Consequently, since the nature of the war varies with the object, it may be defensive in one theatre of operations and offensive in another.

Where the operations are defensive in character any special movement or movements may be offensive.

OBJECTIVE

An objective is "any point or force against which an offensive movement is directed." Thus where the _object_ in any theatre of operation is to get command of a certain sea in which the enemy maintains a fleet, that fleet will usually be the _objective_.

LINES OF OPERATION

A line of operation is "the area of land or sea through which we operate from our base or starting point to reach our objectives."

Lines of operation may be exterior or interior. We are said to hold the interior lines when we hold such a position, in regard to a theatre of operations, that we can reach its chief objective points, or forces, more quickly than the enemy can move to their defence or a.s.sistance. Such a position is called an interior position. "Exterior Lines" and "Exterior Position" are the converse of these.

LINES OF COMMUNICATION

This expression is used of three different things:--

(1) _Lines of supply_, running from the base of operations to the point which the operating force has reached.

(2) _Lines of lateral communication_ by which several forces engaged in one theatre of operations can communicate with each other and move to each other's support.

(3) _Lines of retreat_, which are lines of supply reversed, _i.e._, leading back to the base.

These three ideas are best described by the term "lines of pa.s.sage and communication," which we had in use at the end of the eighteenth century.

Ash.o.r.e, lines of pa.s.sage and communication are roads, railways, waterways, &c.

At sea, they may be regarded as those waters over which pa.s.ses the normal course of vessels proceeding from the base to the objective or the force to be supplied.

In Land Strategy the great majority of problems are problems of communication. Maritime Strategy has never been regarded as hinging on communications, but probably it does so even more than Land Strategy, as will appear from a consideration of maritime communications, and the extent to which they are the main preoccupation of Naval operations.

MARITIME COMMUNICATIONS

The various kinds of Maritime Communications for or against which a fleet may have to operate are:--

(1) Its own communications, or those of its adversary (which correspond to the communications of armies operating ash.o.r.e). These tend to increase in importance strategically with the increasing hunger of modern fleets (for coal, ammunition, &c).

(2) The communications of an army operating from an advanced oversea base, that is communication between the advanced and the main base.

(3) Trade Routes, that is the communications upon which depend the national resources and the supply of the main bases, as well as the "lateral" or connecting communications between various parts of belligerents' possessions.

N.B.--Such "lines of pa.s.sage and communication" are the preoccupation of Naval Strategy; that is to say, problems of Naval Strategy can be reduced to terms of "pa.s.sage and communication" and this is probably the best method of solving them.

NAVAL STRATEGY CONSIDERED AS A QUESTION OF Pa.s.sAGE AND COMMUNICATION

By "Naval Strategy" we mean the art of conducting the operations of the Fleet. Such operations must always have for their object "pa.s.sage and communication"; that is, the Fleet is mainly occupied in guarding our own communications and seizing those of the enemy.

PROOF I.--_Deductive_.--We say the aim of Naval Strategy is to get command of the sea. What does this mean? It is something quite different from the Military idea of occupying territory, for the sea cannot be the subject of political dominion or ownership. We cannot subsist upon it (like an army on conquered territory), nor can we exclude neutrals from it. Admiral Colomb's theory of "conquest of water territory," therefore, involves a false a.n.a.logy, and is not safe as the basis of a strategical system. What then is the value of the sea in the political system of the world? Its value is as a means of communication between States and parts of States. Therefore the "command of the sea" means the control of communications in which the belligerents are adversely concerned.

COROLLARY.--The command of the sea can never be, like the conquest of territory, the ulterior object of a war, unless it be a purely maritime war, as were approximately our wars with the Dutch in the 17th century, but it may be a primary or immediate object, and even the ulterior object of particular operations.

PROOF II.--_Inductive_, from history or past experience.--History shows that the actual functions of the Fleet (except in purely maritime wars) have been threefold.

1. The prevention or securing of alliances (_i.e._, deterring or persuading neutrals as to partic.i.p.ating in the war).

EXAMPLES.--The operations of Rooke in the first years of the War of the Spanish Succession, 1702-04, to secure the adhesion of Savoy and Portugal to the Grand Alliance. Operations of Nelson to maintain the alliance of the Kingdom of Naples.

In the first case there came a crisis when it was more important to demonstrate to Savoy and Portugal what they stood to lose by joining Louis XIV than to act immediately against the Toulon Fleet. In the second, the Neapolitan Alliance was essential to our operations in the Eastern Mediterranean; the destruction of the Toulon Fleet was not.

2. The protection or destruction of commerce.

3. The furtherance or hindrance of military operations ash.o.r.e.

NOTE.--The above is the best working "Definition of Naval Strategy," as emphasising its intimate connection with diplomatic, financial, and military aspects of major strategy.

These functions may be discharged in two ways:--

(1) By direct territorial attacks, threatened or performed (bombardment, landing, raiding parties, &c).

(2) By getting command of the sea, _i.e._, establishing ourselves in such a position that we can control the maritime communications of all parties concerned, so that we can operate by sea against their territory, commerce, and allies, and they cannot operate against ours.

NOTE.--The power of the second method, by controlling communications, is out of all proportion to the first--direct attack. Indeed, the first can seldom be performed with any serious effect without the second.

Thus, from this point of view also, it is clear that Naval Strategy is mainly a question of communications.

But not entirely. Circ.u.mstances have arisen when the Fleet must discharge part of its function by direct action before there is time to get general control of the communications. (That is, political and military considerations may deflect normal operation of Naval Strategy.)

EXAMPLE.--Rooke's capture of Gibraltar in 1704, in the face of the unshaken Toulon Fleet. j.a.panese invasion of Manchuria.

COMMAND OF THE SEA

Command of the sea exists only in a state of war. If we say we have command of the sea in time of peace it is a rhetorical expression meaning that we have (a) adequate Naval positions; (b) an adequate Fleet to secure the command when war breaks out.

VARIOUS CONDITIONS OF COMMAND

1. It may be (a) general; (b) local.

(a) _General command_ is secured when the enemy is no longer able to act dangerously against our line of pa.s.sage and communication or to defend his own, or (in other words) when he is no longer able to interfere seriously with our trade or our military or diplomatic operations.

This condition exists practically when the enemy is no longer able to send squadrons to sea.

NOTE.--Command of the sea does not mean that the enemy can do absolutely nothing, but that he cannot _seriously_ interfere with the undertakings by which we seek to secure the object of the war, or to force our will upon him.

(b) _Local command_ implies a state of things in which we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our pa.s.sage and communication in one or more theatres of operation.

2. Both local and general command may be (a) temporary; (b) permanent.

(a) _Temporary command_ is when we are able to prevent the enemy from interfering with our pa.s.sage and communication in all or some theatres of operation during the period required for gaining the object in view (_i.e._, the object of a particular operation or of a particular campaign).

This condition existed after Togo's first action.