The Polity of the Athenians and the Lacedaemonians.

by Xenophon.

I

Now, as concerning the Polity of the Athenians, (1) and the type or manner of const.i.tution which they have chosen, (2) I praise it not, in so far as the very choice involves the welfare of the baser folk as opposed to that of the better cla.s.s. I repeat, I withhold my praise so far; but, given the fact that this is the type agreed upon, I propose to show that they set about its preservation in the right way; and that those other transactions in connection with it, which are looked upon as blunders by the rest of the h.e.l.lenic world, are the reverse.

(1) See Grote, "H. G." vi. p. 47 foll.; Thuc. i. 76, 77; viii. 48; Boeckh, "P. E. A." pa.s.sim; Hartman, "An. Xen. N." cap. viii.; Roquette, "Xen. Vit." S. 26; Newman, "Pol. Arist." i. 538; and "Xenophontis qui fertur libellus de Republica Atheniensium," ed.

A. Kirchhoff (MDCCCLXXIV), whose text I have chiefly followed.

(2) Lit. "I do not praise their choice of the (particular) type, in so far as..."

In the first place, I maintain, it is only just that the poorer cla.s.ses (3) and the People of Athens should be better off than the men of birth and wealth, seeing that it is the people who man the fleet, (4) and put round the city her girdle of power. The steersman, (5) the boatswain, the lieutenant, (6) the look-out-man at the prow, the shipright--these are the people who engird the city with power far rather than her heavy infantry (7) and men of birth of quality. This being the case, it seems only just that offices of state should be thrown open to every one both in the ballot (8) and the show of hands, and that the right of speech should belong to any one who likes, without restriction. For, observe, (9) there are many of these offices which, according as they are in good or in bad hands, are a source of safety or of danger to the People, and in these the People prudently abstains from sharing; as, for instance, it does not think it inc.u.mbent on itself to share in the functions of the general or of the commander of cavalry. (10) The sovereign People recognises the fact that in forgoing the personal exercise of these offices, and leaving them to the control of the more powerful (11) citizens, it secures the balance of advantage to itself. It is only those departments of government which bring emolument (12) and a.s.sist the private estate that the People cares to keep in its own hands.

(3) Cf. "Mem." I. ii. 58 foll.

(4) Lit. "ply the oar and propel the galleys."

(5) See "Econ." viii. 14; Pollux, i. 96; Arist. "Knights," 543 foll.; Plat. "Laws," v. 707 A; Jowett, "Plat." v. 278 foll.; Boeckh, "P.

E. A." bk. ii. ch. xxi.

(6) Lit. "pentecontarch;" see Dem. "In Pol." 1212.

(7) Aristot. "Pol." vi. 7; Jowett, "The Politics of Aristotle," vol.

i. p. 109.

(8) {klerotoi}, {airetoi}.

(9) Reading with Kirchhoff, {epeo tou}, or if {epeita}, "in the next place."

(10) Hipparch.

(11) Cf. "Hipparch." i. 9; "Econ." ii. 8.

(12) E.g. the {dikasteria}.

In the next place, in regard to what some people are puzzled to explain--the fact that everywhere greater consideration is shown to the base, to poor people and to common folk, than to persons of good quality--so far from being a matter of surprise, this, as can be shown, is the keystone of the preservation of the democracy. It is these poor people, this common folk, this riff-raff, (13) whose prosperity, combined with the growth of their numbers, enhances the democracy.

Whereas, a shifting of fortune to the advantage of the wealthy and the better cla.s.ses implies the establishment on the part of the commonalty of a strong power in opposition to itself. In fact, all the world over, the cream of society is in opposition to the democracy. Naturally, since the smallest amount of intemperance and injustice, together with the highest scrupulousness in the pursuit of excellence, is to be found in the ranks of the better cla.s.s, while within the ranks of the People will be found the greatest amount of ignorance, disorderliness, rascality--poverty acting as a stronger incentive to base conduct, not to speak of lack of education and ignorance, traceable to the lack of means which afflicts the average of mankind. (14)

(13) Or, "these inferiors," "these good-for-nothings."

(14) Or, "some of these folk." The pa.s.sage is corrupt.

The objection may be raised that it was a mistake to allow the universal right of speech (15) and a seat in council. These should have been reserved for the cleverest, the flower of the community. But here, again, it will be found that they are acting with wise deliberation in granting to (16) even the baser sort the right of speech, for supposing only the better people might speak, or sit in council, blessings would fall to the lot of those like themselves, but to the commonalty the reverse of blessings. Whereas now, any one who likes, any base fellow, may get up and discover something to the advantage of himself and his equals. It may be retorted: "And what sort of advantage either for himself or for the People can such a fellow be expected to hit upon?"

The answer to which is, that in their judgment the ignorance and baseness of this fellow, together with his goodwill, are worth a great deal more to them than your superior person's virtue and wisdom, coupled with animosity. What it comes to, therefore, is that a state founded upon such inst.i.tutions will not be the best state; (17) but, given a democracy, these are the right means to procure its preservation. The People, it must be borne in mind, does not demand that the city should be well governed and itself a slave. It desires to be free and to be master. (18) As to bad legislation it does not concern itself about that. (19) In fact, what you believe to be bad legislation is the very source of the People's strength and freedom. But if you seek for good legislation, in the first place you will see the cleverest members of the community laying down the laws for the rest. And in the next place, the better cla.s.s will curb and chastise the lower orders; the better cla.s.s will deliberate in behalf of the state, and not suffer crack-brained fellows to sit in council, or to speak or vote in Parliament. (20) No doubt; but under the weight of such blessings the People will in a very short time be reduced to slavery.

(15) Lit. "everybody to speak in turn."

(16) Or, "it is a counsel of perfection on their part to grant to,"

etc.

(17) Or, "the ideal state."

(18) Or, "and to govern and hold office."

(19) Or, "it will take the risk of that."

(20) See Grote, "H. G." v. p. 510 note.

Another point is the extraordinary amount of license (21) granted to slaves and resident aliens at Athens, where a blow is illegal, and a slave will not step aside to let you pa.s.s him in the street. I will explain the reason of this peculiar custom. Supposing it were legal for a slave to be beaten by a free citizen, or for a resident alien or freedman to be beaten by a citizen, it would frequently happen that an Athenian might be mistaken for a slave or an alien and receive a beating; since the Athenian People is no better clothed than the slave or alien, nor in personal appearance is there any superiority. Or if the fact itself that slaves in Athens are allowed to indulge in luxury, and indeed in some cases to live magnificently, be found astonishing, this too, it can be shown, is done of set purpose. Where you have a naval power (22) dependent upon wealth (23) we must perforce be slaves to our slaves, in order that we may get in our slave-rents, (24) and let the real slave go free. Where you have wealthy slaves it ceases to be advantageous that my slave should stand in awe of you. In Lacedaemon my slave stands in awe of you. (25) But if your slave is in awe of me there will be a risk of his giving away his own moneys to avoid running a risk in his own person. It is for this reason then that we have established an equality between our slaves and free men; and again between our resident aliens and full citizens, (26) because the city stands in need of her resident aliens to meet the requirements of such a multiplicity of arts and for the purposes of her navy. That is, I repeat, the justification for the equality conferred upon our resident aliens.

(21) See Aristot. "Pol." v. 11 and vi. 4; Jowett, op. cit. vol. i. pp.

179, 196; Welldon, "The Politics of Aristotle," pp. 394 323; Dem.

"Phil." III. iii. 10; Plaut. "Stich." III. i. 37.

(22) See Diod. xi. 43.

(23) Reading, {apo khrematon, anagke}, or (reading, {apo khrematon anagke}) "considerations of money force us to be slaves."

(24) See Boeckh, "P. E. A." I. xiii. (Eng. trans. p. 72). "The rights of property with regard to slaves in no way differed from any other chattel; they could be given or taken as pledges. They laboured either on their master's account or their own, in consideration of a certain sum to be paid to the master, or they were let out on hire either for the mines or any other kind of labour, and even for other persons' workshops, or as hired servants for wages ({apophora}): a similar payment was also exacted by the masters for their slaves serving in the fleet." Ib.

"Dissertation on the Silver Mines of Laurion," p. 659 (Eng.

trans.)

(25) See "Pol. Lac." vi. 3.

(26) Or, "we have given to our slaves the right to talk like equals with free men, just as to resident aliens the right of so talking with citizens." See Jebb, "Theophr. Char." xiv. 4, note, p. 221.

See Demosth. "against Midias," 529, where the law is cited. "If any one commit a personal outrage upon man, woman, or child, whether free-born or slave, or commit any illegal act against any such person, let any Athenian that chooses" (not being under disability) "indict him before the judges," etc; and the orator exclaims: "You know, O Athenians, the humanity of the law, which allows not even slaves to be insulted in their persons."--C. R.

Kennedy.

Citizens devoting their time to gymnastics and to the cultivation of music are not to be found in Athens; (27) the sovereign People has disestablished them, (28) not from any disbelief in the beauty and honour of such training, but recognising the fact that these are things the cultivation of which is beyond its power. On the same principle, in the case of the coregia, (29) the gymnasiarchy, and the trierarchy, the fact is recognised that it is the rich man who trains the chorus, and the People for whom the chorus is trained; it is the rich man who is trierarch or gymnasiarch, and the People that profits by their labours.

(30) In fact, what the People looks upon as its right is to pocket the money. (31) To sing and run and dance and man the vessels is well enough, but only in order that the People may be the gainer, while the rich are made poorer. And so in the courts of justice, (32) justice is not more an object of concern to the jurymen than what touches personal advantage.

(27) For {mousike} and {gumnastike}, see Becker's "Charicles," Exc.

"Education."

(28) See "Revenues," iv. 52; Arist. "Frogs," 1069, {e xekenosen tas te palaistras}, "and the places of exercise vacant and bare."--Frere.

(29) "The duties of the ch.o.r.egia consisted in finding maintenance and instruction for the chorus" (in tragedy, usually of fifteen persons) "as long as they were in training; and in providing the dresses and equipments for the performance."--Jebb, "Theophr.

Char." xxv. 3. For those of the gymnasiarchy, see "Dict. of Antiq." "Gymnasium." For that of the trierarchy, see Jebb, op.

cit. xxv. 9; xxix. 16; Boeckh, "P. E. A." IV. xi.

(30) See "Econ." ii. 6; Thuc. vi. 31.

(31) See Boeckh, "P. E. A." II. xvi. p. 241.

(32) For the system of judicature, the {dikasteria}, and the boards of jurymen or judges, see Aristot. "Const.i.tution of Athens," ch.

lxiii.; "Dict. of Antiq." s.v.