"Abraham Lincoln."

Conservative commanding officers criticised this Presidential order as an a.s.sumption on Mr. Lincoln's part of the direction of the war in the field, and the naming of a day for the army and navy to move was denounced an unwise and a notice to the enemy. Under other circ.u.mstances, the President would have been open to criticism from a strategist's standpoint, but the particular circ.u.mstances and the state of the country and the public mind warranted his action.

Foreign interference or recognition of the Confederacy was threatened.

No decided Union victory had been won. McClellan had held the Army of the Potomac idle for six months in sight of the White House.

Halleck at St. Louis, in command of a large and important department, had long talked of large plans and so far had executed none.

Matters were at a standstill in Western Virginia. Buell was, so far, giving little promise of an early forward movement.

The Confederate forces held advanced positions in Missouri and high up on the Mississippi. They were fortified at Forts Henry and Donelson, on the Tennessee and the c.u.mberland respectively, and at Bowling Green and other important places in Kentucky. They still held the Upper Kanawha, the Greenbrier country, Winchester, and other points in the Shenandoah Valley. The Confederate Army was holding McClellan almost within the fortifications south of the Potomac at Washington. The President was held responsible for the inactivity of the army. Under other circ.u.mstances, with other army commanders, the order would not have been issued. It served to notify these commanders that the army must attack the enemy, and it advised the country of the earnestness of the President to vigorously prosecute the war, and thus aided enlistments, inspired confidence, and warned meddling nations to keep hands off.(15)

On January 28, 1862, both General Grant and Commodore A. H. Foote, Flag Officer United States Naval Forces in the Western waters, wired Halleck at St. Louis that, with his permission, Fort Henry on the Tennessee could be taken by them. Authority being obtained, they invested and attacked it by gunboats on the river side and with the army by land. The fire of the gunboats silenced the batteries, and all the garrison abandoned the fort, save General Lloyd Tilghman (its commander), his staff, and one company of about 70 men, who surrendered February 6th. A hospital boat containing 60 sick and about 20 heavy guns, barracks, tents, ammunition, etc., also fell into Union hands. The only serious casualty was on the _Ess.e.x_, caused by a shot in her boilers, which resulted in wounding and scalding 29 officers and men, including Commodore David D.

Porter.

General Grant reported on the same day that he would take Fort Donelson, and on February 12, 1862, he sent six regiments around by water and moved the body of his command from Fort Henry across the country, distant about twelve miles.

Three gunboats under Lieutenant-Commander S. L. Phelps went up the Tennessee as far as Florence, Alabama, while others proceeded to the mouth of the c.u.mberland and ascended it to aid the land forces.

Commander Phelps on his way up the river seized two steamers, caused six others loaded with supplies to be destroyed, took at Cerro Gordo a half-finished gunboat, and made other important captures of military supplies. He discovered considerable Union sentiment among the inhabitants, some of them voluntarily enlisting to fight the Confederacy.(16)

Grant was a.s.signed to the District of West Tennessee February 14, 1862.(17)

General Grant had, when he commenced the attack of Fort Donelson, about 15,000 men, in three divisions, commanded, respectively, by Generals C. F. Smith, John A. McClernand, and Lew Wallace. The total force of the enemy was not less than 20,000, under the command of General J. B. Floyd.(18) The investment of the fort commenced on the 12th, but it was not complete until the evening of the 13th, on the arrival of the gunboats and the troops sent by water. Flag Officer Foote opened fire on the enemy's works at 3 P.M. on the 14th, from four gunboats, which continued for an hour and a half with a brilliant prospect of complete success, when each of the two leading boats received disabling shots and were carried back by the current. The other two were soon partially disabled and hence withdrawn from the fight. Grant then concluded to closely invest the fort, partially fortify his lines, and allow time for Commodore Foote to retire, repair his gunboats, and return. But the enemy did not permit this to be done. He drew out from his left the princ.i.p.al part of his effective troops under Generals Gideon J. Pillow, B. R. Johnson, and S. B. Buckner during the night of the 14th, and at early dawn of the 15th a.s.sailed, with the purpose of raising the siege or of escaping, the extreme right of Grant's army. A battle of several hours' duration ensued, and for the most part the Confederates gained ground, driving back the Union right upon the centre. Grant was absent in consultation with Commodore Foote (19) when the attack began. Foote was then contemplating a return to Cairo to repair damages, and was likewise wounded.(19) Grant on returning to the battle-ground ordered a counter-attack on the enemy's right by Smith's division, which met with such success as to gain, at the close of the day, possession of parts of the Confederate intrenchments. After Smith's charge had commenced, McClernand and Wallace were ordered to a.s.sume the offensive on the enemy's left flank, which resulted in driving the Confederates back to the works from whence they had emerged in the morning. Preparation was then made for an a.s.sault all along the line early next morning.

Consternation and demoralization prevailed in the Confederate camps during the night, especially at headquarters.

A council of war was held at midnight of the 15th between Floyd, Pillow, and Buckner, at which the number of Grant's army was greatly magnified, and it was decided that it was impracticable to attempt to cut through the investment. Floyd pretended to believe that his capture was of the first importance to the Union cause, and, although the senior in command, he announced a determination "_not to survive a surrender there_." Pillow, the next in command, also a.s.sumed the same importance and individual right for himself; hence Floyd, through Pillow, turned over the command, at the end of the council, to Buckner, with the understanding that the latter would, at the earliest hour possible, open negotiations for the surrender of the forces.(20) Floyd and Pillow, with the aid of two small steamboats, which arrived from Nashville in the night, succeeded in ferrying across the river and in getting away with about 1000 officers and men, princ.i.p.ally belonging to Floyd's old brigade.

Some cavalry and small detachments and individual officers with Colonel Forrest escaped in the night by the river road, which was only pa.s.sable, on account of back-water, for mounted men.(21)

The action of both Floyd and Pillow in not sharing the fate of their commands, and the conduct of Floyd especially in carrying off the troops of his old brigade in preference to others, were strongly condemned by President Davis and his Secretary of War.

Both Generals were, by Davis's orders, relieved,(21) and neither, thereafter, held any command of importance. The sun of their military glory set at Donelson. Floyd had been unfaithful to his trust as Buchanan's Secretary of War, and early, as we have seen, deserted his post to join the Rebellion. Pillow as a general officer had won a name in fighting under Taylor and Scott and the flag of the Republic in Mexico.

At an early hour on the 16th Buckner sent a note to Grant proposing "the appointment of commissioners to agree upon the terms of capitulation of the forces and post" under his command, and suggesting an armistice until 12 o'clock of that day. To this note Grant responded thus:

"Yours of this date, proposing armistice and appointment of commissioners to settle terms of capitulation, is just received.

_No terms except unconditional and immediate surrender can be accepted. I propose to move immediately on your works_."

General Buckner denominated Grant's terms as "_ungenerous and unchivalrous_," but accepted them, forthwith capitulating with about 15,000 officers and men, about 40 pieces of artillery, and a large amount of stores, horses, mules, and other public property.

The casualties in Grant's army were 22 officers and 478 enlisted men killed, and 87 officers and 2021 men wounded, total 2608.(22) The loss in the navy under Foote was 10 killed and 44 wounded.

The Confederate killed and wounded probably did not exceed 1500,(23) as they fought, in most part, behind intrenchments. The capture of Fort Donelson was thus far the greatest achievement of the war, and won for Grant just renown.

The writer's regiment, as we have stated, went into camp in December, 1861, at Bacon Creek, Kentucky. The winter was rainy and severe, the camps were much of the time muddy, and the troops underwent many hardships. It was their first winter in tents, and many were sick.

Colonel Marrow, on one pretence or another, was generally absent at Louisville, and the responsibility of the drill and discipline of the regiment devolved on Lieutenant-Colonel Beatty, who was quite equal to it, notwithstanding Marrow said and did much to prejudice the regiment against him. The writer also had the Colonel's displeasure.

On his return to the regiment, January 28th, Beatty handed him, to be forwarded, charges relating to his disloyalty, unmilitary conduct, and inefficiency; whereupon he decided to resign and the charges were withdrawn. Beatty became Colonel and I Lieutenant-Colonel, February 12, 1862.

Buell's army commenced to move southward February 10th, Mitchel's division in the advance.

The high railroad bridge over Green River at Munfordville had no railing or protection on the sides, but it was safely pa.s.sed over with the teams by moonlight. The scene of the crossing was highly picturesque, and attracted much attention from the troops just starting on a new campaign.

The march of the 14th developed much of interest. There were evident signs of loyalty at the houses of all who owned no slaves, and where slaves appeared they exhibited the greatest delight to see the Union soldiers. All slaves had the belief that we had come to free them, and there was much difficulty in preventing them from marching with us. The country through which we pa.s.sed was cavernous, and the surface had many bowl-like depressions, at the bottom of which was, generally, considerable water. Springs and streams were scarce. The Confederates on retiring drove their disabled, diseased and broken-down horses, mules, etc., into these ponds and shot them, leaving them to decay and thus render the water unfit for use by the Union Army.(24) The troops had no choice but to use the water from the befouled ponds. We shall hear of them again.

On this day the division reached Barren River and exchanged a few artillery shots with the rear of General A. S. Johnston's army, under the immediate command of General Hardee. The next day--the last day of fighting at Fort Donelson--the advance of Mitchel's division crossed the river and occupied Bowling Green, which was found strongly fortified and a naturally good position for defence.

In its hasty evacuation many stores were burned; others distributed to the inhabitants, and some abandoned to capture. After an unaccountable delay here of one week, during which time we heard of the victory at Fort Donelson, Mitchel's division, still in advance, resumed its march towards Nashville, distant about seventy miles. The head of the division reached Edgefield (suburb of Nashville on the north bank of the c.u.mberland) on the evening of the 24th of February, and the following morning the Mayor and a committee of citizens formally surrendered the city of Nashville while yet Forrest's cavalry occupied it. General Nelson's division of Buell's army arrived by boats the night of the 24th, and at once landed in the city.

Nashville would have been a rich prize and easily taken if troops from either Donelson or Bowling Green had been pushed forward without delay when Fort Donelson fell.

General A. S. Johnston abandoned the city as early as the 16th, and concentrated his forces at Murfreesboro, thirty or more miles distant, leaving only Floyd with a demoralized brigade and Colonel N. B. Forrest's small cavalry command to remove or destroy the guns and stores, of which there was an immense quant.i.ty.

Floyd was ordered by Johnston not to fight in the city.(25) Pandemonium reigned everywhere in Nashville for a week before it was taken. The mob, in which all cla.s.ses partic.i.p.ated, had possession of it. The proper officers abandoned their stores of ordnance, quartermaster and commissary supplies, and such as were portable were, as far as possible, carried off by anybody who might desire them. No kind of property was safe, private houses and property were seized and appropriated. No other such disgraceful scene has been enacted in modern times.(26)

Johnston had a right to expect the arrival of the Union Army as early as the 18th, and had wise counsel prevailed, Nashville might have been taken on that or an earlier day.

A diversity of views led to delays in the movement of Buell's army.

Buell early expressed himself favorably to moving directly on Nashville _via_ Bowling Green or by embarking his divisions at Louisville on steamboats and thence by water up the c.u.mberland.(27)

Halleck p.r.o.nounced the movement from Bowling Green on Nashville as not good strategy, and this opinion he telegraphed both Buell and McClellan. Success at Fort Donelson did not change Halleck's views, and Grant was condemned for advancing Smith's division to Clarksville.

After Buell reached Nashville he became panic-stricken, and, though he had 15,000 men, possessed of an idea he was about to be overwhelmed.

He a.s.sumed, therefore, to order Smith's command of Grant's army to move by boat from Clarksville to his relief.(28)

The first time I saw Grant was on the wharf at Nashville, February 26, 1862. He was fresh from his recent achievements, and we looked upon him with interest. He was then only a visitor at Nashville.

His quiet, modest demeanor, characteristic of him under all circ.u.mstances, led persons to speak of him slightingly, as only a common-looking man who had, by luck, or through others, achieved success. He was then forty years old,(29) below medium height and weight, but of firm build and well proportioned. His head, for his body, seemed large. His somewhat p.r.o.nounced jaw indicated firmness and decision. His hands and feet were small, and his movements deliberate and unimpa.s.sioned. He then, as always, talked readily, but never idly or solely to entertain even his friends.

Both Halleck and Buell were apparently either jealous of Grant or they entertained or a.s.sumed to entertain a real contempt for his talents. Buell paid him little attention at Nashville, and Halleck reported him to the War Department for going there, although the city was within the limits of his district. His going to Nashville was subsequently a.s.signed as a reason for practically relieving him of his command.(30)

Reports that Grant was frequently intoxicated, and that to members of his staff and to subordinate commanders he was indebted for his recent victories, were at this time freely circulated. Grant, like most great generals in war, had to develop through experience, and even through defeats. He, however, early showed a disposition to take responsibilities and to seize opportunities to fight the enemy.

He had the merit of obstinacy, a quality indispensable in a good soldier.

In contrast with him, Halleck and Buell, each pretending to more military education and accomplishments, lacked either confidence in their troops or in themselves, and hence were slow to act.

Complicated and difficult possible campaigns were talked of by them but never personally executed. They were each good organizers of armies on paper, knew much of the equipment and drilling of troops, also of their discipline in camp, but the absence in each of an eagerness to meet the enemy and fight him disqualified them from inspiring soldiers with that confidence which wins victories. Mere reputation for technical military education rather detracts from than adds to the confidence an army has in its commander. Such a commander will be esteemed a good military clerk or adjutant-general, but not likely to seek and win battles.

The 3d Ohio, with the brigade, marched through Nashville on the 27th of February, and went into camp at a creek on the Murfressboro turnpike about four miles from the city. Quiet was restored in Nashville, the inhabitants seeming to appreciate the good order preserved by the Union troops, especially after the recent experience with the mob.

At Nashville the 3d Ohio's officers (especially Colonel Beatty) were charged with harboring negro slaves, and Buell gave some slave- hunters permission to search the regiment's camp for their escaped "_property_." The Colonel ordered all the colored men to be a.s.sembled for inspection, but it so happened that not one could be found. One of the slave-hunters proposed to search a tent for a certain runaway slave, and he was earnestly told by Colonel Beatty that he might do so, but that if he were successful in his search it would cost him his life. No further search was made. One of the runaway slaves, "Joe," a handsome mulatto, _borrowed_ (?) from Colonel Beatty, a.s.sistant Surgeon Henry H. Seys, and perhaps others, small sums of money and disappeared. Some time afterwards I saw "Joe" in the employ of Hon. Samson Mason in Springfield, Ohio.

On the 8th of March, John Morgan, the then famous partisan irregular cavalry raider, dashed from a narrow road along the west side of the Insane Asylum, located about five miles from Nashville on the Murfreesboro pike, and captured, in daylight, a part of a wagon train inside our lines and made off over a by-road with Captain Braden of General Dumont's staff, who had the train in charge, the teamsters, and about eighty horses and mules. Colonel John Kennett, with a portion of his regiment (4th Ohio Cavalry) pursued and overtook Morgan, killed and wounded a portion of his raiders, and recaptured Captain Braden and the drivers; also the horses and mules. About this time Mitchel organized a party of infantry to be rapidly transported in wagons, and some cavalry, to move by night upon Murfreesboro, with the expectation of surprising a small force there. The expedition started, but had not proceeded far when about nine o'clock at night the head of the expedition was met by Morgan and about twenty-five of his men with a flag of truce, he pretending to desire to make some inquiry. The flag of truce at night was so extraordinary that he and his party were escorted to the Asylum grounds, and there detained until Buell could be communicated with. The expedition was, of course, abandoned, and about midnight Morgan and his escort were dismissed.

Columbus, Kentucky, regarded as a Gibraltar of strength, strongly fortified and supplied with many guns, most of which were of heavy calibre, deemed necessary to prevent the navigation of the Mississippi, was occupied by General Leonidas Polk with a force of 22,000 men, but on being threatened with attack by Commodore Foote and General W. T. Sherman, was evacuated March 2, 1862.(31) The State of Kentucky thus became practically free from Confederate occupancy, and the Mississippi, for a considerable distance below Cairo was again open to navigation from the North.

( 1) _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 255, 442.

( 2) _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 255, 442.

( 3) _Ibid_., pp. 466, 469, 485, 553, 567.

( 4) _War Records_, vol. iii., pp. 466, 469, 485, 533, 567

( 5) _Ibid_., pp. 144, 274, 312.