A full detailed history of the great campaign of the Wilderness and of the many battles fought in the spring and summer of 1864 in Southeast Virginia and around Richmond and Petersburg will not here be attempted. I shall confine myself to a general story of the campaign, with dates, results of engagements and losses, and some details of the fighting partic.i.p.ated in by troops I was immediately connected with or interested in.

General Grant (April 9, 1864), in a confidential communication to General Meade,( 1) outlined his plan for the early movements of all the princ.i.p.al Union armies. Texas was to be abandoned, save on the Rio Grande, and General Banks, then on Red River, was to concentrate a force, not less than 25,000 strong, at New Orleans to move on Mobile. Sherman was to leave Chattanooga at the same time Meade moved, "Joe Johnston's army being his objective point and the heart of Georgia his ultimate aim"; if successful, Sherman was to "secure the line from Chattanooga to Mobile, with the aid of Banks." General Franz Sigel (then in command of the Department of West Virginia ( 2)), was to start two columns, one from Beverly under General Ord, to endeavor to reach the Tennessee and Virginia Railroad west of Lynchburg, and the other from Charleston, West Virginia, under General George Crook, to strike at Saltville and go thence eastward to join Ord. General Quincy A. Gilmore was to be transferred, with 10,000 men, from South Carolina to General B.

F. Butler at Fortress Monroe, and the latter General was to organize a force of about 23,000 men, under the immediate command of General W. F. Smith, with which, and Gilmore's command, he should "seize City Point and operate against Richmond from the south side of the river," moving simultaneously with Meade's army. To Meade he said: "_Lee's army will be your objective point. Wherever Lee goes there you will go also_." General Burnside, then at Annapolis organizing the Ninth Army Corps, was to reinforce Meade with probably 25,000 men. There was to be naval co-operation on the James. Grant had not then determined on which flank to attack Lee, or whether he would cross the Rapidan above or below the Confederate Army.

All baggage was reduced to the lowest standard possible. "Two wagons to a regiment of 500 men ... for all baggage, exclusive of subsistence stores and ordnance stores. One wagon to a brigade and one to a division headquarters, ... and about two to corps headquarters."

Meade subsequently made a further reduction, and allowed only one wagon to a regiment.

When it was finally determined to move by Lee's right flank, Meade was ordered to have supplies forwarded to White House, on the Pamunkey.( 3)

Sigel was directed to advance a column in co-operation from Martinsburg up the Shenandoah Valley.

Grant, in a confidential dispatch,( 4) April 29th, to Halleck, fixed May 4th as the date for putting the Army of the Potomac in motion, saying:

"My own notions about our line of march are entirely made up, but as circ.u.mstances beyond my control may change them, I will only state that my effort will be to bring Butler's and Meade's forces together."

The next day, on the authority of a rebel officer arrested in Baltimore, who left Lee's army on April 17th, Halleck wired Grant that Lee was about to move Longstreet by the mountain road westward over the Blue Ridge with 20,000 men; that Hill, 50,000 strong, was to force Grant's right at Culpeper, and with three divisions form a junction at Warrenton with Ewell; that all Confederate troops from East Tennessee were to strengthen Lee; that Breckinridge, with 25,000 men in West Virginia, accompanied by Morgan's cavalry, was to force his way down the Kanawha into Ohio, near Gallipolis; that if Lee reached Pennsylvania, Breckinridge was to join him, Morgan's cavalry destroying all railroads to east and west; that Lee's general direction was to be towards Wheeling and Pittsburg; that Richmond's defence was to be left to Beauregard, with Pickett's division of 15,000 men, the Maryland Line, details from hospitals, conscripts, militia of Governor Smith's call (fifty to fifty-five years of age), and a foreign legion of forced aliens.( 5)

This plan, if ever formed, comprehensive as it may have been in conception, was never to be even partially put in execution. It probably originated in the fertile imagination of the rebel officer from whom Halleck obtained it.

In March, 1864, an equally comprehensive plan was conceived by Longstreet, then at Greenville, Tennessee, by which Beauregard was to lead an advance column from the borders of North Carolina through the mountain pa.s.ses, Longstreet to follow through East Tennessee, uniting with Beauregard in Kentucky, and, together, move against the line of railway from Louisville, and thus force Sherman to retire from Johnston's front, allowing him to advance northward, avoiding general battle until all the Confederate columns could form a grand junction on or near the Ohio River. This plan was approved by Lee, and by both Lee and Longstreet laid before President Davis and the War Department at Richmond. Davis disapproved it.

Another plan, submitted by Bragg (then "Commander-in-Chief near the President"), received the approval of Davis. By this Johnston was to march to the headwaters of the Little Tennessee River, Longstreet to the east of Knoxville and join Johnston, and, united, they were to march west into Middle Tennessee and break the Union line of supplies about Nashville. Though some orders were issued looking to the execution of this plan, it was not seriously attempted, as Joe Johnston regarded it as impracticable.( 6) Longstreet, with the part of his command that had served in Virginia, was, early in April, transferred to the Rapidan. Grant alone moved his armies to the execution of his campaigns as planned.

_Wilderness_

Not until May 2d did Meade send orders to his corps for the movement on the 4th across the Rapidan. On the day of starting he issued a stirring and patriotic address to his soldiers.( 7) Grant had determined to attack and turn Lee's right flank.( 8)

As soon in the early morning as engineers could lay pontoons the cavalry crossed the river at Ely and Germanna Fords, and cleared the way for the infantry. Hanc.o.c.k's (Second) corps crossed at Ely's Ford and marched to the vicinity of Chancellorsville. Warren's (Fifth) corps, with Sedgwick's (Sixth) following, crossed at Germanna Ford. Warren proceeded to the Old Wilderness Tavern. Sedgwick bivouacked on the heights south of the river. The reserve artillery crossed at Ely's Ford, and subsistence and other trains at this and Culpeper Mine Ford. All these movements took place as ordered.( 9)

No serious resistance was met with the first day. On the night of the 4th I encamped immediately south of the Rapidan on the height just above the ford. I was ordered to cover the ford and protect the pontoon bridge until the head of Burnside's column should reach it. The whole army slept without tents. On rising in the early morning, and while standing on a bluff overlooking the river, Major Wm. S. McElwain of my regiment, in a quiet but somewhat troubled way, ventured to suggest that unless I was more prudent than usual I would never recross it. I told him the chances of war were hardly lessened by prudence where duty was involved, and that my chances of going North alive were probably as good as his. He seemed to have no concern about himself.

General Grant, his staff, and escort, rode by while we waited. He was on a fine, though small, black horse, which he set well; was plainly dressed, looked the picture of health, and bore no evidence of anxiety about him. His plain hat and clothes were in marked contrast with a somewhat gaily dressed and equipped staff. He saluted and spoke pleasantly, but did not check his horse from a rather rapid gait.

About 10 A.M. Burnside, at the head of his command, reached the ford. His corps, the Ninth, had been recently organized by him at Annapolis, Maryland, and officers and soldiers were, in general, newly equipped and clothed, and all regiments and headquarters had new flags. The long line, as displayed for miles, moving slowly over the lowlands to the crossing, was most imposing, and gave rise to varied reflections. But the time for strong battle had come.

The head of the Fifth Corps was pushed forward on the Orange and Fredericksburg plank road, the purpose being to avoid the intrenchments of Mine Run, but the enemy appearing on the turnpike running, in general, parallel with the plank road and to the north of it, the Sixth Corps (except the Second Brigade, Third Division) moved to position on the right of the Fifth, save Getty's division, which was sent to the intersection of the Brock and Orange plank roads with instructions to hold it, at all hazards, until the arrival of Hanc.o.c.k's corps from Todd's Tavern. About noon two divisions of Warren's corps had a sharp combat with the head of Ewell's corps on the pike, driving it back some distance when, being outflanked, they were in turn forced back, losing two guns. Wadsworth's division of this corps having been sent to the plank road was withdrawn to a junction with Warren's other divisions. Warren suffered some loss in prisoners taken from Crawford's division. Getty, on his arrival on the plank road, found our cavalry being pressed back by Hill's corps, but he deployed on each side of the road, and opening fire on the enemy checked him. Getty was able to hold his position until Hanc.o.c.k arrived about 2 P.M. Hanc.o.c.k, with his corps and Getty's division, a.s.sailed the enemy furiously, and for a time successfully, though meeting with stubborn resistance. General Alexander Hays was killed in this action while repairing a break in our line. The enemy moved troops from the turnpike to Hill's relief, and Meade, seeing this, sent Wadsworth's division and Baxter's brigade of the Fifth Corps to Hanc.o.c.k. Night came, and the battle ceased on this part of the field before the reinforcements arrived, both armies holding their positions.

The Sixth Corps (Getty's division absent with Hanc.o.c.k) with much difficulty made its way through the dense low pine thicket, and about 2 P.M. was in position, princ.i.p.ally deployed, on the right of the Fifth, Ricketts' division (Second Brigade absent) on the left, and Wright on the right. Soon after the head of Burnside's column reached Germanna Ford, my brigade moved to the battle-ground.

As we advanced, firing along the extended front soon told us where serious work had begun. General Truman Seymour (of Ol.u.s.tee fame) was a.s.signed this day to command the brigade, but he did not promptly join it. As we approached the battle, I was ordered by a staff officer of Sedgwick to conduct the brigade to the right of that part of the Sixth Corps already in line and partly engaged. This order being executed, we became the extreme right of the army.

The other brigades of the Third Division being in position on the left of the corps, I was not in touch with them, and reported to General H. G. Wright, commanding the First Division.

Heavy firing already extended along the line of the Sixth Corps to the left of us. The brigade, about 2 P.M., was put by me in position in two lines, the 6th Maryland and 110th Ohio, from left to right, in the front, and the 122d and 126th Ohio and the 138th Pennsylvania on the rear line and in reserve. Skirmishers were advanced, who pressed the enemy's skirmishers back a short distance to his main line, and a sharp engagement ensued, lasting until about 5 P.M., when, proper support being promised, an aggressive attack was made.

I quote from my official report, dated November 1, 1864:

"I received orders to a.s.sume general charge of the first line, to press the enemy, and, if possible, outflank him upon his left.

The troops charged forward in gallant style, pressing the enemy back by 6 P.M. about one half mile, when we came upon him upon the slope of a hill, intrenched behind logs which had been hurriedly thrown together. During the advance the troops were twice halted and the fire opened, killing and wounding a considerable number of the enemy.

"The front line being upon the extreme right of the army, and the troops upon its left failing to move forward in conjunction with it, I deemed it prudent to halt without making an attack upon the enemy's line. After a short consultation with Col. John W. Horn, I sent word that the advance line of the brigade was unsupported upon either flank, and that the enemy overlapped the right and left of the line, and was apparently in heavy force, rendering it impossible for the troops to attain success in a further attack.

"I soon after received an order to attack at once.

"Feeling sure that the word I sent had not been received, I delayed until a second order came to attack. I accordingly made the attack without further delay.

"The attack was made about 7 P.M. The troops were in a thick and dense wilderness. The line was advanced to within 150 yards of the enemy's works, under a most terrible fire from the front and flanks. It was impossible to succeed; but the two regiments, notwithstanding, maintained their ground and kept up a rapid fire for nearly three hours, and then retired under orders, for a short distance only.

"I was wounded about 8.30 P.M. by a rifle ball pa.s.sing through both bones of the left forearm, but did not relinquish command until 9 P.M.

"The troops were required to maintain this unequal contest under the belief that other troops were to attack the enemy upon his flank.

"In this attack the 6th Maryland lost in killed, two officers and sixteen men, and eight officers and 132 men wounded; and the 110th Ohio lost one officer and thirteen men killed, and six (6) officers and ninety-three (93) men wounded, making an aggregate in the two regiments of 271.

"Major William S. McElwain, 110th Ohio, who had won the commendations of all who knew him, for his skill, judgment, and gallantry, was among the killed.

"Lieutenant Joseph McKnight, 110th Ohio, and Captain Adam B. Martin, 6th Maryland, were mortally wounded, and have since died.

"Captain J. B. Van Eaton and Lieutenants H. H. Stevens and G. O.

McMillen, 110th Ohio, Major J. C. Hill, Captains A. Billingslea, J. T. Goldsborough, J. J. Bradshaw and J. R. Rouser, and Lieutenants J. A. Swarts, C. Damuth and D. J. Smith, 6th Maryland, were more or less severely wounded.

"All displayed the greatest bravery, and deserve the thanks of the country.

"Colonel John W. Horn, 6th Maryland, and Lieutenant-Colonel O. H.

Binkley, 110th Ohio, deserve to be specially mentioned for their courage, skill, and ability.

"Captains Brown, 110th Ohio, and Prentiss, 6th Maryland, distinguished themselves in their successful management of skirmishers.

"From reports of this night attack published in the Richmond papers it is known that the rebel Brigadier-General J. M. Jones, (commanding the Stonewall Brigade) and many others were killed in the attack."

In consequence of my wound I was absent from the brigade after the battle of the Wilderness until August 26, 1864, and I am therefore unable to give its movements and operations from personal knowledge.

Colonel Ball succeeded me on the field in command of the brigade, and Colonel Horn in charge of the advance line in the night attack.

Seymour was not present with the attacking troops. He was captured the next day, and the command of the brigade devolved on Colonel B. F. Smith.

To enable the reader to follow it through the battle I quote further from my report of November 1, 1864.

"Early on the morning of the 6th of May, the brigade formed in two lines of battle and a.s.saulted the enemy's works in its front, the 122d and 126th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania in the front line, and the 110th Ohio and 6th Maryland in the rear line. The brigade was still the extreme right of the army. The a.s.sault was most vigorously made, but the enemy was found to be in too great numbers and too strongly fortified to be driven from his position. After suffering very heavy loss, the troops were withdrawn to their original position, where slight fortifications were thrown up. In the charge the troops behaved most gallantly. The 122d and 126th Ohio and 138th Pennsylvania lost very heavily.

"About 2 P.M. Brigadier-General Shaler's brigade, of the First Division, Sixth Army Corps, took position upon the right of this brigade, and became the extreme right of the army.

"Skirmishing continued until about sunset, when the enemy turned the right of the army and made an attack upon its flank and rear, causing the troops to give way rapidly, and compelling them to fall back for some distance before they were reformed. So rapid was the enemy's advance upon the flank and rear, that time was not given to change front to meet him, and some confusion occurred in the retreat. Few prisoners were lost in the brigade. The lines were soon re-established and the progress of the enemy stopped.

An attack was made by the enemy upon the re-established line about 8 P.M., but was handsomely repulsed.

"Unfounded reports were circulated that the troops of this brigade were the first to give way, when the first attack of the enemy was made.

"It is not improper to state here that no charges of bad conduct are made against the troops upon its right, but that this brigade remained at its post and successfully resisted a simultaneous attack from the front, until the troops upon its right were doubled back and were retreating in disorder through and along its lines."

The presence of a general officer in authority, or an intelligent staff officer representing him, would have averted the useless slaughter of the evening of the 5th, and the disaster of the evening of the 6th, which, for a time, threatened the safety of the whole army. A brigade or more of troops thrown on the enemy's left by a little _detour_ on either evening would have doubled it back and given us, with little loss, that part of the field and a free swing for the next day.

The success in gaining ground on the 5th left our right in the air, bent to the front, with the enemy on its flank, thus inviting the attack made the next day by General J. B. Gordon, which drove back the main part of the Sixth Corps on the Union centre. Gordon's attack was a repet.i.tion of Stonewall Jackson's flank movement at Chancellorsville, and it should have been so far antic.i.p.ated as to cause its disastrous failure.