Marino, July 1984-September 1986 Joseph R. Detrani, December 1986-April 1989 Frank R. Anderson, April 1989-May 1991 Robert G. Ruhle, May 1991-April 1994 Robert W. Manners, February 1994-October 1996 James L. Morris, December 1996-March 1997 Patrick L. Meehan, May 1997-October 1998 Robert W. Wallace, December 1998-August 2002 Edward B. Charbonneau, August 2002-June 2003 Lawrence J. Boteler, July 2003-May 2005 Sterling K. Ainsworth, June 2005-June 2006 Anne C. Manganaro, June 2006-PresentAppendix D CIA Trailblazers from OTS The Central Intelligence Agency marked its 50th anniversary on September 18, 1997. As part of that anniversary, the Agency named fifty officers whose actions, example, innovation, or initiative shaped the history of the Agency. Four of these Trailblazers had significant a.s.sociation with Office of Technical Service. Their official citations read as follows: DAVID E. COFFEY.

Service Years: 1968-1995 Mr. Coffey's exceptional ability to solve operational problems with technology culminated in his successful creation and maintenance of an extremely sensitive-but uniquely valuable-covert communications capability. As an overseas Base Chief, his understanding of operational needs and his grasp of technology set him apart as a consummate technical operations officer and manager. His leadership significantly enhanced the integration of technical support into espionage operations. His personal commitment to excellence and teamwork did much to promote cooperative relationships between the Directorate of Science and Technology and the Directorate of Operations.

PAUL L. HOWE.

Service Years: 1956-1987 Mr. Howe engineered the Agency's single greatest advance in operational photography-the ultraminiature camera. His work enabled us to photograph materials under the most difficult operational circ.u.mstances. The value of the intelligence collected solely as a consequence of the availability of this capability is beyond calculation. His intense dedication to advancing the Agency's ability to collect intelligence clandestinely has significantly contributed to the Agency's mission.

JOHN N. McMAHON Service Years: 1951-1986 Starting at the bottom rung of the Agency career ladder, Mr. McMahon had the distinct honor of holding leadership positions in all four Directorates, on the Intelligence Community Staff, and as Deputy Director of Central Intelligence. McMahon demonstrated extraordinary leadership, managerial savvy, decisiveness, and integrity in his many a.s.signments, and was especially effective in dealing with the Agency's senior customers and overseers. His deep understanding of the people and substance of the intelligence profession shaped the morale of CIA's workforce and the high standards of achievement to which they aspire.

ANTONIO J. MENDEZ.

Service Years: 1965-1990 Mr. Mendez is recognized for founding the development and engineering capability in the Agency's operational disguise program. His ideas led to the design and deployment of a series of increasingly sophisticated tools that enabled operations officers to change their appearance convincingly. The application of his skills to one of the Agency's highest-profile and most successful operations earned Mendez an Intelligence Star. His vision and artistic skill had a major impact on the Agency's operational capabilities in hostile environments.Appendix E Pseudonyms of CIA Officers Used George Saxe Operations officer specializing in covert communications in denied areas Operations officer specializing in covert communications in denied areas Ron Duncan Field technical operations officer Field technical operations officer Ken Seacrest Technical officer specializing in denied-area operations Technical officer specializing in denied-area operations Tom Grant An early technical operations officer specializing in audio An early technical operations officer specializing in audio Tom Linn Program manager for battery development Program manager for battery development Stan Parker Chemist specializing in power sources chemistry Chemist specializing in power sources chemistry Martin Lambreth Mechanical and audio specialist Mechanical and audio specialist Kurt Beck Senior audio engineer and program manager Senior audio engineer and program manager Gene Nehring Engineering manager Engineering manager Greg Ford Special-devices engineering manager Special-devices engineering manager Jack Knight Research and development program manager Research and development program manager Pat Jameson Specialist in unconventional warfare and counterterrorist covert action Specialist in unconventional warfare and counterterrorist covert action Bill Parr Special missions officer Special missions officer Brian Lipton Secret-writing chemist Secret-writing chemist John Orkin Electronic and explosive device evaluation engineer Electronic and explosive device evaluation engineer Mark Fairbain Special missions manager Special missions manager Frank Shumway Explosive ordnance and counterterrorism specialist Explosive ordnance and counterterrorism specialistAppendix F Instructions to Decipher the Official Message from the CIA on page xxv Step One: copy the numbers in the CIA message onto a large pad of graph paper, leaving approximately one inch betweens lines. copy the numbers in the CIA message onto a large pad of graph paper, leaving approximately one inch betweens lines.

Step Two: Copy the numbers from the Copy the numbers from the TRIGON TRIGON one-time pad beneath each digit. one-time pad beneath each digit.

Step Three: Subtract the OTP from the "message" using "non-carrying" math. Subtract the OTP from the "message" using "non-carrying" math.

Step Four: Separate the deciphered message into two digit numbers and convert into letters; A-Z are numbered 01 to 26 (A=01, B=02, C=03, D=04, etc.). An X (24) is used to separate sentences. The message begins: Separate the deciphered message into two digit numbers and convert into letters; A-Z are numbered 01 to 26 (A=01, B=02, C=03, D=04, etc.). An X (24) is used to separate sentences. The message begins:

Author's Note: For operational use (but not in the example presented here) the first five-digit group at the top of the left-hand column was designated the "indicator group." The first five-digit group received in the OWVL transmission identified the correct page of the agent's OTP for encryption. After one-time use, the entire page would be destroyed by the agent to protect forever the security of the encrypted communication. For operational use (but not in the example presented here) the first five-digit group at the top of the left-hand column was designated the "indicator group." The first five-digit group received in the OWVL transmission identified the correct page of the agent's OTP for encryption. After one-time use, the entire page would be destroyed by the agent to protect forever the security of the encrypted communication.

If you have deciphered the message successfully, it will be identical to that which appears with the Preface endnotes and you may have the skills needed for a career in the CIA. The authors invite you to learn more at: https://www.cia.gov/careers/index.html.Glossary Access agent- A person who facilitates contact with a target individual or entry into a facility. A person who facilitates contact with a target individual or entry into a facility.

Accommodation address- An address with no obvious connection to an intelligence agency, used for receiving mail containing sensitive material or information. An address with no obvious connection to an intelligence agency, used for receiving mail containing sensitive material or information.

Active concealment- A concealment device camouflaged as an everyday item that functions in accordance to its disguise to add an additional layer of security should the device attract scrutiny. Examples of an active concealment would include a ballpoint pen capable of writing, a flashlight that lights, or a can of shaving cream that dispenses cream. A concealment device camouflaged as an everyday item that functions in accordance to its disguise to add an additional layer of security should the device attract scrutiny. Examples of an active concealment would include a ballpoint pen capable of writing, a flashlight that lights, or a can of shaving cream that dispenses cream.

Active measures- Soviet intelligence term for highly aggressive covert action and propaganda campaigns launched against the West in an attempt to influence foreign policy or create domestic unrest. Active measures, including disinformation campaigns, were aimed at Western and Third World countries, the CIA, U.S. military, and the American public. Soviet intelligence term for highly aggressive covert action and propaganda campaigns launched against the West in an attempt to influence foreign policy or create domestic unrest. Active measures, including disinformation campaigns, were aimed at Western and Third World countries, the CIA, U.S. military, and the American public.

Agent-An individual, typically a foreign national, who works clandestinely for an intelligence service.

Agent in place- An individual employed by one government while providing secrets to another. An individual employed by one government while providing secrets to another.

Alias- A false ident.i.ty used to protect an intelligence officer in the field; it may be as simple as a false identification and phony business cards or as elaborate as an established career substantiated with background details and legitimate doc.u.mentation. A false ident.i.ty used to protect an intelligence officer in the field; it may be as simple as a false identification and phony business cards or as elaborate as an established career substantiated with background details and legitimate doc.u.mentation.

Al-Qaeda- International radical Islamic organization established by Osama bin Laden in 1988 to unite Muslims to fight the West and expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Responsible for the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States and other terrorist bombings throughout the world since the early 1990s. International radical Islamic organization established by Osama bin Laden in 1988 to unite Muslims to fight the West and expel Westerners and non-Muslims from Muslim countries. Responsible for the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States and other terrorist bombings throughout the world since the early 1990s.

Audio-The capture and recording of private conversations by electronic means. Better known as "bugs," audio devices can either be "hardwired" or transmit a signal via radio frequency, or optically using a laser or infrared light.

Bang and burn- CIA slang for personnel and operations involved with explosives, sabotage, and post-blast damage a.s.sessments. CIA slang for personnel and operations involved with explosives, sabotage, and post-blast damage a.s.sessments.

Beacon- A device typically fastened to an object or individual that transmits a radio signal in order to track its location. The technological discipline is called beaconry. A device typically fastened to an object or individual that transmits a radio signal in order to track its location. The technological discipline is called beaconry.

BIGOT list- A list of names of individuals with authorized knowledge of a particularly sensitive intelligence matter. A list of names of individuals with authorized knowledge of a particularly sensitive intelligence matter.

Brush pa.s.s- A brief contact between an agent and case officer during which an exchange of physical material, such as doc.u.ments, film, money, or other items, occurs. A brief contact between an agent and case officer during which an exchange of physical material, such as doc.u.ments, film, money, or other items, occurs.

Car toss- Similar to the brush pa.s.s, the car toss allows an agent and handler to clandestinely exchange physical material by tossing it through, or from, the open window of a car. Similar to the brush pa.s.s, the car toss allows an agent and handler to clandestinely exchange physical material by tossing it through, or from, the open window of a car.

Case-The official record of an intelligence operation.

Case officer (also operations officer) - An intelligence officer responsible for an agent operation; responsibilities may include recruitment, instruction, as well as those of paymaster and personal advisor. An intelligence officer responsible for an agent operation; responsibilities may include recruitment, instruction, as well as those of paymaster and personal advisor.

Central Intelligence Group (CIG) -The CIG, formed in 1946, was the predecessor to the Central Intelligence Agency.

Chief of station (COS) -The officer in charge at a CIA station, usually in a foreign capital.

Clear signal- A radio frequency (RF) transmission that is not masked (disguised) or encrypted. A radio frequency (RF) transmission that is not masked (disguised) or encrypted.

Communicator-An intelligence officer responsible for maintaining and operating communication devices linking field stations with Headquarters.

Compartmentation- A procedure restricting knowledge of a case or operation to a small number of individuals on a "need to know" basis. A procedure restricting knowledge of a case or operation to a small number of individuals on a "need to know" basis.

Concealment device- An object modified or fabricated to contain either a device or intelligence materials for purposes of covert storage, transport, placement within a target, or dead-dropping. An object modified or fabricated to contain either a device or intelligence materials for purposes of covert storage, transport, placement within a target, or dead-dropping.