Proportional Representation: A Study in Methods of Election - Part 12
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Part 12

Papers showing no further preference 201 -- 201 ---- --- ----

Totals 1801 800 1001

In this way each of the candidates B, C, and Z obtains in strict proportion that share of A's surplus to which he is ent.i.tled, and, so far as this operation is concerned, the element of chance is wholly eliminated.[8]

The papers selected for transfer, however, are those last filed in the process of sorting, and should it become necessary to transfer these papers a second time there would enter in this further distribution an element of chance which, as explained in the Appendix already referred to, is so trifling as to have no practical effect upon the result unless the number of electors is small as compared with the number of members to be elected.

_The Gregory Method._

A third method, in which the element of chance is eliminated from every transfer, has been embodied in the Tasmanian Act of 1907. Whenever it is necessary to transfer surplus votes, the whole of the successful candidate's papers on which preferences are marked are transferred, but at a reduced value. In the example given the whole of A's papers on which next preferences had been marked for B, C, and Z would be carried forward to those candidates, but each paper would be transferred at the value of one-half, the remaining portion of the value of each paper having been used for the purpose of electing A. This method is known as the fractional, or Gregory, method of transfer, having been first suggested by Mr. J. B. Gregory of Melbourne, in 1880. The regulations for the conduct of elections contained in the Tasmanian Act are given in Appendix VIII.

The committee which investigated the working of this system as applied to the Tasmanian General Election of 1909, made a very valuable comparison between the rules contained in the Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill[9] and the more exact rules of the Tasmanian Act. A fresh scrutiny, based on the rules of the Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill, was made of all the ballot papers used in that election. It was found that in each district the same candidates were excluded in the same order and the same candidates returned as at the actual election. The same results would, therefore, have been attained and much labour saved if the rules of the Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill had been used. This committee, however, in view of the fact that the more exact method had already been established in Tasmania, and that the ascertainment of the results only involved an expenditure of a few hours more time, and that there were no data available to show the frequency of close contests in which a small change in the distribution of votes might possibly affect the result, recommended that no change should be made in the law. Still it would seem that the rules of the Munic.i.p.al Representation Bill are sufficiently exact for all practical purposes except where the number of electors is small. The fractional transfer is of course the most perfect from the mathematical point of view, but the Royal Commission on Electoral Systems, after a careful examination of its working, report that "we agree with the Proportional Representation Society in regarding the additional labour involved as greater than it is worth."[10]

Where the number of electors is small, however, it is not only desirable to carry out the transfers with the exactness prescribed by the Tasmanian rules, but in important elections, such as those of the Senators in South Africa, it is desirable to introduce a further modification. In transferring the votes in ordinary elections fractions of votes are ignored, because such fractions do not affect the result.

Where, however, there are only a few electors such fractions may become important, and, for this reason, the regulations (see Appendix IX.) adopted by the South African Government for the election of Senators provided that each ballot paper should be treated as of the value of 100, or, in other words, that fractions should be taken into account as far as two places of decimals. The application of these regulations presented no difficulty; the counting of the votes in each of the four Colonies proceeded without the slightest hitch.

_The Gove or Dobbs Method._

The methods of transfer hitherto described all enable the voter to maintain complete power over the disposal his vote. It has, however, been suggested that the candidate for whom the vote is recorded should have the privilege of deciding to whom it should be transferred. The suggestion was first made by Mr. Archibald E. Dobbs, who, in 1872, in a pamphlet ent.i.tled _General Representation_, made the proposal that before the date of the election each candidate should publish a schedule of the names of any of the other candidates to whom he desired his vote to be transferred. This method of transfer by schedule is usually known as the "Gove" method, and was contained in the Bill submitted by Mr. W.

H. Gove to the Legislature of Ma.s.sachusetts, in 1891. Section 7 of this Bill reads as follows: "Votes shall be transferred according to the request of the candidate for whom they were originally cast to a person named in the list furnished by said candidate before the date of the election." With this method the elector in recording his vote for any one candidate would have no independent power of indicating to whom the vote should be transferred, and Mr. Dobbs, in a later pamphlet[11] has suggested that the elector should be given the option of accepting the schedule of preferences published by the candidate, or of indicating his own. Mr. Dobbs thus gets rid of the compulsory acceptance of a schedule of preferences, a proposal to which most English-speaking electors would have an instinctive dislike. But even to an optional schedule certain objections remain. The system has lost in simplicity, and the order of the candidates in the particular schedules would be determined in most cases by the party organizations.

The _transferability_ of votes is the connecting link between all these systems; it is the essential feature upon which depends the proportionate representation of the contending parties, and the mode of transfer is properly regarded as a matter upon which different views may be held. As regards the second and third systems of transfer outlined above--which so far are the only ones which have been put into practice--experience confirms the theoretical conclusions of mathematicians that, save in the case of small electorates, both methods yield the same result. The second method was that used by the Proportional Representation Society for the purpose of its model elections, and is now applied in the election of Munic.i.p.al Councils in Johannesburg and Pretoria. A description of the Model Election of 1908 will serve to ill.u.s.trate the various processes involved in the sorting and counting of votes.

_The model election of 1908._

In this election it was a.s.sumed that the voters in a const.i.tuency returning five members were asked to make their choice among twelve candidates. These candidates were all well-known political men, and were chosen with an attempt at impartiality from the Liberal, the Unionist, and the Independent Labour parties. As no Irish newspaper was publishing the ballot paper, no Nationalist was included.[12] This ballot paper, a copy of which appears on page 147, was sent, accompanied by a short explanatory article, for publication to, and appeared in, the following newspapers: _The Times, The Morning Post, The Spectator, The Nation, The Daily News, The Financial News, The Manchester Guardian, The Yorkshire Post, The Yorkshire Daily Observer, The Western Morning News, The Western Daily Mercury, The Glasgow Herald, The Dundee Advertiser, The Woolwich Pioneer_, and _The Labour Leader_. Readers of the newspapers were asked to cut out the ballot paper, mark it and return it to Caxton Hall by the first post on the morning of Tuesday, 1 December 1908.

Ballot papers were also circulated independently among members of the Proportional Representation Society and their friends. About 18,000 papers were returned by newspaper readers, and about 3700 by members of the Society and their friends. In all a const.i.tuency of 21,690 electors was formed, a number whose votes were enough, but not too many, for counting in a single evening.

PROPORTIONAL REPRESENTATION ELECTION, 1908

BALLOT PAPER

PLEASE VOTE

In this Ill.u.s.trative Election FIVE members are to be elected for a single const.i.tuency, such as Leeds. The following TWELVE Candidates are supposed to have been nominated.

Order of Preference. Names of Candidates

........... ASQUITH, The Rt. Hon. H. H.

........... BALFOUR, The Rt. Hon. A. J.

........... BURT, The Rt. Hon. Thomas

........... CECIL, Lord Hugh

........... HENDERSON, Arthur

........... JONES, Leif

........... JOYNSON-HICKS, W.

........... LLOYD GEORGE, The Rt. Hon. D.

........... LONG, The Rt. Hon. Walter H.

........... MACDONALD, J. Ramsay

........... SHACKLETON, David

........... SMITH, F.E.

INSTRUCTIONS TO VOTERS

A. _Each Elector has one vote_, and one vote only.

B. _The Elector votes_

(a) By placing the figure 1 opposite the name of the candidate _he likes best_.

He is also invited to place

(b) The figure 2 opposite the name of his _second choice,

(c) The figure 3 opposite the name of his _third choice_, and so on, numbering as many candidates as he pleases in the order of his preference.

_N.B._--The vote will be spoilt if the figure 1 is placed opposite the name of more than one candidate.

This Ballot Paper should be filled in and returned not later than _Tuesday_, first post, 1 _December_ 1908, in open envelope (halfpenny stamp), addressed to

THE RT. HON. LORD AVEBURY, Caxton Hall, Westminster, S.W.

_The counting of the votes. General Arrangements_.

The votes were counted at the Caxton Hall, Westminster, on the evening of Thursday, 3 December. Unfortunately, it was not found possible for all the newspapers to reproduce the ballot paper in its exact dimensions, and the unevenness in the sizes of the papers, which would not occur in a real election, caused some trouble to the counters. The method on which the room was arranged may best be gathered from the plan shown on next page.

[Ill.u.s.tration: ILl.u.s.tRATIVE ELECTION, DECEMBER 3RD, 1908 PLAN OF ROOM]

In the centre of the room was the sorting table, where the votes were in imagination discharged from the ballot boxes. At this table were stationed a number of helpers, chiefly Post Office sorters, who through Mr. G. H. Stuart, of the Postmen's Federation, and Mr. A. Jones, of the Fawcett a.s.sociation, had kindly volunteered their services. Here also were a dozen sets of pigeon-holes, each set having twelve compartments, and each compartment being labelled with the name of a candidate. As soon as the count began, the sorters started sorting the ballot papers according to the names marked 1, placing in each candidate's compartment the papers in which his name was so marked, and setting aside spoilt or doubtful papers. Printed instructions to the sorters had been issued, thus:--

1. Sort the ballot papers according to the names marked 1.

2. Place spoiled or doubtful papers on top of the case (right-hand side).