Hayward in _The Nineteenth Century_, February 1884, p. 295.]

[Footnote 8: _Proportional Representation_, by Professor Commons, p. 52 _et seq_. For further examples in the United States the reader should consult Chapter III. of Professor Commons' book.]

[Footnote 9: _Preferential Voting_, by the Right Hon. J. Parker Smith.

p. 8.]

[Footnote 10: _Proportional Representation_, p. 50.]

[Footnote 11: _The Machinery of Politics_, W. R. Warn, 1872.]

[Footnote 12: Such instructions are contained in Clause 40 of the South African Act, signed by the South African National Convention at Bloemfontein, 11 May 1909.]

[Footnote 13: See Report of Delimitation Commission.]

[Footnote 14: This electoral method is known by various names. In Australia it is called the block vote, in the United States the general ticket, on the Continent the _scrutin de liste_.]

[Footnote 15: The action was defended on the ground that the Munic.i.p.al Reform party had obtained a majority of 39,653 votes at the polls.]

[Footnote 16: _Report on Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill (H.L.)_, 1907 (132), p. vi.]

CHAPTER III

THE INDIRECT RESULTS OF MAJORITY SYSTEMS

"Nous attachons un interet vital, presque aussi grand, a la forme dans laquello on consulte la nation qu'au principe lui-meme du suffrage universel."--GAMBETTA

_False impressions of public opinion._

The first and immediate consequence arising from present electoral methods is the growth of false impressions of the true tendencies of public opinion, impressions that are still further distorted by the exaggerations of the press. The winning of a seat is always a "brilliant victory," and a "crushing defeat" for the other side. The German General Election of 1907 affords an excellent ill.u.s.tration of these false impressions. The Social Democrats lost nearly 50 per cent. of their previous representation, and an outburst of delight arose in certain journals over their "crushing defeat." But the Socialists' poll showed an increase of a quarter of a million, and although their total poll had not increased in quite the same proportion as that of other parties, the figures showed that the Social Democrats were still by far the largest party in Germany. The number of seats won were no true index to the movements in political forces. Not only the press, however, but some of the most careful writers on modern tendencies in politics are also misled by these false impressions. The General Election of 1895, in which there was a majority of 117,473 for the Unionists in a total of 4,841,769 votes, is a case in point. This election has often been chosen as marking the commencement of a period of strong reaction in political thought. Writers have been misled by the overwhelming majority in seats obtained by the Unionists at that election. They have entirely ignored the figures of the polls, and these, the only safe guide to the opinions of the electors, show that the reaction was far less strong than is usually supposed.

_False impressions become the basis of legislative action._

False impressions of public opinion, however, lead to an indirect effect of much greater importance. The false impression becomes the basis of action, and an apparent triumph for reaction makes a "reactionary"

policy much more easy of achievement. Similarly an apparent triumph for a "progressive" policy facilitates its adoption. For the House of Commons is still the most powerful factor in determining our political destinies, and hence these false results have a very material effect in the shaping of history. If the opinion of the people had been truly represented in the Parliaments elected in 1895 and 1900, is it not almost a certainty that the legislation of those two Parliaments would have been considerably modified? Or, to go further back to the election of 1886, the result of which was universally interpreted as a crushing defeat of Mr. Gladstone's proposals in favour of Home Rule, would not a true result on that occasion have influenced subsequent developments?

Over-representation, which results in the temporary triumph of a party and of partisan measures, involves the nation in a serious loss, for the time and energy of a Parliament may be largely consumed in revising and correcting, if not in reversing the partisan legislation of its predecessor. Thus, a considerable portion of the time of the Parliament of 1906-1909 was spent in attempting to reverse the policies embodied in the Education and Licensing Acts of the preceding Parliament.

_Loss of prestige by the House of Commons._

Apart, however, from speculation as to the effect of false electoral methods on the development of public affairs, the serious divergences between representation and polling strength, to which attention has been directed in the previous chapter, must tend to the weakening of the authority and prestige of the House of Commons. Should a Government, misled by the composition of the "representative" House, make use of its majority in that House for the pa.s.sage of measures not really desired by the country, and should the House of Lords, reformed or not, guess rightly that the decisions of the Commons were contrary to the popular will, then inevitably the position of the House of Lords would be strengthened as compared with that of the Commons. "A House of Commons which does not represent," said a leading Liberal journal, "may stand for less in the country than the House of Lords, or the Crown, and its influence will infallibly decline in proportion. One has only to take up an old volume of Bagehot to confirm one's suspicions that the imperfections of electoral machinery, combined with the changes in the character of the electorate, are already threatening to undermine the real sources of the nation's power."[1] Sir Frederick Pollock has declared that our defective electoral system may "yield a House of Commons so unrepresentative in character as to cease to command the respect and obedience of citizens."[2]

_Unstable representation._

False impressions of public opinion, unstable legislation based upon such false impressions, the weakening of the foundations on which the authority of the House of Commons rests, these are results which in themselves const.i.tute a sufficiently serious condemnation of present methods. But those upheavals in representation, those violent swings of the pendulum which have often been so p.r.o.nounced a feature of elections, give an instability to the composition of our supreme legislative chamber that must still further undermine its authority. Many, indeed, imagining that this dangerous instability is the reflection of an equally unstable electorate, begin to question whether a popular franchise is in any circ.u.mstances a satisfactory basis for government.

The violence of the change in representation is attributed to the character of the electors instead of to the evil effects of a defective electoral method. On the other hand, the large majorities which accompany such changes are regarded by other politicians as blessings in disguise--as being essential to the formation of a strong Government.

But a Government based on a false majority will, in the long-run, find that this exaggeration of its support in the country is a source of weakness rather than of strength. Like the image in Nebuchadnezzar's dream, the feet of such a Government are part of clay. For the extreme swing of the pendulum which brought the Government into power is usually followed by an equally violent swing in the opposite direction. When the high-water mark of success is attained at a General Election it becomes practically impossible for the party in power to gain additional seats at bye-elections, whilst an unbroken series of losses makes it difficult to prevent a feeling arising that the ministry has lost the confidence of the electors, although the actual change in public opinion may have been of the slightest. The prestige of the Government is gone, and prestige is as necessary to a Government as a majority. In brief, a large majority strengthens a Government only in so far as that majority corresponds to public opinion.

_Weakened personnel_.

Moreover, the extreme changes which take place at a General Election often result in a considerable weakening of the personnel of the House of Commons. In such a debacle as that which took place in 1906, there was no process of selection by which the Unionists might have retained the services in Parliament of their ablest members. Although there were 33,907 Unionists in Manchester and Salford, Mr. Balfour, the leader of the party, experienced the mortification of being rejected by one of the divisions. This failure was paralleled by the defeat of Sir William Harcourt at Derby in 1895, whilst Mr. Gladstone, in contesting Greenwich in 1874, only succeeded in obtaining the second place, the first seat being won by a Conservative. A way is usually found by which party leaders return without delay to the House of Commons, but there are members of the highest distinction and capacity who, especially if these qualities are a.s.sociated with a spirit of independence, find, it increasingly difficult to re-enter political life. Victory at the polls depends not so much upon the services which a statesman, however eminent, may have rendered to his country, as upon the ability of the party to maintain its majority in the particular const.i.tuency for which he stands. Indeed, in this matter a leader of opinion is placed at a disadvantage as compared with an ordinary member of the party; his very pre-eminence, his very activities bring him into conflict with certain sections of the electorate which, insignificant in themselves, may yet be sufficiently numerous to influence the result of an election.

Statesmen, moreover, have often lost their seats merely because they have endeavoured to give electors of their very best. When Mr. John Morley (now Lord Morley of Blackburn), during the election of 1906, received a deputation of Socialists, he, with characteristic courage, explained very frankly the ground on which he could not support their principles.[3] A similar candour on his part in 1895 cost him his seat at Newcastle. Can we wonder then that there arise complaints that our statesmen are deficient both in courage and in ideas? Single-member const.i.tuencies are, as Gambetta pointed out more than twenty years ago, inimical to political thinking, and recent General Elections have afforded numerous examples in support of this statement. The courageous and forcible presentment of ideas has time after time been rewarded by exclusion from the House of Commons.

_Degradation of party strife._

There is a further and equally serious charge that can be laid against the existing electoral system--it is in no small measure responsible for that increasing degradation in the methods of warfare which has characterised recent political and munic.i.p.al contests. This debas.e.m.e.nt of elections cannot fail to contribute to that undermining of the authority of the House of Commons, upon which stress has already been laid. Indeed, there is abundant evidence to show that in conjunction with the imaginary instability of the electorate, the debas.e.m.e.nt of elections is weakening the faith of many in representative inst.i.tutions.

An efficient bureaucracy is now being advocated by a writer so distinguished as Mr. Graham Wallas, as the best safeguard against the excesses of an unstable and ignorant democracy. There is no need to undervalue the importance of competent officials, but all experience has shown the equal necessity of an adequate check upon the bureaucracy, however efficient, and such check must be found in the strengthening of representative bodies. Mr. Graham Wallas declares that "the empirical art of politics consists largely in the creation of opinion by the deliberate exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences,"[4] and cites in support of this statement the atrocious posters and mendacious appeals of an emotional kind addressed to the electors in recent contests. It does not appear from electoral statistics that so large a proportion of voters are influenced by such appeals as Mr. Wallas thinks; his conclusions, like those of others, are based upon the false impressions arising from false results. It is, however, sufficient for the purpose of the political organizer to know that a number of the electors will succ.u.mb to such influences. The votes of this small section of the electorate can turn the scale at an election, and so long as we adhere to a system under which the whole of the representation allotted to any given const.i.tuency is awarded to the party which can secure a bare majority of votes, we must expect to see a progressive degradation of electoral contests. The successful organizer of victory has already learnt that he must not be too squeamish in the methods by which the victory is obtained, and if "the exploitation of subconscious non-rational inferences" is necessary to this end he will undoubtedly exploit them to the best of his powers.

_The final rally._

Mr. Wallas gives from his personal experience an admirable ill.u.s.tration of the way in which elections are often lost and won. His vivid description of the close of a poll in a County Council election in a very poor district is in itself an emphatic condemnation of our electoral system. "The voters," says he, "who came in were the results of the 'final rally' of the canva.s.sers on both sides. They entered the room in rapid but irregular succession, as if they were jerked forward by a hurried and inefficient machine. About half of them were women with broken straw hats, pallid faces, and untidy hair. All were dazed and bewildered, having been s.n.a.t.c.hed away in carriages or motors from the making of match-boxes, or b.u.t.ton-holes, or cheap furniture, or from the public-house, or, since it was Sat.u.r.day evening, from bed. Most of them seemed to be trying in the unfamiliar surroundings to be sure of the name for which, as they had been reminded at the door, they were to vote. A few were drunk, and one man, who was apparently a supporter of my own, clung to my neck while he tried to tell me of some vaguely tremendous fact which just eluded his power of speech. I was very anxious to win, and inclined to think that I had won, but my chief feeling was an intense conviction that this could not be accepted as even a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government for a city of five million inhabitants, and that nothing short of a conscious and resolute facing of the whole problem of the formation of political opinion would enable us to improve it." The political "boss" has no such qualms; victory may turn upon the votes recorded at this final rally, and every effort must be made to ensure that the party's poll exceeds that of the enemy. Mr. Wallas does not propose any remedy; he merely suggests that something must be done to abolish the more sordid details of English electioneering. Why not go to the root of the evil and amend the electoral system which places so great a premium upon the success of such practices? It is indeed evident that this cannot be accepted as "a decently satisfactory method of creating a Government." But we are not compelled to continue the use of such a method. What possible justification is there for making the representation of all the other electors of a const.i.tuency depend upon the result of a final rally?

_Bribery and "nursing"_

Evidence was tendered before the Worcester Election Commission[5] to the effect that there were 500 voters in the city who were amenable to the influence of a small bribe, and that the party which secured the votes of these electors won the election. Again, is there no alternative to an electoral system which makes the representation of a town depend upon the action of the least worthy of its citizens? Direct bribery has been rendered more difficult by the Corrupt Practices Act, but bribery in a much more subtle form--"nursing" the const.i.tuency--would appear to be on the increase. Mr. Ellis T. Powell, who has had a considerable electioneering experience, gives an admirable statement[6] of the expenses attending a successful candidature. "If the candidate's means,"

says he, "permit of a favourable response to these invitations (appeals for money), he is said to be engaged in 'nursing' the const.i.tuency in which the gifts are distributed. A great proportion of these appeals relate to funds which are for public, or quasi-public purposes, such as those of hospitals; and there is no suggestion that any direct political influence is exercised in consequence of donations or contributions made to these inst.i.tutions. But what is certain is that a section of the electorate-diminishing, but still potent, section--is favourably influenced by the fact that Mr. A. has given 100 to the funds of the hospital, whereas Mr. B. has given 5, 5_s_., or nothing at all.

Candidates and their agents are perfectly well aware of this, and are even known to delay the announcement of their contributions in order to ascertain their respective amounts, and so to guard themselves against giving less than others have done. Mr. A. is inclined to give 20, but waits to see if Mr. B. gives 25, in which case he will raise his intended 20 to 30. These tactics are adopted, not because either of the candidates desires to be lavish or ostentatious in his gifts, and still less from any vulgar desire for notoriety in itself. They are simply an element, almost vital under existing conditions, of a successful appeal to the electorate. They may be said to be of the psychological rather than the political order, introducing into the electoral arena forces which have no business to be there, and whose activity is wholly vicious; but forces which nevertheless no politician can ignore, unless he wishes to postpone his realisation of their exact potency until the declaration of the poll places it before his, own eyes in large and unmistakable characters.... The writer was once consulted by a gentleman who, from motives which were truly laudable, desired to represent a London const.i.tuency. The path was clear to his selection as a candidate; the only question was that of expense. The writer, after noting the number of electors, informed him of the maximum sum which he might expend at a contest, but at the same time warned him that unless he were prepared to spend from 1500 to 2000 a year from that time until the General Election (of which there was no immediate prospect) he might regard his ambition as a hopeless one. The const.i.tuency was one where money _must_ be spent. The other candidate would spend it, and his opponent must do at least as much, while his chance at the poll would be increased if he did a little more. When his opponent gave 10s. to a local cricket club, he could give no less. If he gave a guinea it might make a difference in his poll. The advice was not given in regard to electoral conditions as they ought to be, but as they are. The writer gave it with regret, and felt that he was playing almost a cynical part when he uttered the words. Yet it was in complete accord with the necessities of the existing system." Some of the practices a.s.sociated with const.i.tuency-nursing can perhaps be reached by further legislation, but, if so, bribery in all probability will only take a form still more subtle. Again, why not strike at the root cause which makes these practices so highly profitable? Why continue to make the representation of all electors depend upon the votes of those who are influenced by the attentions of a rich patron?

_The organization of victory._

The c.u.mulative effect of these demoralising elements in party warfare is shown in the separation of the work of the party organizer from that of the party leader--separation which is becoming more and more complete.

The work of covering h.o.a.rdings with posters of a repulsive type, the task of preparing election "literature," must be carried out by men of a different character from those who are responsible for the public direction of the party; and as party agents often obtain their appointments because of their previous success in winning elections, the mere force of compet.i.tion is compelling agents, sometimes against their own wishes, to resort to these questionable practices. The success of the Munic.i.p.al Reform campaign in the London County Council election of 1907 was followed by a demand from many Progressives that the tactics of their opponents should be copied, that gramophone should be answered by gramophone, poster by poster. It is, however, certain that the more victory depends upon the work of the party organizer the more must his power increase, and this fact explains the unique position of the political "boss" in the United States, where ordinary electoral methods have been carried to their logical conclusion.[7] The political "boss"

has become all-powerful because he has made himself the indispensable factor in successful political organization. At the London County Council elections in 1907, the leaders of the Munic.i.p.al Reform Party dissociated themselves from the more extreme accusations made against the administration of the Progressives, but the conduct of the elections was apparently outside their powers of control. It may never become possible in England for a political organization such as "Tammany Hall"

to succeed in planting on the register of voters a large number of fraudulent names, nor is it necessary yet for the press to issue a notice such as that which appeared in the New York _Evening Post:_ "There are a thousand 'colonizers' waiting to vote for the Tammany ticket. Vote early, so that no one can vote ahead of you in your name."[8] In New York the Citizens' Unions have at each election to spend several weeks in succession in thwarting attempts at this offence on a large scale, and though our more perfect organization of elections renders such frauds impossible, still if we are to arrest the Americanization of our electoral contests we must cease to allow the results of a "final rally," the votes of the least worthy citizens, a.s.siduous "nursing," or suggestive posters to decide the representation of a const.i.tuency.

_Party exclusiveness._

The preceding criticism of recent developments in electoral warfare must not be read as a condemnation of party organization as such. Party organization there must be, and unquestionably the success of a party is intimately bound up with the efficiency of its organization. But our defective electoral system confers upon party organization a weapon which is not an adjunct to efficiency in the true sense of the word, but a weapon which has been and can be made a serious menace to the political independence and sincerity both of electors and of Members of Parliament. During the memorable three-cornered fight in Greenwich in 1906, Lord Hugh Cecil made this statement: "The opposition to me is not to put a Tariff Reformer in, but to keep me out. ... We are face to face with an innovation in English politics, and it is a question of how far it is desirable to introduce methods which may be handled with a view to creating a party mechanism so rigid, so powerful, and so capable of being directed by a particular mind towards a single object, that it may become a formidable engine for carrying out a dangerous proposal. We do not want a system of political a.s.sa.s.sination under which any one who is in the way may be put out of the way." To realize the dangerous weapon which our present system places in the hands of party organizations, it is not necessary to give complete a.s.sent to the statement of Lord Hugh Cecil as to the character of the opposition brought against him. The power undoubtedly exists. Prior to the election of January 1910, the secret organization known as "confederates" was reported to have marked down all Unionist candidates who would not accept a course of policy approved of by this body. The action was defended on the ground that it was essential to secure Tariff Reform immediately and at all costs, but it nevertheless const.i.tuted a serious attack upon the representative character of the House of Commons. By such methods that historic House will be deprived of its rightful place in the const.i.tution of this country. Political power will no longer be centred in the House of Commons; it will be vested in organizations outside Parliament, which will only meet to carry out their bidding. At the General Election of 1906 the mere threat of a three-cornered fight was sufficient to induce many Free Trade Unionists to retire from the contest; the purging was completed at the election of January 1910, and it would seem that in the future only those politicians who can with alacrity adopt the newest fashions or change their party allegiance can hope to take a permanent part in the political life of their country. Many of those who were so eager for Tariff Reform at all costs--the "confederates"

themselves--would probably have protested most vigorously had the same policy of excluding competent men from Parliament been adopted for the attainment of political objects of which they did not approve, and the comment of _The Times_ on this exclusive policy reflects the opinion of those who value the representative character of the House of Commons more highly than an immediate party triumph:--

"Parliament ought to represent the opinion of the country as a whole, and each of the great parties ought to represent the diversities of opinion which incline to one side or the other of a dividing line which, however practically convenient, does not itself represent any hard and immutable frontier. Now the variety and elasticity of representation, which are the secret of the permanence of our inst.i.tutions, are directly injured by any attempt to narrow the basis of a party. If such attempts were to succeed upon any considerable scale we should have a couple of machine-made parties confronting one another in Parliament, with no golden bridges between their irreconcilable programmes. There is some danger at the present day of an approximation to a state of things in every way to be deprecated, and it is surely not for the Unionist party to promote any movement tending in that direction."[9]

This process of excluding valuable elements from our representative chamber is equally at work within the Liberal party. At the General Election of 1906 Sir William Butler, a Liberal of very high attainments, was compelled to withdraw his candidature for East Leeds on the ground that he could not fully support the Education policy of the Government.

Mr. Harold c.o.x, during the Parliament of 1906, criticised the work of the Liberal Government from the point of view of a Liberal of the Manchester school, and the Preston Liberal Council withdrew its support.

Nor does the Labour Party escape the same charge. Originally each member was required to accept in writing the const.i.tution of the party, and this condition was rigorously enforced. In January 1911 it was decided at the Party Conference held at Leicester to dispense with the written pledge, but it would appear that a cast-iron conformity to party decisions is still insisted upon. On 10 February 1911 the party moved an amendment to the Address in favour of the Right to Work Bill, a measure as to the practicability of which there is a difference of opinion within the party. Mr. Johnson, the member for Nuneaton, voted against the amendment, and commenting on the incident the _Labour Leader_ said: "Is Mr. Johnson to be allowed to defy the Party's mandate? We invite the Labour stalwarts of Nuneaton to give their earnest consideration to this question. And there can be no doubt as to what the verdict will be."

_Mechanical debates._

These repeated attempts to make members of a party conform in all respects to a specified pattern, this constant insistence that members must give up the right of criticism and support on all occasions the party to which they belong, must and does react on the composition of the House of Commons. The duty of a Member of Parliament will tend more and more to be restricted to registering his approval or disapproval of the decisions of the Government, and, as the central organization of each party is in close touch with the party whips, the free and independent electors will be more and more confined, in the election of their representatives, to a choice between the nominees of machine-made parties. Moreover, in a House of Commons so composed discussion necessarily loses its vitalizing character. The debates on Free Trade in the House of Commons in 1905 towards the close of Mr. Balfour's administration were very real and full of life, because argument could and did affect the votes of members, but if the process continues of excluding all elements save those of the machine-controlled, debates will become more and more formal. They will lose their value. As Lord Hugh Cecil has said[10]: "The present system unquestionably weakens the House of Commons by denuding it of moderate politicians not entirely in sympathy with either political party, and consequently rendering obsolete all the arts of persuasion and deliberation, and reducing parliamentary discussion to a struggle between obstruction on the one side and closure on the other. The disproportion, moreover, between the majority in the House and that in the country, which it is supposed to represent, deprives the decisions of the House of much of their moral authority. The rigid partisanship, and the essentially unrepresentative character of the House of Commons as now const.i.tuted, leave it only the credit which belongs to the instrument of a party, and deprive it of that higher authority which should be the portion of the representatives of the whole people. "Similarly Mr. Birrell, in speaking[11] of the debate on the Women's Franchise Bill (12 July 1910), stated that he rejoiced in the immunity on that occasion from the tyranny of Government programmes and the obligation to all to think alike. "To think in programmes," said he, "is Egyptian bondage, and works the sterilization of the political intellect." And the nation suffers.

_The disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of minorities in bi-racial countries_

The extreme partizan who believes that political action is possible only through a well-controlled organization may be affected but little by the preceding arguments, and is, moreover, nearly always inclined to postpone the consideration of any reform which might possibly deprive his party of the advantages which he imagines it may obtain at the next General Election. Yet cases have occurred when parties have sacrificed their own advantage to the higher interests of the nation as a whole, and national interests demand a change in electoral methods. For the disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of minorities often gives rise to serious difficulties.

The elections which took place in the Transvaal and Orange River Colony,[12] after the grant of self-government in 1906, show how racial divisions are unduly emphasized by such disfranchis.e.m.e.nt. Only one--Barberton--of the twenty-six country const.i.tuencies of the Transvaal returned a member who did not owe allegiance to Het Volk, although the figures of the polls showed that the minority numbered more than 25 per cent, of the electors. In Pretoria the Progressives gained but one seat, and that as the chance result of a three-cornered contest.

The disfranchis.e.m.e.nt of minorities heightened the natural difference which existed between Johannesburg and the rest of the Transvaal--a difference which would have been still more p.r.o.nounced had not Het Volk succeeded in obtaining six and the Nationalists five out of the total of thirty-four seats allotted to Johannesburg and the Rand. The first elections in the Orange River Colony resulted in a similar exaggerated contrast between Bloemfontein and the rest of the country. Five seats were allotted to Bloemfontein, four of which were won by members of the Const.i.tutional party, whilst the fifth was only lost to them by the extremely narrow majority of two. Before the election _The Friend_, the organ of the Orangia Unie, stated that "if Bloemfontein ventures to vote for the Const.i.tutionalists it will be setting itself in opposition to the whole country, and will be manifesting a spirit of distrust of the country population for which it will have to suffer afterwards." On the morrow of the election the same paper declared that "the election results of Bloemfontein will be read with deep disappointment throughout the colony, where the feeling will be that the capital has now shown itself politically an alien city." But would Bloemfontein have "shown itself politically an alien city" if the electoral method had been such that the minorities, both in Bloemfontein and in the country districts, had been able to secure representation in proportion to their strength?

Had the Const.i.tution of South Africa provided for the representation of minorities in the House of a.s.sembly, as proposed in the original draft signed at Cape Town, the process of race unification, both in the Transvaal and the Orange River Colony, would have been facilitated, and the conflicting interests of the const.i.tuent States and of town and country would not by their exaggerated expression in the United Parliament have impeded the consolidation and unification of South Africa. The problem presented by racial differences is not confined to South Africa. The United Kingdom itself presents a conspicuous example of a nation in which the process of unification is still far from complete, and the process has been r.e.t.a.r.ded, and is at the present time being r.e.t.a.r.ded, by the electoral method in force. Not only does Ireland still continue to chafe against the Union, but the racial divisions within Ireland itself are encouraged and fostered by the failure of our representative system to do justice to minorities. The South and West of Ireland is represented in the House of Commons by Nationalists, and Nationalists alone, and, ranged in opposition to them, the North-East is represented by a smaller but equally determined body of Unionists, while those forces in Ireland which would endeavour, and in the past have endeavoured, to bridge over the differences between the North and South are entirely unrepresented. Had the minorities in the North and South of Ireland been represented within the House, there would probably have still remained a notable contrast between the two areas, but that contrast would not have appeared in its present heightened form, and, in addition, with a true electoral system there would have come from Ireland representatives whose sole aim and purpose was to achieve its unification. The picture which Ireland would have presented within the House would have been of a different character to that presented to-day, and the perennial Irish problem would have been infinitely less difficult, because the forces which made for union would have had full play. Even the unification of England and Wales may, in some respects, be described as incomplete; but such differences as exist largely arise from the electoral system which sometimes deprives the minority in Wales of all representation in the House of Commons. When in 1906 the fortunes of the Welsh Conservatives reached their lowest ebb, the latter numbered 36 per cent. of the voters, whilst in former elections the minority sometimes exceeded 40 per cent. Had Welsh Conservatives, during the last two decades, been adequately represented in the House of Commons, would not our conception of Wales from the political point of view have been considerably modified, would not the process of political unification have been made more complete?