It will be noticed that in the Raymond letter the President left out all reference to slavery. In previous ones he had insisted on the _abandonment of slavery by the South_ as well as the restoration of the Union. On questions of amnesty, confiscation, and all other matters the President was ready to grant everything to the South.( 9)

This letter was never delivered. Mr. Raymond, in personal interviews with Mr. Lincoln, became convinced the latter understood the situation and the sentiment of the country better than he and his committee did, and the matter was dropped.

It must not be a.s.sumed that the President for a moment gave up his long settled purpose to insist on the abolition of slavery as a condition of peace. In his annual Message to Congress, December, 1864, in expressing his views and purposes on the subject of terminating the war, he says:

"In presenting the abandonment of armed resistance to the national authority on the part of the insurgents as the only indispensable condition to ending the war on the part of the government, I retract nothing heretofore said as to slavery. I repeat the declaration made a year ago, that 'While I remain in my present position I shall not attempt to retract or modify the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation nor shall I return to slavery any person who is free by the terms of that proclamation, or by any of the acts of Congress.' If the people should, by whatever mode or means, make it an Executive duty to re-enslave such persons, another, and not I, must be their instrument to perform it. In stating a single condition of peace, I mean simply to say that the war will cease on the part of the government whenever it shall have ceased on the part of those who began it."

Mr. Lincoln was triumphantly re-elected, but notwithstanding this and the foreshadowed collapse of the Confederacy, Francis P. Blair, Sen., a veteran statesman who had flourished in Jackson's time, came forward in the hope that he might become a successful mediator between the North and the South. He personally gave the President hints of his wishes in this respect, but received from the latter no encouragement, save the remark: "Come to me after Savannah falls." Sherman took Savannah, December 22, 1864. Mr. Lincoln, without permitting Mr. Blair to reveal to him his plans in detail, on December 28th, wrote and signed a card: "Allow the bearer, F.

P. Blair, Sr., to pa.s.s our lines, go South, and return."

With this credential Mr. Blair went to Grant at City Point, and under a flag of truce sent communications to "Jefferson Davis, President," etc., etc. The effect of one of the messages was to request an interview with Mr. Davis to confer upon plans that might ultimately "lead to something practicable"--peace. After some vexatious delay, Mr. Blair was allowed to go to Richmond, where, January 12, 1865, Davis accorded him an interview.

Mr. Blair explained to Mr. Davis that he came without President Lincoln's knowledge of his plans but with the latter's knowledge of his purpose to try and open peace negotiations. After some preliminary talk Mr. Blair read to Mr. Davis an elaborate paper containing his "suggestions." These covered a reference to slavery, "the cause of all our woes," saying it was doomed and hence no longer an insurmountable obstruction to pacification, adding that as the South proposed to use slaves to "conquer a peace," and to secure its independence, "their deliverance from bondage" must follow.(10) With slavery abolished, Mr. Blair suggested the war against the Union became a war for monarchy. Reference was then made to Maximilian's reign in Mexico, under Austrian and French protection, and of its danger to free inst.i.tutions by establishing a "Bonaparte-Hapsburg dynasty on our Southern flank." Mr. Davis was complimented over his position being such as to be the instrument to avert the danger. It was suggested that Juarez at the head of the "Liberals of Mexico" could be persuaded to "devolve all the power he can command on President Davis--a dictatorship if necessary --to restore the rights of Mexico." Mr. Davis was to use his veteran Confederates and Mexican recruits, with, if necessary, "mult.i.tudes of the army of the North, officers and men" to drive out the invaders, uphold the Monroe Doctrine, and thus "restore the Mexican Republic." Mr. Blair further suggested that if Mr.

Davis accomplished all this it would "ally his name with Washington and Jackson as a defender of the liberty of the country" and if "in delivering Mexico he should model its States in form and principle to adapt them to our Union and add a new Southern constellation to its benignant sky," he would attain further glory.

This and more talk of like kind seemed to command Davis' attention, for Mr. Blair says he p.r.o.nounced the scheme "possible to be solved."

Mr. Davis declared he was "thoroughly for popular government."

There was nothing agreed upon, though the interview covered much ground as reported by Mr. Blair. Mr. Davis was evidently anxious for some arrangement, for on the 12th of January he addressed to Mr. Blair, who was still in Richmond, a note saying among other things he had "no disposition to find obstacles in forms," and was willing "to enter into negotiations for peace; that he was ready to appoint a commissioner to meet one on the part of the United States to confer with a view to secure peace to the _two countries_."

This note was carried to Washington by Mr. Blair and shown to President Lincoln, who, January 18th, addressed him a note saying, he had constantly been and still was ready to appoint an agent to meet one appointed by Mr. Davis, "with the view of securing peace to the people of our _one common country_." With Mr. Lincoln's note Mr. Blair returned to Richmond, and without any authority from any source, shifted to a new project, namely, that Grant and Lee should be authorized to negotiate. This failed to ripen into anything. Mr. Lincoln's note proffering negotiations looking alone to "peace to the people _of our one common country_" placed Mr.

Davis in a great dilemma. The situation was critical in the extreme.

The Confederate Congress had voted a lack of confidence in Mr.

Davis; Sherman had not only marched to the sea, but was moving up the Atlantic coast through the Carolinas; Lee reported his army had not two days' rations; and many of Davis' advisers had declared success impossible. At last Mr. Davis, on consultation with Vice- President Stephens and his Cabinet, decided to appoint a commission, composed of Mr. Stephens, Senator R. M. T. Hunter, and ex-Secretary of War John A. Campbell. This commission was directed (January 28, 1865) to go to Washington for informal conference with President Lincoln "_upon the issues involved in the existing war, and for the purpose of securing peace to the two countries_." Mr. Davis was advised by his Secretary of State, Mr. Benjamin, to instruct the commissioners to confer upon the subject of Mr. Lincoln's letter. The instructions were not in accordance with Mr. Lincoln's note, nor were they warranted by anything he had ever said.

Notwithstanding this, the commissioners appeared at the Union lines and asked permission to proceed to Washington as "Peace Commissioners."

On this being telegraphed to Washington, Major Eckert of the War Department was sent to Grant's headquarters, with directions to admit them, provided they would say, in writing, they came to confer on the basis of the President's note of January 18th. Before Major Eckert arrived, they had, in violation of their instructions, asked permission "to proceed to Washington to hold a conference with President Lincoln upon the subject of the existing war, and with a view of ascertaining upon what terms it may be terminated, in pursuance of the course indicated by him in his letter to Mr. Blair of January 18, 1865." They were admitted to Grant's headquarters and Mr. Lincoln was advised of their last request. The latter sent Secretary Seward to Fortress Monroe to meet them. Seward was, in writing, instructed to make known to the commissioners that three indispensable things were necessary: "(1) The restoration of the national authority throughout all the States. (2) No receding by the Executive on the slavery question from the position a.s.sumed thereon in the late annual Message. (3) No cessation of hostilities short of the end of the war, and the disbanding of all forces hostile to the government." On other questions the Secretary was instructed to say the President would act "in a spirit of sincere liberality." Mr. Seward was not definitely to consummate anything.

He started to meet the commissioners on February 1st. Meantime, on the same day, Major Eckert had met them at City Point and informed them of the President's requirements, to which they responded by presenting Davis' written instructions. Major Eckert at once notified them they could not proceed unless strictly in compliance with Mr. Lincoln's terms. This seemingly put an end to the mission of Stephens, Hunter, and Campbell. Grant, being impressed with their anxiety to secure a peace, wired Stanton his impression, and expressed regret that Mr. Lincoln could not have an interview with Stephens and Hunter, if not all three, before their return. The President on reading Grant's dispatch decided to meet the commissioners in person at Fortress Monroe. Mr. Lincoln joined Mr. Seward at this place on the _River Queen_, where they were met by the commissioners on the morning of February 3d. The conference which ensued was wholly without significance. The President was frank and firm, standing by his. .h.i.therto announced ultimatum. Stephens tried to talk about Blair's Mexican scheme; about an armistice and some expedient to "give time to cool." Mr. Lincoln met all suggestions by saying: "The restoration of the Union is a _sine qua non;_" and that there could be no armistice on any other terms.

It is not absolutely certain what was, in detail, proposed or rejected on either side, as no concurrent report was made of the conference and reporters were excluded from it. Mr. Lincoln, according to the commissioners, declared the road to reconstruction for the insurgents was to disband "their armies and permit the national authorities to resume their functions." The President stated he would exercise the power of the Executive with liberality as to the confiscation of property. He is reported to have said also that the effect of the Emanc.i.p.ation Proclamation was to be decided by the courts, giving it as his opinion that as it was a war measure, it would be inoperative for the future as soon as the war ceased; that it would be held to apply only to such slaves as had come under its operation. Mr. Seward called attention to the very recent adoption by Congress of the Thirteenth Amendment to the Const.i.tution. The commissioners report him as saying that if the seceding States would agree to return to the Union they might defeat the ratification of the amendment.

It is apparent that some coloring entered into the statements of Mr. Stephens and party. About the only good point made in the talk about which there is no controversy was made by Mr. Lincoln. Mr.

Hunter, in attempting to persuade the latter that there was high precedent for his treating with people in arms, cited the example of Charles I. of England treating with his subjects in armed rebellion.

To this the President answered: "_I do not profess to be posted in history. On all such matters I will turn you over to Mr. Seward.

All that I distinctly recollect about the case of Charles I. is that he lost his head_."

The commissioners reached Richmond much disappointed, and reported their failure. The effect on the South was depressing. Mr. Stephens seemed to give up the Confederate cause at this time; he departed from Richmond, abandoned the Rebellion and went into retirement.(11) Mr. Davis transmitted his commissioners' report to the Confederate Congress, stating that no terms of settlement could be obtained "other than the conqueror might grant." The last flicker of the Hampton Roads conference was seen in a public meeting held at the African Church in Richmond, February 6, 1865, at which bravado speeches were made by Mr. Davis and others. Mr. Davis announced a belief that they would "compel the Yankees, in less than twelve months, to pet.i.tion us for peace on our own terms."(12)

General E. O. C. Ord, commanding the Army of the James, about February 20th, attempted to inaugurate another peace conference to be conducted through military channels, aided by the wives of certain officers of the two armies. To this end he secured, on a trivial pretext, an interview with General James Longstreet, then commanding the Confederate forces immediately north of Richmond.

Ord, in the interview, referred to the Hampton Roads' conference, stating (according to Longstreet) that the politicians North were afraid to touch the question of peace; that there was no way to open the subject save through officers of the armies; that on the Union side the war had gone on long enough, and that the army officers "should come together as former comrades and friends and talk a little." Ord is reported as saying that the "work as belligerents" should cease; Grant and Lee should have a talk; that Longstreet's wife with a retinue of Confederate officers should first visit Mrs. Grant within the Union lines; that then Mrs. Grant should return the call at Richmond under escort of Union officers, and that thus the ladies could aid Generals Grant and Lee in fixing up peace on terms honorable to both sides. Longstreet took kindly to Ord's talk. Lee met Longstreet at President Davis' house in Richmond. Breckinridge (then Secretary of War) was present. At this meeting it was decided that Longstreet was to seek a further interview with Ord and see how the subject could be opened between Grant and Lee. Longstreet summoned his wife from Lynchburg to Richmond by telegraph. About the last day of February, Ord and Longstreet had another meeting at which Ord suggested that if Lee would write Grant a letter, the latter was prepared to receive it, and thus a military convention could be brought about. Longstreet reported the result of the talk with Ord, and Lee, March 1st, wrote Grant that he was informed that Ord, in a conversation relating to "the possibility of arriving at a satisfactory adjustment of the present _unhappy difficulties_ by means of a military convention,"

had stated that if Lee desired an interview with Grant on the subject, the latter would not decline, provided Lee had authority to act. Lee, in his letter, said he was fully authorized in the premises, and proposed a meeting at the place proposed by Ord and Longstreet, on Monday the 6th. Accompanying Lee's letters was the usual "by-play" letter on an immaterial subject. Grant, on receiving Lee's communication, wired its substance to Secretary Stanton, who laid the matter before President Lincoln at his room at the Capitol whither he had gone to sign bills the last night of a session of Congress. Mr. Lincoln, without advice from any person, took his pen, and with his usual precision wrote:

"The President directs me to say that he wishes you to have no conference with General Lee unless it be for capitulation of General Lee's army, or on some minor or purely military matter. He instructs me to say that you are not to decide, discuss, or confer upon any political questions. Such questions the President holds in his own hands, and will submit them to no military conferences or conventions. Meantime you are to press to the utmost your military advantages."

This perfectly explicit dispatch was shown to Mr. Seward, then handed to Mr. Stanton, who signed and sent it the night of March 3, 1865. Grant, the next day, answered Lee in the light of the dispatch, saying:

"In regard to meeting you, I would state that I have no authority to accede to your proposition for a conference on the subject proposed. Such authority is vested in the President of the United States alone."(13)

Thus ended the Ord-Longstreet attempt to patch up a peace.

There was one more remarkable attempt made (before Lee surrendered) to bring about a peace in part of the Confederacy. General Lew Wallace was ordered, January 22, 1865, "to visit the Rio Grande and Western Texas on a tour of inspection." Shortly after his arrival at Brazos Santiago, by correspondence with the Confederate General J. E. Slaughter, commanding the West District of Texas, and a Colonel Ford, he arranged for a meeting with them at Point Isabel (General Wallace to furnish the refreshments), nominally to discuss matters relating to the rendition of criminals, but really to talk about peace. The conference took place March 12th. General Wallace a.s.sumed only to negotiate a peace for States west of the Mississippi. He did not profess to have any authority from Washington, nor did he offer to make the terms final. He must have been wholly ignorant of the President's dispatch to Grant of March 3d. Wallace's plan was, at Slaughter and Ford's instance, reduced to writing, and addressed to them, to be submitted to the Confederate General J. G. Walker, commanding the Department of Texas. Here it is:

"_Proposition.

"I. That the Confederate military authorities of the Trans- Mississippi States and Territories agree voluntarily to cease opposition, armed and otherwise, to the re-establishment of the authority of the United States Government over all the region above designated.

"II. The proper authorities of the United States on their part guarantee as follows:

"1. That the officers and soldiers at present actually comprising the Confederate Army proper, including its _bona fide attaches_ and employees, shall have, each and all of them, a full release from and against actions, prosecutions, liabilities, and legal proceedings of every kind, so far as the government of the United States is concerned: _Provided_, That if any of such persons choose to remain within the limits of the United States, they shall first take an oath of allegiance to the same. If, however, they or any of them prefer to go abroad for residence in a foreign country, all such shall be at liberty to do so without obligating themselves by an oath of allegiance, taking with them their families and property, with privileges of preparation for such departure.

"2. That such of said officers and soldiers as thus determine to remain in the United States shall, after taking the oath of allegiance to the United States Government, be regarded as citizens of that government, invested as such will all the rights, privileges, and immunities now enjoyed by the most favored citizens thereof.

"3. That the above guaranties shall be extended to all persons now serving as civil officers of the national and State Confederate governments within the region above mentioned, upon their complying with the conditions stated, viz., residence abroad or taking the oath of allegiance.

"4. That persons now private citizens of the region named shall also be included in and receive the same guaranties upon their complying with the same conditions.

"5. As respects rights of property, it is further guaranteed that there shall be no interference with existing t.i.tles, liens, etc., of whatever nature, except those derived from seizures, occupancies, and procedures of confiscation, under and by virtue of Confederate laws, orders, proclamations, and decrees, all of which shall be admitted void from the beginning.

"6. It is further expressly stipulated that the right of property in slaves shall be referred to the discretion of the Congress of the United States.

"Allow me to say, in conclusion, that if the above propositions are received in the spirit they are sent, we can, in my opinion, speedily have a reunited and prosperous people.

"Very truly, gentlemen, your friend and obedient servant,

"Lew Wallace, "Major-General of Volunteers, U. S. Army."(14)

General Wallace forwarded this pretentious proposition, with an elaborate letter, through General Dix to General Grant, who received both about March 29, 1865, but probably made no response thereto.

The Confederate officers submitted the plan to their chief, who, besides severely reprimanding them for entertaining it, wrote General Wallace, March 27, rejecting the proposition, "as to accede to it would be the blackest treason"; adding, that "whenever there was a willingness to treat as equal with equal, an officer of your high rank and character, clothed with proper authority, will not be reduced to the necessity of seeking an obscure corner of the Confederacy to inaugurate negotiations."

The whole story of attempts to negotiate a peace is grotesque, yet the conditions surrounding the North and the South and the stress of the times speak in defence of the ambitious spirits who came to the front and essayed, by negotiations, to put an end to the war.

Providence had another, more fitting and consummate, ending in store, whereby the war should produce results for the good of mankind commensurate with its cost in tears, treasure, and blood.

( 1) _Life of R. E. Lee_, White (Putnam's), pp. 416-17.

( 2) _Mana.s.sas to Appomattox_, p. 204.

( 3) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vii., pp. 367-8.

( 4) _War Between the States_, vol. ii., pp. 557-62, 780; _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. vii., pp. 371-4.

( 5) Jewett must have attended school where the master required the cla.s.s to pa.r.s.e the sentence, "_Dog, I, and father went a- hunting_."

( 6) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. ix., pp. 184-200.

( 7) Vol. ii., p. 610. Also see _Lincoln_ (N. and H.), vol. ix., pp. 201-2.

( 8) The att.i.tude of the Democratic party caused the political friends of President Lincoln the deepest anxiety. In its National platform adopted at Chicago, August 30, 1864, it demanded, "that after four years of failure to restore the Union by the experiment of war, immediate efforts should be made for a cessation of hostilities, with a view to an ultimate convention of the States, or other peaceable means, to the end that at the earliest practicable moment peace may be restored on the basis of the Federal Union of the States."

( 9) _Lincoln_ (Nicolay and Hay), vol. ix., pp. 216-21.

(10) If the reader is curious to know what effort was made by the Confederate authorities to enlist slaves and free negroes as soldiers, he will find interesting correspondence on the subject between Davis, Lee, Longstreet, and others. _War Records_, vol.