In the following pa.s.sage, _Harpers Weekly_, for March 5, 1894, points out the error in the reasoning made by several college presidents who, after compiling statistics, stated that a college education increased a man's chance of success from one in ten thousand to one in forty:--

Not many persons doubt any longer that an American college education is an advantage to most youths who can get it, but in these attempts to estimate statistically what college education does for men there is a good deal of confusing of _post hoc_ and _propter hoc_.

Define success as you will, a much larger proportion of American college men win it than of men who don't go to college, but how much college training does for those successful men is still debatable.

Remember that they are a picked lot, the likeliest children of parents whose ability or desire to send their children to college is evidence of better fortune, or at least of higher aspirations than the average.

And because their parents are, as a rule, more or less prosperous and well educated, they get and would get, whether they went to college or not, a better than average start in life....

If one boy out of a family of four goes to college, it is the clever one. The boys who might go to college and don't are commonly the lazy ones who won't study. The colleges get nowadays a large proportion of the best boys of the strongest families. The best boys of the strongest families would win far more than their proportionate share of success even if there were no colleges.

An exposure of similarly fallacious reasoning is made by Edward M.

Shepard in _The Atlantic Monthly_ for October, 1904.

The Republican argument is that the whole edifice of our prosperity depends upon high protective or prohibitive duties, and that to them is due our industrial progress. Is it not, indeed, a disparagement of the self-depending faculties of the American people thus to affirm that, in spite of their marvelous advantages, they would have failed in industrial life unless by force of law they could have prevented the compet.i.tion with them of other peoples? It is only by the sophistry to which I have referred that this disparagement is justified. It is that old argument of veritable folly that, because event Z follows event W, as it follows events A and B and many besides A, therefore W is the sole cause of Z. Theory or no theory, the Republican says that we have in fact grown rich by protection, because in our country prosperity and protective duties have existed together.

They ignore every inconvenient fact. They would have us forget that each of the industrial depressions of 1873-78 and 1893-96 followed long operation of a high protective tariff. They ignore the contribution of soil and climate to our prosperity, the vast increase which modern inventions and improved carrying facilities have, the world over, brought to the productivity of labor, and here in the United States have brought more than anywhere else. They ignore the superior skill and alertness of the American workman and the wonderful extent to which he has been stimulated by the conditions and ideals of our democracy. They ignore the freedom of trade, which, since 1789, the Federal Const.i.tution has made operative over our entire country,-- by far the most important area of free trade ever known,--and which everyone to-day knows to be a prime condition of the prosperity of our forty-five commonwealths.

From what has been said it is obvious that it is never safe to account for an occurrence or a condition by merely referring to something that accompanies it or precedes it. There must be a connection between the alleged cause and the effect, and this connection must be causal; otherwise, both may be the result of the same cause. The cause must also be adequate; and it must, moreover, be evident that the result has not been produced, wholly or partially, by some other cause or causes.

IV. COMPOSITION AND DIVISION.

COMPOSITION. The fallacy of composition consists of attributing to a whole that which has been proved only of a part. To condemn or to approve of a fraternity because of the conduct of only a few of its members, to say that what is advantageous for certain states in the Union would therefore be beneficial for the United States as a whole, to reason from the existence of a few millionaires that the English nation is wealthy, would be to fall into this fallacy. Furthermore, it is fallacious to think that because something is true of each member of a cla.s.s taken _distributively_, the same thing holds true of the cla.s.s taken _collectively_. It is not logical to argue that because each member of a jury is very likely to judge erroneously, the jury as a whole is also very likely to judge erroneously. Because each witness to an event is liable to give false or incorrect evidence, it is unreasonable to think that no confidence can be placed in the concurrent testimony of a number of witnesses.

DIVISION. The fallacy of division is the converse of the fallacy of composition. It consists of attributing to a part that which has been proved of the whole. For instance, Lancaster county is the most fertile county in Pennsylvania, but that fact by itself does not warrant the statement that any one particular farm is exceptionally fertile. Because the people of a country are suffering from famine, it does not follow that one particular person is thus afflicted. Again, it would be fallacious to say: It is admitted that the judges of the court of appeal cannot misinterpret the law; Richard Rowe is a judge of the court of appeal; therefore he cannot misinterpret the law.

V. IGNORING THE QUESTION. (IGNORATIO ELENCHI.)

An arguer is said to ignore the question, or to argue beside the point, whenever he attempts to prove or disprove anything except the proposition under discussion. This fallacy may arise through carelessness or trickery. An unskilled debater will often unconsciously wander away from his subject; and an unscrupulous debater, when unable to defend his position, will sometimes cunningly shift his ground and argue upon a totally new proposition, which is, however, so similar to the original one that in the heat of controversy the change is hardly noticeable. A discussion on the subject, "The boycott is a legitimate means of securing concessions from employers," which attempted to show the effectiveness of the boycott, would ignore the question. Likewise, in a discussion on the proposition, "The average college student could do in three years the work now done in four," any proof showing the desirability of such a crowding together of college work would be _beside the point_.

In the following pa.s.sage Macaulay holds up to scorn certain arguments which contain this fallacy:--

The advocates of Charles, like the advocates of other malefactors against whom overwhelming evidence is produced, generally decline all controversy about facts, and content themselves with calling testimony to character.

We charge him with having broken his coronation oath; and we are told that he kept his marriage vow! We accuse him of having given up his people to the merciless inflictions of the most hot-headed and hard- hearted of prelates; and the defence is, that he took his little son on his knees and kissed him! We censure him for having violated the articles of the Pet.i.tion of Rights, after having, for good and valuable consideration, promised to obey them; and we are informed that he was accustomed to hear prayers at six o'clock in the morning!

Whenever an arguer avoids the question at issue and makes an attack upon the character, principles, or former beliefs or personal peculiarities of his opponent, he commits the special form of this fallacy known as _argumentum ad hominem_. It is obviously fallacious to reason that a principle is unsound because it is upheld by an untrustworthy advocate, or because it is inconsistent with the advocate's former beliefs and practices. Honesty is a worthy principle, even though advocated by a thief. The duty of industry is no less binding because it is advocated by an idler. Lawyers often commit this error by seeking to discredit the opposing attorney.

Campaign speakers frequently attempt to overthrow the opposing party's platform by showing that it is inconsistent with the party's previous measures and declarations. To bring in such irrelevant matter is to ignore the question.

Closely allied to _argumentum ad hominem_ is another phase of ignoring the question called _argumentum ad populum_. This fallacy consists of using before a certain audience statements which will strongly appeal to their prejudices and partisan views, but which are not generally accepted facts and which would undoubtedly meet with strong opposition elsewhere. A speaker who brings in this kind of argument makes use neither of reasoning nor of legitimate persuasion.

He neglects his proposition and attempts to excite the feelings of his audience to such an extent as to render them incapable of forming a dispa.s.sionate judgment upon the matter in hand.

In general, it is necessary only to point out a fallacy to weaken an argument. Sometimes, however, the error is so involved and so hidden that, though it is apparent to one who is arguing, yet it is not easily made apparent to the audience. In overcoming this difficulty, arguers often resort to certain peculiar devices of arranging and presenting the material for refutation. Long experience has shown that the two methods given here are of inestimable value.

VI. REDUCTIO AD ABSURDUM. (REDUCING TO AN ABSURDITY.)

The method of refuting an argument by _reductio ad absurdum_ consists of showing that the argument to be refuted, if true, proves not only the conclusion given, but also other conclusions which are manifestly absurd. For example, a debater once contended that colleges should not seek to root out professionalism in athletic sports, because, by coming in contact with college life, professional players receive considerable benefit. His opponent answered him by showing that the same argument carried out to its logical conclusion would prove that a college should encourage the attendance of criminals and degenerates on the ground that they will be benefited thereby. Thus he reduced the argument to a manifest absurdity.

At one time the officers of a national bank permitted their inst.i.tution to be wrecked by certifying, and thereby practically guaranteeing, the checks of a firm of stock-holders when the brokers did not have the money represented by the checks deposited in the bank. This was distinctly a criminal offense. The brokers failed, and, the bank having closed its doors in consequence, the president of the bank was brought to trial. _The Atlantic Monthly_ reduces to an absurdity the chief argument used for the defense.

A jury having been empaneled to try him, he pleaded guilty, his counsel urging, as a reason for clemency, that the violation of this statute was a habit of the New York banks in the Wall Street district, and that if the wrecked bank had not followed this law-breaking custom of its compet.i.tors the stock brokers would have withdrawn their account. The plea was successful, and the officer escaped with a small fine. Imagine a burglar or a pickpocket urging a plea for clemency based on the general business habits and customs of his criminal confreres! [Footnote: The Atlantic Monthly, Vol. 94, p. 173.]

Mr. E. A. Freeman, the historian, once made the statement that English literature cannot be taught. His course of reasoning was to the effect that it is impossible to teach a subject in which one cannot be examined; and he maintained that it is impossible to hold satisfactory examinations in English literature, since this is a subject which is studied for the purpose of cultivating the taste, educating the sympathies, and enlarging the mind. If this reasoning proves anything, it has been pointed out, it proves too much. What Mr. Freeman says of English literature may equally well be said of Latin, Greek, and every other kind of literature. But as Latin and Greek literature have been successfully taught for hundreds of years, Mr. Freeman's argument is absurd.

College students are continually urging as a defense of professionalism in their own athletic teams the argument that since other colleges employ professional players it is necessary for them to do likewise. By carrying this argument a step farther, one could show, with equal reason, that since drinking, stealing and cheating are prevalent in other colleges, these same practices should also be indulged in at the college in question. In the same way one may refute by _reductio ad absurdum_ all such arguments as, "Custom has rendered the spoils system desirable"; "The prevalency of the high license law shows its superiority to prohibition"; and "Since in the past all college students were required to study Latin and Greek, these subjects should be required at the present time."

II. THE DILEMMA.

Another device an arguer will often find useful in refuting an opponent's statement is the _dilemma_. In the dilemma the arguer shows that the statement he wishes to disprove can be true only through the truth of at least one of several possibilities. He then proves that these possibilities are untenable, and therefore the original statement is false. To represent the dilemma with letters: The truth of A rests upon the truth of either x or y; but as x and y are both false, A is false. Once when it was believed in certain quarters that j.a.pan was about to undertake a war against the United States, many people maintained that if j.a.pan desired to go to war she was amply able to finance such an undertaking. In reply to this contention, a certain newspaper, making use of the dilemma, said that since j.a.pan had no money in the treasury she could meet the expenses of war in only three ways: either by contracting a large debt, or by increasing taxation, or by indemnifying herself at the expense of the enemy. The paper then went on to prove that j.a.pan was not in a position to float a large loan, that taxes in j.a.pan were already as heavy as the people could bear, and that she could not hope, at least for a long time, to secure any indemnity from the enemy. Therefore j.a.pan was not in a financial position to enter upon a war with the United States.

In attempting to show that munic.i.p.alities do not have the moral right to own and operate public utilities, T. Carpenter Smith uses the dilemma. He says:--

"Any commercial business is carried on either at a profit, or at a loss, or in such a way that the expenses equal the income. If the city business of gas or electric lighting is to be carried on at a profit, then those citizens who use gas or electric light will be charged a high price for that light, in order to pay the profit, not only to themselves, but also to those who do not use it. If the works are to be carried on at a loss, then the citizens who do not use the gas or electric light will pay taxes to furnish a convenience or economy to those citizens who do use it. If the works are to be operated exactly at cost, then the city will carry on a business from which it will get nothing, but in which it will have to take the labor and risk incident to such a business in order to benefit only some of its citizens, furnishing a commodity not desired by all."

In conversation and debate, the dilemma is frequently introduced by means of a question. The debater, wishing to trap his opponent, asks him a pertinent question which previous investigation has shown can possibly be answered in only two or three ways, and which the opponent cannot afford to answer at all. A good ill.u.s.tration of this device occurs in the New Testament.

And it came to pa.s.s, on one of the days, as he was teaching the people in the temple, and preaching the gospel, there came upon him the chief priests and the scribes with the elders; and they spake, saying unto him, Tell us: By what authority doest thou these things? or who is he that gave thee this authority? And he answered and said unto them, I also will ask you a question; and tell me: The baptism of John, was it from heaven, or from men? And they reasoned with themselves, saying, If we shall say, From heaven; he will say, Why did ye not believe him?

But if we shall say, From men; all the people will stone us: for they be persuaded that John was a prophet. And they answered, that they knew not whence _it was_. And Jesus said unto them, Neither tell I you by what authority I do these things. [Footnote: Luke xx, 1-8.]

During the Lincoln-Douglas debates in 1858, when both men were seeking the United States senatorship from Illinois, Lincoln, wishing either to kill Douglas's senatorial prospects or to head him off from the presidency two years later, asked him a question which put him in a dilemma. Ida M. Tarbell describes the question as follows:--

"Can the people of a United States territory in any lawful way, against the wish of any citizen of the United States, exclude slavery from its limits prior to the formation of a State Const.i.tution?"

Lincoln had seen the irreconcilableness of Douglas's own measure of popular sovereignty, which declared that the people of a territory should be left to regulate their domestic concerns in their own way subject only to the Const.i.tution, and the decision of the Supreme Court in the Dred Scott case that slaves, being property, could not under the Const.i.tution be excluded from a territory. He knew that if Douglas said _no_ to this question, his Illinois const.i.tuents would never return him to the Senate. He believed that if he said _yes,_ the people of the South would never vote for him for President of the United States.

In the last example, Lincoln, by forcing Douglas to answer this question, sought to destroy, and, as history shows, did destroy, the popular conception of Douglas's fitness for public office.

Before one can safely use the dilemma he must carefully investigate every phase of the statement that he wishes to refute. If he is to use the dilemma directly, he must consider every possibility--commonly called the horns of the dilemma--upon which the truth of the statement may rest. If there is a single possibility which he is not ready to meet and overthrow, his whole effort is fruitless. For instance, a debater, in attempting to rebut the statement that college fraternities are harmful, said that his opponent must show that fraternities are either morally, socially, financially or intellectually detrimental to their members; he then proved as best he could that in these respects fraternities are beneficial rather than harmful, and sat down thinking that he had gone a long way toward winning the debate. His opponent then arose and admitting nearly everything that had been said, based his argument on the idea that fraternities were harmful _to the college as a whole_. The first speaker had not considered every alternative. If an arguer is to approach a dilemma through the medium of a question, he must be sure that he knows every reasonable answer that his opponent can make. When one has satisfied these conditions, he can use the dilemma with great effect.

By way of summary it may be said that the successful arguer must both build up his own proof and destroy his opponent's. To accomplish the latter one has to know what to refute and what to leave alone; he must distinguish between the important and the unessential, and he must take care not to "refute himself." Since proof consists of evidence and reasoning, the first step for him to take in refuting an argument is to apply the tests for each, and if possible show where his opponent has erred. In the next place, he should see whether he can discover and point out any of the more important fallacies; the ones mentioned here are _begging the question_, _ambiguous terms_, _false cause_, _composition and division_, and _ignoring the question_.

Should the arguer find any of these fundamental weaknesses, it is ordinarily sufficient merely to call attention to them; for the sake of emphasis, however, one may make use of two especially effective methods of refutation, _reductio ad absurdum_ and the _dilemma_.

EXERCISES.

A. Criticize the following arguments and point out the fallacies they contain:--

1. Four thousand men have taken examinations at Princeton under the honor system, and only six of these were found guilty of "cribbing."

This record shows conclusively that the honor system restrains dishonest work in examinations.

2. Athletics do not injure a man's scholarship; one of the best players on last year's football team attained such a high grade that he was awarded a fellowship.

3. During the decade from 1870 to 1880, illiteracy among the negroes decreased ten per cent., but the race grew more criminal by twenty- five per cent.; from 1880 to 1890, illiteracy decreased eighteen per cent., but criminality increased thirty-three and one-third per cent.

Who can now say that education does not injure the negro?

4. Since the honor system failed at Franklin and Marshall, it will fail at ---- College.

5. Frequent athletic games benefit a college because they tend to take the students' attention away from their studies.