Let us imagine, however, that, owing to the malign influence which, Spenser said, attends England in Irish affairs, the Irish landed gentry were removed from the land, and their former tenants were put in their place as owners. What would be the consequences, economic, social, political, of this sudden agrarian revolution in one of the Three Kingdoms? The distribution of the Irish soil between the cla.s.ses which would possess it, would be unfavourable, in the highest degree, to the establishment of a 'peasant proprietary,' the common name in use on this subject. Of the 486,000 tenant farmers in Ireland, some 132,000 hold patches of from less than one to five acres in extent; are these to be stereotyped as real land owners? More than 90,000 occupy from fifty to five hundred acres and upwards; these include the great graziers of the rich tracts of pasturage; do these supply elements of a 'peasant proprietary' in any rational sense? The only cla.s.s which even on plausible, _a priori_ grounds could be made occupying owners of the land would contain much less than 300,000 families; and probably it occupies less than two-thirds of the island as a whole. Are all these bodies of men to be lumped, so to speak, together, and universally to receive the ownership of the soil; would not compulsory purchase, even on these conditions, be the sheerest folly? Furthermore, the configuration of Ireland and her climate make it next to impossible that a 'peasant proprietary' could generally thrive within her borders; Nature herself forbids an attempt to carry out, on a large scale, a settlement of the kind. The central area of the island is a low watershed of wide extent, from which a succession of streams descends through vast tracts of mora.s.s and bog; in other parts of the country there are large and deep rivers, curving as they approach the sea, and flowing through mountain s.p.a.ces; the lands they traverse are swampy, and require main drainage; a large part of Ireland is composed of wild hill ranges only fit for the rearing of young and coa.r.s.e breeds of cattle; she possesses a fine area of the best pasturage, confined, however, to a few counties; her true agricultural area is comparatively small. Her climate, moreover, is wet to a proverb; torrents of rain from the Atlantic fall on her plains for months; above all, her inland towns are far from each other, and petty; scarcely one is peopled by more than 10,000 souls. Any well-informed and right-judging person who knows the conditions under which a 'peasant proprietary' can alone flourish, must know that, from the nature of the case, it would be a failure, in the circ.u.mstances in which it would be necessarily placed, were it forcibly established in every part of Ireland. Ireland has little in common with Belgium, with Northern Italy, with France; this settlement of confiscation would go the way of the Englishry of the Middle Ages and the Cromwellian colonists.

The most conclusive argument against compulsory purchase has, nevertheless, to be yet put forward. The state of things 'voluntary purchase' is evolving would a.s.suredly be aggravated a hundred-fold were every tenant in Ireland made the owner of his farm by a revolutionary act on the part of the State. It is significant, in the highest degree, that from the time of the 'New Departure' to this hour, the conspiracy against our rule in Ireland has clamoured for the expropriation of the Irish landed gentry by force, and for the conversion of their tenants into possessors of these estates; far better informed than British statesmen, it has rightly calculated that this violent change would increase the 'Nationalist' sympathies of the Irish peasant; and this opinion is being confirmed, to a great extent, by the results of 'voluntary purchase' being now developed. The coa.r.s.e materialist view that bribery will make a cla.s.s law-abiding and loyal, is opposed to human nature and fact; bribery will not efface ideas, feelings, and tendencies, deep-rooted in history and ancient tradition; above all, if it is a concession to agitation and a rebellious movement, it will only quicken the animosity to the State and the greed of the favoured cla.s.s. Parnell, I have said, had his mind made up on this subject; he always insisted that the Irish tenant, wherever his holding had been made his own, would be 'more true to the cause than ever;' it is curious that the confident prediction of a most able man appears to have been persistently ignored. For the rest, the mischief 'voluntary purchase' is already doing would be enormously aggravated by the effects of compulsory purchase. The Irish tenant farmers, made owners of the land everywhere, would, like the present 'purchasers,' cut down woodland wholesale; the country would be disafforested over an immense area; the consequences to agriculture would be as bad as possible.

Arterial and main drainage too would, as a rule, be neglected; but these would, comparatively, be trifling results; the compulsory purchaser would deal with the land as their 'voluntary' fellows are now largely dealing, but, in all probability, more generally, and in much a greater proportion.

Holding as they would nine-tenths of the Irish soil at terminable annuities much lower than any rent, they would inevitably subdivide, sublet, and mortgage their farms in tens of thousands of cases; they would become middlemen, over whole counties, the harsh oppressors of a mult.i.tude ground down by rack-rents; the worst kind of 'landlordism' would be reproduced in the worst aspect. The tendency of events is even now confirming what I wrote a long time ago on this subject: 'Freehold ownership, therefore, would disappear more or less quickly over extensive tracts, the "yeomen" would become a diminishing quant.i.ty, and these would be replaced by a new cla.s.s of landlords with tenants at compet.i.tion rents, that is, determined by the land hunger of the Celt. The transformation would inevitably go on, for its causes would operate with intense force; and before many years probably two-thirds of Ireland would have become a land of mere peasant landlords placed over a ma.s.s of rack-rented tenants.'[147] The creation of a universal 'peasant proprietary,' by force, would, in fact, bring the Irish land system back by degrees into the state in which it was before the Great Famine, when millions of serfdom squatted on the soil, disorganising agriculture and preventing social progress.

These considerations, however, by no means exhaust the case against the compulsory purchase of the rented land of Ireland. Irish landlords have been decried, for an evil purpose, during many years; their position is difficult and open to attack; but if they are an unpopular cla.s.s, they have been a civilising influence in Ireland of real value, the most civilising influence, perhaps, in her three southern provinces. Their annihilation, despoiled and impoverished as they are, would still withdraw a large fund from Irish rural labour; and it would be most injurious to agriculture in many ways, especially as regards main and arterial drainage, an absolute necessity for the Irish soil, and scarcely possible except under a system of large estates. Their extinction, too, Englishmen ought not to forget, would deprive the State of one of its mainstays in Ireland; the idea to the contrary growing up is a mere delusion; it was not for nothing that Parnell and Davitt described this order of men as 'the British garrison' and insisted that were it once out of the fortress the power of England in Ireland would certainly perish. The conversion of Irish farmers universally into landowners would also have a ruinous effect on many Irish industries. It would do infinite harm to many branches of commerce, especially to trades of the higher type; it would be disastrous to such towns as Dublin and Belfast, already beginning to protest against it; and, whatever may be said, the prospect of it is dreaded by agricultural Irish labourers as a cla.s.s, which has always been ill-treated by their masters, the farmers, though, owing to the influence of priests and demagogues, they are unwilling to express the sentiments they really feel. Compulsory purchase, in fact, is by no means so generally asked for in Ireland as is supposed; her representation demands it by a great majority of votes; but this representation, as I have pointed out before, is not a true index of Irish opinion. Another consideration, too, should be taken into account in coming to a reasonable conclusion on this subject. The land system of England and Scotland, from a variety of causes sufficiently known, is essentially different from that of Ireland; politically, socially, economically, it has little in common with it. But were Parliament to declare that the whole tenant cla.s.s of Ireland were to be transformed into fee simple owners, subject only to renders, much less than true rents, and payable for a short s.p.a.ce of time, I much doubt if English and Scottish tenants would acquiesce, and would not agitate for legislation of a similar kind, especially as British agriculture is still heavily depressed. Leaseholders of large houses in towns, for long terms of years, at ground rents, and a whole cla.s.s of builders, a.s.suredly would join in such a demand; the contagion of revolution and socialism is always perilous. English and Scottish landlords have usually played the part of the Jew to the Samaritan as regards their Irish fellows; but 'proximus ardet Ucalegon' might be borne in mind.[148]

The Irish land system, therefore, from every point of view, is simply in a deplorable state; it is an economic and social chaos, pregnant with mischiefs and dangers of many kinds. Confiscation has wrought its work on the Irish landlord; has shaken the structure of Irish society; and has produced its inevitable results in banishing capital from the land, and in dealing a weighty blow to Irish credit. The legislation of 1881, and of subsequent years, has conferred immense advantages on the tenant cla.s.s in Ireland; but these have fallen short of what might be supposed; this cla.s.s declares itself to be dissatisfied with its lot; it is clamouring for the wholesale transfer to itself of the rented lands of Ireland, through what is known as compulsory purchase, that is, corruption and spoliation combined in an act of the State. And these efforts of legislation, essentially unwise, in direct conflict with fact and economic science, a mere makeshift to stave off agitation and trouble, are, in all probability, by no means the worst. Demoralisation has spread throughout Irish landed relations, affecting them, unfortunately, in many ways; divisions of cla.s.s have been made worse, as well as the old divisions of race and faith; respect for contracts and obligations has been destroyed; dishonesty and thriftlessness have been favoured, and industry and honesty not encouraged; an evil spirit of discontent and desire for change is abroad; agriculture is plainly on the decline; there is nothing secure or settled in the land. Vicious as the Irish land system unquestionably was before Mr. Gladstone first took it in hand, I believe that, having regard to the general interests of the State, it is still more vicious at the present time; it has been transformed, but, on the whole, transformed for the worse. As I wrote before, when commenting on the position of affairs in Ireland, before the Land Act of 1870, a revolution only could have removed the deep-rooted ills in all that related to the land; a revolution alone could remove them now. But in the one instance, as in the other, the evil caused by a revolution would be infinitely greater than the good; a new agrarian revolution in Ireland would be a curse to her; it is better, as Burke has remarked, to try to repair even ruins than to blot out every trace of the edifice. Still, taking it as we find it, can nothing be done to amend, in some measure, at least, the existing land system? Much of it, I admit, must be left untouched; the principle of settling rent, through the agency of the State, false as it is, must continue to work; the principle of so-called 'land purchase' must, within reasonable limits, be still given free scope. But something in the nature of reform is, I think, possible; the discussion of the subject may be of use; I contribute my mite to it, if with unfeigned diffidence.

In order to find out the truth, and thoroughly to clear the ground, a Commission, I suggest, ought to be appointed, as important as the Devon Commission of nearly sixty years ago; it should investigate the Irish Land Question in all its branches. Its President should be a great English n.o.bleman--the nation would have confidence in the Duke of Bedford, a princely and most liberal English landlord; but the judicial element should be strong in it; English and Irish judges should be among its members; it should include trained agricultural experts: it should have representatives of Irish landlords and tenants. It should examine the Irish land system as this existed before 1870; should review the whole series of Irish Land Acts, from 1870 to the present time, and inquire into their results and tendencies; should carefully consider the operation of the tribunals selected to carry out the new Irish land code, especially as regards the fixing of 'fair rents,' and that not with respect to their procedure only, an unjust limit imposed on the Fry Commission, but with respect to the principles that have been adopted and the methods pursued; it should deal exhaustively with the subject of so-called 'land purchase,'

and see whether it has not directly led to the demand for compulsory purchase; it should take evidence as to 'peasant proprietary' and its creation; and it should make a complete and searching report, with a view to the legislation it might recommend. And if I am not altogether mistaken, such a Commission would state, in emphatic language, that the present Irish land code was ill designed, even if it cannot be now much changed; that its administration has been attended with grave errors; that cruel wrong has been done to Irish landlords, while Irish tenants have not obtained what was hoped for; that the economic and social results have been deplorable; that if 'land purchase' cannot be stopped, it is a bad expedient on its present lines, and that the cry for compulsory purchase has been its evident effect; and that extensive, still more universal peasant ownership, is an impossible and would be a pernicious policy.

Finally, if I am not much mistaken again, such a Commission would report that a reform of the Irish land system, if very difficult, should be attempted; and that, in its main scope and operation at least, it should be carried out on the side of land tenure, that is, in the relations of landlord and tenant, as has been the opinion of every thinker from Burke onwards, who has not been swayed by the exigencies of agitation, or of party politics.

I proceed briefly to put my scheme forward, a.s.suming that I have made a reasonably correct forecast. I may say it has been a subject of reflection during many years, indeed, since the legislation of 1881; Mr. Gladstone, in his place in the House of Commons, pointedly approved of a tract in which I set forth my views; and so, curiously enough, did Parnell. It is impossible, I have said, to transform the existing system of Irish land tenure; a wide departure from it cannot be made; but improvement is really feasible within certain limits. My object would be to get rid of palpable evils, inseparable from the present state of things; to make the positions of both Irish landlords and tenants in some degree better than they now are; to place the Irish land system on a somewhat less precarious basis.

In the first place, the law as to the exemption of tenants' improvements from rent, an excrescence on the Land Act of 1881, and made extravagant by the Land Act of 1896, should be restricted in its application to some extent; as it stands, it is a fruitful cause of injustice, of demoralisation, and of hard swearing, producing endless litigation to very little purpose; claims in respect of improvements ought to be more limited, in point of time, than they are; a check should be placed on obsolete and illusory claims; this would be advantageous, I think, to all interests involved. Again, it would be impracticable to exclude from the operation of the present land code lands that have been already brought within its scope; but a more precise definition should be made of the lands that are intended to be now excluded--demesnes, town parks, residential holdings, and large pastoral farms; the decisions of the Courts, in this province, are very perplexing; a good definition would make litigation very considerably less. These changes, I am convinced, would do much appreciable good; but I would go a long way farther in attempting to make the status of both landlord and tenant in Ireland less insecure and vexatious than it now is. In the first place, leaving lands now excluded out, I would make all agricultural and pastoral Irish tenants ent.i.tled to the tenure of the 'Three F's,' removing the prohibition as to 'future tenants,' a distinction that never ought to have been made, and, as far as possible, securing this mode of tenure to the poorest tenants, by means to which I shall advert afterwards. In the next place, I would make an earnest effort to lessen the ruinous litigation and the instability caused by the statutory leases renewable at short intervals of time. The tenant should have 'fixity of tenure' in a real sense; the estate created in his favour against the landlord ought not to be one of fifteen years only, however indefinitely it may be extended; I would prefer to see it an estate for ever; but, as in the present state of agriculture, there would be objections to this, on account of the uncertainty of the rate of rent, it might be an estate for a limited term.

But the term ought not to be less than thirty years at least, renewable, of course, like the shorter term of fifteen; this would quiet possession and get rid of lawsuits for the period of a generation of men. The tenant should retain his right of 'free sale;' but I would make the conditions less stringent than they are under the existing law.

The position of the Irish tenant would thus be greatly improved; the sphere of the 'Three F's' would be largely extended; he would have 'fixity of tenure,' for a long time, at least, without the hazard and loss of litigation every fifteen years; his right of 'free sale' would be less restricted; and he would have distinct advantages, as respects 'fair rent,' under the part of my plan I am about to explain. I turn to the position of the Irish 'landlord'--I still use this expression and that of 'tenant,' though both words are hardly applicable to existing facts; this, too, in my judgment, would be made much better. The estate that is now created against him would still be preserved; I wish it were a perpetual estate, but it would be one for thirty years at least; he would, therefore, remain a.s.similated to a rent-charger, as he is at present. But like his tenant he would be comparatively free from lawsuits; he would be less hara.s.sed by claims in respect of improvements; he would have, in many particulars, a more stable tenure. He should, of course, retain the 'royalties' still reserved to him--mines, minerals, timber, and such things; and he should have the t.i.tle to the statutory conditions he now has; but as his reversionary rights would be somewhat lessened, he should be compensated for these by a small money payment. With one great exception he should have the legal remedies to enforce the rights he now possesses; and that exception would be of great importance. I have always thought the law of ejectment for non-payment of rent harsh; it is an innovation on the ancient Common Law; it sometimes causes forfeitures far from just; it is not properly applicable to tenancies of long duration. I would certainly abolish this mode of procedure; I would instead of it give the landlord a power to sell the tenant's lands, by a procedure a.n.a.logous to that of bankruptcy, should default be made in the payment of the rent, or rather the rent-charge that might be due. The advantage to both landlord and tenant would be great: the first would have a remedy more expeditious and just than he has; the second, should the land be sold and lost to him, would, as a rule, have a surplus over and above his debts; unlike what is sometimes the case in evictions, he would realise for himself his whole legitimate interest in the land. This single reform would do much to make 'fair rent' a less onerous charge than it now is.

By these means the status of the Irish landlord would be made by many degrees more secure; the Irish tenant would acquire an interest in the land much more durable and stable than he has now, in fact, nearly equivalent to full ownership, subject to a rent-charge; and if his interest were made a perpetuity, as I hope would be the case at last, he would be a.s.similated to an owner subject to a perpetual rent, or to an English copyholder subject to a similar render. This is the position Burke proposed he should have, considerably more than a century ago;[149] it is that which has been advocated by John Stuart Mill, and, I am happy to add, by Mr. John Morley; it is the only position, compatible with common sense and justice, which the new Irish land code has left possible, for I put the quackery of compulsory purchase out of sight, and voluntary purchase is a bad half-measure. The great subject of fixing rent by the State would remain; for, unjustifiable as this expedient is, it is impossible, after what has happened, to dispense with it. Without imputing personal motives or moral blame to any one, the Land Commission and its Sub-Commissions ought, I am convinced, to cease to be the agency to fix 'fair rents;'

however unconsciously, in my judgment, they have often proceeded on false principles, and have done immense, if not wilful wrong; they are decried by landlords and tenants alike in Ireland. Besides, there is a const.i.tutional objection to their adjusting rent; the Land Commission is entrusted with the task of carrying out 'land purchase;' it has a direct inducement to whittle rents away, in order to facilitate the sale of land; its interest and its duty are thus placed in conflict. Be this as it may, my plan for fixing 'fair rents' in Ireland by the State would be altogether different. In the first place, a definition of 'fair rent'

should be made by statute, and should dominate, so to speak, the subject; the omission of this criterion has caused grave injustice. This having been made, I would adjust Irish rents by a method much better, I believe, than that now in existence. A body of competent and well-paid valuers of land should be formed--there would be no difficulty about this in Ireland; these men should visit, when required, estates; and having heard what landlords and tenants had to say on the spot, should declare what they consider the 'fair rents' of farms, making a deduction for improvements as arranged by a reformed law, and taking waste and deterioration into account. The reports made by the valuers should be complete and explicit; they would probably satisfy landlords and tenants in most instances; but dissatisfied persons should have a right to an appeal, which should be a full rehearing of all the facts in issue; but the appeal should be at the peril of costs against unsuccessful suitors.

The tribunals to decide the appeals should, I suggest, be composed of two eminent judges, for each of the four provinces, a.s.sisted by trained agricultural experts; but the authority of the judges should prevail on all questions. From these Courts a further appeal should run to the Court of Appeal in Ireland, on all matters of law and fact, and ultimately should run to the House of Lords; the present restricted appeal to the Land Commission has been little better than a sorry mockery of right.

The scheme I propose has obvious defects; it sanctions the vicious principle of State-settled rents, a thing unknown in lands outside of Ireland, a defiance of the simplest axioms of economic science. But it endeavours at least to improve a bad system of tenure dealing with accomplished facts now beyond recall; I certainly think it would make the relations of Irish landlords and tenants better than they are, and would tend to place both cla.s.ses in the positions which, as affairs now stand, they will probably, in the long run, occupy. As regards 'alternative policies,' as they have been called, I have set forth the reasons that the compulsory purchase of the Irish land would be, I believe, impossible, and, were it possible, would be a confiscation of the foullest kind, ruinous to Great Britain and Ireland alike. I have also shown how the present system of so-styled 'voluntary purchase' is, in my judgment, essentially immoral, and pregnant with dangers; and I have indicated the results being already produced. That system, however, must go on; for the present it cannot be arrested; a Conservative Government still pins its faith on it, as a Whig Government, half a century ago, pinned its faith on the Enc.u.mbered Estates Act; but a 'peasant proprietary' rooted in corruption will hardly succeed, and 'voluntary purchase' draws the worst kind of distinctions in Irish land tenure. The acceleration, indeed, of this 'remedy' has been deemed advisable; and as long as the sum voted by Parliament is not expended, the system evidently must continue in force.

Some of its evils, however, would be lessened were the State to reserve to itself the woodland, which tenant 'purchasers,' as a rule, cut down and sell; and if tenants proved to be solvent were compelled to advance part of the money required to transfer their lands to themselves. It is revolting to my mind to see a wealthy Irish farmer bribed into the ownership of his farm by an Act of the State, without having paid a shilling of the price. I commend this spectacle to the hard-pressed general taxpayer.

I need hardly say that, under the scheme I propose, existing interests of tenants should remain intact, and statutory leases should be allowed to come to an end, before a change should be made by law in the position they hold. The question of compensating the Irish landlords would remain; a very few words on this will suffice. I must remind the reader, as I have already shown, that the Land Act of 1881 was pa.s.sed on the condition that, should experience prove that real injury had been done to this order of men, their right to indemnity would be plain; Mr. Gladstone's language was unequivocal; the House of Commons approved. Nor can any reasonable doubt exist that the course of legislation from 1881 to 1896 has confiscated the property of the cla.s.s to an immense extent; the simple fact that the value in Ireland of the fee simple in land has been reduced by a third at least, and that the value of the tenant right has been increased in about the same proportion, points to a conclusion evident to impartial minds. I am satisfied as to what would be the report on this subject of the Commission I should wish to see appointed; it could not avoid drawing an inference that cannot be resisted. The question, therefore, will have to be faced; the good faith of Parliament is virtually at stake; and if a pledge made in the name of the State is not to be broken, the right of the Irish landlords to compensation is complete. Independently, too, of considerations of this kind, it is a recognised principle that should a policy have caused loss to a cla.s.s, the State is morally bound to make the loss up; a violation of this principle is unjust and dangerous alike. I quote from John Stuart Mill on this very question: 'The principle of property gives the landowners no right to the land, but only a right to compensation for whatever portion of their interest in the land it may be the policy of the State to deprive them of. To that their claim is indefeasible. It is due to landowners and to owners of any property whatever, recognised as such by the State, that they should not be dispossessed of it without receiving its pecuniary value, or an annual income equal to what they have derived from it. If the land was bought with the produce of the labour of themselves or their ancestors, compensation is due to them on that ground; even if otherwise, it is still due on the ground of prescription. Nor can it ever be necessary for accomplishing an object by which the community altogether will gain, that a particular portion of the community should be immolated. When the property is of a kind to which peculiar affections attach themselves, the compensation ought to exceed a bare pecuniary equivalent.... The legislature, which, if it pleased, might convert the whole body of landlords into fundholders or pensioners, might, _a fortiori_, commute the average receipts of Irish landowners into a fixed rent-charge, and raise the tenants into proprietors; supposing always that the full market value of the land was tendered to the landlords, in case they preferred that to accepting the conditions proposed.'[150]

a.s.suming, then, the case for compensating the Irish landlords to have been made out, compensation can be afforded without the loss of a shilling to the State. The _bona fide_ enc.u.mbrances on their estates, that is, those which represent advances in cash, are now at an interest of from 4 to 5 per cent.; the State could pay off those which were perfectly secure at an interest of 2-1/4 per cent., and could make the landlords chargeable with interest at 3 per cent., in order to provide against possible loss. As for enc.u.mbrances that were not perfectly secure, the State should only pay off what was well charged; but it should do this on the same conditions; and it should declare hopeless enc.u.mbrances extinct. This would be a considerable and just boon to the Irish landlords; the securities taken by the State should be in the form of debentures, which would pa.s.s from hand to hand in the market; and many owners of enc.u.mbrances would no doubt accept sums less than their full demands, for these, they well know, are at present in danger. I would go, however, farther in relieving the Irish landlords; their estates are subject to a ma.s.s of family charges created under a different order of things; if the State has arbitrarily cut down the fund set apart for these, by a wholesale reduction of rents, I cannot understand how it is not the simplest justice to cut the charges down in some fair proportion. At all events, I make these suggestions for what they may be worth; if right is to be done to the Irish landed gentry, and a gross breach of public faith is not to be made, some relief of this kind should be extended to them. Very possibly this will not be afforded; but I venture to remind politicians that even an unpopular cla.s.s cannot be cruelly wronged and sacrificed, without doing injury to all cla.s.ses, and shaking to their foundations the clear rights of property. And I openly avow that, in my judgment, it would be in the highest degree against the national interest to annihilate this body of men, as must probably happen, should things in Ireland be left as they are. What if they are the heirs of conquest and confiscation in the past? Is that a reason for destroying them after the lapse of centuries, and when England planted them in the land to be her mainstay? What if, in instances, comparatively few in the extreme, they have abused the social trust imposed on them? Was not this because the opportunity was given by law, and was not the law the work of successive Parliaments? Is it not a fact that British ministers, so to speak, of yesterday, declared that they were secure in their proprietary rights; and that Mr. Gladstone solemnly acquitted them of what had been laid to their charge? On the other hand, have they not been for ages the staunchest friends of England in Irish affairs, especially in troubled and perilous times? Is it for nothing that they have been called the British garrison by her foes, the strongest obstacle to rebellion and treason? And is a cla.s.s, which has, on the whole, been a civilising influence, for many years, in Ireland, and which has given the State far more than a due proportion of worthies--warriors, orators, statesmen, thinkers, men of eminence in all the arts of life--to be sacrificed at the bidding of a conspiracy bent on subverting British rule in Ireland, or in deference to false and perilous theories?

CHAPTER VII

THE QUESTION OF THE FINANCIAL RELATIONS BETWEEN GREAT BRITAIN AND IRELAND

The subject briefly considered--Financial position of Ireland before 1782, and under Grattan's Parliament--Her taxation and debt small before 1798--Ireland financially a distinct country--At the Union, Pitt wished to 'a.s.similate her in finance' with Great Britain, but this impossible, and why--Ireland's contribution after the Union--This was unjust, but it left her financially a distinct country--Ireland made nearly bankrupt--The compromise of 1816--The Irish Exchequer closed, and the Irish and British debts consolidated--The object of the compromise was rather to relieve Ireland from her burdens than to a.s.similate her in finance with Great Britain--She still remained for many years financially distinct from Great Britain, and is so still to some extent--The conduct of Peel a striking proof of this--Mr.

Gladstone imposes the income tax on Ireland, and her spirit duties are largely raised--Injustice of this policy--The Committee of 1863-64--Ireland does not obtain financial justice--The Report of the Childers Commission made upon a reference by Mr. Gladstone following Mr. Goschen--The Commission declares that Ireland has been greatly overtaxed for many years--Evidence on which it has founded this conclusion--Examination of arguments to the contrary--Another Commission promised, but the promise not fulfilled--Importance of settling this question.

The financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland have been a subject, at intervals of time, no doubt, of strong controversy during a whole century. I shall not harp on the saying of Johnson to an Irish friend, 'Avoid a Union with England, she will only rob you;' but, in the opinion of well-informed Irishmen, the fiscal treatment of Ireland, since 1800-01, strikingly ill.u.s.trates the significant remark of Burke, 'When any community is subordinately connected with another, the great danger of the connection is, the extreme pride and self-complacency of the superior, which, in all matters of controversy, will probably decide in its own favour.' There is no reason to impeach the good faith of Pitt and Castlereagh; but the financial arrangements they made for Ireland, when the Union became law, were denounced by the most distinguished Irishmen of the day; these imposed on Ireland an overwhelming burden, and, in fact, reduced her to the very edge of bankruptcy. A compromise was effected in 1816-17; this has been described as a generous boon to Ireland; but it was at best a slight relief from injustice; and it weakened securities she had against fiscal exaction, while it involved her in liabilities which, if remote, were not the less possible. It is a most significant fact that Peel, who, as Chief Secretary from 1812 to 1818, was familiar with the economic state of Ireland, refused, though under the strongest inducements, to apply to Ireland the fiscal charges extended to her by one of his brilliant successors; the most sagacious financier of the nineteenth century played, in this matter, a very different part from the most impulsive and not the least unscrupulous. In 1853, and from thence in other years, Mr. Gladstone, in order to carry out a policy distinctly opposed to many Irish interests, subjected Ireland to a sudden and heavy load of taxation, exactly at the time when, for the plainest reasons, she ought to have been exempted from it; from that day to this, Irishmen, who understand the question, are agreed that this was gross, nay, cruel, injustice. The whole subject of British and Irish financial relations was sent by Mr. Gladstone to a Commission in 1893, here following the example of Mr. Goschen; a careful inquiry was held during many months; the Report of the Commission was startling and important in the extreme. This tribunal, mainly composed of eminent English experts, announced, and that almost with one voice, that Ireland was being enormously overtaxed, and had been for upwards of forty years; and it plainly intimated that a remedy for this wrong should be found. No real answer has been made to this remarkable judgment; the attempts at answers that have been made are nearly all mere trifling; Lord Salisbury's Government evidently believes that an answer is not possible; it promised to appoint another Commission to investigate certain parts of the subject; years have pa.s.sed, and it has not performed its promise. Meanwhile, even amidst the hurly-burly of Irish politics, Irishmen of all parties have united in a demand for redress; and if the demand is not pressed with extreme vehemence, it is sustained by all that is best in Irish opinion. It is obviously unwise, and it may become dangerous, to continue to ignore such a claim; in any event the financial relations of the Three Kingdoms are not the least important of 'Present Irish Questions;' I shall briefly examine it in this chapter.

It is unnecessary to dwell on the financial relations of Great Britain and Ireland before 1782 and the Union. England held the position of an absolutely dominant State before 1782, Ireland that of a conquered and despised colony; Ireland was under the control of the British Parliament, and was governed by English officials supreme at the Castle. Ireland was excluded from the foreign and colonial trade of Great Britain; her agriculture and manufactures were half destroyed by the selfish jealousy and greed of her imperious neighbour. She contributed, on the other hand, nothing to the treasury of the ruling power; she had little or no part in British wars, or in building up the edifice of the Empire, except through her soldiers in the British army; she was free from British debt and from British taxation. In these circ.u.mstances, grievous as was the incubus of Protestant ascendency upon the land, it is remarkable what material progress she made; her Parliament, though little more than a local vestry, unquestionably promoted her material welfare; she was very lightly taxed, and was free from debt for many years. She was still so completely distinct from Great Britain, that it was not until 1769 that her Parliament agreed that 15,000 men, of whom 12,000 were to remain in Ireland, should be enrolled for the defence of the State; before that time, she was only obliged to maintain a small British force within her borders. After a partial relaxation of the restraints on her commerce caused by the stress of the American War, and by the famous volunteer movement, Ireland obtained legislative independence in 1782; she ceased to be subject to the British Parliament, and to fill the position of a degraded colony; she became, in theory at least, an independent State in many respects. Her Parliament was all but sovereign in name; Ireland was now united to Great Britain only by the link of the Crown; by an executive always despatched from Downing Street; and, it must be added, by the corruption of her Houses of Lords and Commons. She was thus more than ever a distinct country; in fact, most British statesmen had soon perceived that the celebrated settlement of 1782 greatly weakened her old connection with England. She advanced, however, markedly in prosperity for many years, until the French Revolution arrested this; her debt was little more than 2,000,000 for a long time, her taxation only about 1,000,000. But by the close of the eighteenth century these figures had been disastrously changed; her debt had risen to upwards of 28,000,000, her taxation to about 2,500,000. This great increase had been partly caused by the costly expenditure of her transformed Parliament, which had spent considerable sums on public works, and on economic experiments of different kinds; but five-sixths of it was probably caused by the enormous charge incurred by the Rebellion of 1798--one of the most woeful tragedies of Irish history--and by the suppression of that ill-starred movement.[151]

The Rebellion led at once to the Union; it precipitated what had perhaps become a necessity of State. The great measure of Pitt was badly designed, and was, moreover, tainted by a grave breach of faith; it was only what was called a 'Protestant Union,' that is, it rested upon false and narrow foundations; it deceived Catholic Ireland, and did her gross wrong; above all, it did not effect its main object, and incorporate the lesser with the more powerful country. It left Ireland, hitherto completely distinct, still, to a very considerable extent, a distinct State; she retained a separate Government and Administration, separate Courts of Justice, a separate Exchequer for many years; this shadow of separation, as Foster, one of her ablest worthies, foretold, would give a demand for separation substance.[152] The financial arrangements between Great Britain and Ireland were practically altogether the work of Pitt. A disciple of Adam Smith, the minister's wish was to 'a.s.similate the two countries in finance;' to place both under the same fiscal system, to make taxation in both uniform. But in 1800, the National Debt of Great Britain was more than 446,000,000, and her taxation was about 3 a head; the National Debt of Ireland, we have seen, was some 28,000,000, and her taxation by the head not more than 10_s._; this immense inequality made 'a.s.similation in finance' impossible. Besides, Pitt, as a matter of course, knew that Great Britain was a very rich country, and Ireland perhaps the poorest in Europe; he was too great a financier to accept the false and shallow theory that, as between two communities wholly unequal in wealth, equal taxes were really equal burdens, and could be just; he had emphatically remarked in 1785, when his celebrated 'Commercial Propositions' were opposed by the selfish monopolies of British commerce, 'If one country exceeded another in wealth, population, and established commerce in a proportion of two to one, he was nearly convinced that that country would be able to bear near ten times the burden that the other would be equal to.'[153] It had become necessary, therefore, at the time of the Union, to place the financial relations between Great Britain and Ireland on a basis that had nothing in common with uniformity of taxation, and a common fiscal system; 'a.s.similation in finance' was for the present to be indefinitely postponed.

The financial settlement made at the Union distinctly embodied these principles, and was carried by Castlereagh through the Irish Parliament, by what methods history records with shame. Like Pitt, the Chief Secretary looked forward to a time when Great Britain and Ireland might be under the same fiscal system; but at this juncture, this consummation was, he acknowledged, hopeless. Ireland was, financially, to remain a separate country; she was to have a separate exchequer and separate taxes; her National Debt was to be kept distinct from that of Great Britain. She was to furnish only a contribution to the State; and Castlereagh declared, over and over again, that this contribution was to be only in proportion to her means, and that in no event was she to be unduly taxed. 'The great point to be ascertained is the best criterion that can be found of the relative means of the two countries, in order to fix the relative proportions of their contributions.... As to the future, it is expected that the two countries will move forward together, and unite with regard to their expenses in the measure of their relative abilities.' By a comparison made between British and Irish imports and exports, and between the values of certain commodities, Castlereagh came to the conclusion that the contributions which Great Britain and Ireland ought to be expected to make for the general support and administration of the State, should be, respectively, fifteen- and two-seventeenths, that is, Great Britain was to pay about 88 per cent., and Ireland about 12 per cent. of the sum total.

This proportion was to be made liable to revision at the end of twenty years; for this provision, Castlereagh remarked, gave 'Ireland the utmost possible security that she cannot be taxed beyond the measure of her comparative ability, and that the ratio of her contributions must ever correspond with her relative wealth and prosperity;' and then followed arrangements which undoubtedly had the 'a.s.similation of Great Britain and Ireland in finance' remotely in view; but subject to limitations that would preserve for Ireland her fiscal rights, and would secure her from taxation beyond her means, and unjust. It was proposed that if, at some future time, the debts of both countries should be discharged, or if their debts and their contributions were in the same proportion, Great Britain and Ireland might be 'a.s.similated in finance,' and placed under the same fiscal system; but this was to be on two express conditions, that the circ.u.mstances of the two countries should admit of this change, and that, in any case, should the change be made, Ireland--as was the case of Scotland when her Union took place-should have the benefit of such 'exemptions and abatements' of taxation as might be deemed proper, and the circ.u.mstances of the situation might allow. The meaning of the technical words, 'exemptions and abatements,' interpreted of late years in a pettifogging sense, was fully recognised at the time, and for a long subsequent period, indeed, has been recognised to this day by most of our leading statesmen, namely, that Ireland was not to be taxed unfairly or beyond her resources, as Castlereagh had repeatedly promised.[154]

The Opposition in the Irish Parliament had many able lawyers--the names of Saurin, of Plunket, of Bushe are still known to fame; it is to be regretted, perhaps, that these powerful minds did not examine with more jealousy the conditions under which Great Britain and Ireland might be 'a.s.similated in finance,' distant as the contingency appeared to be; did not criticise more sharply words that might be wrested from their accepted sense; and trusted too much to Castlereagh's phrases. But the attention of the Opposition was rather directed to the Union in its political than in its financial aspect; it rather denounced the attempt to destroy the settlement of 1782 than scrutinised the terms of the fiscal system to be imposed on Ireland, at least, as these were concerned with the future. The arrangements, nevertheless, by which Ireland was to make the contribution of the two-seventeenths were fiercely a.s.sailed in both the Houses in College Green; Foster described the calculations of Pitt and Castlereagh as utterly false, and declared that the charge to be borne by Ireland was much too large; Grattan echoed this opinion in characteristic language: 'Though I do not think the means of this country are unequal to any necessary expense, yet I do think they are inadequate to that contributory expense which the Union stipulates.... The attempt will exhaust the country, at the same time that it enslaves her. Colour it as you please, Ireland will pay more than she is able. Considering these the terms of the Union so far as they relate to revenue, they amount to a continuation of the double establishment, an increase of the separate establishment, and a military government, with a prospect of soon succeeding to the full taxes of England.'[155] The Opposition, too, in the Irish House of Commons loudly protested: 'Your Majesty's faithful Commons are satisfied that this calculation is extremely erroneous; and that on a just and fair inquiry into the comparative means of each country, the Kingdom ought not, and is not able to contribute anything like that proportion.'[156] And twenty Irish peers placed this emphatic protest on record; I have s.p.a.ce for a few sentences only: 'Under such circ.u.mstances, it appears to us that if this Kingdom should take upon herself irrevocably the payment of two-seventeenths of these expenses, she will not have means to perform her engagements unless by charging her landed property with 12_s._ or 13_s._ in the pound; it must end in the draining from her her last guinea, in totally annihilating her trade for want of capital, in rendering the taxes unproductive, and consequently in finally putting her in a state of bankruptcy. We think ourselves called upon to protest against a measure so ruinous to our country, and to place the responsibility of its consequences upon such persons as have brought it forward and supported it.'[157]

The Treaty of Union left Ireland, financially, still a separate country, paying a fixed contribution for the uses of the State. The great war with France soon broke out again; England was involved with Napoleon in a life-and-death struggle; her fiscal resources were strained to the utmost; her expenditure became prodigious for a series of years. In these circ.u.mstances, the debt of Ireland rose from 28,000,000 to upwards of 112,000,000; and her taxation from about 2,500,000 to about 4,500,000; while the debt of Great Britain advanced from some 446,000,000 to some 737,000,000, and her taxation from some 24,000,000 to 54,000,000; the taxation of Ireland being by the head about 1 in 1816, that of Great Britain being about 5, the figures sixteen years before being 10_s._ and 3. The immense increase in the debt of Ireland, much greater in proportion than that of Great Britain, was certainly due to a large extent to the fact--and this was frankly admitted by Grattan--that the poorer country could not keep pace with the richer in the gigantic charges of the war; the case, it has justly been remarked, may be compared to a case of this kind: 'If one man, A, who has been living at the rate of 100 per annum, arranges to keep house with another man, B, who has for some time been living at the rate of 700 per annum, and to spend 1 for every 7 which B spends, then so long as B continues to live at the same rate as before, the expenses of A will not be increased. But if B begins to live at the rate of 2100 a year, A will have to spend 300 a year, and if his means are not sufficient for this, he must become bankrupt.'[158]

Allowing, nevertheless, for all this, it is not the less certain that the calculations of Pitt and Castlereagh were utterly falsified by the event, and that the warnings of Foster, Grattan, and other well-informed Irishmen, besides the protests made in the Irish Parliament, were verified to the fullest extent; as has been remarked by a distinguished English expert, 'The calculations of Mr. Pitt and Lord Castlereagh, the ministers who promoted the Union, and who declared that Ireland would be able to pay, and ought to pay, two-seventeenths of the joint expenses of the United Kingdom, turned out to be mistaken, and the opinions of Mr.

Grattan, Mr. Foster, and other Irish members, who denied that she would be able to contribute so large a proportion, are proved by the event to have been well founded.'[159]

This contrast, it is hardly necessary to say, to persons acquainted with Irish history, is only one of the innumerable proofs of the ignorance of Ireland too common to British statesmen, and of their too common disregard of the best Irish opinion. In 1815-16, at the close of the war, Ireland was financially in a bankrupt condition; she could not pay the interest on her debt; she could not bear the weight of further taxation; she was exhausted and sucked dry by fiscal injustice. Her social state, too, had become very alarming; her population had rapidly increased, and, mainly depending on the frail potato, was already becoming an incubus on the land; the collapse of the high war prices had caused a sudden fall in rents and the wages of labour; there was general distress in several counties, and Whiteboy and agrarian disorder widely prevailed. The financial position of Ireland was necessarily taken up by Parliament; a Committee of the House of Commons was selected to report upon it. By this time one of the contingencies had taken place for the possible 'a.s.similation in finance' with Great Britain of the much weaker country; the contribution of Ireland, compared with her debt, was even in less proportion than the contribution of Great Britain to her own; she had been left far behind in the effort to pay her way. In this position of affairs the Committee made its report, after a long and careful examination of the case; the House of Commons pa.s.sed these resolutions in May, 1816: 'That it is the opinion of this Committee that the values of the respective debts of Great Britain and Ireland, estimated according to the provisions of the Acts of Union, have been, at a period subsequent to these Acts, in the same proportion to each other (within one-hundredth part of the said value), with the respective contributions of each country respectively, towards the annual expenditure of the United Kingdom; and that the respective circ.u.mstances of the two countries will henceforth admit of their contributing indiscriminately by equal taxes imposed upon the same articles upon each, to the future expenditure of the United Kingdom; subject only to such particular exemptions and abatements in Ireland and in Scotland as circ.u.mstances may appear from time to time to demand; and that it is no longer necessary to regulate the contribution of the two countries according to any specific proportion, or according to the rules prescribed by the Acts of Union, with respect to such proportions. That it is the opinion of this Committee, that it is expedient that all expenses henceforth to be incurred, together with the interest and charges of all debts. .h.i.therto contracted, shall be so defrayed indiscriminately by equal taxes to be imposed on the same articles in each country; and that from time to time, as circ.u.mstances may require, such taxes should be imposed and applied accordingly, subject only to such exemptions and abatements in Ireland and Scotland as circ.u.mstances may appear to demand. That it is the opinion of this Committee that such legislative measures should be adopted as may be necessary to carry into further effect the purposes of the said Acts of Union, by consolidating the public revenues of Great Britain and Ireland into one fund, and applying the same to the general services of the United Kingdom.'[160]

These resolutions were partly embodied in an Act which received the Royal a.s.sent in June, 1816. By this law the separate exchequer of Ireland was shut up; there was to be but one exchequer for the Three Kingdoms; all the revenues of Great Britain and Ireland were thrown into a general fund to be applied to the requirements of the State; the separate debt of Ireland was fused into that of Great Britain, the two making a common National Debt. By these means Ireland was relieved from an intolerable load of debt; but those who contend that an immense boon was thus conferred on her, only ill.u.s.trate the aphorism of Burke referred to before; the matter was decided by the opinion of the dominant power. Ireland, no doubt, was set free from an overwhelming burden; but the burden was one improperly cast on her by the Union; the relief was only a small redress of injustice.[161] On the other hand, the arrangements of 1816 abolished the contribution of the two-seventeenths, and made Ireland less a separate country, financially, than she had been before; the resolutions of the House of Commons did not all become law, but they at least declared that she might become 'a.s.similated in finance' to Great Britain at a convenient time, and thus diminished her security against undue taxation; and the amalgamation of her debt with that of Great Britain made her subject, at least conceivably, to a gigantic charge, for which she was not in any way liable. The compromise, however, effected at this time, rather contemplated the relief of Ireland from existing debt than her ultimate 'a.s.similation in finance to Great Britain,' and the extension to both countries of the same fiscal system. For many years after 1816 Ireland remained, financially, completely distinct from Great Britain, and under a scheme of taxation altogether different. Nor is the reason difficult to seek; she was declared ent.i.tled, by the resolutions before mentioned, to the 'exemptions and abatements' secured to her by the Treaty of Union; and the Parliament of that day respected the treaty, interpreting these terms in their true sense, that Ireland was not to be taxed beyond her means.

Her fiscal wrongs, besides, from 1800 to 1816, were still fresh in the minds of statesmen; these did not wish to repeat injustice; above all, she had many representatives of real weight at Westminster--Grattan was a tower of strength in himself, and he had very able followers; these men would certainly have fiercely resented attempts to impair the financial rights of their country.

The fiscal systems of Great Britain and Ireland, still altogether distinct, continued nearly on this footing for a series of years. Great Britain was gradually relieved from taxation peculiar to herself, amounting to very considerable sums; Ireland was not relieved in the same proportion; but this was hardly a real grievance; the taxation of Great Britain during the war had been enormously higher than that of Ireland. In 1819-20 the charge on Great Britain, which had been about 5 per head, had been reduced to 3 13_s._; that on Ireland, which had been about 1 a head, had been reduced to 15_s._ 5_d._ There seems to have been little to complain of in these figures. Some steps, however, but tentative only, were made by degrees in 'a.s.similating the two countries in finance,'

according to the resolutions of 1816; the duties on tea were made equal for the Three Kingdoms, and the duties on tobacco, as early as 1819; but it deserves special notice that this policy was angrily opposed by many Irishmen in the House of Commons, the most conspicuous of these being Sir John Newport, a real master of Irish finance, who had been Chancellor of the Irish Exchequer in 1806-07. Still, notwithstanding innovations like these, the fiscal systems of Great Britain and Ireland remained substantially distinct for a long period; this was notably made manifest as late as 1842. At this time the population of England was in an alarming state; the Chartist agitation was in full swing; British commerce was half strangled by heavy duties on foreign imports; the corn laws crippled and burdened industry. Peel was at the head of his great Ministry; he began to carry into effect the policy of free trade, inaugurated by Pitt, but unhappily delayed; in order to accomplish this he had to diminish or get rid of the charges on foreign imports, and generally to subst.i.tute direct for indirect taxation. He was under a strong temptation to 'a.s.similate Great Britain and Ireland in finance;' but he had been a friend and colleague of Castlereagh; he understood the true import of the Treaty of Union; above all, he knew Ireland well for an Englishman; he had practically been her ruler for nearly six years. In these circ.u.mstances he imposed the income tax on Great Britain as an equivalent for many indirect taxes; but he pointedly abstained from extending the tax to Ireland; he felt that this would be an act of financial wrong; and though he increased for a short time the duty on Irish spirits, he took off the increase within a few months. The only 'a.s.similation in finance' he effected was to make the stamp duties in Great Britain and Ireland equal, and this was rather a legal than an economic reform.

The life of the great minister was prematurely cut short; time brought with it its changes on its wings. The statesman who had living traditions of the Union and its finance had pa.s.sed away; O'Connell had disappeared from the scene; the representation of Ireland had fallen into a deplorable state. Meanwhile the free trade policy of Peel had achieved great results in England and Scotland; free trade had given an immense impulse to our manufactures and our foreign commerce; the repeal of the corn laws had wonderfully quickened industry, and had been a magnificent boon to the ma.s.s of the people; the prosperity of Great Britain was advancing by leaps and bounds. The development of free trade was the object of nearly all our statesmen; to accomplish this it was essential still further to lessen or to abolish the duties on foreign imports, and to let in the raw materials of manufactures free; indirect taxation was still further to give place to direct. In 1853, and during part of the subsequent period, our finances were in the hands of a minister whose impulsive nature was upheld by a most imperious will, and who, whatever was his policy, seldom stuck at trifles. Apparently without mature reflection, and, it is to be hoped, with little knowledge of the facts of the case, Mr. Gladstone, setting the example of Peel at nought, suddenly subjected Ireland to the income tax, and began to raise the duties on Irish spirits; by 1860 these duties had been more than trebled; and the taxation of Ireland had been increased by upwards of two millions sterling. And what were the circ.u.mstances, during a large part of this period, of the country on which this enormous burden had been laid?

Ireland, no doubt, had begun to revive from the effects of the catastrophe of 1845-47; but, compared with Great Britain, she was miserably poor; and the Great Famine had shaken her social structure to its base. Two millions of her population had fled from their homes into exile; a large part of the upper and of the middle cla.s.ses had been involved in ruin; whole tracts of her lands were derelict wastes; her local taxation was exceedingly high. The imposition of this load of taxation on a country in such a condition, unjustifiable in the abstract, and from every point of view, was, in the existing position of affairs, an act of cruel wrong; no wonder even one of Mr. Gladstone's colleagues has remarked, measured as is his language, 'We think that if the House of Commons, in the period 1853 to 1860, when the great enhancement of taxation took place, had fully considered the circ.u.mstances of Ireland, they would not have felt themselves justified in increasing the taxation of that country by means of the income tax and the equalisation of the spirit duties.'[162] At this time, in a word, the future Solon of Home Rule proved himself to be the merciless Draco of Irish finance.

This great increase of taxation, to a considerable extent, 'a.s.similated Ireland to Great Britain in finance;' placed the two countries under nearly the same fiscal system; made the taxes of each not far from equal.

This a.s.similation, however, was still by no means complete--indeed, is not complete to the present day; Ireland has still fiscal privileges under the Treaty of Union; and this should be carefully borne in mind. Mr.

Gladstone, moreover, when he made this increase, acknowledged that Ireland remained a distinct country, ent.i.tled to immunities of her own; when he made her liable to the income tax, he cancelled a debt of 4,000,000 which he professed she owed; and if this was an illusory pretence, for her liability for this reason was more than doubtful, and the income tax she has since paid has exceeded 23,000,000, still he distinctly admitted the principle--indeed, it has always been admitted by statesmen worthy of the name. The enormous new burdens imposed on Ireland, from 1853 to 1860, provoked widespread and profound discontent; a Parliamentary inquiry was conceded; a Committee of the House of Commons went into the subject in 1863-64. But the representation of Ireland, I have said, was feeble; her complaints were stifled by the arts of the treasury; the arguments of her members were overborne by specious but utterly false sophistry; the inquiry came to nothing as regards her interests. The question remained in abeyance for years; the Irish reforms of Mr. Gladstone, from 1869 to 1873, the troubles caused by the Land and the National Leagues, and the Home Rule agitation that followed, turned public attention away f