The headquarters of the conspirators were located and a quant.i.ty of dynamite, arms and provisions was found.

It was the intention of the leaders, after their plans had been perfected, to give wide publication to a proclamation calling upon all native and patriotic Porto Ricans who hold liberty dearer than life, to join them and accomplish the overthrow of the Spanish government and the death of the governor and his officials. The plans of the conspirators were so carefully laid that had it not been for the accidental discovery of Castillo's letter, they would unquestionably have been carried out.

The discovery of the conspiracy occurred about the time of the visit to Washington of Dr. J. J. Henna and Ramon Todd, both prominent Porto Ricans, of whom we have had occasion to speak before, and whose purpose in going there was to hold a conference with President McKinley relative to the establishment of a provisional United States government in the island after the Spaniards had been driven out.

Within twenty-four hours after the arrest the two leaders, Baselga and Castillo, were shot.

The residents became very much excited over the affair, and feeling against the Spanish officials ran high.

From the very beginning the real Porto Ricans, as we shall see hereafter, were in favor of the Americans. The Spaniards, however, were most bitter, and as had been the case in Havana and Manila, kept up an absurd show of superior strength. This is well manifested by a proclamation which, signed by Jose Reyes, Celestins Dominguez and Genara Cautino, was issued to the people of Guayama on May 20, 1898. As one of the curiosities of the war, it can only be compared to the celebrated and laughable manifesto which Captain-General Augustin issued at Manila just before the appearance of Admiral Dewey's fleet.

The Porto Rican proclamation ran as follows:

"To the people of Guayama. Hurra for Spain!

"A nation that is our enemy, by its history, by its race, and because she is the princ.i.p.al cause of our misfortunes in Cuba, having fomented in this island that is our sister a war in which she supplied all kinds of resources, taking away at last the mask with which she concealed her fict.i.tious friendship, has excited us to-day to vowed war.

"There is a deep abyss between the manner of being of that people and ours, which established antagonism that we should never be able to remove. Our sonorous language, our habits, the religion of our ancestors, and our necessities are conditions of our life so different from those of that race, so opposite to those of that people, that we are frightened in thinking that we should be constrained to accept a manner of being that is repugnant to our origin, our heart and our feelings. We are a people entirely Spanish, and we were born to a civilized life under a flag that was, and we hope ever will be, that of our wives and children. For four hundred years the warmth of the mother of our native country has given life to our organisms, ideas to our brains, majestic thoughts to our souls, and generous undertakings to our hearts, and in those four centuries the glories of the Spanish house have been our glories, her gayeties our gayeties, and her misfortunes our own misfortunes.

"We have been full of haughtiness when, being considered as the Conqueror's sons, we know that we had partic.i.p.ation in the heroic actions of our brothers, and that the laurels with which they crowned their hero's front were also our laurels. When in tranquil hours we heard in our hearths our predecessors' epopee, describing as superfluously exact their achievements; giving them lively color that always inspires our tropical fancy, our nerves felt the thrill produced by enthusiasm; at those moments, our being all affected, our breast with its strong aspirations and our fiery tears rolling down the cheeks reminded us, obliging the cords of patriotism to vibrate, that we were Spaniards, and we neither could nor would like any other thing than to remain Spaniards.

"As if it could be that the country of Sergeant Diaz, of Andino, and Vascarrondo's, and all those conspicuous countrymen that irrigated with their blood Martin Pena and Rio Piedras camps could measure either the vigor or the haughtiness of an enemy who has not yet exhibited his face after so many ostentatious and angry vociferations. No! and thousand times no! The light fishermen of Porto Rico's sh.o.r.es, merchants, lawyers, musicians, mechanics, journeymen, all persons who may have strength to grasp a gun must ask for it. All united, with a solid front we shall go to intercept the invader. Behind us and as a reserve legion will come down from the highlands like a raging storm, if it is necessary, the _jibaros_, our fields' brothers, the most accomplished exemplar of abstinence, probity and bravery; the same that formed the urban militia; the same that were sent to Santo Domingo to defend gentile honor; they, who in number of more than 16,000, covered the plains of the north sh.o.r.e of the island, and compelled the Englishmen in 1797 to re-embark hastily, leaving their horses and artillery park.

"Porto Ricans! the moment is rising when not a single man of this country gives a step backwards, as it is said commonly; the hour of organizing ourselves for defense is sounded. The Spanish lion has shaken his dishevelled mane, and our duties calls us around him. Our temper is to fight, and we shall fight. Our fate is to overpower, and we shall overpower. Honor imposes upon us the obligation of saving home, and we shall save it in this land of our loves. Before North American people carry their boldness so far as to tread our sea-coasts it is necessary that we must be ready to receive them; that they may find in every Porto Rican an inexorable enemy, in every heart a rock, in each arm a weapon to drive them away; that that people feels that here it is detested intensely, and that Porto Rica's spirit is Spanish, and she will ever be so; therefore, inhabitants of Guayama, we invite you for a meeting at the Town House next Tuesday and offer our kind offices to the government, who will give us arms.

"It would be unworthy of our so gentle history, we should deny our blood, if in these moments of struggle we should endure indifferently.

Let our enemies know that we are a brave people, and that if we are soft in peace days, we are also fit for war chances; that all his command, all his pride, and all his arrogance may fall out with a wall composed of all Porto Rican b.r.e.a.s.t.s."

In the light of ulterior and posterior events, this doc.u.ment is really as comical as anything in opera-bouffe.

"We have no means of knowing," says the New York Sun, in commenting upon this precious effusion, "whether Senor Jose Reyes, Senor Celestino Dominguez and Senor Genaro Cautino actually grasped their guns and immolated themselves upon the altar of four centuries and in the presence of the ostentatious and vociferous invader; or whether they prudently joined the light fishermen, merchants, lawyers, musicians and _jibaros_ of Porto Rico, to whom they had vainly appealed in the name of Spain in yelling themselves hoa.r.s.e as the Stars and Stripes went up in town after town. Perhaps they took the latter course. Perhaps they will turn out good Americans. In Porto Rico, as elsewhere, times change, and men's minds change with the changes of time and destiny."

CHAPTER VIII.

NAVAL LESSONS TAUGHT BY THE WAR.

After the remarkable victory at Santiago de Cuba, where Admiral Cervera's fleet, which attempted to steal out of the harbor, with the loss of but one man on the American side, Admiral Sampson, with a portion of his fleet, proceeded to San Juan in Porto Rico. This city he bombarded, directing his princ.i.p.al fire against Morro Castle.

What followed bears strong testimony to the remarkable gunnery of our "jackies."

Morro Castle and the buildings on the high ground in its rear were simply riddled. Great holes were in places blown out by our large sh.e.l.ls and the walls were pitted by the hail of the smaller ones.

There was one entire building which was blown to pieces, and a whole section of the Cuartel was laid in ruins. To be sure, many of our sh.e.l.ls were wasted in the sea wall, but this is not to be wondered at, as the parapet had embrasures for guns, and from where our ships were lying, these would naturally be mistaken for a sea battery.

Neither in Morro Castle nor in the more pretentious fortifications known as San Cristobal, were there any great number of modern guns. There were a few Krupp guns, but the remainder consisted of muzzleloaders of an ancient pattern; most of the latter were mounted upon parapets of masonry. It may be said that the defences of San Juan were opposed to every theory of modern military science. The defenses might have been considered impregnable some fifty years or so ago, but to-day they are by no means formidable.

Our marvelous naval victories have taught a lesson to the entire world, and America to-day stands stronger than she ever did before. In fact, there is not a nation that does not respect us and fear us, which possibly could not have been said before the American-Spanish war. Prior to that, it was rather the fashion to sneer at the Yankee army and navy, but that will never be done again.

Foreign nations know now what the United States really is.

"Dewey's and Sampson's victories must be very depressing to French, German and Russian naval aspirations," observes a gentleman of Washington, who is a most competent authority. "For years they have been measuring up against England, and quietly calculating what combinations they could make to overthrow British sea power. France, particularly, has been building a navy which she hoped, in spite of past experience, might cope with England's. She has spent immense sums upon it, and relative to the interests it has to guard, it is larger and stronger than England's. But Spain's experience reiterates the old story that it is not so much the ships as the men on them who win victories. Had the Americans been on Spanish ships and the Spanish on the American there would have been a very different story to tell. While the French are very superior to the Spanish, they are of the same Latin blood, and there is just enough similiarity between the two peoples to hint at the success French ships would have in encountering with Anglo-Saxons, either sailing under the Star Spangled Banner or the Cross of St.

George. Germany is likely to have the same sort of a chill. The Gentians have never been a maritime nation. A German war vessel has never fired a hostile shot, and Germans may well have solicitous thoughts as to the result of a struggle with men who have shown themselves past masters in the art of naval warfare. Russia is in the same situation. She has never actually fought anybody at sea but the Turks. The wiser among these peoples are very likely to begin thinking that their dreams of sea power are vain illusions, and that they had better save the money they have been spending on navies and resign the dominion of the sea to the English-speaking races."

There is no doubt that our naval victories have taught many and valuable lessons, and it is perhaps proper to make a slight digression here and show what some of these lessons are.

Let us then consider the deliberations of a board of naval officers, some of the ablest experts in the service, appointed by Admiral Sampson, after the battle of Santiago de Cuba, to report upon the condition of Cervera's sunken fleet, the extent of damages done by American sh.e.l.ls and the lessons to be learned therefrom to guide the United States in its future ship construction.

The conclusions reached by the board were as follows:

The use of wood in the construction and equipment of war ships should be reduced to the utmost minimum possible.

Loaded torpedoes above the water line are a serious menace to the vessels carrying them, and they should not be so carried by vessels other than torpedo boats.

The value of rapid-fire batteries cannot be too highly estimated.

All water and steam pipes should be laid beneath the protective deck and below the water line and fitted with risers at such points as may be considered necessary.

The board also found that the ships Infanta Maria Teresa, Almirante Oquendo and Viscaya were destroyed by conflagration, caused by the explosion of sh.e.l.ls in the interior, which set fire to the woodwork. The upper deck and all other woodwork on their ships was entirely consumed except the extremities. This shows the importance of fireproofing all woodwork on board ships.

Many of the guns on board the burned ships were found loaded at the time of the board's visit, indicating the haste with which the crews were driven from the guns.

With talks with experts the following was developed as to what the war showed:

First--That the gun is still the dominating factor in war.

Second--That rapid-fire guns are especially valuable, but that it is advisable to retain guns of large calibres.

Third--That smokeless powder is absolutely essential for modern warfare.

Fourth--That there should be a great reduction in the amount of woodwork on board ship and that that left on board should be fireproof, some going so far as to say that woodwork should be eliminated entirely, its place to be taken by some other substance.

Fifth--That armor should be distributed over the entire ship rather than be limited to the section where its vitals are located.

Sixth--That monitors are useless for cruising purposes or for fighting in rough waters.

Seventh--That the United States should have a larger navy, with speedier battleships and fast armored cruisers, and with coaling stations in different sections of the globe, where men-of-war can procure supplies and make repairs if necessary.

Captain Charles O'Neil, chief of the bureau of ordnance, gave his opinion as follows:

"I do not think the battle off Santiago de Cuba demonstrated that we should abandon the heavy calibres of guns. Serious injury to an enemy's thickly-armored battleships can be inflicted only by large-calibre guns.

"It is possible that with rapid-fire guns you may shoot away the lightly armored superstructure, but as long as the vitals are protected and the turret armor is intact the guns in the turret will be able to do execution, and large-calibred guns will be necessary to perforate the armor and disable those weapons. Even with her 12-inch guns the Texas can fire at the rate of one round per minute, and this record is as good as that made by any foreign ships. Rapid fire consists in good facilities for handling ammunition and loading the gun with a quick working breech mechanism.

"We are now building at the Washington gun factory an experimental 6-inch rapid-fire gun, different from the rapid-fire guns we have now in service, which are supplied with what is termed fixed ammunition. The powder and projectile to be used in the experimental gun will be separate, and two operations consequently will have to be employed in loading. This can be done so quickly that it is expected that a very rapid fire will be obtained.