The first list contains the "electoral quotient" twice, the second twice, and the third once, and the five seats are allotted accordingly.

Each party obtains one representative for every quota of voters which it can rally to its support, all fractions of "quotas" being disregarded.

The method of determining the electoral quotient may appear at first sight rather empirical, but the rule is merely the arithmetical expression, in a form convenient for returning officers, of the following train of reasoning. The three lists with 8000, 7500, and 4500 supporters are competing for seats. The first seat has to be allotted; to which list is it to go? Plainly to the list with 8000 supporters.

Then the second seat has to be disposed of; to which list is it to go?

If it is given to the first list, then the supporters of the first list will have two members in all, or one member for each 4000 votes. This would be unfair while 7500 supporters of the second list are unrepresented, therefore the second seat is allotted to the list with 7500 supporters. Similar reasoning will give the third seat to the list with 4500 supporters, the fourth to the list with 8000 supporters, which now will rightly have one representative for each 4000, and the fifth to the list with 7500. The question in each case is to what list must the seat be allotted in such a way that no one group of unrepresented electors is larger than a represented group. The separate allotment of seats one by one in accordance with the foregoing reasoning may be shown thus:--

8,000 (List No. 1) 7,500 ( " No. 2) 4,500 ( " No. 3) 4,000 ( " No. 1) 3,750 ( " No. 2)

This result of course agrees with that obtained by the official process of dividing the total of each list by the electoral quotient.

_The selection of successful candidates._

The seats having been apportioned to the respective lists it becomes necessary to ascertain which of the candidates on the respective lists are to be declared elected. In this second process it will be seen now great an advantage is obtained by the candidates at the top of each list.[2] A11 the votes marked in the s.p.a.ce at the top of a list, _i.e.,_ list votes, form a pool from which the candidates of the list draw in succession as many votes as are necessary to make their individual total equal to the electoral quotient, the process continuing until the pool is exhausted. In the example already given, a.s.sume that List No. 1 consists of three candidates, A, B, and C, arranged in the order named, and that the 8000 supporters of the list have given their votes as follows:--

Votes at the head of the List 4,000 Preferential votes for A 600 " " B 500 " " C 3,000 ----- Total 8,000

Candidate A, being the first in order on the list, has the first claim on the votes recorded for the list. The electoral quotient is 3750, and A's total 500 is raised to this number by the addition of 3250 votes taken from those recorded for the list. This secures his election, and there remain 750 list votes which are attributed to candidate B, this candidate being the second in order on the list. B, however, also had 500 votes recorded against his name, and his total poll therefore amounts to 1250. But candidate C has obtained 3000 votes, all recorded for himself personally, and as this total exceeds B's total of 1250, C would be declared elected. The two candidates chosen from List No. 1 would, in this case, be A and C. The successful supplementary candidates are ascertained in the same way.

_A Belgian election. Ghent, 1908: the poll._

In a Belgian election the polling proceeds very smoothly and quietly.

This is largely due to the fact that the law for compulsory voting has relieved the party organizations of the necessity of whipping up their supporters to the poll. At the election of Ghent, which the author was privileged to witness, the candidates for the Chamber of Representatives were as given in the ballot paper on page 177. It will be seen that six lists of candidates were presented, but in the election of Senators only the three chief organizations took part. There were eleven members of the House of Representatives and five Senators to be elected.

The const.i.tuency was divided into 350 polling districts, the maximum number of electors for a district being 500. To each district was a.s.signed a polling place in charge of a presiding officer, appointed by the returning officer of the district; the presiding officer was a.s.sisted by four citizens, each of whom was required to be in possession of the maximum number of votes, and to be at least forty years of age.

In addition, the party organizations sent duly accredited witnesses to watch against possible fraud, and to a.s.sure themselves of the absolute regularity of the proceedings. The poll opened at 8 A.M. Each elector had to present his official "summons" to vote, and received from the presiding officer one, two, or three ballot papers according to the number of votes to which he was ent.i.tled. The elector took the papers to a private compartment, as in an English election, marked them, placed them in the ballot box and received back his official letter, now stamped--evidence, if need be, that he had carried out the obligation imposed upon him by law. At 1 P.M. the poll was closed; the ballot boxes were opened and the ballot papers counted in the presence of the a.s.sessors and party witnesses for the purpose of ascertaining that all papers in the possession of the presiding officer at the opening of the poll had been duly accounted for.

_The counting of the votes_.]

In order to maintain as far as possible, not only the secrecy of the individual vote, but the secrecy of the vote of any locality, the votes of three polling places were counted together, the grouping of polling places for this purpose having been previously determined by lot. Thus the votes counted at the town hall (polling district No. 1) were those recorded in the districts Nos. 1, 112, and 94. The proceedings were directed by the presiding officer of the first polling place, a.s.sisted by the presiding officers of the other two. The only other persons present were witnesses representing the three chief parties. The counting commenced soon after 3 P.M., and was completed, both for the Senate and Chamber, by 7 P.M. The papers were sorted according to the votes given for each list, subsidiary heaps being made for those candidates who had received individual votes of preference. A separate heap was made of spoiled and blank voting papers, but it was evident from the very commencement of the proceedings that the method of voting had presented no difficulty to the elector. Of the 1370 votes recorded in this division for candidates for the Chamber there were but twenty-six spoiled papers; of these thirteen were blank, indicating that the voters, although attending the poll, did not wish to record any opinion. The thirteen other papers showed in nearly every case some confusion in the mind of the elector with the elections for the communal councils, when the elector can give several votes of preference. The official returns, after endors.e.m.e.nt, were forwarded by post to the returning officer, whose duty it was to prepare the returns for the whole const.i.tuency. The figures for each district were given to the press at the close of the count, and special editions of the journals, containing the probable result of the election, were issued the same evening.

_The final process._

The compilation of the returns for the whole const.i.tuency took place on the following day. The returning officer presided, and was a.s.sisted by four a.s.sessors, a secretary and three witnesses, who attended on behalf of the chief parties. In addition there were two professional calculators, who were responsible for the accuracy of the arithmetical processes. The proceedings, in brief, consisted in extracting the details of the returns furnished by the 120 counting places. The final sheet for each list showed not only the total number of votes obtained by the party, but the number of votes of preference recorded for each candidate. The votes for each list were as follows:--

List No.1. List No.2. List No.3. List No.4. List No.5. List No.6.

78,868 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271

The process of allotting the seats to the respective parties then commenced. The totals for each list were divided by the numbers 1, 2, 3, and so on, and arranged thus:--

List List List List List List No. 1. No. 2. No. 3. No. 4. No. 5. No. 6 78,865 39,788 913 1,094 23,118 271 39,432 19,894 11,559 26,288 13,262 19,716 9,947 15,773 13,144 11,266

The eleven highest figures thus obtained were then arranged in order of magnitude, and the seats allotted accordingly:--

1st Seat 78,865 (List No. 1--Catholic) 2nd " 39,783 ( " No. 2--Liberal) 3rd " 39,432 ( " No. 1--Catholic) 4th " 26,288 ( " No. 1--Catholic) 5th " 23,118 ( " No. 5--Socialist) 6th " 19,894 ( " No. 2--Liberal) 7th " 19,716 ( " No. 1--Catholic) 8th " 15,773 ( " No. 1--Catholic) 9th " 13,262 ( " No. 2--Liberal) 10th " 13,144 ( " No. 1--Catholic) 11th " 11,559 ( " No. 5--Socialist)

Thus the Catholics, Liberals, and Socialists obtained six, three, and ten seats respectively. It will be noticed that the eleventh figure, 11,559, which is the "common divisor," or "electoral quotient," is contained six times in the Catholic total, with a remainder of 9511; three times in the Liberal total, with a remainder of 5000; and twice in the Socialist total.

The highest number of preferences recorded for any individual candidate (although placards had been posted inviting votes of preference for M.

Buysse, the candidate fourth on the Liberal list, and for M. Cambier, the candidate third on the Socialist list) were 1914 and 1635, much too small to effect any change in the order of the candidates as arranged by the a.s.sociations. It remains to add that the task was accomplished with perfect regularity and despatch; the figures were checked at each stage, but as the number of votes polled in the double election (for the Senate and for the Chamber) amounted to no less than 270,892, it is not surprising that the compilation of the final figures was not completed until midnight.

_Public opinion favorable to the system._

This was the fifth parliamentary election[3] in which the system of proportional representation has been put to the test; its practicability, both from the point of view of the elector and of the returning officer, is now no longer open to question. Interviews on the effects of the system with Catholic leaders like M. Beernaert or M. Van den Heuvel, with Liberals like Count Goblet d'Alviella, or M. Gustave Abel, the editor of _La Flandre Liberale_, or with Socialists like M.

Anseele, revealed the fact that there is no party in Belgium which desires to return to the former electoral system. The Liberals and Socialists are hostile to plural voting, but their att.i.tude to proportional representation may be summed up in the desire to make the system more perfect.[4] Const.i.tuencies returning three or four members are not sufficiently large to do complete justice to a system of proportional representation, and many, among whom must be included M.

Vandervelde, desire the grouping of these smaller const.i.tuencies into larger ones. The general trend of public opinion is in complete agreement with the views of party leaders, and found forcible expression in the press comments on the elections in 1908 for the provincial councils.

_The relation of the Belgian to other list systems._

The Belgian list method, although simple in form, is based upon a very careful examination of earlier list systems, and represents an attempt to avoid the defects and inconveniences of those systems. As already stated, the vote in a "list" system has two aspects. Indeed, in the canton of Solothurn in Switzerland each elector is invited, first, to record his vote for a list as a separate act, and secondly, to vote for the particular candidate he prefers.

In tracing the growth of the Belgian system it will be best to consider these two aspects separately, and, in the first place, the vote in so far as it affects the fortunes of the list. The object in view--the allotment of the seats in proportion to the total number of votes obtained by the respective lists--would seem quite simple of attainment, and would be so were the totals obtained by each list such that it was possible to divide the seats among them in exact proportion. Voters do not, however, group themselves in exact proportion, and it becomes necessary therefore to devise a rule of distribution that shall approximate to the desired end as closely as possible.

_The different methods of apportioning seats to lists._

The first rule--a very simple one--was adopted because, in the words of Ernest Naville, "it seemed most intelligible to the general public." The grand total of votes polled by the different lists was divided by the total number of seats, and the distribution of seats was based upon the quotient, or "quota" thus obtained. The total of each list was divided by the quota for the purpose of ascertaining the number of seats to which it was ent.i.tled. The answers, as will be seen from the following example, usually contained fractions. a.s.sume that seven seats are to be distributed among three lists, A, B, C; that the grand total of votes is 7000, and that the respective lists have polled as follows:--

List A 2,850 votes " B 2,650 "

" C 1,500 "

----- Total 7,000

The quotient in this case is 1000. The totals of the lists A, B, and C contain the quotient twice, twice and once respectively, but in each case with a remainder, and it is the remainder that const.i.tutes the difficulty. According to the earliest list schemes the remaining seats were allotted to the lists having the largest remainders, and, in the example given, lists A and B would each receive an additional seat.

Party organizers were not slow to perceive that it was advisable to obtain as many of the largest remainders as they could, and considerable dissatisfaction arose in Ticino from the action of the Conservatives, who very skilfully divided their forces into two groups, thereby obtaining additional seats. A simple example will explain. a.s.sume that three deputies are to be elected, that the grand total of votes is 3000, and that the party votes are as follows:--

Party A 1,600 votes " B 1,400 "

----- Total 3,000

The quota would be 1000 votes. Party A, having the larger remainder, would obtain two seats, and party B only one seat; but if party B should present two lists and arrange for the division of its voting force, the following result might ensue:--

Party A 1,600 votes " B1 700 "

" B2 700 "

----- Total 3,000

The quota would still be 1000 votes, but party A would only obtain one seat, whereas party B would obtain two, because each of its two lists would show a remainder larger than A's remainder. This possibility led to a modification of the rule, and the seats remaining after the first distribution were allotted to the largest parties. But this was also far from satisfactory, as will be seen from the following example taken from a Ticino election:[5]--

Conservatives 614 votes Radicals 399 "

----- Total 1,013

The const.i.tuency to which the figures refer returned five members; the quotient therefore was 202, and the Conservatives obtained three seats on the first distribution, and the Radicals one. As, under the rule, the remaining seat was allotted to the largest party, the Conservatives obtained four seats out of the five when, obviously, the true proportion was three to two.

The rule subsequently devised aimed at reducing the importance of remainders in the allotment of seats. The total of each list was divided by the number of seats plus one. This method yielded a smaller quota than the original rule and enabled more seats to be allotted at the first distribution. The final improvement, however, took the form of devising a rule which should so allot the seats to different parties that after the first distribution there should be no seats remaining unallotted. This is the great merit of the Belgian or d'Hondt rule, which has already been fully described.

_Criticism of d'Hondt Rule_.

The d'Hondt rule certainly accomplishes its purpose; it furnishes a measuring rod by which to measure off the number of seats won by each list.[6] But the rule is not without its critics.[7] As in the earlier Swiss methods objection was taken to the undue favouring of certain remainders, so in Belgium objection is taken to the fact that remainders are not taken into account at all. The Belgian rule works to the advantage of the largest party, a fact that many may consider as a point in its favour.

A further simple example will explain how the larger parties gain.

a.s.sume that eleven seats are being contested by three parties, whose votes are as follows:--