[Footnote 2: These are the facts of the transaction: they will be commented upon in a future page. Vide comment near the end of Chapter X.]

s.p.a.ce would fail were I to detail the various modes employed by the confederates to produce on the mind of Siraj-ud-daula the conviction that his only safety lay in battle with the English. He had tried many methods to escape the dilemma, to rid himself of the heavy hand of Clive. He had made overtures to Bussy at Haidarabad; to the Marathas; to the Court {88}of Delhi; to the Nawab-Wazir of Oudh. But every proposed combination had fallen through. He had quarrelled with Mir Jafar, with his chief n.o.bles, with the bankers. He had suspected treachery, but had never been quite certain. At last, on the thirteenth of June, information was brought to him that the English agent, Mr. Watts, and his subordinates, had fled from Kasimbazar, after an interview with Mir Jafar, at the time in his disfavour. Then he gave way: then he realized that, without the aid of his n.o.bles, he was helpless: then he guessed the whole plot; the schemes of Clive; the treason of his own people: then he turned to Mir Jafar for reconciliation, imploring him not to abandon him in his distress. Mir Jafar and the other n.o.bles, most of whom were in the plot, all swore fealty and obedience, Mir Jafar leading the way. They would risk everything for the Subahdar. They would drive back the cursed English, and free Bengal from their influence. Recovering his equanimity from these a.s.surances, Siraj-ud-daula ordered his army to march to an intrenched camp he had prepared near the village of Pla.s.sey, in the island of Kasimbazar,[3] twenty-two miles distant.

There was some difficulty regarding the arrears of pay of his men, failing the settlement of which they refused to march. But, with friendly a.s.sistance {89}this difficulty was overcome; the army set out three days later for its destination, and arrived in the intrenched camp on the 21st of June.

[Footnote 3: Kasimbazar is called an island because whilst the base of the triangle which composes it is watered by the Ganges, the western side, on which lies Pla.s.sey, is watered by the Bhagirathi; the eastern by the Jalangi.]

I propose now briefly to record the movements of Clive: then to describe the decisive battle which followed his arrival on the island.

{90}

CHAPTER IX THE BATTLE OF PLa.s.sEY

Meanwhile Clive had made every preparation for the advance of his army. A considerable portion of it had been stationed at Chandranagar. To that place he despatched on the 12th of June all the soldiers available, and 150 sailors lent him by the Admiral, leaving Calcutta guarded by a few sick Europeans, some sipahis to look after the French prisoners, and a few gunners to man the guns on the ramparts. On the 13th he quitted Chandranagar, the Europeans, with the guns, munitions, and stores, proceeding by water in 200 boats, towed by natives against the stream, the sipahis marching along the right bank of the river, on the highroad made by the Mughal Government from Hugli to Patna.[1] The force consisted, all told, of about 900 Europeans, 200 men of mixed native and Portuguese blood who served with the Europeans, a small detail of lascars, and 2100 sipahis. The artillery consisted of eight six-pounders and two small howitzers.

[Footnote 1: Vide Broome's _History of the Bengal Army_, p. 137.]

{91}The day after the force had set out Clive despatched to the Subahdar a communication tantamount to a declaration of war; and he proceeded, as he approached the enemy's camp, to act as though such a declaration had been accepted. On the 16th he reached Palti, a town on the western bank of the Kasimbazar river about six miles above its junction with the Jalangi. Twelve miles higher up he came within striking distance of Katwa, the Governor of which was supposed to be one of the conspirators. Clive, expecting that the opposition would not be serious, despatched to occupy it, on the 17th, 200 Europeans and 500 sipahis, under Major Eyre Coote. But either the Governor had changed his mind or he had only feigned compliance, for he prepared to resist Coote's attack. Coote at once made preparations for an a.s.sault, and took such dispositions, that the garrison, recognizing the futility of resistance, and fearing to be cut off, evacuated the place, leaving large supplies in the hands of the victors.

The next day, the 18th, a terrific storm raging, the force halted.

The day following, Clive, who had committed himself to the enterprise mainly on the conviction that Mir Jafar would support him, received a letter from that n.o.bleman, informing him that he had feigned reconciliation with the Subahdar and had taken an oath not to a.s.sist the English, but adding that 'the purport of his convention with them must be carried into execution.' This strange letter from the man upon whose co-operation he particularly {92}depended led Clive to doubt whether, after all, Mir Jafar might not betray him. Under this possibility, the sense of the extreme danger of the enterprise in which he was engaged revealed itself to him more clearly than it had ever presented itself before. To cross an unfordable river in the face of a vastly superior enemy, at a distance of 150 miles from all support, would, he felt, be a most hazardous undertaking. Should Mir Jafar be faithless to him, as he had appeared to be to his master, and should the English force be defeated, there would scarcely survive a man to tell the tale. Again would Calcutta be in jeopardy--this time probably beyond redemption. Under the influence of such thoughts he resolved not to cross the river until he should receive from Mir Jafar more definite a.s.surances.

The next day, the 20th, a messenger arrived from his agent, Mr.

Watts, who was then at Kalna, carrying a letter to the effect that before he quitted Murshidabad he had been engaged in an interview with Mir Jafar and his son, when there entered some emissaries of the Subahdar; that, in the presence of these, Mir Jafar had denounced Mr.

Watts as a spy, and had threatened to destroy the English if they should attempt to cross the Bhagirathi. This letter decided Clive. He resolved to summon a Council of War.

There came to that Council, about noon of the 21st of June, the following officers: Colonel Clive, Majors Kilpatrick and Grant, Captains Gaupp, {93}Rumbold, Fischer, Palmer, Le Beaume, Waggonner, Corneille, and Jennings, Captain-Lieutenants Parshaw and Molitore;--Major Eyre Coote, Captains Alexander Grant, Cudmore, Armstrong, Muir, Campbell, and Captain-Lieutenant Carstairs. The question submitted to them was: 'whether under existing circ.u.mstances, and without other a.s.sistance, it would be prudent to cross the river and come to action at once with the Nawab, or whether they should fortify themselves at Katwa, and wait till the monsoon was over, when the Marathas or some other country power might be induced to join them.' Contrary to the usual custom, Clive spoke first, the others following according to seniority. Clive spoke and voted against immediate action. He was supported by the twelve officers whose names immediately follow his own name in the list I have given, and opposed by the owners of the seven last names, Major Eyre Coote speaking very emphatically in favour of action; the majority of the Council, we thus see, siding with Clive.

The subsequent career of Eyre Coote, especially in Southern India, proved very clearly that as a commander in the field he fell far short of Robert Clive, but on this occasion he was the wiser of the two. Some years later Clive, giving his evidence before a Select Committee of the House of Commons, emphatically stated that had he abided by the decision of the Council it would have caused the ruin of the East India Company. As it was, he reconsidered his vote the moment the Council was over. It is said that he {94}sat down under a clump of trees, and began to turn over in his mind the arguments on both sides. He was still sitting when a despatch from Mir Jafar[2]

reached him, containing favourable a.s.surances. Clive then resolved to fight. All doubt had disappeared from his mind. He was again firm, self-reliant, confident. Meeting Eyre Coote as he returned to his quarters, he simply informed him that he had changed his mind and intended to fight, and then proceeded to dictate in his own tent the orders for the advance.

[Footnote 2: Vide Ives's _Voyage and Historical Narrative_, p. 150.

Mr. Ives was surgeon of the _Kent_ during the expedition to Bengal, and was a great friend of Admiral Watson.]

At sunrise on the 22nd the force commenced the pa.s.sage of the river.

By four o'clock it was safe on the other side. Here a letter was received from Mir Jafar, informing Clive of the contemplated movements of the Nawab. Clive replied that he 'would march to Pla.s.sey without delay, and would the next morning advance six miles further to the village of Daudpur, but if Mir Jafar did not join him there, he would make peace with the Nawab.' Two hours later, about sunset, he commenced his march amid a storm of heavy rain which wetted the men to the skin. In all respects, indeed, the march was particularly trying, for the recent rains had inundated the country, and for eight hours the troops had to follow the line of the river, the water constantly reaching their waists. They reached Pla.s.sey, a distance of fifteen miles, at one o'clock on the morning of the 23rd of June, and lay {95}down to sleep in a mango-grove, the sound of drums and other music in the camp of the Nawab solacing rather than disturbing them.

The Subahdar had reached his headquarters twelve hours before them.

The mango-tope in which the English were resting was but a mile distant from the intrenched position occupied by Siraj-ud-daula's army. It was about 800 yards in length and 300 in breadth, the trees planted in regular rows. All round it was a bank of earth, forming a good breastwork. Beyond this was a ditch choked with weeds and brambles. The length of the grove was nearly diagonal to the river, the north-west angle being little more than 50 yards from the bank, whilst at the south-west corner it was more than 200 yards distant. A little in advance, on the bank of the river, stood a hunting-box belonging to the Nawab, encompa.s.sed by a wall of masonry. In this, during the night, Clive placed 200 Europeans and 300 natives, with two field-pieces. But in the morning he withdrew the greater part of them.[3] He had with him 950 European infantry and artillery, 200 topa.s.ses, men of mixed race, armed and equipped as Europeans, 50 sailors with seven midshipmen attached, 2100 sipahis, a detail of lascars, and the field-pieces already mentioned.

[Footnote 3: Vide Orme's _History of India_, and Broome's _History of the Bengal Army_.]

On the spot which the Nawab had selected for his intrenched camp the river makes a bend in the form of a horseshoe, with the points much contracted, {96}forming a peninsula of about three miles in circ.u.mference, the neck of which was less than a quarter of a mile in breadth. The intrenchment commenced a little below the southern point of this gorge, resting on the river, and extending inland for about 200 yards, and sweeping thence round to the north for about three miles. At this angle was a redoubt, on which the enemy had mounted several pieces of cannon. About 300 yards to the eastward of this redoubt was a hillock covered with jungle, and about 800 yards to the south, nearer Clive's grove, was a tank, and 100 yards further south was a second and larger one. Both of these were surrounded by large mounds of earth, and, with the hillock, formed important positions for either army to occupy. The Subahdar's army was encamped partly in this peninsula, partly in rear of the intrenchment. He had 50,000 infantry of sorts, 18,000 horse of a better quality, and 53 guns, mostly 32, 24, and 18-pounders. The infantry was armed chiefly with matchlocks, swords, pikes, bows and arrows, and possessed little or no discipline; the cavalry was well-trained and well-mounted; the guns were mounted on large platforms, furnished with wheels, and drawn by forty or fifty yoke of powerful oxen, a.s.sisted by elephants.

But the most efficient portion of his force was a small party of forty to fifty Frenchmen, commanded by M. St. Frais, formerly one of the Council of Chandranagar. This party had attached to it four light field-pieces.[4]

[Footnote 4: For these details see Orme, Broome, Clive's _Evidence before the Committee of the House of Commons_, Clive's _Report to the Court of Directors_, Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_, and Ives's _Voyage and Historical Narrative_. The account which follows is based entirely on these authorities.]

{97}At daybreak on the 23rd of June the Nawab moved his entire army out of the intrenchment and advanced towards the position occupied by Clive, the several corps marching in compact order. In front was St.

Frais, who took post at the larger tank, that nearest Clive's grove.

On a line to his right, near the river, were a couple of heavy guns, under the orders of a native officer. Behind these two advanced parties, and within supporting distance, was a chosen body of 5000 horse and 7000 foot, under the immediate command of the Nawab's most faithful general, Mir Madan.[5] The rest of the Nawab's army extended in a curve, its right resting on the hillock near the camp; thence sweeping round in dense columns of horse and foot to the eastward of the south-east angle of the grove. Here, nearest to the English, were placed the troops of Mir Jafar, then those of Yar Lutf Khan, beyond these Raja Dulab Ram. The English within the grove were thus almost surrounded by the river and the enemy; but in view of the promised treachery of Mir Jafar, the greatest danger was to be apprehended from their immediate front, viz. from St. Frais, with his little body of Frenchmen, and from Mir Madan.

[Footnote 5: See Elliot's _History of India_, vol. viii. p. 428.]

From the roof of the hunting-house Clive watched his enemy take up the positions which would hold {98}him, if their generals were true to their master, in a vice. 'They approached apace,' he wrote in a letter of July 26 to the Secret Committee of the Court of Directors, 'and by six began to attack us with a number of heavy cannon, supported by the whole army, and continued to play on us very briskly for several hours, during which our situation was of the utmost service to us, being lodged in a large grove, with good mud banks. To succeed in an attempt on their cannon was next to impossible, as they were planted in a manner round us, and at considerable distances from each other. We therefore remained quiet in our post, in expectation of a successful attack upon their camp at night. About noon the enemy drew off their artillery and returned to their camp.'

So far, up to mid-day, we have the outline of the fight as narrated by Clive; it is, however, but an outline. It would seem that the action commenced by a discharge of one of the four guns of St. Frais.

This discharge killed one and wounded another of the men of the European battalion. Immediately afterwards the whole of the enemy's guns opened fire, but their shots flew high, and did but little mischief. Clive meanwhile had drawn up his troops in line in front of the grove, their left resting on the hunting-box, with the exception of two guns and two howitzers which he had posted at some brick-kilns some 200 yards in front of the hunting-box spoken of. These, as soon as the enemy opened, replied promptly and effectively. The remaining six guns, placed three on {99}each flank of the European battalion which formed the centre of his line, answered the heavy batteries of the enemy, but, from their small calibre, made but little impression.

After a cannonade of half an hour, the English having lost ten Europeans and twenty sipahis in killed and wounded, Clive withdrew them under shelter of the grove, leaving one detachment at the brick-kilns, another at the hunting-box. This retrograde movement greatly encouraged the enemy. They brought their guns much nearer, and their fire became more vigorous and sustained. But its effect was less fatal, for the English troops were protected by the trees and the mud bank, and, sitting down, were but little exposed. This warfare continued till about eleven o'clock, the casualties being far greater on the side of the Nawab's army than among the English. Then Clive summoned his princ.i.p.al officers to a conference, and it was resolved that the troops should occupy their existing positions until midnight, and should then attack the Nawab's camp. We may regard the close of the conference as occurring about the same time as the withdrawal of the enemy's artillery indicated by Clive in the above extract from his despatch.

For, scarcely was the conference over, than the skies poured down a fierce shower, such as occurs often during the rainy season, which lasted an hour. Then it was that the enemy's artillery fire slackened by degrees almost to the point of ceasing, for the rain had damaged their ammunition, left almost completely {100}without cover. Clive had been more careful of his powder, so that when the enemy's horse, believing the English guns as powerless as their own, advanced towards the grove to charge, they were received with a fire which emptied many a saddle, and sent them reeling back. In this charge Mir Madan, previously referred to, was killed.[6]

[Footnote 6: Elliot states, on the authority of the J'ami'ut Taw'ari'kh, that he was accidentally struck by a cannon-ball.

_History of India_, vol. viii. p. 427.]

The death of this brave and faithful soldier greatly disheartened the Subahdar. He sent for Mir Jafar, and implored him to remain faithful to his oath. Taking off his turban and casting it at the feet of his uncle,[7] he exclaimed in humble tones, 'Jafar, that turban thou must defend.' Mir Jafar promised, but instead of performing, the degenerate Muhammadan returned to his confederates and sent a despatch to Clive, informing him of all that had pa.s.sed, and begging him to push on immediately, or, if that were impossible, not to fail to attack during the night. His letter did not reach Clive till late in the evening. Meanwhile other influences had been at work to bring about a similar result.

[Footnote 7: Mir Jafar had married the sister of Ali Vardi Khan, the Nawab's father.]

It is impossible not to feel sympathy for the youthful prince, surrounded by traitors, his one true adherent killed. Scarcely had Mir Jafar quitted him when there came to him another traitor, Raja Dulab Ram, who commanded the army corps nearest to the position {101}he had taken. The Raja found his master in a state of great agitation. The English were showing themselves in the open; his own men were giving way; hope was vanishing quickly. Instead of encouraging the Subahdar to fight it out, the treacherous Raja gave fuel to his fears, told him the day was lost, and urged him to flee to Murshidabad. In an evil hour for his dynasty and for himself, Siraj-ud-daula yielded to his persuasions, and, ordering his troops to retire within the intrenchment, mounted a swift dromedary, and fled, accompanied by 2000 hors.e.m.e.n, to his capital.

It was then two o'clock. The first hour since Clive's conference had been marked by the heavy rain; the second by the repulse of the Subahdar's hors.e.m.e.n; the following up of the repulsed attack; the conversations of the Subahdar with his two treacherous generals. By two o'clock the enemy's attack had completely ceased, and they were observed yoking their oxen preparatory to withdrawing within the intrenchment as the Subahdar had ordered. There remained only on the ground that body of forty gallant Frenchmen under St. Frais, whom I have described as occupying the ground about the larger tank, that nearest to the grove. The post was an important one, for from it the English could have taken the retreating enemy in flank, and have inflicted heavy loss upon them. St. Frais was nearly isolated, but he, too, had seen the advantage the English would derive from occupying the position, and, faithful amid the faithless, he, with the gallantry of his nation, {102}resolved to defend it until it should be no longer defensible.

There was with the army a very gallant officer, Major James Kilpatrick, who had greatly distinguished himself in Southern India, and who, on this occasion, commanded the Company's troops. Kilpatrick had noted the firm front displayed by St. Frais, the great advantage to be derived from occupying the position he held, the disadvantage of leaving him to hold it whilst the English force should advance. He resolved, then, to expel him: so sending word to Clive of his intentions, and of the reason which prompted his action, he marched with two companies towards St. Frais.

Clive, meanwhile, seeing the enemy's attack broken, yet deeming it better, not having received Mir Jafar's letter, to wait till the sun should have descended before making the decisive attack, had proceeded to the hunting-box to rest after so many hours of fatigue and excitement, to be followed, he believed, by many more, having first given orders that he should be informed of any change that might occur in the enemy's position. He was there when the message of Kilpatrick reached him. Rising, he hurried to the spot, met Kilpatrick as he was advancing to the a.s.sault, reprimanded him for having taken such a step without orders, but seeing him so far forward, he took himself the command of the detachment, sending back Kilpatrick to the grove to bring the remainder of the troops. When St. Frais recognized {103}the earnestness of the English, and that he was entirely without support, he evacuated the post, and retreated to the redoubt at the corner of the intrenchment. There he placed his guns ready for action.[8]

[Footnote 8: This episode is not specially mentioned by Clive, but it rests on irrefragable evidence. Vide Orme, vol. ii. p. 176: see also Sir Eyre Coote's _Narrative_; also Malcolm's _Life of Lord Clive_, vol. i. p. 260.]

Meanwhile, whilst the English force was thus advancing, the army corps commanded by Mir Jafar was observed to linger behind the rest of the retreating enemy. It was noticed, further, that when it had advanced almost abreast of the northern line of the grove, it faced to its left and advanced in that direction. For a time it seemed to the English officers as though the troops composing it were about to make a raid on their baggage, and a party with a field-piece was sent forward to check them. The corps then halted, remained so for a time, then slowly retired, taking, however, a direction which led it apart from the other corps of the enemy. We shall return to them in a few moments.

Whilst this corps was executing the manoeuvre I have described, Clive had advanced to a position whence he could cannonade the enemy's camp. The effect of this fire was to cause great loss and confusion amongst the troops of the Subahdar, at the same time that the English, giving, by their advance, their flank to the French in the redoubt, suffered also. To put {104}an end to this cross-fire Clive saw that the one remedy was to storm the redoubt. He was unwilling, however, to risk his troops in a severe contest with the French so long as the army corps, the movements of which I have described in the preceding paragraph, should continue to occupy its apparently threatening position. That corps might be the corps of Mir Jafar, but there was no certainty that it was so, for Clive had not then received Mir Jafar's letter, nor was he aware of the flight of the Nawab. It was just at this critical moment that he observed the corps in question making the retrograde movement I have referred to. Then all doubt was over in his mind. It must, he was convinced, be the corps of his adherent. Certain now that he would not be molested, he hurled his troops against the redoubt and the hillock to the east of it. St. Frais displayed a bold front, but, abandoned almost immediately by his native allies, and deeming it wiser to preserve his handful of Europeans for another occasion, he evacuated the redoubt, leaving his field-pieces behind him. His resistance was the last opposition offered to the English. The clocks struck five as he fell back, thus tolling the memorable hour which gave to England the richest province in India; which imposed upon her the necessity to advance upwards from its basis until she should reach the rocky region called with some show of reason the 'Glacis of the Fortress of Hindustan.'

Just as the beaten and betrayed army was moving {105}off with its impedimenta, its elephants, its camels, leaving to be scrambled for an enormous ma.s.s of baggage, stores, cattle, and camp equipage, Clive received messengers from Mir Jafar requesting an interview. Clive replied by appointing a meeting for the morrow at Daudpur, a village twenty miles to the south of Murshidabad. Thither the bulk of the troops, their spirits cheered by the promise made them that they would receive a liberal donation in money, marched that evening; whilst a detachment under Eyre Coote went forward in pursuit, to prevent the enemy from rallying. After a short halt, to enable the commissariat to exchange their small and worn-out bullocks for the splendid oxen of the Subahdar, the troops pressed on, and at eight o'clock the entire force was united at Daudpur.

Such was the battle of Pla.s.sey. The loss of the English force was extremely small, amounting to seven Europeans and sixteen sipahis killed, and thirteen Europeans and thirty-six sipahis wounded. No officer was killed: two were wounded, but their names are not recorded. A midshipman of the _Kent_, Sh.o.r.editch by name, was shot in the thigh, whilst doing duty with the artillery. The enemy's casualties were far greater. It was calculated to be, in killed and wounded, about a thousand, including many officers. They had been far more exposed than the English. Writing, in the letter already referred to, of the phases of the action between two and five o'clock, Clive states that their horse exposed {106}themselves a great deal; that 'many of them were killed, amongst the rest four or five officers of the first distinction.'

Clive had gained his victory. We have now to record the use that he made of it.

{107}

CHAPTER X HOW CLIVE DEALT WITH THE SPOILS OF PLa.s.sEY: HIS DEALINGS WITH MiR JAFAR; WITH THE PRINCES OF SOUTHERN INDIA; WITH THE DUTCH

The following morning Clive despatched Mr. Scrafton and Omar Beg[1]