Upon the nature of the object depends the fundamental distinction between _offensive_ and _defensive_, upon which all strategical calculation must be based. Consequently, the solution of every strategical problem, whether of Major or Minor Strategy, depends primarily on the nature of the object in view.

All objects, whether ulterior or not, may be positive or negative.

A _positive_ object is where we seek to a.s.sert or acquire something for ourselves.

A _negative_ object is where we seek to deny the enemy something or prevent his gaining something.

Where the object is positive, Strategy is offensive.

Where the object is negative, Strategy is defensive.

This is the only certain test by which we can decide whether any particular operation is offensive or defensive.

Ulterior objects are not necessarily the same in their nature as the primary or secondary objects which lead up to them; _e.g._, ulterior objects may be offensive, while one or more of the primary objects may be defensive, and _vice versa_. For example, in the Russo-j.a.panese War the ulterior object of the war (to drive Russians from Manchuria) was offensive (positive). The ulterior object of the fleet (to cover the invasion) was defensive (negative). Its primary object to effect this was to attack and destroy the Russian naval force. This was offensive (positive).

_Relation of Offensive to Defensive_

The Offensive, being positive in its aim, is naturally the more effective form of war and, as a rule, should be adopted by the stronger Power. The Defensive, being negative in its aim, is the more lasting form of war, since it requires less force to keep what one has than to take what is another's, and, as a rule, is adopted by the weaker Power. In most cases where the weaker side successfully a.s.sumes the offensive, it is due to his doing so before the enemy's mobilization or concentration is complete, whereby the attacking force is able to deal in succession with locally inferior forces of the enemy.

The advantages of the Offensive are well known.

Its disadvantages are:--

That it grows weaker as it advances, by prolonging its communications, and that it tends to operations on unfamiliar ground.

The advantages of the Defensive are chiefly:--

Proximity to the base of supply and repair stations, familiar ground, facility for arranging surprise by counter attack, and power of organising in advance.

The disadvantages of the Defensive are mainly moral. They become, however, real and practical when the enemy's objective or line of operations cannot be ascertained, for then we have to spread or attenuate our force to cover all probable objectives, but this disadvantage can be neutralised when it is possible to secure an interior position.

_Functions and Characteristics of the Defensive_

True Defensive means waiting for a chance to strike.

To a.s.sume the defensive does not necessarily mean that we do not feel strong enough to attack. It may mean that we see our way by using the defensive to force certain movements on the enemy which will enable us to hit harder.

A well-designed defensive will always threaten or conceal an attack. Unless it does this it will not deflect the enemy's strategy in our favour. Thus, in 1756, the French, by a.s.suming the defensive in the Channel, threatened an attack on our coasts, and concealed their attack on Minorca.

This power inherent in the defensive is peculiarly strong in naval warfare, since the mobility of fleets enables them to pa.s.s instantaneously from the defensive to the offensive without any warning. When we a.s.sume the defensive because we are too weak for the offensive, we still do not lay aside attack. The whole strength and essence of the defensive is the counter-stroke. Its cardinal idea is to force the enemy to attack us in a position where he will expose himself to a counter-stroke.

The stock instance upon which naval defensive is usually condemned is the burning of our ships at Chatham by the Dutch. But in that case we were not _acting on the defensive_ at all. We had laid up our battle fleet and were doing nothing. We were purely pa.s.sive, in expectation of peace. It is really an instance of the successful use of defensive _by the Dutch_. Being no longer strong enough for a general offensive, they a.s.sumed the defensive, and induced us to lay up our ships and so expose ourselves to a counter-stroke. It was a counterstroke by the worsted belligerent to get better terms of peace.

So far is the defensive from excluding the idea of attack, that it may consist entirely of a series of minor offensive operations. Clausewitz calls it "a shield of blows." It is often called _offensive-defensive,_ or _active defence_. Neither term is really necessary. For a defensive which excludes the idea of offence or action is not war at all-at least at sea.

The old Elizabethan term _Preventive_ most closely expresses the idea.

The most important function of the defensive is that of covering, b.u.t.tressing, and intensifying the main attack. No plan of campaign, however strong the offensive intention, is perfect which does not contemplate the use of the defensive. Without some use of the defensive the cardinal principle of concentration can rarely be fully developed. To develop the highest possible degree of concentration upon the main object or objective, the defensive must be a.s.sumed everywhere else. Because it is only by using the defensive in the minor or less important theatres of operation that the forces in those theatres can be reduced to the minimum of security, and the maximum of concentration can thereby be obtained in the main theatre.

In considering the defensive as a general plan of campaign the maxim is: If not relatively strong enough to a.s.sume the offensive, a.s.sume the defensive till you become so--

(1) Either by inducing the enemy to weaken himself by attacks or otherwise;

(2) Or by increasing your own strength, by developing new forces or securing allies.

It must always be remembered that, except as a preparation or a cover for offensive action, the defensive is seldom or never of any use; for by the continued use of the defensive alone nothing can be acquired, though the enemy may be prevented from acquiring anything. But where we are too weak to a.s.sume the offensive it is often necessary to a.s.sume the defensive, and wait in expectation of time turning the scale in our favour and permitting us to acc.u.mulate strength relatively greater than the enemy's; we then pa.s.s to the offensive, for which our defensive has been a preparation. At sea we have had little occasion for the defensive as a general plan. But that is no reason for neglecting its study. In despising the defensive ourselves we have consistently ignored the strength it gives our enemies. The bulk of our naval history is the story of how we have been baffled and thwarted by our enemies a.s.suming the defensive at sea in support of their offensive on land. We have seldom succeeded in treating this att.i.tude with success, and it is only by studying the defensive we can hope to do so.

_Offensive Operations used with a Defensive Intention_

(A) Counter attacks.

(B) Diversions.

_Counter attacks_ are those which are made upon an enemy who exposes himself anywhere in the theatre of his offensive operations. It is this form of attack which const.i.tutes what Clausewitz calls the "surprise advantage of defence."

_Diversions_ are similar operations undertaken against an enemy outside the limit of his theatre of offensive operations.

Diversions are designed to confuse his strategy, to distract his attention, and to draw off his forces from his main attack. If well planned, they should divert a force greater than their own. They should, therefore, be small. The nearer they approach the importance of a real attack the less likely they are to divert a force greater than their own.

Diversions involve a breach of the law of concentration, and it is only their power of diverting or containing a larger force than their own that justifies their use.

This power depends mainly on suddenness and mobility, and these qualities are most highly developed in combined expeditions.

_Diversions_ must be carefully distinguished from _eccentric attacks.

Eccentric attacks_ are true offensive movements. They have a positive object, _i.e._, they aim to acquire something from the enemy; whereas diversions have a negative object, _i.e._, they aim at preventing the enemy doing or acquiring something. Eccentric attacks are usually made in greater force than diversions.

Examples.--Diversion.--Our raid on Washington in 1815. Landing force, about 4,000 men. Object, according to official instruction, "a diversion on the coasts of United States of America in favour of the army employed in the defence of Canada"; _i.e._, the intention was negative--preventive--defensive. _Eccentric Attack._--Operations against New Orleans in 1815. Intended force, 15,000 to 20,000 men. Object, "to obtain command of the embouchure of the Mississippi, and, secondly, to occupy some important and valuable possession, by the restoration of which the conditions of peace might be improved, &c."; _i.e._, the intention was positive--to acquire. Compare Rochefort Expedition (diversion) with those against Martinique and Belleisle (eccentric attacks) in the Seven Years'

War.

This distinction gives a threefold cla.s.sification of combined expeditions, as used by Elizabethan strategists, viz., raids, incursions, and invasions.

These correspond respectively with our modern diversions, eccentric attacks, and true direct offensive.

LIMITED AND UNLIMITED WARS

From the nature of the ulterior object we get an important cla.s.sification of wars, according to whether such object is _limited_ or _unlimited_.

(1) _War with limited object_ ("limited war") is where the object is merely to take from the enemy some particular part of his possessions or interests; _e.g._, Spanish-American War, where the object was the liberation of Cuba.

(2) _War with an unlimited object_ is where the object is to overthrow the enemy completely, so that to save himself from destruction he must agree to do our will (become subservient); _e.g._, Franco-German War.

PLANS OF WAR

_System of Operations_

Having determined the nature of the war by the nature of its object (_i.e._, whether it is offensive or defensive and whether it is limited or unlimited), Strategy has to decide on the system of operations or "plan of the war."

Apart from the means at our disposal a plan of war depends mainly upon--

(1) The theatre of the war.

(2) The various theatres of operation available within it.