The cells were still doorless, but the prison was packed far beyond its 4,500-inmate capacity with 6,000 men crowded into the four structures known as the "circulars." Every level of every circular was filled with trash and vermin of every variety, from rats and lice to bedbugs and roaches. Prisoners were on their own to cope with the lack of sanitation that held the potential for disease and infection.

Each cell had a sink and a toilet, but no running water. A tap on the ground floor provided water that, as the three American soon discovered, was undrinkable. Smelling of fish, it could be used for bathing, washing clothing, and flushing the toilets, but not much else. Prisoners hauled this water to their cells in five-gallon buckets. Drinking water was trucked into the facility, and emptied into a cistern from which prisoners carried a gallon or two at a time up to their cells. Conserving water became a fact of life, and prisoners acquired new skills, such as using a single cup of the precious liquid to shave.

Since the toilets did not function properly, the prisoners designated two cells on each tier as communal bathrooms. These toilets frequently clogged, spilling sewage over their rims that eventually worked its way down to the ground floor, creating a half-inch of slimy sc.u.m across the terrazzo floor.

"Talk about stink," said Anderson. "Once in a while they would get some 'volunteers' for clean-up duty. The 'president' of the circular's prisoners was an ex-motorcycle cop that worked for Batista. He was a tall mulatto guy whose job was to control the prison and he would get a couple guys to bring some water up and they'd get a stick, pour water in, stir, and keep repeating until they finally emptied the thing."

Castro's prison held an odd mix of inmates, including many of Cuba's prerevolutionary elite of doctors, lawyers, and businessmen along with Batista loyalists and an American soldier of fortune. These political prisoners were held in circulars different from those that housed common criminals. "Of course there was politics. All the counterrevolutionaries hated the Batista people and vice versa," said Andy. "But they were all in there together."

The inmates received meager rations of food and the bare necessities of life. The lucky ones received care packages supplied by relatives and friends or bought food in the prison commissary. A few who had the financial means bought food from outside restaurants that prison officials would dutifully deliver. However, for those who could not afford to supplement their prison lifestyle with outside resources, existence was often unbearable. The inadequate diet of rice and beans prompted some starving prisoners to sell their beds for additional food. Prisoners who had no paper ripped off pieces of their shirt to clean themselves after using the toilet. Those who lacked the discipline for personal hygiene lived in filth.

The three techs sent collect telegrams to Mario's maid-who had acted as their outside contact when they were in La Cabana-asking for supplies to be sent in. "As a result, we got packages once in a while," remembered Wally. "That's the only way you lived in a Cuban jail. They give you almost nothing. They gave us those Batista military khakis with big P's stenciled on the back, but if you couldn't come up with razor blades, soap, toilet paper, spoons, dishes, and the like, you did without and they couldn't care less."

Eventually the CIA arranged for a private attorney to hire a woman to bring the techs packages from the States. The techs were surprised and encouraged as much by the packaging as the contents, since the type of tape and wrapping used were unmistakably the type used at the TSD warehouse near Washington, D.C. It was a clear signal they had not been forgotten.

"During the time we were in prison, the outside attorney's a.s.sistant continued to arrange to get us occasional packages-and sometimes we'd get a big plastic bag of Mixture No. 79 [pipe tobacco]," explained Wally. "When we saw how the packages were wrapped and sealed, it didn't take a rocket scientist adding up two and two to make four to guess who was packaging this stuff and sending it in. After I was released, a friend told me he was nosing around the warehouse and watched the guys packing supplies like underwear and Tang orange drink for shipment to tech bases around the world. But there was one older man over in the corner working all by himself. He would go over to the line, take some stuff out and put it in a box. My friend asked the guy, 'How come you're not over working with the rest them?' He replied very quietly, 'Don't say anything, what I'm doing is for our boys in Cuba. The others don't know that.'"

Less frequently, the techs received letters, including some from family or TSD colleagues. One letter to Dave included a picture of Mia, a TSD secretary oddly identified as Sally Wilson. In the photo, a male Agency colleague was embracing the woman. The two, who had no known personal a.s.sociation, were pictured walking across a stream. Although Dave thought it a strange photo, he was still happy to see familiar faces. Only after their release did the techs learn S Sally W Wilson was a clue signaling that the photograph contained secret writing and should be soaked in water. "If we had put the picture in water the back would have come off and secret-writing instructions would have appeared," said Andy. "Unfortunately, we audio techs weren't briefed on this type of communication, and didn't pick up on the code. So the attempt to establish a covcom link into the prison using secret writing fizzled."

Searches of cells, called requisa, requisa, were frequent. Following an attempted escape by one of the prisoners, the authorities moved all 1,400 men to the ground floor to stand naked in a semicircle, while their cells were searched. "We were there all day and if you lifted your head up, they made you lie facedown in this gunk on the floor," said Andy. "And people were defecating, taking leaks because we were there for fourteen hours with necks bowed and that was very painful. It got dark and the center tower was lit with what looked like 3,200 bulbs, and that was the only light in the circular. They had all the guards with Czech carbines, a box magazine, and a flip-out bayonet that fit along the stock on the side. The guards, young kids, were nervous, too. All of a sudden, we heard them chamber rounds. The prisoners were tired, and many started crouching. We said we aren't going to cower like that, we're Americans. We were the only three standing, but if they started shooting, we'd be the first to get hit." were frequent. Following an attempted escape by one of the prisoners, the authorities moved all 1,400 men to the ground floor to stand naked in a semicircle, while their cells were searched. "We were there all day and if you lifted your head up, they made you lie facedown in this gunk on the floor," said Andy. "And people were defecating, taking leaks because we were there for fourteen hours with necks bowed and that was very painful. It got dark and the center tower was lit with what looked like 3,200 bulbs, and that was the only light in the circular. They had all the guards with Czech carbines, a box magazine, and a flip-out bayonet that fit along the stock on the side. The guards, young kids, were nervous, too. All of a sudden, we heard them chamber rounds. The prisoners were tired, and many started crouching. We said we aren't going to cower like that, we're Americans. We were the only three standing, but if they started shooting, we'd be the first to get hit."

Riots over food and fights were common. When one hunger strike produced better rations, a second was organized. The response to this second protest was swift. Military personnel with bayonets were brought in and a requisa requisa included throwing the contents of cells down from the tiers to the floor below while trigger-happy guards sent shots ricocheting through the facility to intimidate and control the prisoners. included throwing the contents of cells down from the tiers to the floor below while trigger-happy guards sent shots ricocheting through the facility to intimidate and control the prisoners.29 Suicides, as the three would soon learn, were routine. Prisoners would climb over the railing on the fifth floor and jump to their death. One day, when a newspaper astrologer named Dr. Carbell, who was serving two years for predicting Castro's downfall, started to climb over the railing, Wally and Andy pulled him back to safety. "The Cubans all stepped back because they were afraid of being linked with him. Andy and I moved fast and managed to grab him," recalled Wally. "He was educated somewhere in Europe and spoke with a cultured accent. He was also overweight and filthy as h.e.l.l."

An American soldier of fortune, Richard Allen Pecoraro, had been swept up with anti-Castro plotters. Prison life drove Pecoraro mad; living in filth he huddled alone in his cell. Occasionally Cuban prisoners would come by and poke him with sticks, eliciting an animal growl. The techs befriended Pecoraro, a fellow American, cleaned him up, and brought him into one of their cells. They found a Cuban psychiatrist among the prison population who agreed to a.n.a.lyze the American through an interpreter. Eventually, they were able to get a supply of Valium shipped in from the outside for Pecararo.

The prisoners most acclimated to incarceration were the common thieves. One trick the thieves showed the political prisoners was how to smuggle contraband into the circular. Guards at the prison's front door often slept, and trash was piled up among the high weeds surrounding the structures. With contraband hidden by friends in the weeds just beyond the walls, two prisoners would sneak out and walk around the perimeter of the circular in opposite directions to conduct countersurveillance. From inside a cell, a matchbox propelled via a slingshot-type device fashioned by the prisoners would fall at the feet of one of the men on the outside. He would then pretend to bend down to tie his shoelace and tie the newspaper or other contraband to the line to be reeled in.

To pa.s.s the time, the techs made a Monopoly board and taught fellow prisoners the game. "Wally had a bunch of Cuban friends who regularly came in to use our Monopoly set," remembered Andy. "And one day all the pieces came flying out of the cell and there was a lot of shouting. What happened was, Ernesto, a civil engineer who built the tunnels in downtown Havana, landed where someone had about four hotels. He just exploded, refused to pay the rent, and almost destroyed the set."

Andy fabricated a slide rule from a discarded cigar box and worked on logarithms from an old engineering text he found scattered amid the trash. Then the techs created a radio. Someone in the prison had smuggled in an earpiece and, amid the garbage-strewn jail, they had managed to scrounge up a few Russian-made transistors along with pieces of medical tubing used for intravenous feeding that could be used as additional earpieces. The tuning coil was created by wrapping copper wire around the cardboard cylinder from an empty roll of toilet paper.

A battery to power the radio remained a problem. "A battery is two dissimilar metals and electrolyte. We had copper from wiring that we ripped out of the walls and tin from galvanized pails, but we needed an electrolyte," explained Andy. "So we sent a guy to the hospital claiming he was sick, and he came back with a bottle of copper sulfate to treat the alleged ailment. It's a good thing the guards didn't make him drink it." When the crudely a.s.sembled materials were combined with the copper sulfate, the battery produced enough current to power the radio.

Another problem was the lack of a soldering iron. All the wires in the makeshift radio had to be tightly twisted together for a high-resistance contact. The antenna was another challenge. Consisting of a length of wire several hundred feet long, prisoners managed to undo a section of corrugated roof on the top tier to string the antenna along the outside.

When finally a.s.sembled, the radio could pick up broadcasts from WKWF ("overlooking the beautiful Florida Keys") and a high-powered, 50,000-watt New Orleans station. Among the news items that the techs particularly remembered was Roger Maris. .h.i.tting his sixty-first home run and John Glenn becoming the first American to orbit the earth in s.p.a.ce. "I used to go up to the roof at night for best reception," said Andy. "With those four tubes coming out of the radio, I heard American music for the first time in months."

Because of the constant danger of javios javios-prison snitches-the radio remained a closely guarded secret. Rumors of a radio prompted a requisa, requisa, but the radio itself was never discovered. With communication to the outside world established, the prisoners started an underground prison newspaper. "One of the Cuban prisoners was a radio operator," recalled Wally. "He was skilled at tuning the radio to find just the right sensitive spots. Once he got a station, he and an a.s.sistant, a stenographer who had been a legal secretary, worked with him. They would plug in the earphones and take down the news in shorthand from whatever station could be heard. The next morning, a copy of the handwritten 'newspaper' would be circulated among the prisoners." but the radio itself was never discovered. With communication to the outside world established, the prisoners started an underground prison newspaper. "One of the Cuban prisoners was a radio operator," recalled Wally. "He was skilled at tuning the radio to find just the right sensitive spots. Once he got a station, he and an a.s.sistant, a stenographer who had been a legal secretary, worked with him. They would plug in the earphones and take down the news in shorthand from whatever station could be heard. The next morning, a copy of the handwritten 'newspaper' would be circulated among the prisoners."

On April 14, 1961, the three imprisoned techs went to bed as usual only to be awakened before dawn by the sound of gunfire and tracer rounds from .50 caliber machine-gun fire lighting the building. The invasion by Cuban exiles at the Bay of Pigs had begun. Throughout the winter, rumors of a possible invasion had circulated and now it was happening. The prison burst into chaos as a B-26 from the CIA-trained anti-Castro invasion force flew overhead and, a few days later, on April 17, an invasion force landed on Cuba's western sh.o.r.e at the Bay of Pigs.

Conceived during the Eisenhower administration, the invasion by 1,400 Cuban nationals was launched with the approval of President Kennedy. Originally proposed for an area known as Trinidad, in the shadow of Cuba's Escambray Mountains, the plan called for a relatively small invasion force to spark an uprising among the Cuban population. If the revolt proved unsuccessful, the invading forces would then retreat into the mountains to wage guerilla warfare.

However, in March 1961, Kennedy called the plan too "spectacular" and changed the landing site several times before finally settling on the less than ideal Bay of Pigs, a location surrounded by swamps.30 Then, as the ships carrying the members of the Cuban 2506 a.s.sault Brigade approached the island, President Kennedy called off the scheduled second and third waves of air strikes that would destroy the remaining planes of Cuba's small air force. Then, as the ships carrying the members of the Cuban 2506 a.s.sault Brigade approached the island, President Kennedy called off the scheduled second and third waves of air strikes that would destroy the remaining planes of Cuba's small air force.31 Spared from those strikes, Castro's air force was able to sink the brigade's supply ship, the Spared from those strikes, Castro's air force was able to sink the brigade's supply ship, the Houston Houston. With the invaders unable to establish a beachhead and without resupply or air support, failure was inevitable.

On the second day of fighting, the techs began to notice Cuban militiamen loading boxes into a utility tunnel under circulars three and four. There was no explanation for the activity until the bottom of one of the boxes broke and the prisoners could see it was dynamite. Apparently fearful that a ma.s.s escape would liberate inmates to join the invasion, Castro ordered the prison b.o.o.by-trapped. In the dictator's mind, it was better to bring down the structures, killing all 6,000 men inside, than risk a small army of prisoners marching on Havana.

By April 19, the invasion was defeated. Of the Cubans who landed, 1,189 fighters were captured and a small number escaped back to the sea. When news of the failed a.s.sault eventually reached the prison, no hope was held for a second attempt.32 Nothing more was thought of the dynamite until Thanksgiving Day in 1961 when guards began drilling holes in circulars three and four with jackhammers. Andy and Dave, a.s.signed to work details clearing the debris, watched as crews drilled into the support columns of the two buildings. Nothing more was thought of the dynamite until Thanksgiving Day in 1961 when guards began drilling holes in circulars three and four with jackhammers. Andy and Dave, a.s.signed to work details clearing the debris, watched as crews drilled into the support columns of the two buildings.

After three weeks, with the holes completed, trucks arrived and boxes labeled Mech Explosiva Mech Explosiva (explosive fuse) were unloaded into the holes. More boxes followed, these with TNT stenciled across the side. Judging from the number of cartons, the three Americans estimated that five tons of explosives were now underneath the circulars. Ominously, as the explosives were unloaded, some prisoners received black plastic rings with their prison numbers on them; other inmates were tattooed. Reportedly, this was done to identify bodies if the prison was brought down. Apparently, Castro was still fearful of a prison revolt. (explosive fuse) were unloaded into the holes. More boxes followed, these with TNT stenciled across the side. Judging from the number of cartons, the three Americans estimated that five tons of explosives were now underneath the circulars. Ominously, as the explosives were unloaded, some prisoners received black plastic rings with their prison numbers on them; other inmates were tattooed. Reportedly, this was done to identify bodies if the prison was brought down. Apparently, Castro was still fearful of a prison revolt.

The idea of living in a mined building did not appeal to the techs. As word spread throughout the circulars that the Americans intended to do something, a Cuban prisoner named Miro soon joined them. "Miro recruited two of his buddies-one guy looked like the Michelin tire guy," remembers Wally. "We went to one of the cells on the first floor that was being used as a toilet. Serviceo Serviceo is what they call it in Spanish. You didn't linger there very long, the smell was something awful." is what they call it in Spanish. You didn't linger there very long, the smell was something awful."

With the "Michelin tire man" blocking the view of the guards, two other Cubans worked for four days to enlarge the hole in the floor leading to a utility tunnel where the explosives were emplaced. The team then recruited the smallest prisoner they could find, a fair-skinned Cuban who went by the nickname Americano. Standing just five-foot-five and weighing no more than 120 pounds, Americano was persuaded to squeeze through the small hole for a reconnaissance mission.

Lookouts were posted as the young man slipped into the tunnel one afternoon, instructed to bring back samples of whatever he found. Inside the six-foot-high by eight-foot-wide tunnel, Americano discovered enough explosives to bring the buildings down and two detonation systems, one electrical and the other a long length of primer cord. If one failed, the other could be put into play. The young Cuban also brought out a fifteen-pound block of TNT, which the three Americans told him to return, lest the guards find it missing.

A lieutenant in the Cuban army had headed the installation team and the techs now understood the job had been done well. "He was no dummy. He knew explosives and he knew what to do," said Wally. "They ran the lines from an outbuilding into the circulars with the primer cord encased in plastic tubing and the electrical line through separate tubing. When we understood what he'd done, we were left there scratching our heads. We're sitting on this thing and if it goes bang, we're dead."

Clearly, something had to be done, but it was not a simple matter of cutting both lines. Cutting the primer cord line would likely tip off the guards who would notice the slack at the detonation station. Severing the electrical line could also alert guards if they ran a test current through the system. The trick was to disable both systems without leaving any trace of sabotage. Technically the operation was not difficult. Under normal circ.u.mstances with a TSD tool kit, disabling the bomb would have taken minutes, but the techs only had a few simple knives, sewing kits, and razor blades.

"The electrical line looked like European cable, something like zip cord, AC cord. But it was built differently, the two conductors were a little bit separated," said Wally. "We came up with the idea to cut the plastic and then twist it. And that creates a short-and when you've got a short, it won't go. You try to energize the blasting cap and it won't fire."

The solution the techs devised was the electrical equivalent of putting a very tight knot in a length of garden hose. However, if interrupting the electrical circuit was relatively easy, the primer cord was a much more difficult matter. The Cubans were certain to notice if tension in the cord was released, so severing the line was not an option. The trick would be to create a gap in the primer cord while maintaining tension along its entire length. For this, the techs fashioned a special gadget that comprised a spool from a sewing kit and pins. By first cutting the cord, then inserting each end into the center of the spool, they could hold both ends in place with needles and pins. This would create a gap while maintaining tension along the line.

Because none of the techs was small enough to fit through the hole and any effort to enlarge it further would attract notice of the guards, Americano was again recruited to go back into the utility tunnel for the sabotage mission. Over four nights, working in the techs' cells in semidarkness, Americano trained for the mission. Using a sharp knife, he practiced exposing the wires and shorting out the line before slipping the insulation back over the exposed wires. Then he practiced with the makeshift thread spool and pins. Once in the tunnel, he would have only one chance to perform these acts perfectly and under time restrictions-beginning in the afternoon until just before the evening head count.

When the three Americans felt confident in his ability, Americano slipped into the hole. After a few tense hours, he reemerged and reported to Miro that the mission had been a success but, to the dismay of the techs, word about the operation spread. One prisoner ran up to the Americans thanking them for what they had done. Fortunately, the guards never discovered the sabotage plan or, if they suspected something, did not report it to their superiors. There was no requisa, requisa, the three techs were never questioned, and the sabotaged system remained in place. the three techs were never questioned, and the sabotaged system remained in place.

"If and when they pulled the switch, we felt that would give us about twenty minutes before the guards realized what was happening," said Wally. "Then it became a case of breaking out-how the h.e.l.l are we going to get out of there? Well, some of the Cubans had bars cut and whatever. But how many guys are you going to get out through a small window? Not too many. We'd have to go out through the front door."

Emboldened, the three Americans began thinking of weaponry they could have on hand if things came to a head between the prisoners and the guards. The first idea involved a flamethrower. Wally disa.s.sembled an old kerosene stove and spent four days grinding the bra.s.s valves using marble dust and toothpaste. Ultimately, his efforts came to naught when the stove consistently lost the pressure necessary for the flamethrower to operate.

Undeterred, one prisoner came up with the idea of making alcohol for Molotov c.o.c.ktails.33 Fruit was collected-oranges, grapefruits, mangos, and watermelons-and put into gla.s.s jars with water and sugar to distill. Then the extract was run off and cooked in a pressure cooker, the vapors run through a length of plastic tubing. The distillate was pa.s.sed through the homemade still two or three times. Fruit was collected-oranges, grapefruits, mangos, and watermelons-and put into gla.s.s jars with water and sugar to distill. Then the extract was run off and cooked in a pressure cooker, the vapors run through a length of plastic tubing. The distillate was pa.s.sed through the homemade still two or three times.

"We got the chief chemist from Bacardi, who was in the lockup with us, and we got some of the white lightning, handed it to him, and asked his professional opinion," said Wally. "He said, 'Yeah, man, this is good 95 proof.' He took the gallon of alcohol and disappeared. Three days later, we're all standing around, leaning over the edge, smoking cigarettes and talking about this and that, and he comes over and hands me a cup. I look at it, nice appearance. I taste it, and G.o.dd.a.m.n, it's good Courvoisier. I asked him how he got the color. 'Shoe polish,' he said."

The techs also improvised hand grenades. Americano was sent back down into the utility tunnel for some blasting caps and a small quant.i.ty of TNT. Melting down the TNT in a double boiler, they poured the liquefied explosive into condensed milk cans filled with nails, gla.s.s, and anything else that would serve as shrapnel. Blasting caps were attached to the top along with a length of homemade fuse.

Fuses for the grenades were created out of match heads ground into powder and impregnated into cloth. Andy, the true engineer among the three, set up a test program. A tech stood on the fifth floor, lit a fuse, and threw it over the side. A cooperating prisoner below would pick it up without attracting the guards' attention and report how much of the fuse was burned. Eventually, the techs determined that three inches of fuse would burn in about twenty seconds before igniting the blasting cap.

Although day-to-day life in prison did not improve significantly, these acts of defiance-building the radio, defusing the explosives, creating a small a.r.s.enal-encouraged and boosted morale among the techs and like-minded prisoners.

The TSD techs were helpless observers in the fall of 1962 when tensions between Cuba, the United States, and the Soviet Union escalated into an international nuclear crisis. An overflight of Cuba by an Agency U-2 in June indicated the Cubans were preparing for installation of surface-to-air missiles, although no missiles were seen.34 Subsequently, U.S. intelligence observed both military advisors and equipment arriving in Cuba at unprecedented rates. U-2 overhead photography continued to confirm activity during September, including evidence that Soviet short- and intermediate-range missiles were about to be introduced on the island. Subsequently, U.S. intelligence observed both military advisors and equipment arriving in Cuba at unprecedented rates. U-2 overhead photography continued to confirm activity during September, including evidence that Soviet short- and intermediate-range missiles were about to be introduced on the island.

President Kennedy issued a national military alert on October 19 and addressed the world on October 22, explaining that the USSR and Cuba had conspired to install missile bases with the purpose "to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere."35 The threat of an international nuclear confrontation continued until October 28 when the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba. The threat of an international nuclear confrontation continued until October 28 when the Soviets agreed to remove their missiles from Cuba.

The world breathed a sigh of relief that nuclear war had been avoided, and on Christmas Day 1962 word began to circulate that a prisoner exchange was in the works. On March 16, 1963, James B. Donovan visited the prison. A New York-based lawyer specializing in insurance, Donovan (no relation to OSS General William Donovan) had served in the OSS as general counsel and then as a member of the U.S. prosecution team during the Nuremberg trials of n.a.z.i war criminals.36 In the years that followed, Donovan kept a hand in the intelligence business and at the request of the New York Bar a.s.sociation, defended Soviet spy Rudolph Abel, then, several years later, negotiated Abel's exchange for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers. In the years that followed, Donovan kept a hand in the intelligence business and at the request of the New York Bar a.s.sociation, defended Soviet spy Rudolph Abel, then, several years later, negotiated Abel's exchange for U-2 pilot Francis Gary Powers.37 By the time Donovan arrived at the prison, he had already bartered the release of the Cuban members of the 2506 a.s.sault Brigade and was optimistic about his chances for negotiating the release of Wally, Dave, and Andy. "Donovan came down to see us and brought his son," Andy recalled. "We understood he was someone Castro apparently trusted not to attempt to undermine the Cuban government. So the Cubans let him in and he insisted on seeing all of the Americans. I don't know if the place was bugged where we talked, but we acted like it was and were very discreet in what we said. I got the signals from him that they were working on it and 'Don't worry, we'll take care of you.' We took his actions as meaning that something was going on. But you also heard so many rumors and gossip you didn't take anything at face value."

A little more than a month later, on April 21, 1963, Wally, Dave, and Andy, along with eighteen other prisoners, were told to gather up their belongings. They were transported back to La Cabana and released in exchange for four Cuban nationals held in New York on charges of sabotage conspiracy.38 Taking off from Havana for Florida's Homestead Air Force Base, they were well into the air when a CIA medical officer told Wally that his mother had died. The news touched the deepest emotions of the techs who endured two and a half years of depravation and uncertainty. They cried together.

When the plane's hatch opened to a media pack on Homestead's tarmac, the American soldier of fortune, Pecoraro, was the first to step off the plane to freedom. The three techs, to avoid the cameras, lingered behind the others, and were then hustled away to a nearby safe house to see their families, receive medical attention, and undergo the obligatory debriefings.

The techs had been in captivity for 949 days, and for the entire time their cover and aliases held. In prison, they had refrained from discussing the operation or personal reminiscences about home and family lest other inmates overhear the conversation and their cover stories erode. Yet, within days of their return, someone whispered to the press that the three American tourists held in Castro's prison were, in fact, CIA officers.

The CIA debriefings lasted for about a week. They were interviewed by psychologists, counterintelligence officers, debriefers, and subjected to polygraph examinations. Personal security became a concern after their ident.i.ties were leaked to the press. During the summer of 1963, the techs waited for the phone call that would return them to duty. Wally went north to be near his father, while Andy was sent to a fishing camp in Florida owned by Agency retirees. Dave remained in the Washington area.

Eventually certified fit for duty, the three returned to new a.s.signments in the fall of 1963. Dave Christ, against his preference, was transferred to the Office of Research and Development in the newly formed Directorate of Science and Technology. Andy and Wally continued working in TSD. Andy became head of an equipment testing and certification unit at the OTS laboratory while Wally remained in audio operations.

TSD Chief Seymour Russell told Andy that he should not expect to be treated any differently from other techs-he would be judged on the quality of his future work, not the past. Initially, even within TSD, the returnees were avoided by some of their colleagues and business was conducted around them. The only senior Agency official who formally acknowledged what the techs had endured was Executive Director Lyman Kirkpatrick, during a brief meeting with them in his office. Quietly, each received a one-grade promotion but, otherwise, for the official bureaucracy, their nearly three years spent in a Cuban prison never happened.

Christ, seeking no personal recognition, submitted a lengthy and comprehensive recommendation to CIA management in late 1964 that Andy and Wally be given "the highest possible" Agency award for the courage, imagination, and fort.i.tude they exhibited during the ordeal.39 The recommendation was ignored and Christ retired in 1970. The recommendation was ignored and Christ retired in 1970.

When Andy announced his intention to retire from the Agency in 1979, David S. Brandwein, then director of OTS, conducted a routine review of his personnel file to determine what retirement award might be appropriate. Included in Andy's file was a copy of Christ's 1964 memo. The graphic description of the conditions in the prison and professionalism shown by the techs under the horrific circ.u.mstances so impressed Brandwein that he immediately brought the matter to the attention of the CIA's senior awards panel.

At Brandwien's urging, the panel conducted a full review and recommended that all three techs be awarded the Agency's highest medal for bravery. DCI Stansfield Turner accepted the recommendation and personally presented David Christ, Thornton Anderson, and Walter Szuminski with the Distinguished Intelligence Cross in May 1979, sixteen years after their return home.

At the time, only seven others had received the DIC in the CIA's thirty-year history. The citation for each of the techs read: .

The DISTINGUISHED INTELLIGENCE CROSS is awarded in recognition of exceptional heroism from September 1960 to April 1963. During this period [the recipient] endured hardships and deprivations with unquestioned loyalty, great personal courage and conspicuous fort.i.tude. [His] exemplary conduct as a professional intelligence officer was highlighted by his unswerving devotion to the Agency and by his disregard for his own personal safety in order to a.s.sist others. [The recipient's] performance in this instance reflects the highest credit on him and the Federal service.40 .

While the three techs were finding ways to survive in prison, the CIA and TSD were planning to eliminate the Castro government. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations pushed the Agency to develop new capabilities for dealing with what was seen as an intolerable political problem in Cuba. Rather than test the international consequences of a military invasion, both Presidents turned to the CIA for secret and covert means to accomplish a policy objective.

The CIA's Directorate of Plans developed two parallel paths to solving the Cuba problem. Support from the TSD was sought for both plans. Beginning in March 1960, the United States began equipping and training an indigenous "secret army" composed of Cuban exiles and former Batista supporters to invade the island. The second path, direct action against Castro himself, was aimed at incapacitating or killing the Cuban revolutionary.

TSD specialists trained the "Cuban exile army" in clandestine skills needed for a sustained guerilla war. The Cubans were taught clandestine photography and film processing, secret writing, signaling, and use of cover and alias doc.u.mentation. TSD issued a numbered ident.i.ty card to each of the trainees and indirectly created the exile army's name. By selecting the number "2050" for the first card with all others following in numerical order, a TSD tech reasoned that Castro's intelligence service would think the force was larger than it actually was.41 Then, when recruit number 2056, Jose Santiago, died a few weeks later in a training accident, the Cubans adopted the name "Brigada 2056," or later, more formally, the "Brigada de Asalto 2056," in honor of their fallen colleague. Then, when recruit number 2056, Jose Santiago, died a few weeks later in a training accident, the Cubans adopted the name "Brigada 2056," or later, more formally, the "Brigada de Asalto 2056," in honor of their fallen colleague.

To acquire close-up, clandestine photos of people or objects during the Cold War, small Robot cameras, camouflaged by clothing, were designed to shoot through tiny openings in b.u.t.tons or tie tacks, 1960s.

The only TSS-TSD-OTS officer killed in the line of duty between 1947 and 2008 was a casualty of anti-Castro operations. Four days before the Bay of Pigs invasion, TSD explosives experts were training members of the force of Cuban nationals in constructing and arming small charges for hara.s.sment and sabotage operations. As Nels "Benny" Benson, a forty-five-year-old native of Eagle Bend, Minnesota, and one of TSD's experienced explosives officers, demonstrated how to mold a charge composed of thermite and C-4 into a form that resembled a soap dish, an errant spark ignited the materials. The resulting fire threatened to spread to adjacent explosives.42 Benson immediately picked up the flaming mixture and carried it away from the site. Critically burned, he died in a Miami hospital three weeks later. One of the nearly one hundred stars chiseled into a granite wall of the lobby of the Original CIA Headquarters Building commemorates the life and sacrifice of Benny Benson, who died doing what duty demanded.

The CIA's other solution to the Castro problem drew TSD into the ultimately objectionable policy of sanctioned a.s.sa.s.sination. Both TSD's chemistry branch and its explosive devices branch had the expertise to create lethal materials and delivery mechanisms. TSS had previously developed poisons as part of the U-2 program in the mid-1950s and impregnated needles for pilots to carry as an alternative to capture and torture. The so-called suicide needle was created by the devices branch of the Special Operations Division of the U.S. Army Chemical Corps at Fort Detrick Maryland, a military research organization with whom the CIA, through TSD, worked closely. The poison on the needle was saxitoxin, a naturally occurring toxin found in contaminated sh.e.l.lfish and one of the most lethal substances known.43 L-pills had been part of the OSS defensive inventory for issuance to agents on particularly dangerous and sensitive a.s.signments. TSD continued to make those available for CIA operations. Little imagination was required to envision that the same or similar potions could be used offensively as well. Likewise, the guns, bullets, darts, and camouflaged explosives in the TSD inventory for covert paramilitary operations could be considered for use against a specific individual.

After the failed Bay of Pigs invasion, President Kennedy and Attorney General Robert Kennedy admonished senior CIA official Richard Bissell, the Deputy Director for Plans, for "not doing anything to get rid of Castro."44 As a result, in November of 1961 Bissell instructed CIA officer William Harvey to direct a program called ZR/RIFLE, focused on the Cuban problem. As a result, in November of 1961 Bissell instructed CIA officer William Harvey to direct a program called ZR/RIFLE, focused on the Cuban problem. 45 45 From the outset of the Kennedy administration, the CIA had been urged by the White House to create new a.s.sa.s.sination capabilities, referred to as "executive action," the "magic b.u.t.ton," or even the "last resort beyond last resort and confession of weakness." From the outset of the Kennedy administration, the CIA had been urged by the White House to create new a.s.sa.s.sination capabilities, referred to as "executive action," the "magic b.u.t.ton," or even the "last resort beyond last resort and confession of weakness."46 The CIA attempted to a.s.sa.s.sinate Castro at the time of the Bay of Pigs invasion, but it disintegrated into a Keystone Kops comedy.47 The plot involved the CIA's Office of Security engaging a former FBI special agent turned private detective, Robert Maheu, to recruit members of organized crime to carry out the a.s.signment. Maheu contacted a former member of the Capone crime syndicate, who hired two Mafia members judged to "have experience." The plot involved the CIA's Office of Security engaging a former FBI special agent turned private detective, Robert Maheu, to recruit members of organized crime to carry out the a.s.signment. Maheu contacted a former member of the Capone crime syndicate, who hired two Mafia members judged to "have experience."

The plotters faced numerous complications, and TSD's chemists struggled to find the correct weapon-a lethal but slow-acting pill that would give the agent time to slip away before taking effect. The first batches of poison capsules failed to dissolve adequately in water, but the second batch worked in trials on monkeys and was issued to a Cuban "official" for the attempt.48 The official later returned the pills after getting "cold feet." The official later returned the pills after getting "cold feet." 49 49 From 1960 through the end of 1965,50 various schemes, some whimsical and some serious, were discussed and evaluated to eliminate Castro. Of the conceived and planned attacks on Castro that encompa.s.sed public embarra.s.sment as well as a.s.sa.s.sination, none came close to succeeding. various schemes, some whimsical and some serious, were discussed and evaluated to eliminate Castro. Of the conceived and planned attacks on Castro that encompa.s.sed public embarra.s.sment as well as a.s.sa.s.sination, none came close to succeeding.

The variety of plans that were considered to undermine Castro's charismatic appeal by sabotaging his speeches was reminiscent of William Donovan's admonition to Stanley Lovell to "raise merry h.e.l.l." These included: Hallucinogenic Spray: One TSD scientist and bioorganic chemist proposed spraying Castro's broadcasting studio in Havana with a chemical to induce LSD-like hallucinations. TSD eventually found out, however, that the chemical was unreliable. One TSD scientist and bioorganic chemist proposed spraying Castro's broadcasting studio in Havana with a chemical to induce LSD-like hallucinations. TSD eventually found out, however, that the chemical was unreliable.51 Hallucinogenic Cigars: Since the method of introducing the spray into the room was not possible, Schieder suggested impregnating Castro's cigars with a special chemical to produce temporary disorientation during one of his long, rambling speeches, which were broadcast live to the Cuban people. Since the method of introducing the spray into the room was not possible, Schieder suggested impregnating Castro's cigars with a special chemical to produce temporary disorientation during one of his long, rambling speeches, which were broadcast live to the Cuban people.52 Contaminated Shoes: A plan was evaluated to attack Castro's famous beard when he was traveling abroad by contaminating his shoes when they were placed outside his hotel room door at night to be shined. The idea was to "dust" the inside of the shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory which, when absorbed into the body, would cause Castro's beard to fall out. TSD procured the chemical and tested it successfully on animals before the DDP sc.r.a.pped the plan when Castro cancelled his trip. A plan was evaluated to attack Castro's famous beard when he was traveling abroad by contaminating his shoes when they were placed outside his hotel room door at night to be shined. The idea was to "dust" the inside of the shoes with thallium salts, a strong depilatory which, when absorbed into the body, would cause Castro's beard to fall out. TSD procured the chemical and tested it successfully on animals before the DDP sc.r.a.pped the plan when Castro cancelled his trip.53 Depilatory Cigars: Similar in concept to the failed shoe attack, under this scheme, Castro's cigars were to be treated with a powerful depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out, leaving him hairless as a means of damaging his macho image. The special box of cigars was to be provided to Castro during his appearance on a television talk show hosted by David Susskind. After CIA officer David Atlee Phillips questioned how the operation could ensure that only Castro, and not others (including Susskind) would smoke the cigars, the idea was abandoned. Similar in concept to the failed shoe attack, under this scheme, Castro's cigars were to be treated with a powerful depilatory that would cause his beard to fall out, leaving him hairless as a means of damaging his macho image. The special box of cigars was to be provided to Castro during his appearance on a television talk show hosted by David Susskind. After CIA officer David Atlee Phillips questioned how the operation could ensure that only Castro, and not others (including Susskind) would smoke the cigars, the idea was abandoned.54 Phillips made the point that a.s.sa.s.sination schemes required both effective technical substances and precise operational planning. Phillips made the point that a.s.sa.s.sination schemes required both effective technical substances and precise operational planning.

Poisoned Cigars: The CIA recruited a double agent to offer Castro a Cahiba cigar, his favorite brand, treated with botulin, a toxin so deadly that the target would die shortly after putting the cigar onto his mouth. CIA records indicate that the cigars were pa.s.sed to the double agent in February of 1961, but he apparently decided against carrying out the plan. The CIA recruited a double agent to offer Castro a Cahiba cigar, his favorite brand, treated with botulin, a toxin so deadly that the target would die shortly after putting the cigar onto his mouth. CIA records indicate that the cigars were pa.s.sed to the double agent in February of 1961, but he apparently decided against carrying out the plan.55 Exploding Cigars: During a Castro visit to the United Nations the CIA considered a plan to plant a box of exploding cigars at a place where he would smoke one "and blow his head off." The plan was not carried out. During a Castro visit to the United Nations the CIA considered a plan to plant a box of exploding cigars at a place where he would smoke one "and blow his head off." The plan was not carried out.56 Exploding Seash.e.l.ls: In early 1963 TSD was asked to construct a sea-sh.e.l.l with explosives, to be planted in the ocean at a spot in which Castro commonly went skin diving. After a technical and operational review, CIA discarded the idea as impractical. In early 1963 TSD was asked to construct a sea-sh.e.l.l with explosives, to be planted in the ocean at a spot in which Castro commonly went skin diving. After a technical and operational review, CIA discarded the idea as impractical.57 Contaminated Diving Suit: A proposal was made for a U.S. lawyer involved with official negotiations over the release of prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs to present Castro with a contaminated diving suit. TSD bought a diving suit, dusted it inside with a fungus, which would produce Madura foot, a chronic skin disease, and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercle bacillus. The plan was abandoned when the lawyer decided to present Castro with a different diving suit. A proposal was made for a U.S. lawyer involved with official negotiations over the release of prisoners captured at the Bay of Pigs to present Castro with a contaminated diving suit. TSD bought a diving suit, dusted it inside with a fungus, which would produce Madura foot, a chronic skin disease, and contaminated the breathing apparatus with a tubercle bacillus. The plan was abandoned when the lawyer decided to present Castro with a different diving suit.58 Poisoned Pen: On November 22, 1963-the day that President Kennedy was a.s.sa.s.sinated in Dallas-a CIA officer offered a poison pen to a Cuban agent, On November 22, 1963-the day that President Kennedy was a.s.sa.s.sinated in Dallas-a CIA officer offered a poison pen to a Cuban agent, AMLASH AMLASH, in Paris for use against Castro. TSD had modified the ballpoint pen with a hypodermic needle designed to be so fine that the target (Castro) would not sense its insertion and the agent would have time to escape before effects were noticed. AMLASH AMLASH was instructed to use Blackleaf-40, a commercial poison, with the device, but in the aftermath of Kennedy's a.s.sa.s.sination, he decided against taking the pen back to Cuba. was instructed to use Blackleaf-40, a commercial poison, with the device, but in the aftermath of Kennedy's a.s.sa.s.sination, he decided against taking the pen back to Cuba.59 Suppressed Pistol and Rifle: The CIA subsequently provided The CIA subsequently provided AMLASH AMLASH with a suppressed pistol and suppressed FAL rifle and scope, as well as highly concentrated explosives. with a suppressed pistol and suppressed FAL rifle and scope, as well as highly concentrated explosives.60 AMLASH AMLASH took no action, and in June of 1965, the CIA terminated contact with him. took no action, and in June of 1965, the CIA terminated contact with him.61 The DDP's planning of a.s.sa.s.sination attacks on other foreign leaders, such as Patrice Lumumba of the Congo, also drew on TSD's research, production, and delivery capabilities.62 The initial plan to eliminate Lumumba involved putting poison into his food or toothpaste. A syringe, surgical mask, rubber gloves, and a vial of toxin were sent to the Congo for the operation. However, the plot failed when moral objections to a.s.sa.s.sination were raised by senior officers of the Agency's DDP, as well as the difficulty in gaining access to Lumumba's entourage. The initial plan to eliminate Lumumba involved putting poison into his food or toothpaste. A syringe, surgical mask, rubber gloves, and a vial of toxin were sent to the Congo for the operation. However, the plot failed when moral objections to a.s.sa.s.sination were raised by senior officers of the Agency's DDP, as well as the difficulty in gaining access to Lumumba's entourage.63 Ultimately, the plot became unnecessary when opposition Congo forces killed Lumumba in January 1961. Ultimately, the plot became unnecessary when opposition Congo forces killed Lumumba in January 1961.

With the exception of the AMLASH AMLASH operation, a.s.sa.s.sination of foreign leaders as a policy option for the United States ended on November 22, 1963, when President Kennedy was shot in Dallas, Texas. It would be more than a decade before the Rockefeller Commission (1975) and the Church Committee (1975-1976) provided the American public insight into the CIA's secret role in the a.s.sa.s.sination schemes that cl.u.s.tered in the 1959-1963 years. Obscured by the sensationalism and intrigue of the plots and technologies were the conclusions of both investigations. With respect to a.s.sa.s.sination planning, the Rockefeller and Church reports determined that CIA officers acted on accurately understood policy direction from the White House under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. operation, a.s.sa.s.sination of foreign leaders as a policy option for the United States ended on November 22, 1963, when President Kennedy was shot in Dallas, Texas. It would be more than a decade before the Rockefeller Commission (1975) and the Church Committee (1975-1976) provided the American public insight into the CIA's secret role in the a.s.sa.s.sination schemes that cl.u.s.tered in the 1959-1963 years. Obscured by the sensationalism and intrigue of the plots and technologies were the conclusions of both investigations. With respect to a.s.sa.s.sination planning, the Rockefeller and Church reports determined that CIA officers acted on accurately understood policy direction from the White House under both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations.64 In response to the two reports, President Ford issued Executive Order 11905 that contained the provision: "No employee of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, political a.s.sa.s.sination." Subsequently, a revised 1981 Executive Order 12333 governing intelligence activities reaffirmed the prohibition: "No person employed by or acting on behalf of the United States Government shall engage in, or conspire to engage in, a.s.sa.s.sination." The EO added that "no agency of the Intelligence Community shall partic.i.p.ate in or request any person to undertake activities forbidden by this Order," language that explicitly prohibited "indirect partic.i.p.ation" in a.s.sa.s.sination.

Serious public discussion of a.s.sa.s.sination as a U.S. policy option ended with these Executive Orders but it would be rekindled after the September 11, 2001, al-Qaeda terrorist attacks. A December 2001 Newsweek Newsweek poll found that 65 percent of those surveyed supported a.s.sa.s.sination of al-Qaeda leaders. The dramatic change in public opinion likely reflects the contrast between the potential danger perceived from Castro and the reality that al-Qaeda, a non-state organization, carried out attacks on American cities, airlines, and civilians. Even in that environment, however, it remains unlikely the U.S. public would support authorized covert a.s.sa.s.sination operations against the head of a recognized foreign government. poll found that 65 percent of those surveyed supported a.s.sa.s.sination of al-Qaeda leaders. The dramatic change in public opinion likely reflects the contrast between the potential danger perceived from Castro and the reality that al-Qaeda, a non-state organization, carried out attacks on American cities, airlines, and civilians. Even in that environment, however, it remains unlikely the U.S. public would support authorized covert a.s.sa.s.sination operations against the head of a recognized foreign government.

CHAPTER 17.

War by Any Other Name

We had a war going, but n.o.body knew.

-OTS officer in Vietnam, 1962 TSD officer Pat Jameson was sitting on a hard bench in Saigon's Tan Son Nhut Airport in 1962 studying the aircraft traffic as he waited for another Agency officer's flight to arrive. A Pan American plane landed for refueling and Jameson watched as a group of American tourists disembarked. Walking across the tarmac through the glare of the Southeast Asian sun, they made their way to the promising shade of the drab building, eager to see what exotic souvenirs the ramshackle terminal might hold.

Perhaps drawn by an American, or at least Western face, one of the tourists approached Jameson. "I hear there's a war going on down here, is that right?" the tourist asked Jameson casually, as if he were inquiring about the weather in some distant city.

Jameson nodded toward a corner of the tarmac. "Look out there. You see that? There's a bunch of people being taken from that plane to ambulances," he said. "And there's some new guys with fatigue creases in their pants getting on that same plane to go up-country to replace those dead and injured ones. That's the story that we're living with here."

"G.o.d, I never knew that!" the tourist exclaimed as he stared at the scene.

More than forty years later, Jameson reflected on a scene he remembered vividly, "We had a war going, but n.o.body knew."

That a tourist on a brief layover was unaware of the situation in Vietnam was not surprising. For most of the American public in 1962, Vietnam was an obscure and distant country of little consequence. Seemingly just another former European colony in turmoil, news of Vietnam's problems was usually confined to the back pages of the morning paper. The French Indochina War of the early 1950s had been largely forgotten or ignored outside of foreign affairs wonks at the CIA, State Department, and Pentagon.

For those concerned about Vietnam's history and future, 1954 was the year keenly remembered. That spring the French suffered a decisive defeat at Dien Bien Phu when 70,000 Vietnamese soldiers overwhelmed their 13,000-man outpost.1 The Vietnamese had dragged howitzers and other heavy artillery along the ridgeline of the isolated valley north of Hanoi, and then fired directly down into the French garrison. The Vietnamese had dragged howitzers and other heavy artillery along the ridgeline of the isolated valley north of Hanoi, and then fired directly down into the French garrison.2 Led by General Giap, tens of thousands of troops endured not only the hard physical labor of moving artillery over jungle trails, but also repeated strafing by French aircraft. Led by General Giap, tens of thousands of troops endured not only the hard physical labor of moving artillery over jungle trails, but also repeated strafing by French aircraft.

DCI Allen Dulles directed the CIA's "front" airline in Southeast Asia, Civil Air Transport (CAT), to fly resupply missions during the siege using unarmed C-119 "Flying Boxcars" cargo aircraft while the U.S. military sent fifty B-26s for air support operations to aid the beleaguered garrison.3 Despite this U.S. a.s.sistance, which did little to turn the tide, President Eisenhower thought the French government's decision to "make a stand" at Dien Bien Phu ill advised and its efforts to keep Vietnam under colonial rule an invitation for the communists to gain an advantage. Despite this U.S. a.s.sistance, which did little to turn the tide, President Eisenhower thought the French government's decision to "make a stand" at Dien Bien Phu ill advised and its efforts to keep Vietnam under colonial rule an invitation for the communists to gain an advantage.4 Eisenhower's a.s.sessment had been correct. The commander of the French garrison, sensing defeat was at hand, committed suicide with a hand grenade.5 The siege, which lasted from March until early May, effectively ended French colonial rule in Indochina, but brought no lasting peace. An international conference, convened in Geneva during July of 1954, offered a plan to create a unified Vietnamese government following democratic elections in 1956. However, the Geneva agreement was not endorsed by the United States and resulted in a negotiated standoff that included a temporary division between north and south along a Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel. The siege, which lasted from March until early May, effectively ended French colonial rule in Indochina, but brought no lasting peace. An international conference, convened in Geneva during July of 1954, offered a plan to create a unified Vietnamese government following democratic elections in 1956. However, the Geneva agreement was not endorsed by the United States and resulted in a negotiated standoff that included a temporary division between north and south along a Demilitarized Zone at the 17th parallel.6 Two countries emerged from the agreement, the communist-ruled Democratic Republic of Vietnam in the north and the Republic of Vietnam in the south. Almost immediately, Ho Chi Minh's regime embarked on a protracted campaign of guerilla warfare to unify Vietnam under communist rule. The United States, practicing a policy of Cold War "containment," was determined not to let that happen.7 When Jameson encountered the American tourist in Saigon, U.S. paramilitary support to the South Vietnamese consisted of advisors from both CIA and U.S. Army Special Forces. The Eisenhower administration committed American a.s.sistance to South Vietnam, but limited efforts to advising and a.s.sisting the South Vietnamese government in unconventional warfare, paramilitary operations, and political-psychological warfare.8 This role expanded during the Kennedy administration to include CIA paramilitary support with substantial a.s.sistance from Special Forces to interdict material flowing from the north to the Vietcong in the south. This role expanded during the Kennedy administration to include CIA paramilitary support with substantial a.s.sistance from Special Forces to interdict material flowing from the north to the Vietcong in the south.

With limited news coverage and the relatively small commitment of U.S. forces, few Americans recognized Vietnam as a war zone. The fighting did not resemble the battlefields of Europe during World War II or those of the more recent Korean conflict. The Vietcong guerillas, with no means to mount large-scale military attacks, concentrated on building espionage networks within the South Vietnamese government and carrying out terrorist-like attacks on selected targets.

Jameson had been sent to Vietnam by TSD to support the Agency's covert action program.9 His role, as an "authentication" officer, carried on a tradition that reached back two decades to similar work done by OSS. Just as the OSS had reproduced German and French doc.u.ments for agents sent into occupied Europe, TSD was now outfitting South Vietnamese agents with doc.u.ments and clothing for infiltration missions into the north to conduct intelligence gathering, sabotage, and hara.s.sment operations. His role, as an "authentication" officer, carried on a tradition that reached back two decades to similar work done by OSS. Just as the OSS had reproduced German and French doc.u.ments for agents sent into occupied Europe, TSD was now outfitting South Vietnamese agents with doc.u.ments and clothing for infiltration missions into the north to conduct intelligence gathering, sabotage, and hara.s.sment operations.

However, the situation Jameson found in Vietnam suggested that TSD could do more than just provide doc.u.mentation. Another small TSD unit had experience in training and equipping paramilitary forces through its involvement with the ill-fated 1961 Bay of Pigs invasion. Now, a year later, TSD's paramilitary and "authentication" units were combined to form a covert action element. As the only member of the new group in Vietnam, Jameson a.s.sumed the paramilitary responsibility as well.

The primary problem that confronted the CIA and the South Vietnamese government in 1962 was halting the flow of munitions and personnel entering South Vietnam from the north. The princ.i.p.al infiltration routes were Highway 1, an intermittently paved road running along Vietnam's eastern coast and the better-known Ho Chi Minh Trail, an intricate 20,000-kilometer network of roads and jungle trails. The Ho Chi Minh Trail ran along Vietnam's western border, cutting southward through Laos and Cambodia.10 For Jameson and other Agency personnel, shutting down the flow of weapons and personnel meant taking the fight to the enemy by destroying the infrastructure along both supply routes. For Jameson and other Agency personnel, shutting down the flow of weapons and personnel meant taking the fight to the enemy by destroying the infrastructure along both supply routes.

It was to become a counterinsurgency war, fought by small, fast-moving teams. Employing unconventional warfare tactics and clandestine weaponry similar to those used by the OSS, U.S. military advisors worked with special units of the South Vietnamese army and indigenous groups, such as the Montagnards and ethnic Chinese Nungs.11 However, waging this type of war required training and detailed planning. However, waging this type of war required training and detailed planning.

"When doing sabotage, folks tended to focus on the 'big bang,' the explosive charge in your hand," Jameson said. "Part of my job was to make sure all the other pieces were in place. Leave out one of those and you'll leave a bridge standing or lose your team."

Planning for sabotage, Jameson recalled, required exhaustive sessions, sometimes taking two or three days for a single mission. Every detail, from the daily rations to intelligence about the target's precise orientation, materials, and appearance had to be addressed. Destroying just one bridge required logistics, explosives, first aid, communications equipment, and a means to get the team in and out safely. The team had to be trained to handle explosives, set charges, and improvise in the field when necessary. All the intelligence about possible entry and exit routes had to be a.s.sembled and considered, since there would be only one chance to bring down the bridge.

"We had to diagnose the construction of that bridge, often with little data, and design explosive charges to do the job," said Jameson, "but not use P equals Plenty