Slavery and Four Years of War - Part 25
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Part 25

It may be said also that the generally cold business character of the well-to-do Northern people, and their social indifference to one another, and especially to officers and their families serving at posts and in cities, did not attach them to the North. An officer in the regular service in time of peace, having no hope of high promotion before he reaches old age, has but little, save social recognition of himself and family, to make him contented and happy. This somewhat helpless condition makes him grateful for attentions shown, and jealous of inattention.

Turning more directly to the military situation on Lincoln's inauguration, we find Major Anderson holding Sumter, but practically in a state of siege, the Confederate authorities having a.s.sembled a large army at Charleston under Beauregard. Fort Moultrie and Castle Pinckney had been seized and manned; heavy ordnance had been placed in them, and batteries had been established commanding Fort Sumter.

Finally, on April 7th, Anderson was forbidden to purchase fresh provisions for his little band. On April 10th, Captain G. V. Fox, an ex-officer of the navy, sailed with a relief expedition, consisting of four war-ships, three steam-tugs, and a merchant steamer, having on board two hundred men and the necessary supplies of ammunition and provisions.

Beauregard and the Confederate authorities hearing promptly of Captain Fox's expedition and destination, on April 11th, formally demanded of Major Anderson the evacuation of Fort Sumter, which demand was refused.

At 4.30 o'clock, April 12th, a signal sh.e.l.l was fired at Fort Sumter from a mortar battery on James Island, and, immediately after, hostile guns were opened from batteries on Morris Island, Sullivan's Island, and Fort Moultrie, which were responded to from Fort Sumter.

This signal sh.e.l.l opened actual war; its discharge was, figuratively speaking, heard around the world; it awakened a lethargic people in the Northern States of the Union; it caused many who had never dreamed of war to prepare for it; it set on fire the blood of a people, North and South, of the same race, not to cool down until a half-million of men had been consumed in the fierce heat of battle; it was the opening shot intended to vindicate and establish human slavery as the essential pillar of a new-born nation, the first and only one on earth formed solely to eternally perpetuate human bondage as a social and fundamental political inst.i.tution; but, in reality, this shot was also a signal to summon the friends of human freedom to arms, and to a battle never to end until slavery under the Const.i.tution of the restored Union should cease to exist.

Captain Fox's expedition was not organized as he had planned it, and though it reached its destination off Sumter an hour before the latter was fired on, it could not, from want of light boats or tugs, send to the fort the needed supplies or men. Major Anderson, after two days' bombardment, was therefore forced to agree to evacuate the fort, which he accordingly did on Sunday afternoon, April 14th, after having saluted the flag as it was lowered.(18)

There were men North as well as South who censured President Lincoln and his advisers for not, as was at one time contemplated, peacefully evacuating Fort Sumter, thus removing the immediate cause for bringing on hostilities, and leaving still more time for compromise talk and Northern concession. But the Union was already dissolved so far as the seceding States were able to do it, and a peaceable restoration of those States to loyalty and duty was then plainly impossible.

South Carolina was the first to secede, and it is more than probable that President Lincoln clearly discerned that the overt act of a.s.sailing the Union by war would take place at Charleston. So long as surrenders of public property went on without resistance, the Confederacy was growing stronger and more defiant, and in time foreign recognition might come. It was much better for the Union cause for the first shot to be fired by Confederate forces in taking United States public property than by United States forces in retaking it after it had been lost.

The people North had wavered, not in their loyalty to the Union, but in their judgment as how to preserve it, or whether it could be preserved at all, until Sumter came, then firmness of conviction took immediate possession of them, and life and treasure alike thenceforward devoted to the maintenance of Federal authority. Of course, there was a troublesome minority North, who, either through political perversity, cowardice, or disloyalty, never did support the war, at least willingly. It was noticeable, however, that many of these were, through former residence or family relationship, imbued with pro-slavery notions and prejudice against the negro.

It should be said, also, that there were many in the North, born in slave States, who were the most p.r.o.nounced against slavery.

And there were those also, even in New England, who had never had an opportunity of being tainted with slavery, who opposed the coercion of the seceding States, and who would rather have seen the Union destroyed than saved by war. Again, long contact and co- operation of certain persons North with Southern slave-holders politically, and bitter opposition to President Lincoln and his party, made many reluctant to affiliate with the Union war-party.

Some were too weak to rise above their prejudices, personal and political. Some were afraid to go to battle. There was also, though strangely inconsistent, a very considerable cla.s.s of the early Abolitionists of the Garrison-Smith-Phillips school who did not support the war for the Union, but who preferred the slave- holding States should secede, and thus perpetuate the inst.i.tution of slavery in America--the very thing, on moral grounds, such Abolitionists had always professed a desire to prevent. They opposed the preservation of the Union by coercion. They thus laid themselves open to the charge that they were only opposed to slavery _in the Union_, leaving it to flourish wherever it might outside of the Union. This position was not only inconsistent, but unpatriotic. The persons holding these views gave little or no moral or other support to the war for the preservation of the integrity of the Republic.

There were many loyal men in the South, especially in sections where slavery did not dominate. In the mountain regions of the South, opposition to secession was the rule, notably in Western Virginia, Eastern Kentucky, Eastern Tennessee, and Western North Carolina.

There were also loyal men in Northern Alabama and Georgia. But wherever the determined spirit of the slave-holding disunionists controlled, as in the cities and more densely populated parts of the South, though the slave-holding population was even therein the minority, the white community was forced to array themselves with the Confederates. There were many South who, at first, determined to oppose disunion, but who succ.u.mbed to the pressure, under the belief that the Confederacy was an accomplished fact, or that the North either would not or could not fight successfully, and would be beaten in battle. Boasts of superiority and the great display and noisy preparation for war were misleading to those who only witnessed one side of the pending conflict. The North had, up to Sumter, been slow to act, and this was not rea.s.suring to the friends of the Union South, or, perhaps, anywhere. The p.r.o.neness of mankind to be on the successful side has shown itself in all trying times. It is only the virtue of individual obstinacy that enables the few to go against an unjust popular clamor.

But political party ties North were the hardest to break. Those who had been led to political success generally by the pro-slavery politicians of the South could not easily be persuaded that coercion did not mean, in some way, opposition to themselves and their past party principles. Though patriotism was the rule with persons of all parties North, there were yet many who professed that true loyalty lay along lines other than the preservation of the Union by war. These even, after Sumter fell, pretended to, and possibly did, believe what the South repudiated, to wit: That by the siren song of peace it could be wooed back to loyalty under the Const.i.tution.

There were, of course, those in the North who honestly held that the Abolitionists by their opposition to slavery and its extension into the Territories had brought on secession, and that such opposition justified it. This number, however, was at first not large, and as the war progressed it grew less and less. It should be remembered that coercion of armed secession was not undertaken to abolish slavery or to alter its status in the slave States.

The statement, however, that the destruction of slavery was the purpose and end in view was persistently put forth as the justifying cause for dissolving the Union of States. The cry that the war on the part of the North was "an abolition war," that it was for "negro equality," had its effect on the more ignorant cla.s.s of free laborers in both sections. There is an inherent feeling of or desire for superiority in all races, and this weakness, if it is such, is exceedingly sensitive to the touch of the demagogue.

There were those high in authority in the Confederate councils who were not entirely deluded by the apparent indifference and supineness of the Northern people. When Davis and his Cabinet held a conference (April 9th) to consider the propriety of firing on Fort Sumter, there was not entire unanimity on the question. Robert Toombs, Secretary of State, is reported to have said:

"The firing on that fort will inaugurate a civil war greater than any the world has yet seen; and I do not feel competent to advise you."(19)

And later in the conference Toombs, in opposing the attack on Sumter, said:

"Mr. President, at this time it is suicide, murder, and will lose us every friend at the North. You will wantonly strike a hornet's nest which extends from mountain to ocean, and legions now quiet will swarm out and sting us to death. It is unnecessary; it puts us in the wrong; it is fatal."(20)

The taking of Fort Sumter was the signal for unrestrained exultation of the part of the Secessionists. They for a time gave themselves up to the wildest demonstrations of joy. The South now generally looked upon the Confederacy as already established. The Confederate flag floated over Sumter in place of the Stars and Stripes. At the Catholic cathedral in Charleston a _Te Deum_ was celebrated with great pomp, and the Episcopal bishop there attributed the event to the "infinite mercy of G.o.d, who specially interposed His hand in behalf of _their_ righteous cause."

The taking of Sumter was undoubtedly the most significant event of the age. The achievement was bloodless; not a man was killed or a drop of blood spilled by a hostile shot, yet in inaugurated a war that freed four millions of G.o.d's people.(21)

Montgomery, the temporary Capital of the Confederacy, wildly celebrated the event as the first triumph.

Bloodless was Sumter; but the war it opened was soon to swallow up men by the thousand.

Fort Pickens, in Pensacola Harbor, now only remained in the possession of the United States of all the forts or strongholds in the seceded South.

This fortification was taken possession of by Lieut. A. J. Slemmer of the United States Army, and though in great danger of being attacked and taken, it was successfully reinforced on April 23, 1861, and never fell into Confederate hands. At a special session of the Confederate Congress at Montgomery (May 21, 1861), Richmond, Virginia, was made the Capital of the Confederacy, and the Congress adjourned to meet there.

Howell Cobb (late Buchanan's Secretary of the Treasury), the President of this Congress, with some of the truth of prophecy defiantly said:

"We have made all the necessary arrangements to meet the present crisis. Last night we adjourned to meet in Richmond on the 20th of July. I will tell you why we did this. The 'Old Dominion,' as you know, has at last shaken off the bonds of Lincoln, and joined her n.o.ble Southern sisters. Her soil is to be the battle-ground, and her streams are to be dyed with Southern blood. We felt that her cause was our cause, and that if she fell we wanted to die by her."

How was the news of the failure to reinforce Sumter, and of its being fired on and taken possession of by a rebellious people, received in the North? The evacuation of Fort Sumter was known in Washington and throughout the country almost as soon as at Charleston.

Hostilities could no longer be averted, save by the ignominious surrender of all the blood-bought rights of the founders of the Republic.

It must not be a.s.sumed that the President of the United States had not already calculated on the probabilities of war. The portentous clouds had been long gathering, and the certain signs of the impending battle-storm had been discerned by Lincoln and his advisers. He had prepared, as best he could under the circ.u.mstances, to meet it. The long suspense was now broken. This was some relief.

There were to be no more temporizing, no more compromises, no more offers of concession to slavery or to disunionists. The doctrine of the a.s.sumed right of a State, at will, and for any real or pretended grievance, to secede from and to dissolve its relation with the Union of the States, and to absolve itself from all its const.i.tutional relations and obligations, was now about to be tried before a tribunal that would execute its inexorable decree with a power from which there is no appeal. Mercy is not an attribute of war, either in its methods or decisions. The latter must stand in the end as against the conquered. From war there is no appeal but to war. Time and enlightenment may modify or alter the mandates of war, but in this age of civilization and knowledge, neither nations nor peoples move backward. Ground gained for freedom or humanity, in politics, science, literature, or religion, is held, and from this fresh advances may be made. Needless cruelty may be averted in the conduct of war, but mercy is not an element in the science of destroying life and shedding blood on the battle-field.

Sunday, April 14th (though bearing date the 15th), the same day Sumter was evacuated, President Lincoln issued his proclamation, reciting that the laws of the United States had been and then were opposed and their execution obstructed in the States of South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Florida, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas, by combinations too powerful to be suppressed by ordinary judicial proceedings, or by the powers vested in the marshals by law; he called for seventy-five thousand of the militia of the several States of the Union; appealed to all loyal citizens to maintain the honor, integrity, and existence of the National Union, and "the perpetuity of popular government, and to redress wrongs already long enough endured." "The first service," the proclamation recites, "a.s.signed to the forces called forth will probably be to repossess the forts, places, and property which have been seized from the Union."

It commanded the persons composing the combinations referred to, "to disperse and retire peaceably to their respective abodes within twenty days."

It called Congress to convene Thursday, July 4, 1861, in extraordinary session, "to consider and determine such measures as, in their wisdom, the public safety and interest may seem to demand."

This proclamation was the first announcement by President Lincoln of a deliberate purpose to preserve the integrity of the Republic by a resort to arms. In his recent Inaugural Address he had, almost pathetically, pleaded for peace--for friendship; and there is no doubting that his sincere desire was to avoid bloodshed. He then had no thought of attacking slavery, but rather to protect and grant it more safeguards in the States where it existed. Later, on many occasions, when the war had done much to inflame public sentiment in the North against the South, he publicly declared he would save the "Union as it was." His most p.r.o.nounced utterance on this point was:

"I would save the Union. I would save it the shortest way under the Const.i.tution. The sooner the national authority can be restored, the nearer the Union will be 'the Union as it was.' If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time save slavery, I do not agree with them. If there be those who would not save the Union unless they could at the same time destroy slavery, I do not agree with them. My paramount object in this struggle is to save the Union, and is not either to save or destroy slavery. If I could save the Union without freeing any slave, I would do it; and if I could save it by freeing some and leaving others alone, I would also do that."(22)

But Abraham Lincoln was not understood in 1861, nor even later during the war, and not fully during life, by either his enemies or his personal or party friends. The South, in its leadership, was implacable in the spirit of its hostility, but the ma.s.ses, even there, in time came to understand his true purposes and sincere character.

Two days after the call for seventy-five thousand troops, President Davis responded to it by proclaiming to the South that President Lincoln had announced the intention of "invading the Confederacy with an armed force for the purpose of capturing its fortresses, subverting its independence, and subjecting the free people thereof to a foreign power." In the same proclamation he invited persons to take service in private armed vessels on the high seas, tendering to such persons as would accept them commissions or letters of _marque_ and reprisal.

At this time a military spirit had been aroused throughout the seceded States, and a large number of well-equipped Southern troops were already in the field, chiefly at Charleston and Pensacola--in all (including about 16,000 on their way to Virginia) about 35,000.

The field, staff, and general officers in charge of these troops were mainly graduates of West Point or other military schools; even the captains of companies were many of them educated in the inst.i.tutions referred to. It is not to be denied that a higher military spirit existed in the South than in the North prior to the war. The young men from plantations were more generally unemployed at active labor, and hence had more time to cultivate a martial spirit than the hard-working young men of the North.

The summons to arms found the North unprepared so far as previous spirit and training were concerned; yet it did not hesitate, and troops were, within two days, organized and on their way from several of the States to the defense of Washington. The 6th Ma.s.sachusetts was fired upon by a riotous mob in the streets of Baltimore on April 19th. On every side war levies and preparations for war went forward. The farm, the shop, the office, the counting- room, the professions, the schools and colleges, the skilled and the unskilled in all kinds of occupation, gave up of their best to fill the patriotic ranks. The wealthy, the well-to-do, and the poor were found in the same companies and regiments, on a common footing as soldiers, and often men theretofore moving in the highest social circles were contentedly commanded by those of the humblest social civil life.

The companies were, as a general rule, commanded by men of no previous military training, though wherever a military organization existed it was made a nucleus for a volunteer company. Often indifferent men, with a little skill in drilling soldiers, and with no other known qualifications, were sought out and eagerly commissioned by governors of States as field officers, a colonelcy often being given to such persons. A volunteer regiment was considered fortunate if it had among its field officers a lieutenant from the regular army, or even a person from civil life who had gained some little military experience.

General officers were too often, from apparent necessity, taken from those who had more influence than military skill. Some of these, however, by patient toil, coupled with zeal and brains, performed valuable service to their country and won honorable names as soldiers. But the most of them made only moderate officers and fair reputations. War develops and inspires men, and if it continues long, great soldiers are evolved from its fierce conflicts.

Accidental _good_ fortune in war sometimes renders weak and unworthy men conspicuous. Accidental _bad_ fortune in war often overtakes able, worthy, honest, honorable men of the first promise and destroys them.(23) Very few succeed in a long war through pure military genius alone, if there is such a thing. Many, in the heat of battle- field experiences and in campaigns are inspired with the _common sense_ that makes them, through success, really great soldiers.

The indispensable quality of personal bravery, commonly supposed sufficient to make a man a valuable officer, is often of the smallest importance. A merely brave, rash man in the ranks may be of some value as an inspiring example to his immediate comrades, but he is hardly equal for that purpose to the intelligent soldier who obeys orders, and, though never reckless, yet, through a proper amount of individual pride, does his whole duty without braggadocio.

A mere dashing officer is more and more a failure, and unfitted to command, in proportion as he is high in rank. Rash personal conduct which might be tolerated in a lieutenant would in a lieutenant- general be conclusive of his unfitness to hold any general command.

Of course, there are rare emergencies when an officer, let his rank be what it may, should lead in an a.s.sault or forlorn hope, or rush in to stay a panic among his own troops.

This, like all other actions of a good officer, must also be an inspiration of duty. The coward in war has no place,(24) and when found in an army (which is rare) should be promptly mustered out.

There was no such thing in the late war as a regiment of cowards.

Inefficient or timid officers may have given their commands a bad name, and caused them to lose confidence in success, and hence to become unsteady or panicky. The average American is not deficient in true courage.

Careful drill and discipline make good soldiers.

The American people were now awake to the realities of a war in which the same race, blood, and kindred were to contend, on the one side for a separate nationality and for a form of government based on the single idea of perpetuating and fostering the inst.i.tution of domestic slavery and a so-called civilization based thereon, and on the other for the preservation of the integrity of the Union of States, under one Const.i.tution and one flag.

In addition to the 15th of April proclamation for 75,000 volunteers for ninety days' service, the President (May 3d) called into the United States service 42,034 more volunteers to serve for three years, unless sooner discharged. He at the same time directed that eight regiments of infantry, one of cavalry, and one of artillery should be added to the regular army, making a maximum of 22,714 regular officers and enlisted men; he also called for 18,000 seamen for the naval service.