"Alexandria, La., December, 1861.

"Events here seem hastening to a conclusion. Doubtless you know more of the events in Louisiana than I do, as I am in an out-of- the-way place. But the special session of the legislature was so unanimous in arming the state and calling a convention that little doubt remains that Louisiana will, on the 23rd of January, follow the other seceding states. Governor Moore takes the plain stand that the state must not submit to a 'black Republican President.'

Men here have ceased to reason; they seem to concede that slavery is unsafe in a confederacy with northern states, and that now is the time; no use of longer delay. All concessions, all attempts to remonstrate, seem at an end.

"A rumor says that Major Anderson, my old captain (brother of Charles Anderson, now of Texas, formerly of Dayton and Cincinnati, Larz, William and John, all of Ohio), has spiked the guns of Fort Moultrie, destroyed it, and taken refuge in Sumter. This is right.

Sumter is in mid-channel, approachable only in boats, whereas Moultrie is old, weak, and easily approached under cover. If Major Anderson can hold out till relieved and supported by steam frigates, South Carolina will find herself unable to control her commerce, and will feel, for the first time in her existence, that she can't do as she pleases. . . .

"A telegraph dispatch, addressed to me at Alexandria, could be mailed at New Orleans, and reach me in three days from Washington."

I wrote him the following letter on the 6th of January, 1861:

"Dear Brother:--. . . I see some signs of hope, but it is probably a deceptive light. The very moment you feel uncomfortable in your position in Louisiana, come away. Don't for G.o.d's sake subject yourself to any slur, reproach, or indignity. I have spoken to General Scott, and he heartily seconds your desire to return to duty in the army. I am not at all sure but that, if you were here, you could get a position that would suit you. I see many of your friends of the army daily.

"As for my views of the present crisis, I could not state them more fully than I have in the inclosed printed letter. It has been very generally published and approved in the north, but may not have reached you, and therefore I send it to you.

"Affectionately your brother, "John Sherman."

Later he wrote me:

"Alexandria, January 16, 1861.

"My Dear Brother:--I am so much in the woods here that I can't keep up with the times at all. Indeed, you in Washington hear from New Orleans two or three days sooner than I do. I was taken aback by the news that Governor Moore had ordered the forcible seizure of the Forts Jackson and St. Philip, at or near the mouth of the Mississippi; also of Forts Pike and Wood, at the outlets of Lakes Bogue and Pontchartrain. All these are small forts, and have rarely been occupied by troops. They are designed to cut off approach by sea to New Orleans, and were taken doubtless to prevent their being occupied, by order of General Scott. But the taking the a.r.s.enal at Baton Rouge is a different matter. It is merely an a.s.semblage of store-houses, barracks, and dwelling-houses, designed for the healthy residence of a garrison, to be thrown into one or the other of the forts in case of war. The a.r.s.enal is one of minor importance, yet the stores were kept there for the moral effect, and the garrison was there at the instance of the people of Louisiana. To surround with the military array, to demand surrender, and enforce the departure of the garrison, was an act of war. It amounted to a declaration of war and defiance, and was done by Governor Moore without the authority of the legislature or convention. Still, there is but little doubt but that each of these bodies, to a.s.semble next week, will ratify and approve these violent acts, and it is idle to discuss the subject now. The people are mad on this question.

"I had previously notified all that in the event of secession I should quit. As soon as knowledge of these events reached me, I went to the vice president, Dr. Smith, in Alexandria, and told him that I regarded Louisiana as at war against the federal government, and that I must go. He begged me to wait until some one could be found to replace me. The supervisors feel the importance of system and discipline, and seem to think that my departure will endanger the success of this last effort to build up an educational establishment. . . . You may a.s.sert that in no event will I forego my allegiance to the United States as long as a single state is true to the old const.i.tution. . . .

"Yours, "W. T. Sherman."

And again:

"Louisiana State Seminary of Learning and Military Academy,} "Alexandria, January 18, 1861. } "Dear Brother:--Before receiving yours of the 6th, I had addressed a letter to Governor Moore at Baton Rouge, of which this is a copy:--

'_Sir:_--As I occupy a quasi military position under the laws of the state, I deem it proper to acquaint you that I accepted such position when Louisiana was a state in the union and when the motto of this seminary was inscribed in marble over the main door: "By the liberality of the General Government. The Union Esto perpetua."

Recent events foreshadow a great change, and it becomes all men to choose. If Louisiana withdraw from the federal Union, I prefer to maintain my allegiance to the old const.i.tution as long as a fragment of it survives, and my longer stay here would be wrong in every sense of the word. In that event, I beg that you will send or appoint some authorized agent to take charge of the arms and munitions of war here belonging to the state, or advise me what disposition to make of them. And furthermore, as president of the board of supervisors, I beg you to take immediate steps to relieve me as superintendent the moment the state determines to secede; for on no earthly account will I do any act or think any thought hostile to, or in defiance of, the United States.

'With respect, etc., 'W. T. Sherman.'

"I regard the seizure by Governor Moore of the United States a.r.s.enal as the worst act yet committed in the present revolution. I do think every allowance should be made to southern politicians for their nervous anxiety about their political powers and the safety of slaves. I think that the const.i.tution should be liberally construed in their behalf, but I do regard this civil war as precipitated with undue rapidity. . . . It is inevitable. All legislation now would fall powerless on the south. You should not alienate such states as Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri.

My notice is that this war will ruin all politicians, and that military leaders will direct the events.

"Yours "W. T. S."

On the first of February he wrote as follows:

"I have felt the very thoughts you have spoken. It is war to surround Anderson with batteries, and it is shilly-shally for the south to cry 'Hands off! No coercion!' It was war and insult to expel the garrison at Baton Rouge, and Uncle Sam had better cry 'Cave!' or a.s.sert his power. Fort Sumter is not material save for the principle; but Key West and the Tortugas should be held in force at once, by regulars if possible, if not, by militia. Quick!

They are occupied now, but not in force. While maintaining the high, strong ground you do, I would not advise you to interpose an objection to securing concessions to the middle and moderate states, --Virginia, Kentucky, Tennessee and Missouri. Slavery there is local, and even if the world were open to them, its extension would involve no principle. If these states feel the extreme south wrong, a seeming concession would make them committed. The cotton states are gone, I suppose. Of course, their commerce will be hampered. . . .

"But of myself. I sent you a copy of my letter to the Governor.

Here is his answer:

'_Dear Sir:_--It is with the deepest regret I acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 18th instant. In the pressure of official business I can only request you to transfer to Professor Smith the arms, munitions, and funds in your hands, whenever you conclude to withdraw from the position you have filled with so much distinction. You cannot regret more than I do the necessity which deprives us of your services, and you will bear with you the respect, confidence, and admiration of all who have been a.s.sociated with you.

'Very truly, your friend and servant, 'Thos. D. Moore.'

"This is very handsome, and I do regret this political imbroglio.

I do think it was brought about by politicians. The people in the south are evidently unanimous in the opinion that slavery is endangered by the current of events, and it is useless to attempt to alter that opinion. As our government is founded on the will of the people, when that will is fixed, our government is powerless, and the only question is whether to let things slide into general anarchy, or the formation of two or more confederacies which will be hostile sooner or later. Still, I know that some of the best men of Louisiana think this change may be effected peacefully.

But even if the southern states be allowed to depart in peace, the first question will be revenue.

"Now, if the south have free trade, how can you collect revenues in the eastern cities? Freight from New Orleans to St. Louis, Chicago, Louisville, Cincinnati, and even Pittsburg, would be about the same as by rail from New York, and importers at New Orleans, having no duties to pay, would undersell the east if they had to pay duties. Therefore, if the south make good their confederation and their plan, the northern confederacy must do likewise or blockade. Then comes the question of foreign nations. So, look on it in any view, I see no result but war and consequent changes in the form of government."

These letters, written at their dates, on the spur of the moment, present the condition of affairs as viewed by General Sherman and myself when they occurred.

With the conviction just stated General Sherman came to Washington about the time of my election to the Senate. He was deeply impressed with the certainty of war and of its magnitude, and was impelled by the patriotic sentiment that, as he had been educated at the expense of the government for military service, it was his duty, in the then condition of the country, to tender his services. I therefore escorted him to the White House. His statement of the interview given in his "Memoirs" is not very full, for, while Mr.

Lincoln did say, in response to his tender, "I guess we will manage to keep house," he also expressed a hope, which General Sherman knew to be delusive, that the danger would pa.s.s by and that the Union would be restored by a peaceful compromise. This was, undoubtedly, the idea then uppermost in the minds of both the President and Mr. Seward. At this time the public mind in the north was decidedly in favor of concessions to the south. The Democrats of the north would have agreed to any proposition to secure peace and the Union, and the Republicans would have acquiesced in the Crittenden Compromise, or in any measure approved by Lincoln and Seward.

The period between the 4th of March and the 12th of April was the darkest one in the history of the United States. It was a time of humiliation, timidity and feebleness. Fortunately for the future of our country the rebels of the south were bent upon disunion; they were hopeful and confident, and all the signs of the times indicated their success. They had possession of all the forts of the south, except Fortress Monroe, Fort Sumter, and two remote forts in Florida. They had only to wait in patience, and Fort Sumter would necessarily be abandoned for want of supplies. Fortress Monroe could not be held much longer by the regular army, weakened as it was by the desertion of officers and men, and public sentiment would not justify a call for troops in advance of actual war. The people of South Carolina were frenzied by their success thus far, and, impatient of delay, forced an attack on Fort Sumter, then held by a small garrison under command of Major Robert Anderson. The first gun fired on the 12th of April, 1861, resounded throughout the United States and the civilized world, touching an electric chord in every family in the northern states and changing the whole current of feeling. From this time forth, among the patriotic people of the loyal states, there was no thought or talk of compromise. That this insult to our flag must be punished, "that the Union must and shall be preserved," were the resolves of millions of men, without respect to party, who but the day before were eager for compromise. The cold and cautious men of the north were at last awakened from their indifference.

The impression made upon my mind by the attack on Fort Sumter is expressed in a letter I wrote from Washington to my brother, General Sherman, as he was then called, at midnight of the 12th of April:

"Washington, April 12, 1861.

"Dear Brother:--I was unexpectedly called here soon after receiving your letter of the 8th, and at midnight write you. The military excitement here is intense. Since my arrival I have seen several officers, many citizens, and all the heads of departments except Blair. There is a fixed determination now to preserve the Union and enforce the laws at all hazards. Civil war is actually upon us, and, strange to say, it brings a feeling of relief; the suspense is over. I have spent much of the day in talking about you. There is an earnest desire that you go into the war department, but I said this was impossible. Chase is especially desirous that you accept, saying that you would be virtually Secretary of War, and could easily step into any military position that offers.

"It is well for you seriously to consider your conclusion, although my opinion is that you ought not to accept. You ought to hold yourself in reserve. If troops are called for, as they surely will be in a few days, organize a regiment or brigade, either in St.

Louis or Ohio, and you will then get into the army in such a way as to secure promotion. By all means take advantage of the present disturbances to get into the army, where you will at once put yourself in a high position for life. I know that promotion and every facility for advancement will be cordially extended by the authorities. You are a favorite in the army and have great strength in political circles. I urge you to avail yourself of these favorable circ.u.mstances to secure your position for life; for, after all, your present employment is of uncertain tenure in these stirring times.

"Let me now record a prediction. Whatever you may think of the signs of the times, the government will rise from this strife greater, stronger, and more prosperous than ever. It will display energy and military power. The men who have confidence in it, and do their full duty by it, may reap whatever there is of honor and profit in public life, while those who look on merely as spectators in the storm will fail to discharge the highest duty of a citizen, and suffer accordingly in public estimation. . . .

"I write this in great hurry, with numbers around me, and exciting and important intelligence constantly repeated, even at this hour; but I am none the less in earnest. I hope to hear that you are on the high road to the 'General' within thirty days.

"Affectionately your brother, "John Sherman."

Two days later I wrote him:

"Washington, Sunday, April 14, 1861.

"Dear Brother:--. . . The war has really commenced. You will have full details of the fall of Sumter. We are on the eve of a terrible war. Every man will have to choose his position. You fortunately have a military education, prominence, and character, that will enable you to play a high part in the tragedy. You can't avoid taking such a part. Neutrality and indifference are impossible.

If the government is to be maintained, it must be by military power, and that immediately. You can choose your own place. Some of your best friends here want you in the war department; Taylor, Shiras, and a number of others, talk to me so. If you want that place, with a sure prospect of promotion, you can have it, but you are not compelled to take it; but it seems to me you will be compelled to take some position, and that speedily. Can't you come to Ohio and at once raise a regiment? It will immediately be in service.

The administration intends to stand or fall by the Union, the entire Union, and the enforcement of the laws. I look for preliminary defeats, for the rebels have arms, organization, unity; but this advantage will not last long. The government will maintain itself or our northern people are the veriest poltroons that ever disgraced humanity.

"For me, I am for a war that will either establish or overthrow the government and will purify the atmosphere of political life.

We need such a war, and we have it now. . . .

"Affectionately yours, "John Sherman."

He wrote in reply:

"The time will come in this country when professional knowledge will be appreciated, when men that can be trusted will be wanted, and I will bide my time. I may miss the chance; if so, all right; but I cannot and will not mix myself in this present call. . . .

"The first movements of the government will fail and the leaders will be cast aside. A second or third set will rise, and among them I may be, but at present I will not volunteer as a soldier or anything else. If Congress meet, or if a national convention be called, and the regular army be put on a footing with the wants of the country, if I am offered a place that suits me, I may accept.

But in the present call I will not volunteer."

He criticised the call for 75,000 militia for three months, saying that the best of men could only be made indifferent soldiers in three months, and that the best of soldiers could accomplish nothing in three months in such a country as ours. He therefore would not volunteer for such a service, but his mind was occupied with military plans. The correspondence between us shows that he had a better conception of the magnitude and necessities of the war than civilians like myself.