Select Speeches of Kossuth.

by Kossuth.

PREFACE TO KOSSUTH'S SPEECHES.

Nothing appears in history similar to the enthusiasm roused by Kossuth in nations foreign to him, except perhaps the kindling for the First Crusade by the voice of Peter the Hermit. Then bishops, princes, and people alike understood the danger which overshadowed Europe from the Mohammedan powers; and by soundly directed, though fanatical instinct, all Christendom rushed eastward, till the chivalry of the Seljuk Turks was crippled on the fields of Palestine. Now also the mult.i.tudes of Europe, uncorrupted by ambition, envy, or filthy lucre, forebode the deadly struggle impending over us all from the conspiracy of crowned heads. Seeing the apathy of their own rulers, and knowing, perhaps by dim report, the deeds of Kossuth, they look to him as the Great Prophet and Leader, by whom Policy is at length to be moulded into Justice; and are ready to catch his inspiration before he has uttered a word. Kossuth undoubtedly is a mighty Orator; but no one is better aware than he, that the cogency of his arguments is due to the atrocity of our common enemies, and the enthusiasm which he kindles to the preparations of the people's heart.

His orations are a tropical forest, full of strength and majesty, tangled in luxuriance, a wilderness of self-repet.i.tion. Utterly unsuited to form a book without immense abridgment, they contain materials adapted equally for immediate political service and for permanence as a work of wisdom and of genius. To prepare them for the press is an arduous and responsible duty: the best excuse which I can give for having a.s.sumed it, is, that it has been to me a labour of love.

My task I have felt to be that of a judicious reporter, who cuts short what is of temporary interest, condenses what is too amplified for his limits and for written style, severely prunes down the repet.i.tions which are inevitable where numerous[*] audiences are addressed by the same man on the same subject, yet amid all these necessary liberties retains not only the true sentiments and arguments of the speaker, but his forms of thought and all that is characteristic of his genius. Such an operation, rightly performed, may, like a diminishing mirror, concentrate the brilliancy of diffuse orations, and a.s.sist their efficacy on minds which would faint under the effort of grasping the original.

[Footnote *: The number of speeches, great and small, spoken in his American half-year, is reckoned to be above 500.]

It is true, the exuberance of Kossuth is often too Asiatic for English taste, and that excision of words, which needful abridgment suggests, will often seem to us a gain. Moreover, remembering that he is a foreigner, and though marvellous in his mastery of our language, still naturally often unable to seize the word, or select the construction which he desired, I have not thought I should show honour to him by retaining anything verbally unskilful. To a certain cautious extent, I account myself to be a _translator_, as well as a _reporter_, and in undertaking so delicate a duty, I am happy to announce that I have received Kossuth's written approval and thanks. Mere quaintness of expression I have by no means desired entirely to remove, where it involved nothing grotesque, obscure, or monotonous. In several pa.s.sages where I imperfectly understood the thought, I have had the advantage of Kossuth's personal explanations, which have enabled me to clear up the defective report, or real obscurities of his words.

Nevertheless I have to confess my conviction, that nothing can wholly compensate for the want of systematic revision by the author himself; which his great occupations have made impossible. The mistakes in the reports of the speeches are sometimes rather subtle, and have not roused my suspicion. Of this I have been, made disagreeably sensible, by several errata communicated to me by Kossuth in the first great speech at New York, here marked as No. VII. (which have been corrected in this edition.)

Nearly all the points on which attempts have been made to misrepresent in England the cause of Hungary are cleared up in these speeches. On two subjects only does it seem needful here to make any remark: _first_, on the Republicanism of Kossuth; _secondly_, on the Hungarian levies against Italy in the year 1848.

1. Kossuth is attacked by his countrymen on opposite grounds: Szemere despises him for not becoming a republican early enough, Count Casimir Bathyanyi reproves him for becoming a republican at all. The facts are these. Kossuth, like all English statesmen, was a historical royalist, not a doctrinaire. When the existing reign had become treacherous and lawless, he was willing to change the line of succession, and make the Archduke Stephen king. When the dynasty had become universally detested and actually expelled, he approved most heartily[*] the deposition of the Hapsburgs; but still held himself in suspense as to the future of the const.i.tution. By his influence instructions were sent to his representative in England, which were equivalent to soliciting a dynasty from the British government. Meanwhile Szemere, his Home Secretary, took on himself to avow in the Diet that the government was REPUBLICAN, and no voice of protest was raised in either house. Indeed, Mr. Vucovics, who was Minister of Justice under Kossuth, states (see Appendix I.) that the government and both houses responded unanimously to the republican avowal, and that the government removed the symbol of the Crown from the public arms and seal. The press of all shades a.s.sented. After this, it was clear (I presume) to Kossuth, or at least it soon became so, that all sympathy with royal power was gone out of the nation's heart.

Hungarians may settle that amongst themselves: but as for Englishmen,--when for seven or eight months together the English ministry and English peerage would not stir, or speak, or whisper, to save const.i.tutional royalty and ancient peerage for Hungary and for Europe while it was yet possible; with what face, with what decency, can Englishmen censure Kossuth for despairing of a cause, which was abandoned to ruin by ourselves, the greatest power interested to maintain it,--which the monarchs have waded through blood and perjury to destroy,-and which the millions of Hungary will not (in his belief) peril life and fortune to restore?

[Footnote *: How unanimous was the whole country, is clear by the facts stated. How spontaneous was the movement, and free from all government intrigue, see in Appendix I. This is entirely confirmed by our envoy, Mr. Blackwell: Blue Book, March--Ap. 1848.]

2. The ministry of Louis Bathyanyi and Kossuth have been attacked on opposite grounds,--because they _did_, and because they did _not_, attempt to subdue the Italians by force of arms. The facts are rather complicated, but deserve here to be stated concisely.

When the ministry was appointed, there were _already_ Hungarians in Italy with Radetzki, and Austrian soldiers in Hungary. The Viennese ministry promised to exchange them, as fast as could be done without encountering great expense or dislocating the regiments and making them inefficient. With this promise the Hungarian ministry was forced to content itself at the time. At a later period, when it discovered that the Austrian commanders in Hungary had secret orders not to fight against the Serbian marauders, and that the Austrian troops could not be trusted, the Hungarian ministry _desired_ to get back their men from Italy for their own defence; which desire proved ineffectual, yet has been severely blamed by some of our monarchists. But meanwhile the Viennese ministry, as early as June, 1848, endeavoured to buy of the Hungarian ministry an increased grant of troops against Italy, by conceding a most energetic "King's Speech" against the Serbs, with which the Archduke Palatine was to open, and did open, the Diet on July 2d. A part of this speech is quoted in Appendix II., and indeed it is a loathsome exhibition of Austrian treachery. The Hungarian ministry were pressed by the arguments, that since Austria was attacked in Italy by the King of Sardinia, the war was not merely against the Lombards; and that the Pragmatic Sanction bound Hungary to defend the empire if a.s.sailed from without. This led them to acknowledge the _principle_, that they were bound to a.s.sist, if able; but they replied that Hungary itself must first be secured against marauders, and no troops could be spared until the Serbs were subdued. At the same time orders were sent to Radetzki from Vienna to offer independence to the Lombards, and const.i.tutional nationality under the Austrian crown to the Venetians: hence the Hungarian ministry for a time fancied that they would not be fighting against the Italians, as they expected the terms to be accepted by them. When it was farther represented that the Italians had rejected them,--(for Radetzki, acting probably by secret orders, suppressed the despatches, and never offered independence to Lombardy, though the Austrian ministers made diplomatic capital of their liberality,)--then the Hungarian ministry began to think the Italians unreasonable; yet they did not go beyond their abstract principle, that Hungary ought to grant troops for Austrian defence in Italy, provided, 1st, that rebellion in Hungary itself were repressed; 2d, that the troops should not act against the Italians, unless the Italians had rejected the offer of national liberties and a const.i.tution coordinate to those of Hungary, under the Austrian crown.

The protocol on this subject was drawn on July 5th; the public speech of Kossuth concerning it was not until July 22d; and in this short interval the treachery of the dynasty had been so displayed, that Kossuth could no longer speak in the same tone as a few weeks earlier. For a fuller development of this, I refer the reader to Appendix III. The real object of the Austrian ministry, was, to ruin the popularity of Bathyanyi and Kossuth, if they could induce them to sacrifice Italian freedom; or else, to accuse them to all the European diplomatists as conspirators against the integrity of the Austrian empire, if they refused to oppress the liberties of Italy.

Finally, the reader has even here proof enough how false is the statement which has been current in English newspapers, that Kossuth's visit to America was "a failure." This was an attempt to practise on our prevalent disgraceful tendency to judge of a cause by its success.

However, the end is not yet seen: America has still to act decisively, if she would win the lasting glory which we have despised, of rescuing Law and Right from lawless force, and establishing the future of Europe.

KOSSUTH'S SPEECHES.

[The speeches of Kossuth in England, though masterly in themselves, are in great measure superseded by those which he delivered in America, where the same subjects were treated at far greater length, and viewed from many different aspects. From the speeches in England I here present only three topics, in a rather fragmentary form.]

I.--SECRECY OF DIPLOMACY.

[_First Extract: from Kossuth's Speech at the Guildhall, London, Oct.

30th_, 1851.]

The time draws near, when a radical change must take place for the whole world in the management of diplomacy. Its basis has been secrecy: therein is the triumph of absolutism, and the misfortune of a free people. This has won its way not in England only, but throughout the whole world, even where not a penny of the national property can be disposed of without public consent. It surely is dangerous to the interests of the country and to const.i.tutional liberty, to allow such a secrecy, that the people not only should not know how its interests are being dealt with, but that after the crisis is pa.s.sed, the minister should inform them: "The dinner has been prepared,--and eaten; and the people has nothing to do, but digest the consequences." What is the principle of all evil in Europe? The encroaching spirit of Russia.--And by what power has Russia become so mighty? By its arms?--No: the arms of Russia are below those of many Powers. It has become almost omnipotent,--at least very dangerous to liberty,--by diplomatic intrigues. Now against the secret intrigues of diplomacy there is no surer safeguard, or more powerful counteraction, than public discussion.

This must be opposed to intrigues, and intrigues are then of no weight in the destinies of humanity.

[_Second Extract from a Short Speech in London, May 25th, 1858_.]

I must ask leave to make a remark on the system pursued by your Government in their Foreign relations. You consider yourselves a const.i.tutional nation: I fear that in some respects you are not so.

There is a Latin proverb [current in Hungary], _Nil de n.o.bis sine n.o.bis_,--"nothing that concerns us, without us." This in many things you make your maxim. You say that none of your money shall be spent without your knowledge and approval; and in your internal affairs you carry this out; but I think that the secrecy in which the transactions of your diplomacy are involved is hardly const.i.tutional. Of that most important portion of your affairs which concerns your country in its relations with the rest of Europe, what knowledge have you? If any interpellation is made about any affair not yet concluded, my Lord the Secretary of the Foreign Office will reply that _he cannot give any answer, for the negotiations are still pending_. A little later he will be able to answer, that _as all is now concluded, all comment will be superfluous_.

One little fact I will just mention. By the last treaty with Denmark, to which you became a party, the crown of that kingdom was so settled that only three lives stand between it and the Czar of Russia. Three lives!

but a fragile barrier, when high political aims are concerned. It is therefore an allowed fact, that the country which commands entrance to the Baltic, and which, in the hands of an unfriendly power, would effectually exclude your commerce from that sea, may pa.s.s into the hands of Russia, whose pretensions in the south of Europe you take so much pains to check. This your government have done quietly. How many are there of your people that know and approve it? I hope you will not be offended, if I say, that I cannot understand how yours can be called in this respect a const.i.tutional country.

II.--MONARCHY AND REPUBLICANISM.

[_From Kossuth's Speech at Copenhagen House, Nov. 3d, 1851_.]

In my opinion, the form of Government may be different in different countries, according to their circ.u.mstances, their wishes, their wants.

England loves her Queen, and has full motive to do so. England feels great, glorious and free, and has full reason to feel so. But the fact of England being a monarchy cannot be sufficient reason for her to hate and discredit republican forms of government in other countries differing in circ.u.mstances, in wishes, and in wants. On the other side, to the United States of America, which under republican government are likewise great, glorious, and free, their republicanism gives no sufficient reason to hate and discredit monarchical government in England. It entirely belongs to the right of every nation to dispose of its domestic concerns. Therefore I claim for my own country also, that England, seeing from our past that our cause is just, should profess the sovereign right of every nation to dispose of itself, and should allow no power whatever to interfere with our domestic matters. Since I thus regard the internal affairs of every nation to be its own separate concern, I did not think it became me here in England to speak about the future organization of our country.

But my behavior has not been everywhere appreciated as I hoped. I have met in certain quarters the remark that I "am slippery, and evade the question." Now on the point of sincerity I am particularly susceptible.

I have the sentiment of being a straightforward man, and I would not be charged with having stolen into the sympathies of England without displaying my true colours. Therefore I must clearly state, that in our past struggle it was NOT _we_ who made a revolution. We began peacefully and legislatively to transform the monarchico-aristocratical const.i.tution of Hungary into a monarchico-democratical const.i.tution. We preserved our munic.i.p.al inst.i.tutions, as our most valuable treasure; but to them, as well as to the legislative power, we gave, as basis, the common liberty of the people, instead of the cla.s.s-privileges of old.

Moreover, in place of the old Board of Council,--which, being a corporate body, was of course a mockery in regard to that responsibility of the Executive, which was our chartered right on paper,--we established the real and personal responsibility of ministers. In this, we merely[*] upheld what was due to us by const.i.tution, by treaties, by the coronation-oath of every king,--the right to be "governed as a self-consistent, independent country, by our native inst.i.tutions, according to our own laws." This and all our other reforms we effected peacefully by careful legislation, which the King sanctioned and swore to maintain.

[Footnote *: Many Englishmen have unjustly accused the Hungarians as having by the laws of March, 1848, effected a SEPARATION of Hungary from Austria. _Even if this were true_, it could not justify the cause of the Hapsburgs. The dynasty yielded, under the pressure of circ.u.mstances (as alone will dynasties ever yield), while Hungary did but pet.i.tion legally, and was in fact unarmed. The dynasty swore to the new laws; and then conspired with Croatians, Serbians, and Russians to overthrow the laws by marauding and force of arms. In fact, if in January, 1849, Austria would have negotiated, instead of arresting all Hungarian amba.s.sadors, Hungary would have consented to modify the laws of March: but the Austrians had already in October ordered the overthrow of the whole Hungarian const.i.tution, and had no wish to do anything by legal methods.

At the same time, the original objection is fundamentally _false_.

No separation of the two countries was effected by the laws of March, 1848; for no legal union ever existed. Only the crowns were united, not the countries. Kossuth rightly compares the union to that which was between England and Hanover. At any time in the past, Hungary might have made _peace_ with a power with which Austria was at _war_, if the Kings had not falsified their oath by not a.s.sembling the Diet: for the Diet always had the lawful right of War and Peace. Any mode whatsoever of enforcing the Coronation oath, might, according to this logic, be condemned as a "separating" of Austria and Hungary.]

Nevertheless, this very dynasty, in the most perjurious manner, attacked these laws, this freedom, this const.i.tution, by arms. We defended ourselves by arms victoriously. When upon this the perjurious dynasty called in the Russian armies to beat us down, we of course declared the Hapsburgs to be no longer our sovereigns. We avowed ourselves to be a free and independent nation, but fixed as yet no definite form of government,--neither monarchical nor republican. These are plain facts.

Hungary is not now under lawful government, but is being trampled down by a foreign intruder who is _not_ King of Hungary, being _neither acknowledged by the nation, nor sanctioned by law_.

Hungary is, in a word, in a state of WAR against the Hapsburg dynasty, a war of legitimate defence, by which alone it can ever regain independence and freedom. By such war alone has any nation ever won its freedom from oppressors; as you see in Switzerland, Belgium, Spain, Portugal, France, Sweden, Norway, Greece, the United States, and England itself.

I can state it, as known to me, with the certainty of matter of fact, that Hungary will never accept the Hapsburgs as legitimate sovereigns in the future, nor ever enter into any new moral relations with that perjurious family. Nor only so; but their perjury has so entirely plucked out of my nation's heart all faith in monarchy and all attachment to it, that there is no power on earth to knit the broken tie again: and therefore Hungary wishes and wills to be a free and independent republic,--a republic founded on the rule of law, securing social order, guaranteeing person, property, the moral development as well as material welfare of the people,--in a word, a republic like that of the United States, founded on inst.i.tutions inherited from England itself. This is the conviction of my people, which I share in the very heart of my heart.

III.--COMMUNISM AND THE SIBYLLINE BOOKS.

[_From Kossuth's Second Speech at Manchester, Nov. 12th_, 1851.]

I can understand Communism, but not Socialism. I have read many books on the subject, I have consulted many doctors; but they differ so much that I never could understand what they really mean. However, the only sense which I can see in socialism, is inconsistent with social order and the security of property.

Now since France has three times in sixty years failed to obtain practical results from Political revolutions, all Europe is apt to press forward into new Social doctrine to regulate the future. Believing then, that,--not from my merit, but from the state of my country,--I may be able somewhat to influence the course of the next European revolution, I think it right plainly to declare beforehand my allegiance to the great principle of security for personal property. Nevertheless, to give success to my endeavours in this direction, the rational expectations of the nations of Europe must speedily be fulfilled; else neither I, nor more important men, can avail to stay revolutionary movement. The danger of the case may be ill.u.s.trated by the ancient story of the Sibylline books.

Take Hungary as an instance. Three years ago we should have been extremely well contented with the laws as made by our parliament in 1848, _which laws did not break the tie between us and the house of Hapsburg_. But then Austria a.s.sailed us with arms, and it became impossible for us to go on with that const.i.tution; indeed she herself proclaimed it to be dissolved. We defeated her, and next she called in the Russian armies. Hungary was then under the necessity of _casting off the Hapsburg monarchy_; and only the third Sibylline book remained. Yet Hungary did not even then renounce monarchy, but gave instructions to her representative in England to say to the Government of this country, that _if they wished to see monarchy established in Hungary, we would accept any dynasty they proposed_: but it was not-listened to. Then came the horrors of Arad,[*] and destroyed all our faith in monarchy. So the last of the three books was burned.

[Footnote *: In Arad the Hungarian Generals, who surrendered by Gorgy's persuasion, were hanged or shot; and simultaneously Bathyanyi, who had been arrested when he came as an amba.s.sador of peace, was judged anew and murdered by a second court-martial.]

And so, wherever men's reasonable expectations are not fulfilled, it cannot be known where their fluctuations will end. Every man who is anxious for the preservation of person and property should help the world in obtaining rational freedom: if it be not obtained, mankind will search after other forms of action, totally subversive of all existing social order; and where the excitement will subside, I do not know. Men like me, who merely wish to establish political freedom, will in such circ.u.mstances lose all their influence, and others will get influence who may become dangerous to all established interests whatsoever.