(_a_) The quota becomes too large if calculated in the ordinary way.

a.s.sume that 27 electors are to elect 8 candidates. Then the quota is 27/(8+1) + 1 = 4. But 8 x 4 = 32.

There are not enough quotas to go round and difficulties would arise.

The addition of 1 in the case of so small a number makes the quota disproportionately big. For this reason it is advisable to treat each paper as of the value of one hundred. In the case of the Transvaal the quota instead of being 84/(8+1) + 1 = 10 will be 8400/(8+1) + 1 = 934.

(_b_) The disregard of fractions in the case of small numbers may mean the waste of several votes. Take the following example:--

Seat to be filled, 8 Electors 25 Quota = 25/(8+1) + 1 = 3

First Count A 10 B 3 C 3 D E 2 F 1 G 1 H 1 I 1 J 1

A having 10 has a surplus of 7, which has to be distributed. According to the usual rule A's 10 votes are examined and the surplus is distributed in proportion to the next preferences. The preferences are as follows:--

For B....... 5 " C....... 2 " F....... 1 " G....... 1 " H....... 1

Each of these numbers must be multiplied by 7/10, _i.e._ the surplus over the number of unexhausted votes, and the following votes are transferred:--

To B.......3-1/2 " C.......1-2/5 " F.......7/10 " G.......7/10 " H.......7/10

The fractions which are ignored amount to 3 votes, which are consequently wasted. This difficulty is overcome by increasing the value of the papers to one hundred, or in other words by working out the results to two places of decimals.

(c) In a small election at the several stages there may be two or more candidates at the bottom with an equal number of votes. Resort has to be had to lot to decide which is to be eliminated. If the papers are raised to the value of one hundred this difficulty is much less likely to occur after the first count.]

APPENDIX X

LIST SYSTEM: BILL PRESENTED TO THE FRENCH CHAMBER OF DEPUTIES, 1907

The _Commission du Suffrage Universel_, a committee of the Chamber of Deputies, made a careful comparison of the various Bills which had been submitted to the Chamber for the purpose of securing the proportional representation of the electors. The Commission in their report,[1] which was issued in March 1907, recommended the adoption of the Bill, of which a free translation is given below.

The essential features of this measure, which has received the support of the leading advocates of proportional representation, are: (1) The allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the d'Hondt, or Belgian rule (Art. 8); (2) the use of the c.u.mulative vote in determining the relative position of candidates (Art. 6). The elector is given as many votes as there are members to be elected, which he may c.u.mulate upon any one or distribute among several candidates. The elector is not restricted in his choice of candidates to any one list.

_Text of the Bill_

(1) Members of the Chamber of Deputies shall be elected on the list system (_scrutin de liste_) in accordance with the scheme of proportional representation hereinafter stated. There shall be no second ballot.

(2) Each department shall elect one deputy for every 75,000 inhabitants. A remainder of 25,000, or more, inhabitants shall be reckoned as 75,000.

(3) A department shall form a single const.i.tuency, provided that where a department would elect more than ten deputies, it shall be divided into two or more const.i.tuencies, as determined by law hereafter.

(4) A "list" is const.i.tuted by a group of candidates who (after making the declaration prescribed by Article 2 of the Law of 17 July 1889) jointly appeal for the support of the electors.

A list shall not include a larger number of names than there are deputies to be elected in the const.i.tuency, but it may contain a smaller number. An independent candidate shall be reckoned as a distinct list.

(5) Each list shall be delivered at the prefecture at any time after the commencement of the electoral period, and at the latest ten clear days before polling day. It shall be registered and numbered at the prefecture, and a receipt for it shall be given to each candidate.

The name of a candidate shall not be registered unless he has signed the list. A list with more candidates than there are deputies to be elected shall not be accepted for registration.

A candidate whose name appears on one list shall not be entered on another unless he has notified the prefecture by writing under his hand, duly attested, that he retires from the former list, in which case his name shall be at once removed from the former list.

Twenty-four hours before the opening of the poll the prefect shall cause each registered list with the number thereto given to be posted on the doors of the polling station.

(6) An elector has as many votes as there are deputies to be elected in his const.i.tuency.

He may give all or any of his votes to the same candidate.

The reports of the local returning officer at each polling station shall state the number of votes obtained by each candidate. (7) A Central Board (_Commission de recens.e.m.e.nt_) shall collect the reports of the local returning officers, and ascertain the electoral total of each list, and allot the seats among the lists in proportion thereto.

The electoral total of a list is the sum of the votes given to the candidates whose names appear thereon.

(8) For the purpose of allotting the seats, each electoral total shall be divided by the figures 1, 2, 3, 4, and so on up to the number of vacancies, and as many of the resulting quotients as there are vacancies shall be arranged in order of size, beginning with the largest. The smallest of these quotients so arranged, corresponding to the last seat to be filled, shall be used as the common divisor, and to every list shall be allotted a number of deputies equal to the number of times which its electoral total contains the common divisor.

(9) Within each list the seats shall be a.s.signed to the candidates who have the largest numbers of votes; in case of an equality of votes, the eldest candidate shall be elected.

(10) If two or more lists have an equal right to a seat, it shall be allotted as between the competing candidates to that one who has received the greater number of votes, and if those votes are equal the eldest candidate shall be elected.

(11) The unelected candidates of each list with the greatest number of votes shall be cla.s.sed as first, second, and third subst.i.tutes (suppleants), and so on.

If any vacancy shall occur by death, resignation, or otherwise, the subst.i.tutes shall be summoned in their cla.s.sified order to fill the places of the elected members of the list to which they are attached, provided that at the time of summons they are in the enjoyment of their political rights.

(12) If more than six months before the end of a Parliament, the representation of a const.i.tuency is diminished by one-fourth and there is no subst.i.tute who can be declared elected, bye-elections to fill the vacant seats shall be held in that const.i.tuency. (13) The present law shall extend to Algeria. Nothing in this law shall affect the representation of the Colonies.

NOTE.--Since the introduction of this Bill several other proposals have been considered by the _Commission du Suffrage Universel._ The draft Bill proposed in the last report (March 1911) is not based so strictly upon proportional principles as the measure given above.

The points of difference may be summarised as follows:--

(_a_) The use of the c.u.mulative vote is retained (Art. 6), but there is a change in the method of allotting seats to various lists (Art. 8). The new method of allotment is as follows: an "electoral quotient" is found by dividing the number of voters by the number of vacancies, and as many seats are allotted to each list as the number of voters supporting a list contains this quotient. Since each voter has as many votes as there are seats to be filled, the number of voters supporting a list is determined arbitrarily by dividing the total number of votes cast for the list by the number of vacancies.

If there are any seats not allotted by this distribution they are awarded to any list which obtains an absolute majority of the votes.

Should no party obtain an absolute majority, the remaining seats are allotted to the various lists in accordance with the method described in the succeeding Appendix. This method leads to the same distribution of seats as the d'Hondt rule.

(b) The Bill recognises an important new principle in permitting _apparentement des listes_. Parties may unite for the purpose of presenting lists in combination, and the lists so presented are treated for the purpose of the allotment of seats as if they emanated from one party. This is an elastic form of the Belgian "cartel," allowing parties to act together without loss of individuality. The seats won by any such cartel are allotted to the various lists composing the cartel in accordance with the second of the methods described in the previous paragraph.

[Footnote 1: _Chambre des Deputes, Neuvieme Legislature:_ 1907, No. 883.

See note as to further report, March 1911, at end of Bill.]

APPENDIX XI

LIST SYSTEM: LAW ADOPTED BY THE CANTON OF BaLE TOWN, 1905

The special features of the following law are as follows:--

(1) The partial use of the c.u.mulative vote in determining the relative position of candidates (sec. 9).

(2) The allotment of seats to lists in accordance with the rule formulated by Professor Hagenbach-Bischoff (sec. 13).