( 1) _War Records_, vol. x.x.xvi., Part II., p. 34.

( 2) This was in the famous Brough-Vallandigham Ohio election for Governor.

( 3) _War Records_, vol. xxi., Part I., p. 426.

( 4) This lunch consisted of a box of sardines and "hardtack."

( 5) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 242.

( 6) _Ibid_., pp. 250, 428.

( 7) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 428.

( 8) A string tightly drawn around a bottle where the cut is desired to be made, and then rapidly drawn back and forth until the friction heats the gla.s.s, renders it easy to be separated by a sharp jar against the hand or some hard substance.

( 9) Three of these had belonged to Randolph's battery, lost at Winchester.--_War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., p. 626.

(10) _Ibid_., pp. 613-616.

(11) _War Records_, vol. xxix., Part I., pp. 611, 616 (Lee's Report).

CHAPTER V Mine Run Campaign and Battle of Orange Grove, November, 1863--Winter Cantonment (1863-64) of Army of the Potomac at Culpeper Court- House, and its Reorganization--Grant a.s.signed to Command the Union Armies, and Preparation for Aggressive War

Though the roads were bad from frequent rains and much use, and November winds warned that winter was at hand to stop further field campaigning on an extended scale, and though all attempts to cross the Rapidan in the fine weather of the spring and summer had failed, yet, when the Army of the Potomac was again bivouacked at Culpeper, the public cry was heard--"On to Richmond!"

Lee's last campaign was looked upon in high quarters as a big bluff that should have been "called" by Meade while the Army of Northern Virginia was north of the Rappahannock. Meade, however, acted persistently and conscientiously on his own judgment, formed in the light of the best knowledge he could obtain. He would not stand driving, and was something of a bulldozer himself, and sometimes--said to have been caused by fits of dyspepsia--was unreasonably irascible, and displayed a most violent temper towards superiors and inferiors. Notwithstanding this, he never lost his equipoise or acted upon impulse alone, and he never permitted mere appearances to move him. Nor could his superiors induce him to act against his judgment as to a particular military situation.

It will be remembered that he was urged to fight Lee north of the Potomac after Gettysburg. He was urged to bring on a battle before the departure of the Eleventh and Twelfth Corps for the West, and when Lee moved north on his flank his opportunity seemed to have come to fight a battle, but his fear of the same strategy displayed by the Confederate Army in the second Bull Run campaign against Pope induced him to be over-cautious, and to so concentrate his army as to avoid the possibility of its being beaten in detachments.

The next day (October 16th), after Meade reached Centreville, the President, in his anxiety that Lee should not again escape without a general battle, addressed this characteristic note to Halleck:

"If General Meade can now attack him (Lee) on a field no more than equal for us, and do so with all the skill and courage which he, his officers, and men possess, the honor will be his if he succeeds, and the blame may be mine if he fails.

"Yours truly, "A. Lincoln."

This note was forwarded to Meade.

To this he answered that it had been his intention to attack the enemy when his exact whereabouts was discovered; that lack of information as to Lee's position and intentions and the fear of jeopardizing his communications with Washington had prevented his doing so sooner. But the pressure continued. Halleck, the 18th, wired Meade:

"Lee is unquestionably bullying you. If you cannot ascertain his movements, I certainly cannot. If you pursue and fight him, I think you will find out where he is. I know of no other way."

This was too much for Meade's temper. He responded:

" ... If you have any orders to give me I am prepared to receive and obey them, but I must insist on being spared the infliction of such truisms in the guise of opinion as you have recently honored me with, particularly as they have not been asked for. I take this occasion to repeat what I have before stated, that if my course, based on my own judgment, does not meet with approval, I ought to be, and I desire to be, relieved from command."

Although Halleck apologized "if he had unintentionally given offence," and Meade thanked him for the "explanation," these and other like occurrences had their influence on Meade's conduct.

As he had failed to bring Lee to bay at Culpeper, the only opportunity to do so must be sought south of the Rapidan. Meade was not averse to battle.

On November 26, 1863, Meade's army was put in motion with a view to a general concentration south of the Rapidan, at Robertson's Tavern on the turnpike road, by evening of that day. Lee's army of about 50,000 men was mainly ma.s.sed and in winter quarters in front of Orange Court-House, with an intrenched line in its front across the plank road and turnpike, extending to the river.

Meade's design was, by a rapid movement, to carry this line before Lee had time to concentrate behind it.

The Fifth Corps (Sykes) was directed to cross the Rapidan at Culpeper Mine Ford, and thence move by the plank road to Parker's Store and the junction of the road to Robertson's Tavern; the First Corps (Newton), with two divisions, to follow the Fifth. The Second Corps (Warren) was to force a crossing at Germanna Ford, thence march directly to Robertson's Tavern, and there await the arrival of other corps.

The Third Corps (General William H. French), followed closely by the Sixth (Sedgwick), was directed to cross at Jacob's Ford (Mill), and continue the march, bearing to the left, to Robertson's Tavern.

Jacob's Ford, with its steep banks, proved so difficult to pa.s.s that some delay occurred, and the artillery had to be sent around by Germanna Ford, and did not rejoin the corps until the morning of the 27th. Jacob's Ford was the highest up the river, and consequently brought French, on pa.s.sing it, in close proximity to the enemy. Lee, by the evening of the 26th, had thrown forward cavalry and some infantry of Hill's corps to the vicinity of Robertson's Tavern, though not in sufficient force to prevent Warren taking his designated position. Nor was Sykes seriously interfered with. The cavalry crossed at Ely's and other fords. French, with the aid of pontoons, safely pa.s.sed the river, but he did not advance on the 26th more than three miles beyond the crossing, time having been lost in hunting blind country roads, waiting for artillery to arrive, and reconnoitering. A force of the enemy showed itself on intersecting roads to his right, where were a number of such roads leading from Sisson, Witch.e.l.l, Tobaccostick and Morton's Fords, and one which led from Racc.o.o.n Ford--still higher up the river--to an intersection at Jones' house, with the most direct road to the Tavern. The enemy's intrenchments covered a considerable part of this last road, from which he could easily debouch and attack the flank and rear or the trains of the marching columns.( 1) These conditions rendered French's situation perilous, and caused him to move with extreme caution, as the Sixth Corps could not arrive until he was out of the way. Notwithstanding French had some miles farther to march than Warren, and unusual difficulties to overcome or guard against, Meade dispatched him, as early as 1 P.M. of the 26th, that his delay was r.e.t.a.r.ding the operations of Warren, and again at 3 P.M. he dispatched French:

"I would not move forward farther from the river than to clear the way for General Sedgwick, until he comes up and crosses."

The Second Division, General Henry Prince, with some cavalry, was in the advance; the Third, Carr's, and the First, General David B.

Birney's, following in the order named. At the Widow Morris', a somewhat obscure road bore off abruptly to the left, but which, somewhat circuitously, led to Robertson's Tavern. The head of Prince's column, however, was on the more direct road to Tom Morris'

house, with flankers and cavalry well to the right. These were soon attacked and driven in or recalled.

It seems Prince was led to believe he was in communication with Warren's left.( 2)

It soon became evident that the head of French's column was near the Racc.o.o.n Ford road, and the intrenchments held by at least two divisions of Ewell's corps of Lee's army, and there seemed to be no possible chance to extricate it without a battle.

At 11.45 A.M., on the 27th, Meade dispatched French:

"If you cannot unite with Warren by the route you are on, you must move through to him by the left."

At 1.45 P.M. Meade again dispatched French:

"Attack the enemy in your front immediately, throwing your left forward to connect with General Warren at Robertson's Tavern. The object of an attack is to form junction with General Warren, which must be effected immediately."

Prince had, by this time, formed line of battle and engaged the enemy. Carr's division was ordered forward to take position on Prince's left, and at 3 P.M. Birney's division was ordered to form in support of Carr.

Prince covered the road leading to a junction with the Racc.o.o.n Ford road. The First Brigade of Carr's division (General W. H. Morris) moved to the left of Prince, my brigade--the Second--was ordered to pa.s.s behind Morris, and take position on his left, and Colonel B. F. Smith's brigade--the Third--was sent to my left.

Morris became somewhat entangled in a ravine and in thick timber, and was slow in forming good line. In this position he was fired upon from a ridge not two hundred yards from his front, the bullets falling among my men as they pa.s.sed his rear. I appealed to Morris to face to the front, charge, and take the ridge, but he declined to do so for want of orders.

As soon as I could get my two leading regiments, 110th and 122d Ohio, on Morris' left, I led them to the crest of the ridge, captured some prisoners, and posted the regiments in good position behind a fence on the summit. My other regiments, 6th Maryland and 138th Pennsylvania, successively, on their arrival, took position on the left of the Ohio troops. The ridge which extended to my right along Morris' front was still held by the enemy in strong force, and both my flanks were threatened. Through a misunderstanding of orders the Ohio regiments fell back a short distance, but soon retook the crest and were again fiercely engaged, though under an enfilading fire of artillery and a galling fire of musketry. The ground being somewhat open to the front, I could see the enemy ma.s.sing for an attack. I again, but vainly, appealed to Morris to advance and close the gap, as otherwise his position in the ravine and thick woods could not be held. The a.s.sault came, and Morris was forced, in some confusion, to retire. By refusing my right somewhat, I maintained my isolated position and threatened the enemy's right. The First Brigade, though composed in part of regiments not before in strong battle, was quickly re-formed, and, under Carr's order, soon obtained full possession of the ridge by a splendid charge, and thus the gap was closed. The battle by this time raged furiously all along the front. Colonel Smith, pa.s.sing too far to the rear, lost his way in the thickets, and failed to come up on my left. He did not rejoin the division until the battle was over. This misfortune was hard to account for, as Colonel Smith was an intelligent, brave, and skilled officer--a graduate of West Point. He met some scouting parties of the enemy, and, as directed, sought to find a connection with troops of Warren's corps.

His failure caused my left to remain uncovered.

Two a.s.saults were made upon my line by the enemy in columns not less than three lines deep. The first came in front of Horn's regiment, but was antic.i.p.ated, and McClennan's regiment, moving into the open ground, struck the right flank of the enemy and (firing buck and ball from .69 calibre muskets) did great execution.

McClennan was severely wounded, and in consequence was obliged to leave the field.

The battle raged with unabated fury until dark, and as late as 8 P.M. enfilading sh.e.l.ls from heavy guns on our right screamed and crashed through the timber over our heads, bursting with loud noise, producing a most hideous and weird appearance, but really doing little damage.

As night approached, the ammunition of my regiments gave out, and all my command, save one regiment, was relieved by regiments of Birney's division.( 3)

The bravery and fighting skill of Colonels Ball, Horn, and McClennan, also of Lieutenant-Colonels M. M. Granger and W. N. Foster, and Major Otho H. Binkley, and others, was most conspicuous. Lieutenant James A. Fox of the 110th here lost his life. He had risen from the ranks, but was a proud-spirited and promising officer. We buried him at midnight, in full uniform, wrapped in his blanket, behind a near-by garden fence.

I wish to bear testimony also, at this late day, to the quiet gallantry and high soldierly qualities of the long-since-dead General David B. Birney.( 4) He did not obey orders to the letter only. His division being in reserve and support, he took position where he could watch the progress of the battle, and note in time when and where he was needed. He made no display on the field.

When he noticed, by the slackening fire of my men, that their ammunition was about exhausted, he rode to my side and quietly suggested that he be allowed to order regiments from his own command to take their places. That there might not be, even momentarily, a break in the line, his regiments were moved up, and my men lay down while his stepped over them and opened fire. The relieved troops were then withdrawn and resupplied with ammunition.

While the battle was in progress, the Sixth Corps, still some distance to the rear, was directed by another road on Robertson's Tavern, and during the night the Third Corps was ordered to withdraw and follow the Sixth.