Thereafter, Riley introduced rules. He ordered the vacant admiral's cabin217 to be converted into an aircrew club, complete with to be converted into an aircrew club, complete with Esquire Esquire pin-ups and c.o.c.ktail tables. Inside, any aviator was eligible for two drinks a night, provided he was not scheduled to fly. Cmdr. Bill Widhelm, operations officer of Task Force 58, complained bitterly about discrimination between officers and men in the allocation of alcohol: "There are men out there pin-ups and c.o.c.ktail tables. Inside, any aviator was eligible for two drinks a night, provided he was not scheduled to fly. Cmdr. Bill Widhelm, operations officer of Task Force 58, complained bitterly about discrimination between officers and men in the allocation of alcohol: "There are men out there218 on those ships that haven't had a foot on sh.o.r.e for a year. I don't see why we can't do like the British, give those enlisted men a grog. Pilots get it. I had it. But those enlisted men never get it." on those ships that haven't had a foot on sh.o.r.e for a year. I don't see why we can't do like the British, give those enlisted men a grog. Pilots get it. I had it. But those enlisted men never get it."

Cmdr. Jim Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k sought discretion to fine aviators for misdemeanours, because traditional navy punishments held no meaning for them: "These young pilots...are not naval officers as we know a naval officer. They're just flying because it's their job...Discipline...means nothing to them. If you say, 'We'll ground this pilot,' well...they don't want to go to combat anyhow, so they'd just as soon be grounded...they will lay around the bunk room all day and read...But if you take some money away from them, they will feel that." sought discretion to fine aviators for misdemeanours, because traditional navy punishments held no meaning for them: "These young pilots...are not naval officers as we know a naval officer. They're just flying because it's their job...Discipline...means nothing to them. If you say, 'We'll ground this pilot,' well...they don't want to go to combat anyhow, so they'd just as soon be grounded...they will lay around the bunk room all day and read...But if you take some money away from them, they will feel that."

Likewise Cmdr. Jim Mini of Ess.e.x Ess.e.x: "The boys in a squadron219 these days don't have the navy as a career. There's a problem of leadership; you have to have the boys like you. You can't lean on being a commander and saying, 'You'll do this or else.' You have to present it to the boys in an attractive fashion...I can safely say that if [the tour] had been much longer, we would have had trouble, and the boys would have broken down more than they did." A high proportion of aviators caused disciplinary problems, declared a navy report: "The very exacting nature these days don't have the navy as a career. There's a problem of leadership; you have to have the boys like you. You can't lean on being a commander and saying, 'You'll do this or else.' You have to present it to the boys in an attractive fashion...I can safely say that if [the tour] had been much longer, we would have had trouble, and the boys would have broken down more than they did." A high proportion of aviators caused disciplinary problems, declared a navy report: "The very exacting nature220 of flight duties has combined with the youth and frequent irresponsibility of flying officers to create difficulties which a special board was created to police." Fliers' letters home displayed carelessness about security; they broke the rules by keeping diaries; and "drink is often an issue." of flight duties has combined with the youth and frequent irresponsibility of flying officers to create difficulties which a special board was created to police." Fliers' letters home displayed carelessness about security; they broke the rules by keeping diaries; and "drink is often an issue."

Flying combat planes from carriers was one of the most thrilling, yet also most stressful, a.s.signments of the war. Ted Winters remarked of some of their long, long sorties: "It isn't a question of how much gasoline, it's how long you can keep your f.a.n.n.y on that seat." It was an inherently hazardous activity to operate a plane from a cramped and perpetually shifting ocean platform, even before the enemy became involved. "We learned to listen221 for the slightest change in the sound of the engine which might reveal a loss of power," wrote a pilot. "We always welcomed a moderate wind which increased the air flow over the flightdeck. Five to ten knots made the difference between a comfortable take-off and 'sweating it out.'" for the slightest change in the sound of the engine which might reveal a loss of power," wrote a pilot. "We always welcomed a moderate wind which increased the air flow over the flightdeck. Five to ten knots made the difference between a comfortable take-off and 'sweating it out.'"

Beyond combat casualties, the log of a Marine Corsair squadron on Ess.e.x Ess.e.x showed that during a typical fortnight, one plane "splashed" taking off on each of two successive days; on the second of these, another plane crashed on landing. Three days later, one Corsair was lost at sea. Thereafter, three more went into the sea at two-day intervals. Hard deck landings damaged airframes. Sherwin Goodman, an Avenger gunner showed that during a typical fortnight, one plane "splashed" taking off on each of two successive days; on the second of these, another plane crashed on landing. Three days later, one Corsair was lost at sea. Thereafter, three more went into the sea at two-day intervals. Hard deck landings damaged airframes. Sherwin Goodman, an Avenger gunner222, suffered a typical mishap one morning when the flight deck hydraulic catapult failed in mid-launch. His plane slumped into the sea. Seconds later, the huge ship pa.s.sed close enough to strike the sinking Avenger a glancing blow. A destroyer retrieved the crew intact, however, collecting the usual six gallons of ice-cream ransom for returning them to their carrier, and to operations.

"Oh I'd rather be a bellhop than a flyer on a flattop," the pilots sang, "with my hand around a bottle not around the G.o.dd.a.m.n throttle." Unpredicted violent weather could write off whole squadrons of aircraft, because it made navigation problematic. Error meant a descent into the sea when gas ran out. As on sh.o.r.e, almost every aviator wanted to be a "fighter jock," with the thrill of engaging enemy aircraft in the war's best carrier fighter, the Grumman h.e.l.lcat. It is intoxicating to go into battle knowing that your own side possesses much better trained, and thus more proficient, pilots than the enemy. By late 1944, the average j.a.panese flier had just forty flying hours' experience before entering combat. His American counterpart had at least 525 hours, and it showed. In the last phase of the war, U.S. carrier fighters were inflicting amazingly disproportionate losses on their failing foes. Commander Winters: "Most of our kills were223 from the rear end. [The j.a.panese] are scared to death of the Grummans. Only when they outnumber you terrifically will they even stay near you. They will make pa.s.ses, but stay far away and scram when you turn on them." Such cautious enemy behaviour seemed a long march from the kamikaze spirit, of which so much would be heard in 1945. from the rear end. [The j.a.panese] are scared to death of the Grummans. Only when they outnumber you terrifically will they even stay near you. They will make pa.s.ses, but stay far away and scram when you turn on them." Such cautious enemy behaviour seemed a long march from the kamikaze spirit, of which so much would be heard in 1945.

Flying became more hazardous, however, when planes were committed to ground strafing or ship attacks. Low-level dive-bomber and torpedo-carrier missions remained gruelling to the end. Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k was shocked by the intensity of the j.a.panese barrage as he and his men dive-bombed targets around Hong Kong. With unusual sophistication, enemy anti-aircraft gunners followed the American planes down almost to ground level, from 15,000 feet to 8,000, then 3,000. "From pull-out, I looked back was shocked by the intensity of the j.a.panese barrage as he and his men dive-bombed targets around Hong Kong. With unusual sophistication, enemy anti-aircraft gunners followed the American planes down almost to ground level, from 15,000 feet to 8,000, then 3,000. "From pull-out, I looked back224 and saw five planes of my group going down in flames. We're going to have to figure out some way to combat that AA," Lamade told navy debriefers. "After that attack, Admiral McCain said he was very sorry we had lost so many pilots. I told him we...can't go on fighting j.a.ps continually without suffering some losses." and saw five planes of my group going down in flames. We're going to have to figure out some way to combat that AA," Lamade told navy debriefers. "After that attack, Admiral McCain said he was very sorry we had lost so many pilots. I told him we...can't go on fighting j.a.ps continually without suffering some losses."

To beat flak, pilots learned to dive faster and more steeply than they had ever trained for. c.o.c.kpit gla.s.s fogged with the dramatic change of atmosphere as they pulled out of a descent and soared upwards after releasing bombs. As ever in combat, the men who survived were those who were determined but careful: "We had four or five pilots who were over-eager," Fred Bakutis of Enterprise Enterprise told debriefers. "They were excellent boys, very energetic and hard to hold down. It is these people who generally don't come back, because they are so anxious to do damage to the j.a.ps that they take risks beyond reason." Yet there were also shy pilots, content to release their bombs and swing away towards safety with a carelessness of aim that exasperated their commanders. And because these were very young, sometimes wild young men, they were sometimes reckless in the use of their lethal weapons. Senior officers were irked by the frequency with which American planes misidentified as j.a.panese were shot down by "friendly fire" from combat air patrols. A pair of bored pilots unable to identify an enemy target might work off their frustration on a Filipino fishing boat or lumbering cart ash.o.r.e. told debriefers. "They were excellent boys, very energetic and hard to hold down. It is these people who generally don't come back, because they are so anxious to do damage to the j.a.ps that they take risks beyond reason." Yet there were also shy pilots, content to release their bombs and swing away towards safety with a carelessness of aim that exasperated their commanders. And because these were very young, sometimes wild young men, they were sometimes reckless in the use of their lethal weapons. Senior officers were irked by the frequency with which American planes misidentified as j.a.panese were shot down by "friendly fire" from combat air patrols. A pair of bored pilots unable to identify an enemy target might work off their frustration on a Filipino fishing boat or lumbering cart ash.o.r.e.

The job n.o.body wanted was night operations. Take-offs and landings in darkness were more hazardous, the monotony of patrols usually unrelieved by action. If a pilot made a poor deck approach in daylight, he was "waved off" to try again, but in darkness he had to land and take the consequences, rather than hazard the ship by having it switch its landing lights on again. "What the boys want to do225," said a night-fighter squadron commander, Turner Caldwell of Independence Independence, "is to get into a day fighter squadron or a day torpedo squadron and get to be aces and sink j.a.p carriers and that sort of thing. And so we have to give them inducements of various kinds because they are kids and they don't understand enough about the military life to know that this stuff has to be done. All they know is that they don't want to do it."

While the carrier crews might remain at sea for years on end, the men of the air groups knew that they were only pa.s.sing visitors. If injury or death spared them, they were rotated ash.o.r.e after six months' duty. After two combat tours, a.s.serted a navy report, pilots "lose their daring226...feel they have done their parts and other pilots who have not fought should take over the burden." One pool of replacement pilots was held ash.o.r.e on Guam. A second group waited on fleet supply ships, condemned to weeks of crucifying boredom before being abruptly informed one morning that their turn had come, and transshipped by breeches buoy to join an air group. Some replacements idled at sea for months before reaching a carrier. "Upon arrival," complained a squadron CO, "they were practically worthless, because they had forgotten everything they had been taught." It was tough for a man to be pitchforked among strangers, beside whom within hours he was expected to fly and die. "All of a sudden," said Jim Lamade of Hanc.o.c.k Hanc.o.c.k, "they're expected to go ahead and hit the ball right smack on with a combat fighting squadron...those boys get discouraged and you can't blame them." Some such men reported sick. Flight surgeons felt obliged to be harsh. "Combat fatigue is a word we use227 continuously," said Lamade, "and n.o.body knows what it means. It covers a mult.i.tude of sins. I think it ought to be thrown out of our language." continuously," said Lamade, "and n.o.body knows what it means. It covers a mult.i.tude of sins. I think it ought to be thrown out of our language."

Squadron commanders found that the strain of leading their men in combat left them little patience or energy for routine duties back on the ship. They complained about bureaucracy and paperwork. A CO was exasperated to find that after some of his men hit the airfield of neutral Portuguese Macao by mistake, a court of inquiry was convened. Planes, by contrast, were casually expendable. Salt corroded paintwork, yet the remedy was always in short supply, because n.o.body cared to store large quant.i.ties of notoriously flammable paint aboard a carrier. If an airframe was badly damaged, or a plane completed eight months' service, it was most often tipped overboard. With American factories producing new aircraft by the thousand, a worn one seemed worth little.

There were accidents, always accidents. When tired young men were pushing themselves and their equipment to the limits, mistakes were inevitable. The guns of aircraft parked on flight decks were triggered, injuring neighbouring planes and people. Badly battle-damaged planes were discouraged from landing on their carriers, to avoid messing up flight decks. Ditching in the sea was an almost routine occupational hazard. Destroyers shadowed carriers during flight operations, to retrieve waterlogged fliers. As long as pilots were lucky, and ensured that their c.o.c.kpit hoods were locked open to avoid plunging to the bottom with their planes, they could expect to survive an ocean landing. Ninety-nine men in Jim Lamade's air group endured the experience, most with an insouciance conceivable only at such a time and place.

Fred Bakutis of Enterprise Enterprise spent a week on a raft in the Sulu Sea after coming down in the Surigao Strait. Comrades dropped him a two-man life raft. "That plus my own one-man raft made my seven-day tour of duty out there pretty pleasant," he told his debriefers with studied nonchalance. "The weather was pretty good spent a week on a raft in the Sulu Sea after coming down in the Surigao Strait. Comrades dropped him a two-man life raft. "That plus my own one-man raft made my seven-day tour of duty out there pretty pleasant," he told his debriefers with studied nonchalance. "The weather was pretty good228 except at night when it rained pretty hard. I had lots of water, using my one-man raft as a water wagon. My food consisted of minnows, seaweed, candy rations. My main problem in the raft was to stay comfortable. The hands became very sore-and also my rear end." On Bakutis's seventh night adrift, he was wakened from a doze by the sound of diesels, and for a few heart-stopping moments feared that a j.a.panese vessel was approaching. Instead, however, to his infinite relief an American submarine loomed out of the darkness. except at night when it rained pretty hard. I had lots of water, using my one-man raft as a water wagon. My food consisted of minnows, seaweed, candy rations. My main problem in the raft was to stay comfortable. The hands became very sore-and also my rear end." On Bakutis's seventh night adrift, he was wakened from a doze by the sound of diesels, and for a few heart-stopping moments feared that a j.a.panese vessel was approaching. Instead, however, to his infinite relief an American submarine loomed out of the darkness.

The submarine rescue service, often operating close insh.o.r.e amid treacherous shoals or under j.a.panese fire, received the grat.i.tude of every American flier. Together with "dumbo" amphibians and patrolling destroyers, the submarines achieved miracles in saving hundreds of precious aircrew from sea, sharks and the enemy. Cmdr. Ernie Snowden of Lexington Lexington's Air Group 16 paid warm tribute to the submariners: "If they had wheels I think they would climb right up over the beach and pick us up. We have nothing but praise for them." On 10 October 1944, for instance, twenty-one aircraft were shot down attacking the Ryukyu Islands. Yet only eleven pilots and crewmen were lost, the remainder being rescued, six of them off Okinawa by a single submarine, Sterlet Sterlet. When Lt. Robert Nelson crashed229 in Kagoshima Bay off Kyushu, his dinghy began to drift insh.o.r.e. A tiny cruiser-based Kingfisher seaplane landed alongside him, and Nelson clung to its float while it taxied several miles across the water to rendezvous with a submarine-adding a torpedo-bomber crew to its burden on the way. in Kagoshima Bay off Kyushu, his dinghy began to drift insh.o.r.e. A tiny cruiser-based Kingfisher seaplane landed alongside him, and Nelson clung to its float while it taxied several miles across the water to rendezvous with a submarine-adding a torpedo-bomber crew to its burden on the way.

During an air battle off Iwo Jima, j.a.panese Zero pilot Kunio Iwas.h.i.ta was astonished when the surface of the sea was suddenly broken by a long black shape, as an American submarine surfaced to pick up a ditched pilot. An American flying boat, apparently bent on the same mission, was shot down by j.a.panese fighters. Iwas.h.i.ta said: "We were amazed to see the Americans230 taking so much trouble about their people. n.o.body provided that sort of service for us." An extreme example of "force protection" was displayed on 16 September 1944, when Ensign Harold Thompson ditched three hundred yards off Waisile, while strafing j.a.panese barges in his h.e.l.lcat. A Catalina dropped a life raft which Thompson boarded, only to find himself drifting relentlessly towards a pier. Two other h.e.l.lcats were shot down trying to protect him by strafing the sh.o.r.eline-one pilot was killed, the second rescued by a "dumbo." Thompson moored his raft to a chain of j.a.panese barges, and two American PT-boats raced in to rescue him. Their first attempt was frustrated by coastal gunfire, but after Avengers dropped smoke floats to mask their approach, a boat s.n.a.t.c.hed Thompson just as the j.a.panese closed in on him. More than fifty aircraft were involved in the rescue, "which sure was a wonderful show taking so much trouble about their people. n.o.body provided that sort of service for us." An extreme example of "force protection" was displayed on 16 September 1944, when Ensign Harold Thompson ditched three hundred yards off Waisile, while strafing j.a.panese barges in his h.e.l.lcat. A Catalina dropped a life raft which Thompson boarded, only to find himself drifting relentlessly towards a pier. Two other h.e.l.lcats were shot down trying to protect him by strafing the sh.o.r.eline-one pilot was killed, the second rescued by a "dumbo." Thompson moored his raft to a chain of j.a.panese barges, and two American PT-boats raced in to rescue him. Their first attempt was frustrated by coastal gunfire, but after Avengers dropped smoke floats to mask their approach, a boat s.n.a.t.c.hed Thompson just as the j.a.panese closed in on him. More than fifty aircraft were involved in the rescue, "which sure was a wonderful show231 to watch," said Thompson, back on his carrier to watch," said Thompson, back on his carrier Santee Santee.

Destroyers traditionally extracted "ransom" for every flier they sent back. "Rescued pilots were prized possessions," wrote a destroyer officer. "Before returning them, we would strip them232 of all their fancy clothes-silk scarf maps, survival kits with great knives, compa.s.ses and magnifying gla.s.ses, and their pistol. Then we would ask the carrier to send over all the geedunk-ice cream-they had, plus a minimum of two movies our crew hadn't seen." of all their fancy clothes-silk scarf maps, survival kits with great knives, compa.s.ses and magnifying gla.s.ses, and their pistol. Then we would ask the carrier to send over all the geedunk-ice cream-they had, plus a minimum of two movies our crew hadn't seen."

At sea in the Pacific, by the fall of 1944 the might of the U.S. Navy was unchallengeable. That is to say, no rational adversary would have precipitated a headlong confrontation with such forces as Nimitz now deployed. The summer clashes, the "Great Marianas Turkey Shoot," had fatally crippled j.a.panese air power. Only the j.a.panese navy, in the mood of fatalism and desperation which afflicted its upper ranks, could still have sought a "decisive encounter" against such odds. The struggle for the Philippines was to provide the setting not only for America's major land campaign of the Pacific war, but also for the largest sea battle the world would ever know.

CHAPTER FIVE.

America's Return to the Philippines

1. Peleliu

MACARTHUR left Hawaii on 27 July 1944 confident that he had secured endors.e.m.e.nt of his commitment to retake the Philippines. Nonetheless, when the American and British chiefs of staff met at Quebec on 11 September to open the Octagon strategic conference, plans were still on the table not only for landings in November on Mindanao, thereafter on Leyte and Luzon, but alternatively for seizing Formosa and the port of Amoy on the Chinese mainland. In the days that followed, however, the a.s.sembled U.S. leaders-for the British were not consulted about this exclusively American issue-found themselves confronted by new circ.u.mstances. During planning for Third Fleet's left Hawaii on 27 July 1944 confident that he had secured endors.e.m.e.nt of his commitment to retake the Philippines. Nonetheless, when the American and British chiefs of staff met at Quebec on 11 September to open the Octagon strategic conference, plans were still on the table not only for landings in November on Mindanao, thereafter on Leyte and Luzon, but alternatively for seizing Formosa and the port of Amoy on the Chinese mainland. In the days that followed, however, the a.s.sembled U.S. leaders-for the British were not consulted about this exclusively American issue-found themselves confronted by new circ.u.mstances. During planning for Third Fleet's233 autumn operations, Halsey and his staff had agreed that in future, instead of merely addressing predetermined objectives, they would search for opportunities. In pursuit of this policy the fast carriers were now roaming the western Pacific, launching ma.s.sive a.s.saults on j.a.pan's surviving air forces. Off the southern Philippines on 12 September, 2,400 American sorties accounted for some two hundred j.a.panese aircraft in the sky and on the ground. autumn operations, Halsey and his staff had agreed that in future, instead of merely addressing predetermined objectives, they would search for opportunities. In pursuit of this policy the fast carriers were now roaming the western Pacific, launching ma.s.sive a.s.saults on j.a.pan's surviving air forces. Off the southern Philippines on 12 September, 2,400 American sorties accounted for some two hundred j.a.panese aircraft in the sky and on the ground.

At noon on the thirteenth the admiral signalled a report to Nimitz, who speedily forwarded it to Quebec, that j.a.panese resistance was feeble. Halsey, unaware that the enemy was deliberately husbanding resources for a "decisive battle" on the Philippines, urged fast-forwarding the strategic programme. He proposed cancelling all preliminary island landings, and staging a speedy a.s.sault on Leyte. This was Halsey's most influential intervention of the war. Such a change of plans was complex, but perfectly feasible in a theatre where every man and ton of supplies earmarked for shipment to one objective could be redirected to beaches elsewhere, by a nation which now possessed mastery of the ocean and the sky above.

MacArthur was at sea and observing wireless silence, but his staff immediately accepted Halsey's proposal as a means of foreclosing the Formosa-Philippines debate. The general, once back in communication, hastened to add his endors.e.m.e.nt. He said nothing of his intelligence staff's well-justified belief that the j.a.panese defenders of Leyte were stronger than Halsey recognised. Much more serious, he made no mention of his engineers' opinion that it would be hard to build good airfields on the island, and almost impossible in the imminent monsoon months. Over the thirty months since he himself had escaped from Bataan, MacArthur's personal interrogations of every American who escaped from the Philippines "revealed the concern of a man234 whose yearning to get back to his beloved 'second homeland' had become virtually an obsession," in the words of a biographer. The general had no intention of advertising any impediment to its fulfilment. whose yearning to get back to his beloved 'second homeland' had become virtually an obsession," in the words of a biographer. The general had no intention of advertising any impediment to its fulfilment.

In Quebec, after hasty consultation the American chiefs of staff set a target date of 20 October for a landing on Leyte. Admiral King's persistent arguments against following this with a move to Luzon, the main Philippine island, were overruled. The navy withdrew its support for attacking Formosa when it became plain that a landing there was logistically impossible before March 1945, and would require much larger ground forces than were available. The Philippines, by contrast, were immediately accessible. Planning for Leyte began at MacArthur's new headquarters on the banks of Lake Sentani, in the Cyclops Mountains above Hollandia, New Guinea. Once the decision was made to retake the Philippines, there was neither logic in nor resources for an early a.s.sault on Formosa. Since the seizure of Formosa was essential to any landing on the China coast that too was now ruled out. As the U.S. Navy's great historian Samuel Eliot Morison wrote, "The two rival roads were...converging235 on Leyte." All intervening operations were cancelled, save two. First, on 15 September almost 20,000 men landed on the island of Morotai, south-east of the Philippines, and secured its airfield against negligible opposition. By late October, Morotai was crowded with U.S. aircraft waiting to rebase on Leyte. Second, Nimitz and MacArthur shared a conviction that it was important to seize the tiny Palau Islands, of which Peleliu was the key, and to secure their airfields, before a.s.saulting Leyte. on Leyte." All intervening operations were cancelled, save two. First, on 15 September almost 20,000 men landed on the island of Morotai, south-east of the Philippines, and secured its airfield against negligible opposition. By late October, Morotai was crowded with U.S. aircraft waiting to rebase on Leyte. Second, Nimitz and MacArthur shared a conviction that it was important to seize the tiny Palau Islands, of which Peleliu was the key, and to secure their airfields, before a.s.saulting Leyte.

The Palau invasion convoys were already several days at sea, carrying Maj.-Gen. William Rupertus's 1st Marine Division 2,100 miles from Guadalca.n.a.l. The lumbering landing ships averaged a speed of only 7.7 knots, even slower than the 12.1 knots of the transports. Brig.-Gen. O. P. Smith, a.s.sistant commander of the division, pa.s.sed the voyage reading a couple of novels from his ship's library: A Yankee from Mount Olympus A Yankee from Mount Olympus and and The Late George Apley The Late George Apley. Tranquillity aboard was marred by the skipper's insistence on issuing orders and admonishments by loudhailer from the bridge. Smith failed to make friends with the ship's dog, "an aloof c.o.c.ker spaniel236 who refused to notice anyone except the captain." Approaching the Palaus, even veterans of Pacific landings were awed by the size of the force a.s.sembled-some 868 ships, 129 in the a.s.sault element. Submarine chasers guided the fleet, destroyers guarded it, sweepers cleared mines in its path. Behind these came a great flock of command, survey, repair and hospital ships, anti-submarine net-layers, oilers, salvage vessels, tugs, floating dry docks, a dredger, PT-boats, a floating derrick, LSTs, DUKWs, LSDs, cargo ships and 770 small landing craft for 1st Marine Division, together with as many again for the army's 81st Division, joining the Marines from Pearl Harbor. Such was the scale on which the United States launched even a modest Pacific amphibious landing in the autumn of 1944. who refused to notice anyone except the captain." Approaching the Palaus, even veterans of Pacific landings were awed by the size of the force a.s.sembled-some 868 ships, 129 in the a.s.sault element. Submarine chasers guided the fleet, destroyers guarded it, sweepers cleared mines in its path. Behind these came a great flock of command, survey, repair and hospital ships, anti-submarine net-layers, oilers, salvage vessels, tugs, floating dry docks, a dredger, PT-boats, a floating derrick, LSTs, DUKWs, LSDs, cargo ships and 770 small landing craft for 1st Marine Division, together with as many again for the army's 81st Division, joining the Marines from Pearl Harbor. Such was the scale on which the United States launched even a modest Pacific amphibious landing in the autumn of 1944.

On the morning of 15 September, amid a calm sea, a glittering array of bra.s.s watched from the command ship Mount McKinley Mount McKinley as shoals of landing craft headed for the sh.o.r.e. Peleliu had received three days of intensive gunfire from five battleships, five heavy cruisers and seventeen other vessels, which periodically ceased fire only to make s.p.a.ce for air attacks. Vice-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, the bombardment commander, declared: "We have run out of targets." Nine miles offsh.o.r.e the c.o.c.ky naval skipper of Col. "Chesty" Puller's transport enquired, as Puller's men clambered into their landing craft, whether the Marine would be returning on board for his dinner. The colonel responded testily that he expected to be fighting for several days. Surely not, said the sailor. The navy's bombardment would "allow the regiment to walk to its objective unmolested." If that proved so, said Puller, the captain should come ash.o.r.e that afternoon, join the Marines for a meal, and collect some souvenirs. Rupertus, the operational commander, had no experience of a heavily opposed landing, and was himself blithely confident. Four days, he said, should suffice to clear the island. As the Americans approached Peleliu, smoke from the bombardment shrouded the higher ground inland. Rocket ships fired ripples of projectiles ahead of the infantry pitching in their landing craft, then turned aside to open the pa.s.sage for the a.s.sault waves. AA guns on the ships fired airburst sh.e.l.ls at rocks behind the landing places. "Chesty" Puller told his men with characteristic theatricality: "You will take no prisoners, you will kill every yellow as shoals of landing craft headed for the sh.o.r.e. Peleliu had received three days of intensive gunfire from five battleships, five heavy cruisers and seventeen other vessels, which periodically ceased fire only to make s.p.a.ce for air attacks. Vice-Admiral Jesse Oldendorf, the bombardment commander, declared: "We have run out of targets." Nine miles offsh.o.r.e the c.o.c.ky naval skipper of Col. "Chesty" Puller's transport enquired, as Puller's men clambered into their landing craft, whether the Marine would be returning on board for his dinner. The colonel responded testily that he expected to be fighting for several days. Surely not, said the sailor. The navy's bombardment would "allow the regiment to walk to its objective unmolested." If that proved so, said Puller, the captain should come ash.o.r.e that afternoon, join the Marines for a meal, and collect some souvenirs. Rupertus, the operational commander, had no experience of a heavily opposed landing, and was himself blithely confident. Four days, he said, should suffice to clear the island. As the Americans approached Peleliu, smoke from the bombardment shrouded the higher ground inland. Rocket ships fired ripples of projectiles ahead of the infantry pitching in their landing craft, then turned aside to open the pa.s.sage for the a.s.sault waves. AA guns on the ships fired airburst sh.e.l.ls at rocks behind the landing places. "Chesty" Puller told his men with characteristic theatricality: "You will take no prisoners, you will kill every yellow237 son-of-a-b.i.t.c.h, and that's it." son-of-a-b.i.t.c.h, and that's it."

The Marines. .h.i.t the beaches at 0832. There were no j.a.panese in their immediate vicinity. Within minutes, however, the invaders found themselves under heavy sh.e.l.lfire, which wrecked dozens of amphibious vehicles, and made the men reluctant to forsake cover and advance beyond the beach. Medical corpsman Bill Jenkins's unit suffered its first casualty seconds after disembarking. It was "Pop" Lujack, the oldest man in the company, "a guy I thought a lot of238, and it hurt me badly when I saw he was. .h.i.t. I didn't know any better but he was. .h.i.t in the head and practically the whole back of his head was shot off, and I was laying down there trying to fix him up. One of the guys came up and said, 'Doc, get out of there, he's dead.' ''

More than 10,000 j.a.panese were defending the island. Rather than attempt to hold the coast under American bombardment, Col. Kunio Nakagawa had deployed his men inland, on a series of coral ridges which offered commanding views of the sh.o.r.e. The beach at Peleliu, flailed by enemy fire, became one of the Marines' most shocking memories of the Pacific war, and cost them over two hundred dead on the first day. Though the beach had been reconnoitred, Rupertus and his staff knew nothing of the terrain inland, which was ideally suited to defence. Peleliu had been a mining site. Each ridge was honeycombed with tunnels, in which the j.a.panese had installed electricity and living quarters, impervious to sh.e.l.ls and bombs. Marine communications proved so poor that commanders were left struggling to discover their own men's whereabouts, and were thus hesitant about calling in close artillery support. Of the eighteen tanks landed with 1st Marines, three were knocked out before they reached the beach, and all but one were hit by sh.e.l.ls thereafter. In the chaos, a senior officer landed to investigate why so many vehicles were blazing. He could discover little. Most of 1st Marines' headquarters had been wiped out, and 5th Marines' HQ was also badly depleted. A sh.e.l.l blast concussed a Louisiana-born staff officer so badly that he began to murmur in the French of his childhood.

A j.a.panese counter-attack in the afternoon, supported by light tanks, was easily repulsed, the enemy shot to pieces. When feeble little j.a.panese "tankettes" surrounded an American medium tank, it destroyed eleven in a circle, "like Indians round a wagon train," as O. P. Smith put it. Here was a pattern which would become familiar in all the late Pacific battles: when the j.a.panese moved, they were slaughtered; when they held their ground, however, they were extraordinarily hard to kill. Smith was sitting at his forward command post when a mortar bomb landed just short of its protecting bank. A Marine fell back onto the general, a small fragment lodged in the back of his head. Smith's aide bandaged him: "The boy was not badly hurt239 and was talkative. He was married and had been out of the States for two years. To him, the wound was a ticket home." American guns were getting ash.o.r.e only slowly, because so many amphibious vehicles had been destroyed. Snipers provoked wild retaliatory fusillades, as dangerous to Americans as to j.a.panese. When Smith wanted to visit regimental command posts, he could find them only by tracking phone wires. and was talkative. He was married and had been out of the States for two years. To him, the wound was a ticket home." American guns were getting ash.o.r.e only slowly, because so many amphibious vehicles had been destroyed. Snipers provoked wild retaliatory fusillades, as dangerous to Americans as to j.a.panese. When Smith wanted to visit regimental command posts, he could find them only by tracking phone wires.

Nightfall brought no respite. There were 12,000 Americans onsh.o.r.e, crowded into a beachhead which granted each man a few square feet of coral, sand and insects. The Marines held no clearly defined perimeter, merely sc.r.a.pes and holes between four and seven hundred yards inland, along more than a mile of coast. Most of the men were utterly bemused, conscious only of incoming fire. j.a.panese infiltrators crept into American forward positions, grenading and testing nerves. A man who found himself under friendly fire even after shouting the pa.s.sword resorted to singing a verse of the Marine Corps hymn. Some 7th Marines landed amid the shambles, and found themselves unable to locate their objectives. After being harried from place to place, out of radio contact with higher command, under heavy mortaring their amphibious tractors returned to the a.s.sault ship Leedstown Leedstown. Alongside in darkness, the navy refused to let the men board, supposing that they had run away. Their colonel was reluctantly permitted to climb the side alone, to radio divisional headquarters for new orders. Eventually his men were grudgingly authorised to re-embark, but many boats' occupants spent the whole night lost at sea.

It took 1st Marine Division a week and 3,946 casualties to secure the key airfield sites, mocking Rupertus's four-day estimate. Even then the j.a.panese overlooked them from the Umurbrogol Ridge, and could sustain observed fire. After the j.a.panese shot down medics recovering wounded, heavy mortars laid smokescreens to protect stretcher-bearers. The whole island occupied only seven square miles. In O. P. Smith's words, "For the first few days, real estate was at a premium." The beach area was crowded with makeshift bivouacs. There was little scope for outflanking enemy strongpoints. These could only be a.s.saulted headlong, each yard of progress costing blood. "The thousands of rounds240 of artillery sh.e.l.ls, the mortar barrages, the napalm strikes and the bombs poured in...[These] undoubtedly killed many j.a.panese in exposed positions, but those in caves were untouched and there were always new relays of snipers and machine-gunners to replace those who had fallen on the peaks...For the concentrated fury of the fighting it was only exceeded by Tarawa and Iwo Jima," wrote a senior Marine. Reinforced concrete blast walls protected each tunnel mouth. When the Americans finally secured the largest cave system on 27 September, it proved to have housed a thousand defenders. of artillery sh.e.l.ls, the mortar barrages, the napalm strikes and the bombs poured in...[These] undoubtedly killed many j.a.panese in exposed positions, but those in caves were untouched and there were always new relays of snipers and machine-gunners to replace those who had fallen on the peaks...For the concentrated fury of the fighting it was only exceeded by Tarawa and Iwo Jima," wrote a senior Marine. Reinforced concrete blast walls protected each tunnel mouth. When the Americans finally secured the largest cave system on 27 September, it proved to have housed a thousand defenders.

No place on the island was safe. Bill Atkinson watched241 a BAR gunner take up position behind a tank and start firing. To Atkinson's horror, the Sherman suddenly lurched backwards, crushing the man to pulp. Fifth Marine Virgle Nelson, hit in the b.u.t.tock, hollered with glee: "Oh my G.o.d, I guess a BAR gunner take up position behind a tank and start firing. To Atkinson's horror, the Sherman suddenly lurched backwards, crushing the man to pulp. Fifth Marine Virgle Nelson, hit in the b.u.t.tock, hollered with glee: "Oh my G.o.d, I guess242 I get to go back now!" Bill Jenkins, a medical corpsman from Canton, Missouri, was awed by a tough machine-gunner named Wayley, who was. .h.i.t four times. Told that he was to be evacuated, Wayley said: "No way." Jenkins asked his buddy Jack Henry to get a litter. The moment Henry moved, machine-gun fire caught his arms, and he came running back into the tank trap where they lay. "One arm [was] 99.9 percent off and the other almost as bad. I could have taken a scissors and clipped both arms off and buried them. I wasn't trained to try and set the cut-up, broken-up arms...all I did was just kind of put them together, both of them, and I wrapped them up the best I could with T-shirts and used tourniquets. I put his arms over his head to keep him from bleeding to death." Against the odds, Henry survived. I get to go back now!" Bill Jenkins, a medical corpsman from Canton, Missouri, was awed by a tough machine-gunner named Wayley, who was. .h.i.t four times. Told that he was to be evacuated, Wayley said: "No way." Jenkins asked his buddy Jack Henry to get a litter. The moment Henry moved, machine-gun fire caught his arms, and he came running back into the tank trap where they lay. "One arm [was] 99.9 percent off and the other almost as bad. I could have taken a scissors and clipped both arms off and buried them. I wasn't trained to try and set the cut-up, broken-up arms...all I did was just kind of put them together, both of them, and I wrapped them up the best I could with T-shirts and used tourniquets. I put his arms over his head to keep him from bleeding to death." Against the odds, Henry survived.

Another man begged Jenkins for medicinal brandy. The corpsman said sheepishly: "Gosh, I had some, but I got so d.a.m.n scared I drank it myself." Seventeen-year-old Tom Evans landed as a replacement rifleman, but was immediately detailed as a litter-bearer. "I am carrying this guy243 on the stretcher and he's been dead maybe a day and a half but already his body is kind of oily and covered with flies and maggots. I slipped and fell as I was going downhill and naturally he comes sliding down and straddled my neck, and I had maggots on me-Ohh." Marines learned to race clouds of accursed blowflies to every meal, sliding a hand across a can top the instant it was opened. Men's lips and ear tops blistered in the sun. Commanders dispatched from the ships offsh.o.r.e fresh bread-"a great morale-builder"-and occasionally ice cream in milk cans. "Chesty" Puller asked his Marines if there was anything he could get them. Predictably, they asked for a drink stronger than water. Puller issued medicinal alcohol mixed with powdered lemonade. Others found a cache of j.a.panese on the stretcher and he's been dead maybe a day and a half but already his body is kind of oily and covered with flies and maggots. I slipped and fell as I was going downhill and naturally he comes sliding down and straddled my neck, and I had maggots on me-Ohh." Marines learned to race clouds of accursed blowflies to every meal, sliding a hand across a can top the instant it was opened. Men's lips and ear tops blistered in the sun. Commanders dispatched from the ships offsh.o.r.e fresh bread-"a great morale-builder"-and occasionally ice cream in milk cans. "Chesty" Puller asked his Marines if there was anything he could get them. Predictably, they asked for a drink stronger than water. Puller issued medicinal alcohol mixed with powdered lemonade. Others found a cache of j.a.panese sake sake and beer, and were briefly heard singing on line. and beer, and were briefly heard singing on line.

"Our troops should understand244," a command report admonished waverers, "that the j.a.panese is no better able to go without food than we are, his stamina is no greater, the j.a.p gets just as wet when it rains and he suffers as much or more from tropical ills." All this, however, was often hard for Americans on Peleliu to believe. Seventeen-year-old medic Frank Corry had three platoon commanders killed. The last was. .h.i.t when he rashly stuck up his head to view a j.a.panese position. Corry watched wide-eyed as his platoon sergeant, big, tough Bob Canfield, cradled the dead man's head in his arms and burst into tears, saying: "Why did you do it?245"

Snipers behind the lines caused chronic jumpiness, intensified by undisciplined rear-area troops firing weapons for the fun of it. After O. P. Smith investigated one panic, he found that it had been provoked by black stevedores on the sh.o.r.e shooting at an abandoned tractor: "They claimed no one had ever told them they were not to fire their rifles, which was probably correct." Nor was every alarm unjustified. When the exasperated divisional HQ commandant set off with a shotgun to suppress an outbreak of apparently needless firing near his headquarters, he found two dead Marines beside the corpses of three j.a.panese who had killed them. Until a well could be sunk, every American was desperately short of water. Emergency supplies were landed in oil drums, which sickened those who sampled them. Temperatures sometimes reached 115 degrees. Scores of men succ.u.mbed to heat exhaustion, for which salt tablets proved an essential prophylactic. The jagged coral caused boots to wear out within days. A thousand new pairs and 5,000 sets of socks were flown in from Guam.

The army's 81st Division landed on neighbouring Angaur on 17 September. After an easy disembarkation, inland the invaders met thick, matted, almost impenetrable rain forest. The beaches were clogged with traffic. The soldiers, fresh to combat, readily panicked in encounters with even small numbers of j.a.panese. Angaur was only two miles long, and by 20 September it was secure, but the conquerors had not enjoyed their experience. They were still less happy to find themselves loaded back onto ships and transferred to Peleliu. Marines and soldiers were seldom comfortable fighting together. O. P. Smith wrote sceptically: "It is hard to put your finger246 on it, but there is quite a different atmosphere in an army command post as compared to the CP of a Marine outfit. Orders are given like the book says you should give them, but you have the impression they are not carried out." Rupertus was reluctant to enlist army aid. After a week of fighting and alarming casualties, however, he perceived no choice. on it, but there is quite a different atmosphere in an army command post as compared to the CP of a Marine outfit. Orders are given like the book says you should give them, but you have the impression they are not carried out." Rupertus was reluctant to enlist army aid. After a week of fighting and alarming casualties, however, he perceived no choice.

Long-range flamethrowers proved the most effective weapons against Peleliu's cave mouths, but each a.s.sault was painfully slow and costly. In October, gales and torrential rain added to the invaders' miseries. Marine Corsairs at last began to use the island's airstrip on 21 October, but organised resistance persisted for weeks more. Lt. Ilo Scatena of the 2/5th Marines kept a platoon roster. Of forty-two men with whom he landed, fourteen were killed and fourteen wounded. In all, the island's capture cost 1,950 American lives, and gave the invaders one of the most unwelcome surprises of the Pacific war. Almost all the defenders chose to perish rather than quit. A month after Peleliu's commander, Col. Kunio Nakagawa, committed suicide on 24 November, his surviving soldiers killed a group of souvenir-hunting American soldiers. The last five known j.a.panese surrendered on 1 February 1945. Statisticians afterwards calculated that it had taken 1,500 rounds of artillery ammunition to kill each member of the garrison. To capture this tiny outpost, Marine and army infantrymen also used 13.32 million .30 calibre rounds, 1.52 million of .45 calibre, 693,657 rounds of .50 calibre, over 150,000 mortar bombs and 118,262 grenades.

As so often in the Pacific, a marginal objective inflicted worse than marginal casualties. It is widely agreed today-as indeed it was in the winter of 1944-that the decision to occupy the Palaus was one of Nimitz's few bad calls of the war. The j.a.panese lacked means to exploit their remote island airfields. The defenders of Peleliu could not interfere on Leyte, or anywhere else. Its garrison could have been left to rot. American aircraft could use Morotai's strips as easily as those on the Palaus. Once the Peleliu operation was launched onto implacably hostile terrain, there was no shortcut by which firepower or technology could overcome resistance. Although the Marines had fought terrible battles on the Pacific islands, at Tarawa and Saipan they attacked before the defenders had completed the construction of their positions. Now, however, as j.a.pan's Pacific perimeter narrowed, the enemy knew where to expect the Americans, and had been granted ample time to prepare to receive them.

In the Pacific there were no great battles resembling Normandy, the Bulge, the Vistula and Oder crossings, exploiting ma.s.s and manoeuvre. Instead, there was a series of violently intense miniatures, rendered all the more vivid in the minds of partic.i.p.ants because they were so concentrated in s.p.a.ce. Such contests as that for Peleliu were decided by the endeavours of footsoldiers and direct support weapons, notably tanks. This was a battle fought on j.a.panese terms. Like others that would follow in the months ahead, it suited their temperament, skills and meagre resources. The defenders of Peleliu possessed no means of withdrawing, even had they wished to do so. Their extinction therefore required a commitment of flesh against flesh, the sacrifice of significant numbers of American lives. The U.S., whose power seemed so awesome when viewed across the canvas of global war, found itself unable effectively to leverage this in battles of b.l.o.o.d.y handkerchief proportions, such as that for Peleliu.

2. Leyte: The Landing

THE STRUGGLE to regain the Philippines became by far the U.S. Army's largest commitment of the Asian war. MacArthur's long campaign on New Guinea had never caught the imagination of the American public as did the Marines' battles for the Pacific atolls. The general's grandeur was more imposing than his forces-until late 1944 he seldom controlled more than four divisions in the field, in Europe a mere corps command. His next campaign, however, would become the main event of America's conflict with j.a.pan. More than 400,000 j.a.panese awaited the invaders. The Philippines represented a critical link on the sea route between Hirohito's South-East Asian empire and the home islands. Tokyo believed that a confrontation there would offer its best chance to b.l.o.o.d.y the Americans, if not to throw them back into the sea, before the "decisive battle"-a chorus reprised in all j.a.pan's war plans-for Kyushu and Honshu. The j.a.panese difficulty was that their scattered forces lacked mobility in the face of American air and naval superiority. MacArthur could choose where to make his landings. It would be hard for the defenders swiftly to shift large bodies of troops in response. to regain the Philippines became by far the U.S. Army's largest commitment of the Asian war. MacArthur's long campaign on New Guinea had never caught the imagination of the American public as did the Marines' battles for the Pacific atolls. The general's grandeur was more imposing than his forces-until late 1944 he seldom controlled more than four divisions in the field, in Europe a mere corps command. His next campaign, however, would become the main event of America's conflict with j.a.pan. More than 400,000 j.a.panese awaited the invaders. The Philippines represented a critical link on the sea route between Hirohito's South-East Asian empire and the home islands. Tokyo believed that a confrontation there would offer its best chance to b.l.o.o.d.y the Americans, if not to throw them back into the sea, before the "decisive battle"-a chorus reprised in all j.a.pan's war plans-for Kyushu and Honshu. The j.a.panese difficulty was that their scattered forces lacked mobility in the face of American air and naval superiority. MacArthur could choose where to make his landings. It would be hard for the defenders swiftly to shift large bodies of troops in response.

On a map, the Philippine islands resemble a dense scatter of jigsaw pieces. Their combined ma.s.s is almost as large as j.a.pan, rich in luxuriant vegetation and extravagant weather cycles. After the 1898 Spanish-American War, which ended European hegemony, U.S. senator Albert Beveridge spoke for many Americans when Washington decided against granting independence to the Filipinos. He cited "the divine law of human society which makes of us our brother's keeper. G.o.d has been preparing the English-speaking and Teutonic peoples to bring order out of chaos...He has made us adepts in government so that we may administer government among savage and senile peoples."

Filipinos resisted U.S. dominance, in the early days by violent insurgency, and never ceased to crave independence. Socially, the islands were dominated by a rich landlord cla.s.s. The ma.s.s of peasants remained poor and bitterly alienated from the plantocracy. Two-thirds of Filipinos between twenty and thirty-nine were uneducated. Yet many Americans retained a romantic conviction that the virtue of their intentions made U.S. rule over the Philippines somehow more honourable than that of, say, the British in India. U.S. soldiers who served on the islands before 1942 regarded them as a leisure resort offering cheap comforts, servants and amenities of a kind they never knew back home, amidst a lazy Spanish culture. The 1944 U.S. armed forces' Guide to the Pacific Guide to the Pacific noted: "For Isaac Waltons noted: "For Isaac Waltons247: The Philippines are a fisherman's paradise...Recommended for deep sea trolling is a split bamboo rod, a drag reel capable of holding 400 yards of 12 thread line, and a good gaff hook."

j.a.pan's thirty-month-old occupation had been patchy in its impact: oppressive and brutal in some places-the most strategically important naturally including the capital, Manila-while scarcely felt in remote areas. In 1943 the j.a.panese granted the Philippines, along with most of their other occupied territories, notional self-government under a local puppet regime. Yet such was the mindless cruelty of Tokyo's soldiers that this gesture inspired little grat.i.tude among Filipinos. Imperial General HQ reported in March 1944: "Even after their independence, there remains among all cla.s.ses a strong undercurrent of pro-American sentiment...Guerrilla activities are gradually increasing." The j.a.panese fully controlled only twelve of the country's eighteen provinces. Elsewhere, guerrilla bands roamed widely, American-armed and sometimes American-led. Several U.S. officers, such as the legendary Col. Russell Volckmann, had survived in the hills of Luzon since the spring of 1942, and now directed forces thousands strong. The more idealistically inclined guerrillas inflicted four hundred casualties on j.a.panese occupation forces in 1944, a modest enough achievement. Others merely pursued lives of banditry.

The j.a.panese South Asia Army moved its headquarters to Manila in April, when uncertainty persisted in Tokyo about whether the Americans would land in the Philippines at all. Its commander, Field Marshal Count Hisaichi Terauchi, had no such doubts. "If I was MacArthur248, I would come here," he growled at a staff conference in the summer of 1944. "He must know how weak are our defences." Terauchi, once a candidate to replace Tojo as prime minister, was not held in high esteem either by the Americans or by most of his peers. His staff, however, respected the fact that, although a rich man, he succ.u.mbed to few personal indulgences. "He could have filled his headquarters249 with geishas if he wanted," said one officer admiringly, "but he never did. He was a really clean-living soldier." Terauchi was exasperated by the need to refer every detail of his deployments to Tokyo. The general staff only gave final endors.e.m.e.nt to his defensive plan for Leyte two days before the Americans landed there. with geishas if he wanted," said one officer admiringly, "but he never did. He was a really clean-living soldier." Terauchi was exasperated by the need to refer every detail of his deployments to Tokyo. The general staff only gave final endors.e.m.e.nt to his defensive plan for Leyte two days before the Americans landed there.

Until the autumn of 1944, Terauchi's princ.i.p.al subordinate was the Philippines' occupation commander, Lt.-Gen. Shigenori Kuroda, a mild-mannered little man devoted to women and golf. Kuroda said cheerfully: "Why bother about defence plans? The Philippines are obviously indefensible." Such remarks caused Tokyo to conclude that he was a trifle ill-suited to confront an American amphibious a.s.sault. Two weeks before MacArthur's invasion, Kuroda was supplanted by Gen. Tomoyuki Yamas.h.i.ta, who a.s.sumed command of 14th Army under Terauchi. The newcomer summoned his staff and addressed them at his headquarters in Manila: "The battle we are going to fight will be decisive for j.a.pan's fate. Each of us bears a heavy responsibility for our part in it. We cannot win this war unless we work closely and harmoniously together. We must do our utmost, setting aside futile recriminations about the past. I intend to fight a ground battle, regardless of what the navy and air force do. I must ask for your absolute loyalty, for only thus can we achieve victory."

In truth, there was no more chance of the rival services working harmoniously together in the Philippines than anywhere else in the j.a.panese empire. One day in September, a naval officer convinced himself that he saw American ships off-loading troops on Mindanao. A standing order of South Asia Army decreed that all signals on an issue of such gravity must be dispatched jointly by responsible naval and military officers. Ignoring this, the navy sent a flash message to Tokyo announcing an American invasion. Every j.a.panese formation in the field and at sea was alerted. Hours of alarm and confusion followed. Soldiers in Manila remained disbelieving, and of course their scepticism was justified. The army regarded the false alarm as further evidence of the navy's proclivity for fantasy, displayed daily in its wildly exaggerated claims of U.S. ships sunk and planes destroyed.

Yamas.h.i.ta himself, fifty-nine in 1944, had acquired three reputations: first, as an intensely nationalistic political soldier; second, as an outstanding commander; third, as possessing the loudest snore in the Imperial Army, a vice which made his staff reluctant to sleep anywhere near him. The general had been sidelined from high command in 1936, following an equivocal role in an attempted coup against the Tokyo government, but his abilities and popularity among junior officers earned his recall in 1941. As commander of 25th Army in Malaya he achieved his greatest triumph, securing the surrender of a superior British force at Singapore. Yet the government, nervous of his new status as a national hero, once more sidelined Yamas.h.i.ta. j.a.pan's ablest commander was serving in Manchuria when the summons to the Philippines arrived. He said quietly to his chief of staff: "So it's come at last, has it? Well, my going won't change anything. It's my turn to die, isn't it?" When his wife suggested that she should stay in Manchuria, the general said: "You'd better go home and die with your parents." The Manchurian puppet emperor Pu Yi claimed that Yamas.h.i.ta covered his face and wept at his official leave-taking before embarking for the Philippines. "This is our final parting250," said the j.a.panese. "I shall never come back."

In Tokyo en route to Manila, at a series of meetings with the nation's leaders, "Hobun" Yamas.h.i.ta strove in vain to persuade them to share his own brutally realistic appraisal of the strategic situation. A clever and good-natured man who had travelled widely in Europe, he knew the war was lost. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, the navy minister, already privately committed to negotiating a way out of the war, merely shook his head sorrowfully in the face of the general's blunt words and said: "Do your best, Hobun, do your best." Yamas.h.i.ta attended a formal farewell ceremony with Hirohito, which he seemed to enjoy. He told an aide as he left the Imperial Palace that he felt as happy as he ever had in his life. Having saluted his emperor, he was ready to die.

In Manila, the general was unimpressed by the staff which he inherited, and even more dismayed by the quality of the troops he inspected, most of them rendered slothful by long occupation duty. Subordinates shared his misgivings. Lt. Suteo Inoue of the 77th Infantry Regiment, for instance, recorded in his Philippines diary: "Soldiers here lack comradely spirit. I have never seen such an undisciplined outfit as this one. To be strong, units need a sense of shared ident.i.ty. This regiment is the worst in the j.a.panese army...It took a hundred men almost seven hours to cross a river 150 metres wide...due to lack of barges. I presume this reflects j.a.pan's general lack of resources. We have underestimated the importance of material strength, and are now suffering the consequences. If this state of affairs continues for another year, j.a.pan will be in trouble, and our withdrawal from Greater East Asia will become inevitable."

Yamas.h.i.ta ordered a supply officer to transfer service troops to combat duty, and to draft Filipino labour to shift stores in their stead. To his chagrin, he was told that local people could not be trusted in such a role. The commander of 14th Army now had only days in which to prepare for the coming of the Americans. He knew that months would not have sufficed.

LUZON, in the north, is the Philippines' princ.i.p.al landma.s.s, seconded by Mindanao, in the south. Between lies a jumble of densely populated lesser islands, of which Leyte is among the easternmost. In October 1944 this was MacArthur's choice for a first lodgement. Some 115 miles long and 45 miles broad at its widest point, it was inhabited by 915,000 of the Philippines' 17 million people, in modest towns of sun-bleached stucco and villages of straw-thatched huts. Leyte Gulf lies open to the ocean, and thus to an invasion fleet. The immediate American objective after securing the beaches was the rice and corn belt of Leyte Valley. There MacArthur planned to build airfields to relieve his dependence on carrier air support. He would then dispossess the j.a.panese of the mountainous regions beyond the plain. When the island was secure he would address Luzon, and thereafter liberate the rest of the archipelago. in the north, is the Philippines' princ.i.p.al landma.s.s, seconded by Mindanao, in the south. Between lies a jumble of densely populated lesser islands, of which Leyte is among the easternmost. In October 1944 this was MacArthur's choice for a first lodgement. Some 115 miles long and 45 miles broad at its widest point, it was inhabited by 915,000 of the Philippines' 17 million people, in modest towns of sun-bleached stucco and villages of straw-thatched huts. Leyte Gulf lies open to the ocean, and thus to an invasion fleet. The immediate American objective after securing the beaches was the rice and corn belt of Leyte Valley. There MacArthur planned to build airfields to relieve his dependence on carrier air support. He would then dispossess the j.a.panese of the mountainous regions beyond the plain. When the island was secure he would address Luzon, and thereafter liberate the rest of the archipelago.

Once American forces had secured a firm foothold in the Philippines and achieved command of local skies and seas, piecemeal ground operations could contribute nothing towards the defeat of j.a.pan. But the islands had been the general's home. He viewed their people with a paternalistic warmth as great as any British sahib sahib felt towards Indians. Liberating them from j.a.panese rule was the most compelling objective of MacArthur's war. Around three-quarters of a million Filipinos, j.a.panese and Americans would pay with their lives for its accomplishment. felt towards Indians. Liberating them from j.a.panese rule was the most compelling objective of MacArthur's war. Around th