Sound Military Decision - Part 14
Library

Part 14

(b) Comparison of gains and costs. When costs are found to be in excess of the over-all gains, this fact may be the basis for rejecting any courses of action which are less desirable than others. However, retention of a course found to be costly may be justified for sound reasons.

When, as in the example given previously (page 96), the commander receives a directive such as "Deny enemy base sites in the area ABCD by capturing X Island", he carries through his estimate of the situation in the usual manner. He notes, however, that the capture of X Island has been indicated as a predetermined course of action. He makes a proper survey of the factors of relative fighting strength. He considers all pertinent courses of action. He goes through this procedure in order to reach an understanding of all the elements of his problem. He wishes to understand the necessary background. He realizes the importance of a grasp of the considerations which have led higher authority to arrive at the predetermined course of action.

By carrying through the usual estimate procedure, including the a.n.a.lysis of all pertinent courses of action, he a.s.sists himself to arrive at a proper concept of the action to be taken to capture X island. In this way he establishes a sound basis for formulating a detailed plan (in the second step), for inaugurating planned action (in the third step), and for supervising this action (in the fourth step). He also establishes a basis for any constructive representations which he finds it advisable to make to higher authority (page 15).

In another example previously given (page 96), the higher commander indicates only the predetermined course of action (by a directive "Capture X Island") and omits the statement of the true underlying task. The subordinate, on discovering this fact, deduces the underlying task and carries through the estimate procedure, modified, as explained for the previous example. In addition to the merits as previously stated, this method has a further advantage. The deduction of the underlying task enables the commander to judge whether any advisable or necessary deviation or departure from the predetermined course of action (page 15) involves merely a variation from the letter of his instructions or, more important, from their spirit.

For instance, the directive, as in the case previously discussed, may have been "Capture X Island". The higher commander when issuing this order, may have stated his own general plan to be "This force will protect the base at A." The commander, on receipt of this directive, then deduces his true task. This is "Deny enemy bases in area ABCD"

("by capturing X Island"--a predetermined course of action), the purpose of the mission being "in order to protect the base at A".

Now it may be found that the enemy, unconcerned as to X Island, is moving to reinforce Y Island and to use it as a base to attack the base at A. The commander then properly decides to capture Y Island, instead of X Island. By his identification of the predetermined course of action as such, and by his correct deduction of the true underlying task, the commander has established a sound basis for the solution of his problem. He can now, with confidence, defer or abandon the capture of X Island, and can devote his efforts to the capture of Y Island.

His confidence is justified because he knows his decision to be in accordance with the spirit of his instructions.

Naturally, if the higher commander directed, "This force will protect the base at A----", and added, later in his directive, "Deny enemy base sites in area ABCD by capturing X Island", the subordinate commander's deductions would have been made more easily.

The full play of the reasoning power is called for in the process of visualizing courses of action and of selecting the best. This process is the crux of the first step. Here the knowledge of the relationship between cause and effect is applied. Here, also, the commander is brought fully to realize that, to reach a sound decision, there is a requirement for a studied development of each stage by which the human mind pa.s.ses from recognition of a necessity for action to the ultimate conviction as to the best course to pursue.

As essential background for the utilization of his intellectual powers in this process, the commander requires knowledge of the capabilities and limitations of the technique of his profession and of the weapons of his calling. To the necessary knowledge gained through his own experience, either in actual warfare or in peacetime exercises simulating this experience, he adds the equally essential familiarity with the science of war, and with the lessons to be drawn from historical instances of success and failure. In effect, it is here brought home to him that, on a fundamental basis of earnest thought, mental ability, character, knowledge, and experience, finally rests the soundness of decision (see page 219).

The Decision. The word "decision" has the primary meaning of a conclusion. A decision (conclusion) is essential as a starting point for further procedure. Sound decision is the essential preliminary to wise planning and effective action.

The range within which military decisions may fall extends from the instantaneous resolve to meet an emergency, to the conditional intentions of a distant future. Within this range will be found many decisions which the commander is necessarily called upon to reach during the four steps toward the attainment of an a.s.signed objective.

The course of action, or the combination of courses, as finally selected by the commander upon the termination of the first step, represents his conclusion as to his outlined plan for the attainment of his a.s.signed objective. This conclusion will indicate, specifically or inferentially, his general objective, as selected by himself, and--in proper detail--the action required for its attainment. (See pages 88 and 95). The conclusion is thus his Decision, which provides the general plan, or the basis therefor, from which he will, in the second step, develop a detailed plan of operations for his force.

Ill.u.s.tration of the foregoing process may profitably be initiated with respect to the highest echelon involved in the case of a State. The primary national objective of organized government (Chapter I, page 7) is the ensurance of envisaged prosperity and of essential security for the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community.

This aim, as embodied in basic policy (see pages 8 and 9), is the objective visualized by the people of the State, or by its policy-forming elements, in the capacity of an organized government.

For the maintenance of the condition represented in this policy, or for the creation of such a condition not already existing, an appropriate task of the State, as the political embodiment of the national will, might be to maintain or establish friendly (at least, not hostile) governments and social systems in those key localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise.

The national mission (the mission of the State) then becomes:--

(Task) To maintain or establish friendly (at least, not hostile) governments and social systems In those key localities of the world whence, otherwise, effective threats may arise,

(Purpose) in order to ensure envisaged prosperity and essential security for the social system which is the fundamental basis of the community.

A national estimate of the situation, by the highest authority of the State, to determine the effect to be attained for the accomplishment of the foregoing mission, takes account of the possibilities of accomplishment through psychological, political, economic, or military pressure, or by combinations thereof. As a result of this accounting, the State adopts a national Decision which indicates the best way of accomplishing its mission.

To carry out this Decision, each of the primary subdivisions of the State's organization is a.s.signed a specific task or tasks, whose total effect is designed to achieve the result embodied in the national Decision. The task of each such primary subdivision is linked to a purpose which is the attainment of the objective indicated in the national Decision.

In like manner, each organization of the national armed forces is governed in its action by a task a.s.signed to it as a result of a Decision made by the proper authority on the next higher echelon. Each commander is thus provided with a mission which consists of an a.s.signed task and of a purpose as indicated by the general objective decided upon by his immediate superior.

The Second Step

The second step, that of resolving the required action into detailed military operations, may now be undertaken unless the Decision reached in the first step is intended for future reference only. During the second step the commander, if he carries the procedure through to its logical end, visualizes his proposed operations as tasks, in order to ensure their proper formulation. He may, if it is his intent to issue a directive or directives for the execution of his plan of operation, or a part thereof, arrange his procedure so as to facilitate the third step.

The common characteristic of problems of the second step is that they deal with matters pertaining to the support of the action decided upon in the first step, and that they are properly problems for the commander who made that Decision, and not for his subordinates, to solve. Such problems are appropriately termed subsidiary problems.

Their full solution involves subsidiary estimates, subsidiary decisions, and, not infrequently, distinct subsidiary plans and subsidiary directives.

Each detailed operation derived, during the second step, from the outlined plan of operations (as embodied in the basic Decision) is determined upon the basis of an estimate procedure essentially similar to the basic estimate. There is thus a series of subsidiary estimates for this purpose. Such estimates tend to be abbreviated and informal, since the necessary data, and often much of the consideration as to the subsidiary courses of action, may be available from the basic estimate.

Unless the detailed operations are of such a character as to require development into subsidiary plans as a basis for subsidiary directives, such operations are merely embodied, in the form of tasks or otherwise as may be appropriate, in the basic plan. In the excepted cases, where subsidiary plans, in detailed form, are necessary or desirable, such a plan may be the result of a more formal and specialized subsidiary estimate.

Chapter VII is devoted to a discussion of the second step.

The problem involved in the first step has been conveniently termed the basic problem because it is directly concerned with the attainment of the a.s.signed objective (page 81). The solution of the basic problem in the first step, and of its corollary in the second step, completes the planning stage.

The Third Step

The third step consists of the formulation, and--if appropriate--the issue, of the directives which convey to the subordinate the will and intent of the commander. From the mental standpoint, the third step begins when the commander forms the intent of immediately promulgating his directives for the execution of the planned action. Whether or not the third step is partially combined with the second, its problem is a separate one. Its complete solution inaugurates the action planned in the second step.

The third step is discussed and developed in Chapter VIII.

The Fourth Step

The fourth step, which calls for mental effort in the solution of the problem of supervising the action, requires a constant, close observation of the unfolding of the original situation. The procedure employed is customarily termed The Running Estimate of the Situation.

Only an alert commander can invariably determine whether the situation is unfolding along the lines desired by him, as promulgated in the directives of the third step. In effect, the commander, after action is begun, considers the changing situation as a variable in the problem presented for his solution by the original (basic) situation.

With the march of events, he is, therefore, constantly critical to detect whether variations from the original situation are in accordance with his design or whether these variations have introduced new incentives which demand modification or alteration of his plan, or its complete abandonment.

The fourth step is discussed and developed in Chapter IX.

Sequence of Events in the Four Steps

When all of the elements of the entire procedure of the four steps are present, they take, from the viewpoint of the same commander throughout, the following form:

(1) First step: The commander, confronted with a strategical situation (page 83), makes a strategical estimate and comes to a strategical Decision. The problem, the estimate, and the Decision are basic.

(2) Second step: The commander now is confronted with a particular problem, one proceeding from his basic problem and involving the details of a plan of execution to carry out the Decision reached in the first step; this problem consists, itself, of numerous other problems of detail, which require solution by the commander himself.

The basic Decision has embodied an outlined plan, strategical in nature, for an operation to accomplish the motivating task of the first step. This plan requires resolution into the detailed operations necessary for its full accomplishment.

Each such detailed operation, as part of the outlined plan embodied in the strategical Decision, calls for a proper estimate. Though usually not formal in nature, more especially if the necessary data can be found in the basic estimate, such estimates are fundamentally the same as for the basic problem. The a.s.sembly of such detailed operations results in the formulation of a basic plan.

At this point, additional problems may present themselves, these being frequently tactical in nature. Such, for example, may be sortie plans, approach plans, and Battle Plans. Other specialized plans (training, intelligence, logistics, etc.) may be needed. The data essential for the solution of such problems are more detailed than for the usual strategical basic problem. In some instances, such subsidiary plans may be developed directly from the basic Decision by procedures distinctive of the second step. In other instances, solution may require an additional subsidiary estimate, along the lines typical of the first step. These subsidiary estimates lead to subsidiary decisions, which in turn require to be resolved into the necessary detailed operations.

(3) Third step: In the third step, the directives, if the basic problem was strategical in nature, will be of a strategical character.

However, if subsidiary tactical problems were also involved, tactical directives will frequently be included. Logistics directives and other specialized instructions may also be a feature.

(4) Fourth step: The supervision of the planned action, in the fourth step, may involve a new strategical problem, perhaps several. In such event each new basic problem will initiate a new series of problems, with corresponding directives, as described above. Changes in strategical plans may be called for. If no strategical changes are involved, there may nevertheless be introduced one or more new tactical or logistics problems, with corresponding changes in the subsequent procedure. The fourth step may, however, merely involve changes in supporting plans (tactical, logistics, etc.), with resultant changes in the directives involved. Finally, the fourth step may involve changes, for clarification, in the directives formulated in the third step.