(Purpose) in order to a.s.sist in the successful execution of (statement of the superior's general plan).

The words "a.s.sist in", etc., may frequently be understood and therefore omitted.

The foregoing expression of a mission affords, as later explained (Chapter VI), a method for clear visualization of the effect desired by higher authority. (See also page 84.)

All of his a.s.signed tasks which materially influence the commander's Decision (hereinafter discussed) are properly included in his mission; other tasks, naturally, may be omitted in this connection. In the case of a double or multiple task (page 86), all the tasks may be related to a single purpose, or the included tasks may each, or in certain combinations, be linked separately to appropriate purposes.

Survey of Factors of Fighting Strength. The feasibility and acceptability of action for the attainment of an objective are dependent (see the Fundamental Military Principle--page 41) on the factors of fighting strength. Fighting strength (page 35) is derived from the means available and opposed, as influenced by the characteristics of the theater of operations. A survey of these factors, in proper detail according to the nature of the problem, is therefore a necessary phase in the process of its solution. Such a survey completes the basis for the study of courses of action.

Courses of Action. The estimate process naturally takes account (page 80) of methods for attaining the objective indicated in the a.s.signed task. The military profession has, from time to time, applied a variety of terms to designate such methods. Terms so used include, among others, "plans open to us" (or "to the enemy"), "lines of action", and "courses of action". The last-noted, having been standard in our naval service for many years, is the term used in this discussion.

Each course of action is thus a plan of military operations for the attainment of the a.s.signed objective, and each thus indicates (page 37) "an act or a series of acts" which may be undertaken to that end.

Until a final selection is made for embodiment in the Decision, each course of action is a tentative solution of the problem. For the reason given below, a course of action, while under consideration as a tentative solution of the problem, is also correctly conceived as indicating an objective and, in proper detail, the action for its attainment.

When embodied in the Decision, the adopted course of action or combination of courses becomes the commander's general plan (or the basis thereof) for the employment of his force; such a general plan will naturally indicate the commander's general objective (page 49) and, in proper detail, the action to be taken for its attainment (page 44).

The objective may be specifically stated or may be inferred (see page 82; also page 84 for the corresponding discussion of the expression of tasks); but, in any event, clear thinking demands that the objective be definitely envisaged. There is a manifest advantage in such definite envisaging of the objectives involved in courses of action. Suitability as to the appropriate effect desired--the first requirement in the selection of a correct objective (page 51)--is much more readily tested on this basis. The practical bearing of this fact becomes apparent during the early stages (Chapter VI) of the process of solving military problems.

Frequent examples of naval courses of action include (see page 92):

(1) "To destroy the enemy force." Here the objective, "destruction of the enemy force", is specifically indicated.

(2) "To divert the enemy force." Here also the objective, in this case "diversion of the enemy force", is specifically indicated.

(3) "To evade the enemy." Here again the objective, "evasion of the enemy", is specifically indicated.

(4) "To cover friendly and neutral trade." Here the objective, "protection of friendly and neutral trade by the utilization of advantageous covering positions", is more or less inferred.

(5) "To escort trade." Here the objective, "protection of trade by escorting it in convoys", is more or less inferred.

(6) "To patrol the trade routes." Here the objective, e.g., "protection of trade by patrolling the trade routes", is inferred.

(7) "To raid." Here the objective, e.g., "infliction of loss and damage by raiding", is inferred.

In the foregoing instances, the action to be taken is indicated in general terms. The extent to which the action may properly be indicated depends on the nature of the problem and is necessarily left to the judgment of the commander. Two possibilities, between which there may be various intermediate cases, are as follows:

(a) To destroy the enemy force by simultaneous attacks on the escort and convoy.

(b) To destroy the enemy force by an attack with the main force on the escort, following this immediately by an attack on the convoy with a flanking force before the convoy can scatter so widely as to make ineffective the pursuit of any of its units.

For a further application, it will be noted that the national policies referred to early in this discussion (page 7) are national courses of action, considered and adopted as methods of attaining national objectives.

The expression "courses of action", in the sense of a plan considered or adopted as a solution of the problem, has the defect that it appears to emphasize the action, rather than the paramount component, i.e., the objective. So long as this fact is borne in mind, the limitations of the term "courses of action" need not operate to influence, adversely, the solution of the problem.

As noted above, the commander brings to mind courses of action by the mental act of "envisaging", i.e., "viewing with the mind's eye or conceptionally", "seeing as a mental image", bringing fully and distinctively to view. How is this done?

Although the time available for the process depends on the particular problem, the process itself is the same for all. During the clarification of the problem, the commander will have entertained certain ideas,--ideas as to such matters as the existing situation, the desired new situation, the possible physical objectives, the relative positions and movements of the forces involved, and related matters. His training and experience cause these ideas to evoke others, which are a.s.sociated in his mind with problems of the past,--in particular, with the bearing of such ideas on the outcome of those problems.

This process of thinking, if it is to be effective as well as reflective, requires mental access to certain sources of ideas. These sources may lie in the study of history, or in the wealth of doctrine and instructions gathered into official manuals and into other professional writings, or in the commander's own practical experience.

Logicians who have investigated this natural process point out that suggested solutions are the resurrection of ideas from past experience. Good thinking demands access to a large storehouse of ideas connected in various and flexible ways. The best available knowledge is the main source from which reflective thinking obtains relevant and promising suggestions for a solution.

By such resort to a.n.a.logy, the commander utilizes the acc.u.mulations of past experience. Sometimes he finds that the courses of action thus suggested are exactly suitable as tentative solutions for his problem.

In other instances, of course, only parts of the present situation are found to be a.n.a.logous to those previously encountered. Even then, however, the similarity of the facts may be helpful in providing suggestions. Guidance based on limited or partial similarity has been demonstrated to be better than purely intuitive thinking.

The commander cannot be content, however, to depend wholly on the guidance of the past. Sometimes, moreover, he may not be able to obtain suggestions by a.n.a.logy. New suggestions, ideas not drawn from past experience, are very desirable; they are possible, also, in the sense that the result of the a.n.a.lysis of past experience may be rea.s.sembled, in imagination, in novel ways. New courses of action, overlooked in the past, may be contrived. Original combinations, not previously entertained, may be devised. Readiness to employ the novel and the new, as well as to utilize the old, is a prime qualification for command.

Reflective thinking of this nature requires adequate knowledge of the capabilities of weapons, so that new possibilities may be perceived as to coordination in their use. While a.n.a.logy looks backward to find applicable lessons, the search for novelty seeks suggestions from potentialities not heretofore utilized.

The development of the full possibilities of new weapons is an important source of forward thinking. Such thinking constantly integrates the current developments in war. The competent commander does not wait for history to be made; he makes it.

Familiarity with experimentation, research, and new performance is also a fruitful source of suggestions. When used, this method results in advance demands by the armed forces for new weapons not yet supplied.

Closely allied to a.n.a.logy is the application of ordered and cla.s.sified knowledge as to the nature of warfare. Aware of the effects which can be brought about by the weapons at his disposal, the commander identifies his objective with one or more of these effects.

The application of ordered and cla.s.sified knowledge of naval warfare starts, naturally, with a consideration of its objectives, and proceeds thereafter to the study of the various cla.s.ses of operations which may be utilized to this end. Naval effort has as its objective the keeping open of sea communications (see page 62). Command of the sea exists for one belligerent when he possesses and can exercise the ability to move surface traffic, while also being able to prevent the enemy from doing so.

Naval warfare, therefore, logically includes operations for the purpose of gaining, maintaining, or disputing command of sea areas, especially under conditions where freedom of movement and the keeping open of sea communications are of vital importance.

Such operations may be cla.s.sified under the headings:

(1) For securing command of sea areas, (2) In sea areas not under command, and (3) In sea areas under command.

On the basis of this cla.s.sification, specific operations, broadly considered, appear to be limited in number. As to cla.s.sification (1), applicable operations are: to destroy the enemy naval forces, to contain them, or to divert them. For (2), applicable operations are: to raid, to make war against enemy trade, to attack or defend naval lines of communication, and to conduct amphibious warfare requiring overseas movement. For (3), applicable operations are: to blockade trade, to defend own coastal and critical areas, to safeguard expeditions against enemy territory, and to carry out offensive operations against enemy coastal objectives.

Manifestly, each such operation, broadly viewed, may be considered, in an estimate of the situation, as a course of action. Each such course of action (or operation) will involve, if developed into a more or less complete plan of action, numerous detailed operations which const.i.tute parts of the whole. (See page 37.)

There can be no rigid line of demarcation, always applicable, between courses of action and the more detailed operations pertaining thereto.

For example, "to raid" may be, in one instance, an operation of such a character, from the viewpoint of the commander, as to be envisaged, correlatively with "to destroy", as one of his courses of action. Yet, in another problem, a raid may be visualized, properly, as a detailed operation pertaining, in a subordinate capacity, to a more comprehensive operation envisaged as a course of action "to destroy".

Similarly, what is a broad course of action from the viewpoint of one echelon in the chain of command, may be correctly viewed, on a higher echelon, as a detailed operation. Operations a.s.signed in tasks imposed by higher authority become the basis for the determination of courses of action on the next lower echelon, a procedure which continues throughout the chain of command until specialized, on the lowest echelons, in the form of a simplified routine (see page 84).

While the list of courses of action given above is made up from the viewpoint of broad strategical problems, a similar list can be a.s.sembled for other problems. For example, the order, "Destroy enemy naval forces", if taken as the motivating task of a tactical estimate, will be the basis for certain courses of action, const.i.tuting, when complete (see below), a well-recognized general plan for a naval battle. This plan will in turn call for various detailed operations on the part of the several subdivisions of the force under the commander who makes the estimate (see page 95).

As a tentative solution of the problem a course of action may be complete or partial, i.e., it may, if carried out, provide for the complete attainment of the objective; or, such complete attainment may require a combination of several of the courses of action under study.

The exclusive consideration of courses of action of the complete type possesses the advantage of minimizing the total number of solutions under study. This simplifies the procedure of a.n.a.lysis and of comparing courses of action with each other, because of the relatively small number of courses to be tested and to be compared.

However, it is frequently difficult, and sometimes impossible, to visualize complete courses of action, especially during the early stages of the estimate. Sometimes the initial visualization of partial courses and their eventual combination into a complete solution will be found necessary.

Therefore, either or both of the foregoing systems of formulating courses of action may be found appropriate, according to individual preference and the nature of the particular problem.

Individuals, comparable with respect to knowledge, appear to vary greatly in their ability to produce the appropriate suggestion, as to courses of action, at the right time. The reason for this phenomenon is not altogether clear, but it is known that thinking seems to be limited not merely by the range of knowledge, but by whatever part of it becomes available when needed. This point invites attention to another procedure which is open to the commander with respect to stimulating reflective thinking. This procedure recognizes the fact that, when two or more minds attack a problem, together, the combined effort often increases the applied mental power. This fact is universally recognized, for example, in the utilization of staff a.s.sistance (page 13).

Inherent and acquired ability have unquestionably much to do with the possibilities of visualizing single courses of action with respect to their completeness as to attainment of the objective. One method of visualization seems to be the mental picturization of more or less detailed operations, followed by their combination, through rapid synthesis, into complete courses of action.

An example of this method would occur where several rather specific operations were visualized, involving seizure of certain localities as a defensive measure. If it were then observed that the objective in each such case was "denial to the enemy of a particular naval-base site in the area ABCD", an appropriate expression of a comprehensive course of action would be "to deny the enemy naval-base sites in the area ABCD".

Another method of visualizing appropriate courses of action seems to involve initial recognition, in the first instance, of such courses as broad and comprehensive general plans, without first visualizing and combining their details. This method appears to be more usual after considerable experience or training. It is therefore possible that this second method is merely a practiced development of the first, the process of synthesis being so rapidly accomplished that it becomes subconscious.