X.

Much has been said here, and a great deal more in the works of those French writers who were unfriendly towards Russia, concerning her intrigues and encroachments in the Princ.i.p.alities, but it is only fair to admit that her interference invariably resulted in the ameliorating of their condition. This the French writers sometimes grudgingly admit, and the facts of history clearly prove. In nearly every instance Russian interference meant relief to the peasantry and enforced moderation in the rulers. In 1710, when Cantemir III. of Moldavia sought the aid of Peter the Great, it was 'to put an end to the spoliations of the Porte.'

In 1769 Constantine Mavrocordato entered into secret relations with Catherine II., and after the Russian invasion the Porte was compelled by the Treaty of Kainardji to grant autonomy to the Princ.i.p.alities, and to diminish its exactions; in 1802, through Russian remonstrances, abuses were suppressed and the evil-doers punished. In 1812 the chicanery of the rulers and the exactions of the Porte had brought the people to the brink of starvation; the Russians interfered, and put a limit to the demands of the Porte; but after their departure, we are told, the current value of agricultural produce again fell so low that it was impossible for the cultivator to live, and this circ.u.mstance, along with the renewed exactions of the rulers and officials, once more brought ruin upon the peasantry. In 1820 Wilkinson, who, it must be remembered, was Consul at Bucarest, and who was far from being enamoured of Russia, says: 'During my residence in the Princ.i.p.alities several instances have occurred within my observation of very active exertion on the part of Russia to keep the accustomed system of extortion in restraint, and to relieve the inhabitants from oppression, and such exertion has certainly on many occasions prevented the condition of the inhabitants from becoming worse.'[168]

But that the ultimate design of Russia was to secure and incorporate the Princ.i.p.alities as part of her general scheme of aggression, there can be no doubt in the mind of anyone who has followed her operations previous to the Crimean campaign. That and subsequent events may be said to belong to contemporary history; but we must briefly refer to such incidents of the war as affected the Danubian Princ.i.p.alities and laid the foundation of Roumanian freedom. The Emperor Nicholas had picked a wolf-and-lamb quarrel with the Porte, of which the ostensible ground was the protection of subjects professing the Greek Catholic faith in the 'holy places;' and little expecting, perhaps little caring, that he would arouse the jealousy of France and England, he had sent an ultimatum to the Porte, demanding the right of intervention in conformity with the Treaty of Kainardji, threatening the invasion and occupation of the Danubian Princ.i.p.alities in default of immediate acquiescence. Not having received the satisfaction he required, he ordered General Gortschakoff to cross the Pruth and to take possession of and hold the Princ.i.p.alities. This was done in the month of July 1853.

In September the Turkish Commander-in-Chief on the Danube demanded an immediate evacuation of those territories, and, failing compliance, war was declared. For some time the Russians, fearing the enmity of Austria, which had ma.s.sed troops on the Wallachian frontier, remained on the defensive, but in October Omar Pasha a.s.sumed the aggressive, sending a small force across the Danube at Vidin, and it was thought that the straggle between the contending forces would take place in 'Lesser Wallachia.' Omar Pasha, however, either intended this as a feint, or changed his plan, for he soon afterwards occupied strong positions on the Danube at Turtukai and Oltenitza, between Silistria and Rustchuk, and was there attacked by a Russian force, which he succeeded in repulsing. No results followed this encounter; the Russians retreated towards Bucarest, and the Turks fell back across the Danube into Bulgaria.

In February 1854 the French and English Governments sent an ultimatum to Russia, requiring her to evacuate the Princ.i.p.alities, and in March they declared war against her. In June Austria followed suit, so far as demanding the evacuation of Moldo-Wallachia, and received permission from the Porte to drive the Russians out of the Princ.i.p.alities, and occupy them with her troops. She, however, contented herself during the continuance of the war with acc.u.mulating forces on her frontiers, and no doubt it was this threatening att.i.tude which at length compelled Russia to evacuate them. Meanwhile active hostilities were proceeding between Omar Pasha and Gortschakoff. In the early part of 1854, the Russians having met with a reverse at Cetate, near Calafat, the Russian army was ordered to invade Turkey, and, having succeeded in crossing into the Dobrudscha at Galatz, Braila, and Ismail, it was deemed necessary to capture Silistria as a strategic post, in order to ensure the safety of the advancing army. In May 1854 the Russians attacked that fortress unsuccessfully, and after they had attempted to storm it four times, the Turks (in June) a.s.sumed the offensive, and made a sally, during which one of the Russian generals was slain. In the same month Nicholas, finding himself threatened by the Western allies in the Black Sea, and fearing to make an open enemy of Austria, whose forces were constantly increasing on her frontier, gave orders for raising the siege of Silistria, and subsequently for the entire withdrawal of his troops from the Princ.i.p.alities. This was not, however, effected until July, nor before the Russians had sustained another defeat from the Turks at Giurgevo.

Then it was that the army was completely withdrawn, the Turkish vanguard entered Bucarest, and, says one of the historians of the war, 'the Wallachian n.o.bles celebrated a Te Deum in the metropolitan church to commemorate the restoration of Turkish supremacy--the same boyards who, in 1829, kissed the hands of the Russians who had freed them from the Turkish yoke.'

As for the hospodars. Stirbei of Wallachia, and Alexander Ghika of Moldavia, they had retired for safety to Vienna shortly after the outbreak of hostilities, and remained there until September, when the Austrians occupied the country with the approval of the Porte. They then returned for a short period, but Stirbei again abdicated permanently a month afterwards. The Roumanians wore compelled by the Russians to serve in their armies as long as they occupied the country, but a Turkish amnesty relieved them from the consequences of this procedure.

The military operations of the contending Powers external to the Princ.i.p.alities have an interest for us only in their results. After the termination of the Crimean campaign, when Russia was compelled to sue for peace, the Treaty of Paris was concluded, and it contained stipulations of vital consequence to Moldo-Wallachia.

These stipulations may be summarised as follows:--The neutralisation of the navigation of the Danube, which was placed under the control of a European Commission; the cession by Russia to Turkey (and thus to Moldavia) of a portion of Bessarabia at the embouchure of the Danube; and the re-organisation, on an entirely autonomic basis, but still under the suzerainty of the Porte, of the Danubian Princ.i.p.alities. In the year 1857, before the deliberations of the European Powers had given permanent effect to the stipulations of the Treaty of Paris, a movement was actively proceeding in both Princ.i.p.alities, the object of which was to effect their union under one governing head.

The exiles of 1848, who had fled to Paris, and there endeavoured by their published works to keep alive the spirit of independence in Roumania, now returned to their native country and renewed an active agitation at home. Amongst those who then and thereafter strove for the liberties of their country were John Bratiano, C.A. Rosetti, two members of the family of Ghika, Demetrius Stourdza, John Cantacuzene, and other laymen, and Golesco and others of the military profession. These so far attained their end that, after a great deal of idle intervention on the part of Turkey and the other European Powers, most of whom were intriguing for their own hands rather than for the welfare of the Princ.i.p.alities, they succeeded in obtaining from a conference of the Powers at Paris, in 1858, a kind of agreement, which, whilst it insisted upon the retention in each Princ.i.p.ality of a separate prince or hospodar, gave to each an elective parliament, and admitted of a partial fusion, under a kind of central commission, for the 'united Princ.i.p.alities.' This was a species of compromise which was no doubt satisfactory to the guaranteeing Powers, with their conflicting interests, but was not at all to the taste of the young nation struggling for union and independence. By a clever and perfectly justifiable manuvre the people of Moldavia and Wallachia proceeded to supplement the deliberations and decisions of the Powers, by each choosing the same ruler, Captain John Couza, and, in spite of protestations from the Porte, which refused to recognise this as a lawful proceeding, Couza, under the t.i.tle of Alexander John I., mounted the united throne as _Prince of Roumania_. In 1861, chiefly in consequence of the recommendation of the guaranteeing Powers, the Porte a.s.sented to the union.

[Footnote 168: P. 183.]

XI.

Prince Couza was born at Galatz in 1820. He was of an old boyard family, and was educated at Ja.s.sy, Athens, and Paris. In 1845 he married Helena, the daughter of another boyard, Rosetti, and subsequently held high offices in the State. His princess was a patriotic lady who founded and supported many charitable inst.i.tutions, amongst others the orphan asylum known as the Asyle Helene, of which we have already spoken; and had her husband recognised her virtues, and remembered his own obligations to her; he would probably have still sat upon the throne of Roumania. For there is no doubt that during the earlier part of his reign, which lasted from 1859 to 1866, he enjoyed the cordial support of all parties in the State; but he soon endeavoured to render himself absolute, and in 1864 he effected a _coup d'etat_, very similar to the one which has recently been perpetrated by the Prince of Bulgaria, in all probability under the same tutelage. In his case, however, the nation refused to submit to such an arbitrary proceeding, and although it succeeded for a time, that, coupled with his avarice, gross immorality, and general misgovernment, led to his ultimate downfall. In 1864 the monasteries were secularised, that is to say, they were claimed as State property, a proceeding which was sanctioned by the guaranteeing Powers against payment of an indemnity. In 1865 a complete reform took place in the relations between the landed proprietors and the peasantry, who were freed from feudal obligations and became part owners of the soil. Of this reform we have already spoken at length. As we have said, however, the personal actions of the Prince, who enriched himself at the expense of a still suffering country, sought by every means in his power to obtain absolute rule, and led an openly immoral life, against which his advisers protested and warned him in vain, led to what some have called a conspiracy, but which was an uprising of all the leading representatives of the people, lay and military, who united to drive him from the throne.

The so-called abdication, but really the deposition, of Prince Couza, as it was narrated at the time, was effected as follows. The conspiracy being ripe, on February 11 [23], 1866, a sufficiently strong body of military, acting under the orders of General Golesco and others, surrounded the palace in which the Prince was lodged, and a number of officers then forced their way inside. On entering the palace they proceeded to the room of the Prince, arresting on their way thither M.

L----[169] and two officers of the body-guard. Before they forced the door the Prince, it seems, had a presentiment of some danger, and cried from within, 'Don't enter, for I shall fire.' Before the sentence was finished, however, the door was burst open, and he saw before him the conspirators with revolvers in their hands. He was cowardly enough (says the narrative) not to fire once. It is possible that if he had known that they had an order not to fire, whatever might happen, he would have killed one or other of them.[170] Or, perhaps, the presence of Madame ----[171] prevented him from offering resistance, for she was there undressed.

'What do you want?' he asked, trembling.

'We have brought your Highness's abdication,' said Captain C----. 'Will you sign it?'

'I have neither pen nor ink,' he answered.

'We thought of that,' said one of the conspirators.

'I have no table.'

'For this once, I offer myself as such,' said Captain P----.

Having no alternative, the Prince then signed the following act of abdication, as it lay on the shoulders of the stooping officer who had condescended to serve as a desk for the occasion.

'We, Alexander, according to the will of the whole nation, and the oath we took on ascending the throne, this day, February 11 [23], 1866, lay down the reins of government and relegate the same to a princely _loc.u.m-tenens_ and to the ministry chosen by the people.

(Signed) 'ALEXANDER JOHN.'

'This has been my wish for a long time,' said the Prince after having signed; 'but circ.u.mstances not dependent upon myself have caused me to postpone. Spite of all this, I was willing to do it in May.'

After he had signed the act of abdication the conspirators made him dress, and led him to a carriage where Ch----, in the dress of a coachman, received him and drove him to the house of M. Ciocarlanu.

Madame ----, on the other hand, was taken home to her own house after she had habited herself. Immediately after Couza's arrest the bells rang out a merry peal, a band of music struck up before the theatre, and ma.s.ses of people collected before the palace where the Provisional Government had installed itself, and shortly afterwards issued the following proclamation:--

'Roumanians,

During seven years you have shown Europe what can be effected by patriotism and civic virtue. Unhappily you were mistaken in your selection of the prince whom you called to lead the nation. Anarchy and corruption, violation of the laws, squandering of the national finances, degradation of the country at home and abroad, these have characterised the conduct of this culpable Government. Roumanians, the princely _loc.u.m-tenens_ will maintain the const.i.tutional government in its integrity. It will uphold public order, and remove personal ambition from the altar of the Fatherland.

'Roumanians, by the election of a foreigner as Prince of Roumania, the votes of the Divan will become an accomplished fact.'

Let us add a few words concerning this proceeding. We have heard blame attributed to the revolutionists, who, as already stated, comprised the leading statesmen of the country, for using force in order to ensure Couza's abdication, and so far as the mere legality of the doc.u.ment is concerned, his signature, thus obtained, was of course valueless. But in order to be able to form a correct opinion on the crisis and the acts of the revolutionists, it would be necessary to understand not only the character of the prince (which would alone have justified extreme measures, if one half be true that has been written concerning him), but also to estimate the effect of any delay that might have arisen from a more pacific and deliberate course of action. The popular leaders had not forgotten the lessons of 1848, and it was not likely they would be so insensate as to give time for Russian or Turkish intrigues once more to break down the barriers of their hardly-won liberties. That the nation was satisfied is proved by the sequel. No one troubled himself about Couza, who was allowed to withdraw from Roumania laden with the spoils of his reign; and when afterwards the name of the present ruler was placed before the people it was accepted with joy and acclamation.

But we have had another reason for dwelling at greater length than has been customary with historians upon this incident in Roumanian annals.

It was to show the kind of example in morality, or rather immorality and faithlessness, which was set by one of the princes of the country so recently as fifteen or sixteen years since. Such conduct may be treated with contempt in countries having a well-established and settled const.i.tution, but in a new-born nationality it could not fail to work great mischief, which has not yet been fully remedied despite the example of an unblemished Court.

[Footnote 169: As the event is comparatively recent, we have considered it desirable to suppress two or three names of persons who may be still living, and whose connection with the revolution is of no moment.]

[Footnote 170: That _would_ have been cowardly.--AUTHOR.]

[Footnote 171: One of his mistresses, who was with him.]

CHAPTER XIV.

FROM THE DEPOSITION OF PRINCE COUZA (1866) TO THE CORONATION OF KING CHARLES (1881).

Accession of Prince Charles of Hohenzollern--Signs the Const.i.tution--Former differences between the Prince and the Parliament--(Note: State of parties with leaders in 1881)--Action of Russia prior to the war of 1877--Turkish incapacity and obstinacy--Perplexing position of Roumania--Reluctance of the nation to interfere--First att.i.tude of neutrality--The Porte declares the Prince an enemy--The Prince and army organisation--Value of Roumanian co-operation to Russia--The Russian army of operations--Crosses the Danube and occupies Sistova and the Shipka Pa.s.s--Repeated defeats at Plevna and elsewhere--Gloomy outlook for the Russians--The Roumanians cross the Danube--First estimates of them--Contemptuous criticisms and anecdotes--Changing views regarding them--Prince Charles appointed Commander-in-Chief of the allies before Plevna--Defences of Plevna--The Grivitza redoubt--Strength and composition of the armies--Commencement of the attack (August 31, 1877)--Capture of Loftcha by Skobeleff--Russian operations against Plevna--Great a.s.sault of September 11--Defeat of the Russians--Ineffectual bravery of Skobeleff--His appearance after the repulse--The Roumanians--The 'indomitable' Grivitza redoubt--Roumanian approaches (September 7 to 10)--a.s.saults and final capture and retention of the redoubt by the Roumanians (11th)--Carnage in the redoubt--Unsuccessful attempt to capture a second redoubt--Flattering criticisms upon their bravery--Further Roumanian victories and services in the war--Failure of Osman Pasha to break the lines of the allies--His submission--Interview between Osman, the Grand Duke, and Prince Charles--Russian ingrat.i.tude to Roumania--'Exchange' of Bessarabia for the Dobrudscha--Treaty of San Stephano and Berlin Conference--Roumania independent--Coronation of the King and Queen--Conclusion of historical review.

I.

After the fall of Couza the two Chambers elected the Count of Flanders, a younger brother of the King of Belgium, as his successor, but, owing probably to the threatening att.i.tude of the Porte, that Prince declined the honour. Their choice then fell upon the reigning sovereign, Prince Charles of Hohenzollern (son of Prince Charles Anton, of Hohenzollern-Siegmaringen), who accepted the nomination, and was proclaimed Prince of Roumania on the anniversary of his birthday, April 20, 1866, and was received with great joy on his arrival at the capital.

The Sublime Porte protested as usual, but this time the Roumanians threatened--at least, they determined to uphold their choice, and collected a strong force with that object. After vainly endeavouring to enlist the Powers on his side, the Sultan gave his a.s.sent to the nomination, and the Prince was invested with the sovereignty for himself and his heirs.

Meanwhile the national leaders had prepared the draft of the const.i.tution under which Roumania is now governed, of which the leading stipulations, along with the names of its framers, will be found in the Appendix (III.), and on June 30 [July 12] it was approved and signed by the Prince, who at the same time took the qualifying oath, first at Bucarest, and shortly afterwards at Ja.s.sy, where he was received with equal enthusiasm by the Moldavians.

Few rulers have had the obstacles to contend with that greeted Prince Charles on his accession to the throne of Roumania, and few indeed have managed so completely to overcome their difficulties and to win the affections of their subjects--a task which has, however, been materially lightened in his case by the co-operation of his talented consort, whom, as Princess Elizabeth of Wied, he espoused in November 1869. The liberties of Roumania had not been of slow growth, and the people who for sixteen centuries had been the downtrodden va.s.sals, first of this and then of that dominant race of barbarians, were naturally, a little awkward when they were called upon to a.s.sume the responsibilities, as well as to enjoy the privileges, of emanc.i.p.ation. We will not dwell upon the party dissensions which for a series of years militated against the smooth working of the new Const.i.tution, nor upon the known fact that the Prince well-nigh relinquished the reins of power in consequence of the repeated changes of ministry and the unworthy jealousies of those who, having first selected him as a foreigner, subsequently charged this against him as a disqualification. Nor must we examine too narrowly all the causes of this restlessness in the people. They had been so often betrayed by their rulers, and were so jealous of their newly-won liberties, that, it may be, the acts of a prince of the house of Hohenzollern were not always in accord with the tastes of a semi-republican legislature. This friction, through the devotion of the ruler and the good sense and patriotism of his advisers, has ceased to exist; and, far from there being now a bitter strife of parties, one of the Roumanian leaders deplores that there is not a more active and powerful opposition to the ministry, which was last elected in 1875, and has for more than six years guided the destinies of the nation.[172]

[Footnote 172: The Conservatives were overthrown in 1875, and although there are at present nominally three parties in the State there can hardly be said to be an opposition. When the author was in Roumania, in the autumn of 1881, the two Liberal chiefs were John Bratiano, President of the Council, and C.A. Rosetti, who has held more than one portfolio.

We shall speak of these statesmen in the sequel. The Liberal party in the Chamber of Deputies numbers about one hundred and twenty; whilst the Conservatives, led by MM. Catargi, Labovari, and Maiorescu, and the Radicals, with MM. Vernesco and Nicolas Jonesco, number together only about thirty-five members. In the Senate, out of seventy-six members only about sixteen or eighteen are in opposition. This is not altogether to be regretted; such disparities do not last long, and whilst on the one hand criticism of the mistakes or misconduct of Government officials (and more particularly against sub-officials, who are often charged with grave offences) is now confined chiefly to the press, on the other hand a little const.i.tutional despotism is very much needed, not only to correct such abuses promptly, but also to hasten the necessary reforms and to ameliorate the condition of the country. This is the result of personal observation and contact with official life, and not a mere speculative opinion.]

II.

Let us now consider the circ.u.mstances which lately enabled Roumania to throw off the last traces of her va.s.salage, and to take her place in the comity of European nations; and with a brief narrative of those events we must bring this imperfect outline of her past history to a close. The story of the last Russo-Turkish war must be within the memory of all our readers who take the slightest interest in Oriental politics. How Russia, chafing under the restrictions which had been put upon her by the Treaty of Paris, had succeeded in obtaining a modification of that treaty, which gave her once more the right of entrance into the Black Sea; how, resuming her favourite _role_ of protectress of the Christian inhabitants of Turkey, she intervened in the affairs of those nations who stood between her and Constantinople; how the Servians and Montenegrins, incited by her, rose in revolt, and the Bulgarians followed suit; how the European Powers, sympathising with Turkey on the one hand, in consequence of the renewed machinations and transparent designs of her powerful northern enemy, and on the other despairing of her on account of the barbarities with which she endeavoured to quell the rising in her va.s.sal provinces, the inherent weakness of her rule, and the bankrupt condition of her finances, they were compelled at length to leave her at the mercy of her foe. To repeat the narrative of these would be telling an oft-told tale. But when, after the final break-up of the Conference of Constantinople in January 1877, the Cross and the Crescent were once more opposed to each other, and when the Russian forces were ma.s.sed on the eastern bank of the Pruth, then came the moment at which it behoved the newly-liberated nation, which had so often been the victim of the 'holy' strife, to decide on which side it would array itself. Indeed, Roumania had little choice in the matter; the critics who have censured her policy, and have charged her with breach of faith towards her suzerain the Porte (and we know there are many such in this country), cannot have carefully considered her past history; nor have reflected upon the position in which she was placed.[173] As a matter of preference, the young nation which was about being dragged into this ruthless strife could have none, and might with justice have exclaimed, 'A plague on both your houses!' What cared they, on the one hand (and this was the popular sentiment), for the hypocritical crusade undertaken for purposes of aggrandis.e.m.e.nt; or, on the other, what sympathy could they have with the moribund State which had ever been to them as the daughters of the horseleech, and whose atrocities were identical with those that were perpetrated in the days when Huns and Vandals devastated their own fair plains? If Roumania in her then condition (now it would be different) had opposed the pa.s.sage of the Russian forces, they would have entered her territory as enemies, the war would have been carried on once more within her borders, and, beggared and prostrate, she might at best have reckoned upon retaining her political independence through the intervention of the European Powers; though, looking at the fact that these had recognised Russia as their executioner in Turkey, it is very questionable whether they would have interfered for the protection of Roumania, and whether she would not have fallen to Russia along with Bessarabia. On the other hand, if she had actively sided with either Power, her national independence and the happiness of her people would have been staked upon the result. She chose the wise, and indeed the only course, namely, that of allowing her powerful neighbour to pa.s.s through her dominions, stipulating that, so far as Russia could help it, she should be spared the desolation and horrors of war within her frontiers. But what course did the Porte adopt? Not recognising the _force majeure_ which had driven Roumania to this decision, she was suicidal enough to declare her an enemy, and to threaten to depose the Prince, thus giving to her bitterest foe an ally who, at a critical period, in self-defence, turned the scale against her, and caused her to lose some of her fairest provinces. For the Roumanians well knew, after the declared enmity of the Porte, that the defeat of the Russians and their withdrawal into their own territories would at once have been followed by all the incidents of Turkish rule, of which for centuries they had had such a bitter experience.

Amongst the valuable services which Prince Charles had rendered to his adopted country before the outbreak of the Russo-Turkish war was the organisation of a national army on the German model. Under Prince Couza the whole standing army of the two Princ.i.p.alities was at first 8,400 men, but he raised it to 25,000 strong, and officered it on the French system. When Prince Charles received the invest.i.ture at the hands of the Sultan in 1867, the army was limited to 30,000 men of all ranks; but he subst.i.tuted German for French officers, and sent young Roumanians to Germany to study military tactics. In 1874 the standing army numbered 18,542 men of all arms, and the territorial forces 43,744, making a total of 62,286 men and 14,353 horses; these were armed with 52 steel Krupp guns, besides about 200 of an inferior description; 25,000 Peabody rifles, and 20,000 Prussian needle-guns, raised in 1875 to 100,000 rifles of the best description.[174] The sanitary services and the military hospitals had been organised by General Dr. Davila, a French physician, of whom we have frequently spoken elsewhere, and who still occupies the post of Director of Hospitals, &c., and of the Medical School at Bucarest.[175]