16. The nature of proportional representation. (Jones, _Readings on Parties and Elections in the United States,_ pages 164-168; Commons, _Proportional Representation._)

17. Objections to the principle of proportional representation.

(Gettell, _Readings in Political Science,_ pages 324-325.)

18. Preferential voting. (_Ma.s.sachusetts Const.i.tutional Convention Bulletins,_ 1917.)

19. The gerrymander. (Woodburn, _Political Parties and Party Problems in the United States,_ chapter xx.)

20. The short ballot. (Childs, _Short Ballot Principles;_ Ma.s.sachusetts Const.i.tutional Convention Bulletins, 1917.)

21. What proportion of qualified voters actually use the ballot?

(Hart, _Practical Essays on American Government,_ No. 2.)

FOR CLa.s.sROOM DISCUSSION

22. The desirability of extending the Direct Primary in your state.

23. The closed versus the open primary.

24. Advantages and disadvantages of nomination by pet.i.tion.

25. Advantages and disadvantages of holding local, state and National elections at different times.

CHAPTER x.x.xVI

HONESTY AND EFFICIENCY IN OFFICE

451. MAGNITUDE OF THE PROBLEM.--How can we insure the honest and efficient administration of American government? Civic education and the perfection of nomination and election devices will do much toward securing this end, but there remains a troublesome question. This has to do with reorganizing our legislative and administrative machinery, so that public officials may be allowed or encouraged to perform their duties in a responsible and effective manner.

The problem is a vast one, the adequate treatment of which would require volumes. In this chapter, therefore, it will be necessary to confine the discussion to a few of the more pressing aspects of the problem. Of these the following are perhaps the more important: First, the defects in legislative procedure; second, the reorganization of state administration; third, budget reform; and fourth, the reform of munic.i.p.al government.

A. DEFECTS IN LEGISLATIVE PROCEDURE

452. AMERICAN LEGISLATURES ARE OVERWORKED.--It has frequently been pointed out that in the United States both state and National legislatures are overwhelmed with work. One reason for this is that the extension of government control over industrial corporations has rendered legislation more complex and greater in volume. The development of public interest in health, education, and related fields has 'of recent years markedly increased the amount of legislation. The custom which many legislators have of attempting to get as much special legislation for their respective districts as possible has likewise increased the number of laws upon the statute books. Lastly, it should be borne in mind that throughout our history we have tended to believe legislation a cure-all for the defects of American life. This att.i.tude has led to an excessive number of laws on subjects which in European countries are ordinarily left to the discretion of administrative officials.

The combined effect of these developments has been to confront our legislatures with so much business that honest and efficient legislation has been rendered exceedingly difficult.

453 THE COMMITTEE SYSTEM.--The chief defects of American legislation appear in connection with the committee system which exists in both National and state legislatures. The committee system is the practice of dividing the legislative body into a large number of small groups or committees whose duty it is to consider various types of legislative business. The great merit of this device is that it expedites business. Indeed, the membership of our legislatures has become so large, and the amount of legislative business has increased so rapidly, that it is difficult to see how the committee system could be dispensed with. Without some such division of labor, chaos and endless delay would result. [Footnote: For the part played by the committee system in the actual making of a law, see Chapter XLIIL]

At the same time, the committee system has numerous faults. As Lord Bryce has pointed out, it destroys the unity of the legislature by breaking it up into a number of small groups among which there is no appreciable degree of coordination. The committee system limits debate. Since most committee business is transacted in secret session, the public is deprived of light upon public affairs. So minutely does the committee system divide legislative labor that even the most important piece of legislation cannot secure the attention of the best men. There is a diffusion of responsibility when various committees work upon related problems without regard for the work being done by one another. Finally, the committee system throws power, unaccompanied by adequate responsibility, into the hands of the committee chairman.

454 LOG-ROLLING. Log-rolling is the trading of votes among individual legislators. Many of the faults of our state and National legislatures are connected with this practice. Some legislators are so intent upon securing the pa.s.sage of bills in which they are personally interested that they are willing to vote for a fellow-legislator's pet bills, regardless of merit, provided that legislator will return the favor.

In this way special legislation often displaces bills which are drawn in a wider interest,--taxation, education, and other vital matters being neglected so that members may pursue personal ends.

There is as yet no limit to the number of bills which may be introduced by state or National legislators. As a result there is a large number of unnecessary and hastily framed bills for which no one is definitely responsible. It is supposed to be the duty of all legislators to weed out bills which are poorly framed, or which are designed to promote special interests. But in this case everybody's business becomes n.o.body's business. Such machine-like formalities as repeated readings of a bill, and a series of committee reports upon it, are generally subst.i.tuted for individual scrutiny of a measure.

455. LEGISLATIVE REFORM.--The reform of legislative procedure is attracting an increasing amount of attention among students of American politics. Many recent state const.i.tutions define in detail the powers and procedure of the state legislature. A considerable number of states now have legislative reference bureaus, which enable legislators to keep track of legislation in other states, as well as to have ready access to important data bearing upon their own problems. There is a growing tendency for state legislatures to employ expert bill drafters to draw up laws on technical and highly-complex subjects. The expert bill drafter and the legislative bureau help materially to reduce the amount of defective and unwise legislation on the statute books.

Much remains to be done, however. Important public bills ought invariably to be given first consideration by legislators, instead of, as is still many times the case, being put off until the end of the session in order to allow time for log-rolling. Filibustering and other time-wasting tactics should be curbed, because they tend to obstruct legislation. Many students of government advocate the extension of a plan already adopted in Ma.s.sachusetts and a few other states, whereby all bills are given a public hearing. It is also clear that some method ought to be devised whereby the work of the various committees dealing with related subjects could be correlated and harmonized. Lastly, any measures which will reduce the amount of unnecessary and ill-advised legislation must prove of great value.

B. THE REORGANIZATION OF STATE ADMINISTRATION

456. DEFECTS IN STATE ADMINISTRATION.--Originally the state administration consisted of the Governor and a few elective officers, notably a Secretary of State, a Treasurer, and an Attorney-General.

With the rapid development of the country, education, health, dependency, corporations, and similar matters have required more and more attention from state governments. To perform a host of new functions the state administration has expanded to include numerous commissioners, boards, and departments, some of them elected by the people, and some of them appointed by the Governor.

This development has been haphazard, rather than orderly and planned.

As a result, the administrative department is in most states a confused and tangled ma.s.s of boards and commissions, departments and single offices, often duplicating the work of one another, and largely working without any appreciable degree of coordination. In most states numerous administrative officers are elective, rather than appointive.

This situation has two drawbacks: In the first place elective officials are responsible to no one but the people at large, and therefore these officials cannot be _efficiently directed or supervised_ by the Governor. In the second place, no definite person or persons can be held _responsible_ for the conduct of this numerous body of elective administrative officials.

457. THE REFORM OF STATE ADMINISTRATION.--The reorganization and consolidation of state administrative offices is attracting an increasing amount of attention. In New Jersey, Ma.s.sachusetts, Illinois, and several other states, administration has been notably simplified and systematized. The Illinois Administrative Code of 1917, for example, consolidated the work of more than a hundred administrative offices into nine main departments. Each department is in charge of a director, appointed by the Governor, and each department is responsible to the Governor. Coordination of this type economizes time and energy, and saves the state's money by reducing the number of salaried officials. The centralization of the entire administration under the Governor not only allows efficient supervision, but permits the people to hold this official strictly accountable for the administration.

The need of reform in state administration is recognized throughout the Union, but in most states the reorganization of administrative offices is r.e.t.a.r.ded in two ways: First, the movement is opposed by officeholders who fear that their positions will be abolished by a consolidation of departments; second, in many states the consolidation of administrative offices is impossible without substantial amendments to the state const.i.tution.

C. BUDGET REFORM

458. THE QUESTION OF A BUDGET.--In contrast to the leading countries of Europe, our National government until very recently had no budget system. Some of the estimates were prepared by the administrative departments, under the direction of the President, while other estimates were prepared by various committees in the House of Representatives. In Congress there was little or no coordination between the various committees considering different appropriations.

Nor were these committees properly coordinated with the administrative departments which were responsible for the original estimates.

After appropriations had been granted, Congress had no scrutiny over the actual expenditure of the money. Thus the administrative departments might waste their appropriations, and then secure the pa.s.sage of deficiency bills to make up the shortage. At no time did the various departments and committees considering appropriations take into careful account the amount of government revenue. For this reason it was purely an accident if appropriations kept within the limits set by available revenue.

A similar situation formerly prevailed in many of the states. The various administrative departments transmitted to the legislature an estimate of what each required for the coming year. These estimates, together with an unlimited number of appropriation bills introduced by individual members, were referred to various committees. Whether particular appropriations were granted depended, not upon the amount of state revenue, but upon the political pressure brought to bear in favor of those measures. As in Congress, neither the executive nor legislative branch of government, neither particular committees nor individual legislators, could be held wholly responsible for any appropriation measure. Excessive waste of public funds was the result.

459. BUDGET REFORM.--The last two decades have witnessed a growing demand for a national budget. Under the direction of President Taft a commission investigated the general question of responsibility in the handling of Federal finances. The report of the committee favored a national budget, but the unfriendly att.i.tude of Congress checked the movement. Interest in a national budget increased during the two terms of President Wilson, stimulated, especially, by the wave of postwar economy which swept the country after the signing of the armistice in November, 1918. In the spring of 1921, a bill establishing a budget system for the National government pa.s.sed both houses of Congress, and on June 10, 1921, the bill became law by the signature of President Harding. This system is expected markedly to improve Federal finances.

Practically unknown a few years ago, the budget movement among the states has spread so rapidly that at the present time almost all of the commonwealths have some sort of budget system. Three methods of preparing the budget are found among the several states. In some states, as in New York, budget-making is in the hands of the legislature; in other states, as in Wisconsin, both legislature and executive partic.i.p.ate in budget-making; in still other states, as in Illinois, the executive alone is responsible for the preparation of the budget. Many authorities claim that the last-named type of budget preparation is preferable but, in many states it is objected to as giving too much power to the executive.

D. THE REFORM OF MUNIc.i.p.aL GOVERNMENT

460. MUNIc.i.p.aL REFORM: CHANGES IN THE MAYOR-COUNCIL PLAN.--Until the opening of the twentieth century practically every American city was governed under what is known as the mayor-council plan. This plan provides for a council to make the laws, and a mayor to act as executive. Formerly the council of the larger cities was very often composed of two chambers, a board of aldermen and a common council, but of late years the single-chambered council has become more and more common.

The mayor-council plan still prevails in most American cities, particularly in the larger munic.i.p.alities. But everywhere the growing demand for honesty and efficiency in government is leading to the reform of this system. In order to reduce the length of the ballot, the appointive power of the mayor is being increased. In the interests of economy and responsibility the administrative offices are in many cities being consolidated, coordinated and centralized under the mayor. To guard against the abuse of financial power there is in many commonwealths a tendency for state const.i.tutions and statutes to limit the debt-incurring and franchise-granting powers of city councils.

461. MUNIc.i.p.aL REFORM: THE COMMISSION PLAN.--In September, 1900, a tidal wave seriously demoralized the mayor-council form of government in Galveston, Texas. To meet the emergency, the state legislature authorized the establishment of a new type of government, known as the commission plan. Instead of selecting a mayor and councilmen, the voters of Galveston now choose a commission of five officials. All of these commissioners are equal in power, except that one presides as mayor-president. The commission form of government spread rapidly, chiefly among the smaller cities, until in 1921 there were more than 300 munic.i.p.alities governed under this plan. In every case the commission has both legislative and executive powers. Collectively the commissioners act as a legislative body for the city, individually they head the various administrative departments.

A number of important advantages are claimed for the commission form of city government. Responsibility is no longer divided among mayor and councilmen, but can be definitely placed upon the small group of commissioners. It is believed by many that commission government allows a greater harmony of action than is possible under the mayor- council plan. Finally, it is declared, a group of five or seven commissioners can administer city government with more efficiency than can a mayor and a numerous council.

The opponents of commission government maintain, on the other hand, that the plan is undemocratic and oligarchical because it centralizes great power in the hands of a small group. The plan is said to increase the danger of corruption, since appropriating and spending powers are placed in the same hands. The opponents of this form of government also maintain that it renders easier the corruption of the city administration, since party bosses may easily gain control of a few commissioners. A final, and perhaps the most serious, objection is that commission government does not go to the logical conclusion in concentrating responsibility. There is no head to the administration, and no way of preventing the diffusion of responsibility among the commissioners. Jealousy among the commissioners has often led to friction and to working at cross-purposes. [Footnote: Of recent years a number of cities have abandoned commission government for either the mayor-council or the city manager plan.]

462. MUNIc.i.p.aL REFORM: THE CITY MANAGER PLAN.--A recent modification of commission government is the city manager plan. This provides for a small elective commission, which does not itself administer the government of the city, but which chooses, instead, an experienced executive or city manager. The city manager is supposed to be a non- partisan expert whose duty it is to administer the city in accordance with business principles. As the agent of the commission choosing him, the city manager enforces all ordinances, prepares annual estimates, and appoints all other city officials and employees. He also accepts full responsibility for the administration of the city's affairs.