#52. Intimidation in Strikes.# Those who strike work have no right to prevent other workmen from coming and taking their places. If there are unemployed people, able and willing to work at the lower wages, it is for the benefit of everybody, excepting the strikers, that they should be employed. It is a question of supply and demand. The employer, generally speaking, is right in getting work done at the lowest possible cost; and, if there is a supply of labour forthcoming at lower rates of wages, it would not be wise of him to pay higher rates.

But it is unfortunately common for those who strike to endeavour to persuade or even frighten workmen from coming to take their places. This is as much as to claim a right to the trade of a particular place, which no law and no principle gives to them. A strike is only proper and legal as long as it is entirely voluntary on the part of all concerned in refusing to work. When a striker begins to threaten or in any way prevent other people from working as they like, he commits a crime, by interfering with their proper liberty, and at the same time injuring the public. Men are free to refuse to labour, but it is absolutely necessary to maintain at the same time the freedom of other men to labour if they like. The same considerations, of course, apply to lockouts; no employer who locks out his workmen has any right to intimidate, or in any way to oblige other employers to do the same. No doubt voluntary agreements are made between employers, and lockouts are jointly arranged, just as extensive strikes are arranged beforehand. If any employers were to go beyond this and threaten to injure other employers if they did not join in the lockout, they should be severely punished. But such a case seldom or never occurs. Thus, strikes and lockouts are proper only as mere trials, to ascertain whether labour will be forthcoming at a certain rate of wages, or under certain conditions.

If the workmen in a trade are persuaded that their wages are too low, then a strike will show whether it is the case or not; if their employers find themselves unable to get equally good workmen at the same wages, they will have to offer more; but if equally good can be got at the old rate, then it is a proof that the strikers made a mistake. Their wages were as good as the state of trade warranted. It is all a matter of bargain, and of supply and demand. Those who strike work are in the position of those who, having a stock of goods, refuse to sell it, hoping to get a better price. If they make a mistake, they must suffer for it, and those who choose to sell their goods in the meantime will have the benefit. But it is plain that it would never do to allow one holder of goods to intimidate and prevent other holders from selling to the public. It is worthy of consideration whether even voluntary combinations of dealers should not be prohibited, because they are often little better than conspiracies to rob the public. The good of consumers, that is, of the whole people, is what we must always look to, and this is best secured when men act freely and compete with each other to sell things at the cheapest rates.

#53. Trades-Union Monopolies.# It cannot be denied that, in certain trades, the men may succeed to some extent in keeping their wages above the natural level by union. Wages, like the prices of goods, are governed by the laws of supply and demand. Accordingly, if the number of hat-makers can be kept down it reduces the number of hats that can be made, raises their prices, and enables the hat-makers to demand higher wages than they otherwise could do. Many unions try thus to limit production by refusing to admit more than a fixed number of apprentices, and by declining to work with any man who has not been brought up to the trade. It is probable that, where a trade is a small one, and the union powerful, there may be some success. The trade becomes a monopoly, and gets higher wages by making other people pay dearer for the goods they produce. They raise a tax from the rest of the nation, including all the workmen of other trades. This is a thoroughly selfish and injurious thing, and the laws ought by all reasonable means to discourage such monopolies. Moreover, monopoly is extremely hurtful in the long run to the working cla.s.ses, because all the trades try to imitate those which are successful. Finding that the hatters have a strong union, the shoemakers, the tailors, and the seamstresses try to make similar unions, and to restrict the numbers employed. If they could succeed in doing so, the result would be absurd; #they would all be trying to grow richer by beggaring each other#. As I have pointed out in the _Logic Primer_ (section 177, p. 117), this is a logical fallacy, arising from the confusion between a general and a collective term. #Because any trade separately considered may grow richer by taxing other trades, it does not follow that all trades taken together, and doing the same thing, can grow richer.#

No doubt, working men think that, when their wages are raised, the increase comes out of the pockets of their employers. But this is usually a complete mistake; their employers would not carry on business unless they could raise the prices of their goods, and thus get back from purchasers the increased sum which they pay in wages. They will even want a little more to recompense them for the risk of dealing with workmen who strike at intervals, and thus interrupt business. It is the consumers of goods who ultimately pay the increased wages, and though wealthy people no doubt pay a part of the cost, it is mainly the working people who contribute to the higher wages of some of their own cla.s.s.

The general result of trades-union monopolies to the working people themselves is altogether disastrous. If one in a hundred, or one in a thousand is benefited, the remainder are grievously injured. The restrictions upon work which they set up tend to keep men from doing that which they are ready and willing to do. The lucky fatten at the cost of those whom they shut out in want of work, and the strikes and interruptions of trade, occasioned by efforts to keep up monopolies, diminish the produce distributed as wages.

#54. Professional Trades-Unions.# We often hear the proceedings of trades-unions upheld on the ground that lawyers, doctors, and other professional men have their societies, Inns of Court, or other unions, which are no better than trades-unions. This is what may be called a _tu quoque_ (thou also) argument. "We may form unions because you form unions." It is a poor kind of argument at best; one man acting unwisely is no excuse for another doing so likewise. I am quite willing to allow that many of the rules of barristers and solicitors are no better than those of trades-unions. That a barrister must begin to be a barrister by eating certain dinners; that he must never take a fee under a certain amount; that he must never communicate with a client except through a solicitor; that a senior counsel must always have a junior; and most of the rules of the so-called #etiquette# are clearly intended to raise the profits of the legal profession. Many things of this kind want reform.

But, on the other hand, these unions avoid many of the faults of trades-unions. There is no limit to the number of persons who may enter them; all men of good character and sufficient knowledge can become barristers and solicitors. Moreover, the entrance to the legal, medical, and several other professions is being more and more regulated by examinations, which are intended purely to secure able men for the service of the public. Nor is any attempt made in these professional trades-unions to prevent men from exerting themselves as much as they can, so as to serve the public to the utmost of their ability. These professional trades-unions are thus free from _some_ of the evils which other unions produce.

#55. The Fallacy of Making Work.# One of the commonest and worst fallacies into which people fall in political economy is to imagine that wages may be increased by doing work slowly, so that more hands shall be wanted. Workmen think they see plainly that the more men a job requires, the more wages must be paid by their employers, and the more money comes from the capitalists to the labourers. It seems, therefore, that any machine, invention, or new arrangement which gets through the work more quickly than before, tends to decrease their earnings. With this idea, bricklayers' labourers refuse (or did lately refuse) to raise bricks to the upper parts of a building by a rope and winch; they preferred the old, laborious, and dangerous mode of carrying the bricks up ladders in hods, because the work then required more hands. Similarly, brickmakers refused to use any machinery; masons totally declined to set stones shaped and dressed by machinery; some compositors still object to work in offices where type-composing machines are introduced. They are all afraid that if the work is done too easily and rapidly, they will not be wanted to do it; they think that there will be more men than there are berths for, and so wages will fall. In almost every case this is an absurd and most unfortunate mistake.

No doubt, if men insist on sticking to a worse way of doing work after a better one has been invented, they may get bad wages, and perhaps go to the workhouse in old age. Thus, the hand-weavers in Spitalfields would continue weaving by hand, instead of learning to weave by steam power, and the case is somewhat the same with the hand-nailers of South Staffordshire. But when the younger workmen of a trade are wise and foreseeing enough to adopt a new invention as soon as it is successful, they are never injured, and usually much benefited by it. Seamstresses in England received wretchedly poor wages before the introduction of the American sewing machine, and they thought they would be starved altogether when the same work could be done twenty times as fast by machine as by hand. The effect, however, has been just of the opposite kind. Those who were not young, skilful or wise enough to learn machine-sewing, receive better wages for hand-sewing than they would formerly have done. The machine sewers earn still more, as much in many cases as 20s. a week. The explanation of this is that, when work is cheapened, people want much more of it. When sewing can be done so easily, more sewing is put into garments, and the garments being cheapened, more are bought. At the same time a good deal of the sewing, and finishing, and fitting, cannot be done by machinery, and this furnishes plenty of employment for those who cannot work machines.

If masons were to employ machines for cutting stone, they would be benefited like the seamstresses, instead of being injured. The cost of cutting stone by hand is now so great that people cannot build many stone buildings, nor use stone to decorate brick buildings, unless they are wealthy people. Were the dressing of stone much cheapened by the aid of machinery, a great deal more stone would be used, and the masons, instead of labouring at the dull work of cutting flat surfaces, would find plenty of employment in finishing, and carving, and setting the machine-shaped stones. I have not the least doubt that, in addition to those engaged in working the machines, there would in the end be more masons wanted after the general introduction of machines than before.

With type-setters the same thing will happen, if they take betimes to the new type-composing machines. It is true that a man with the aid of a good machine can set types several times as fast as without. But though the wages paid for setting a certain number of types might thus be reduced, so many more books, pamphlets, newspapers, and doc.u.ments of various kinds would be printed, that no want of employment could be felt. Much of the work, too, such as the justifying, correcting, making into pages, &c., cannot be done by machinery, or not profitably, so that there would be plenty of work even for those who would not consent to work machines.

The fact is that #wages are increased by increasing the produce of labour, not by decreasing the produce#. The wages of the whole working population consist of the total produce remaining after the subtraction of rent, interest, and taxes. People get high wages in Lancashire because they use spinning machinery, which can do an immense quant.i.ty of work compared with the number of hands employed. If they refused to use machinery, they would have to spin cotton by hand like the poor inhabitants of Cashmere. Were there no machinery of any kind in England we should, nearly all of us, be as poor as the agricultural labourers of Wiltshire lately were.

People lose sight of the fact that #we do not work for the sake of working, but for the sake of what we produce by working#. The work itself is the disagreeable price paid for the wages earned, and these wages consist of the greater part of the value of the goods produced. It is absurd to suppose that people can become richer by having less riches. To become richer we must make more riches, and the object of every workman should be not to make work, but to make goods as rapidly and abundantly as possible.

#56. Piece-Work.# Some trades unions endeavour to prevent their members from earning wages by piece work, that is, by payment for the quant.i.ty of work done, instead of payment for the time spent in doing it. If a man is paid tenpence an hour, whether he work quickly or slowly, it is evidently for his interest to work slowly rather than quickly, provided that he be not so lazy as to run a risk of being discharged. It is a well known fact that men employed on piece-work do much more work in the same time than those employed on time jobs, and it is altogether better that they should be paid by the piece when the work done can be exactly measured and paid for. The men earn better wages because they are incited to do so much more, and they earn it more fairly, as a general rule. Trades-unions, however, sometimes object to piece-work, the reason given being that it makes the men work too hard, and thus injures their health. But this is an absurd reason; for men must generally be supposed capable of taking care of their own health. There are many trades and professions in which people are practically paid by the piece, but it is not found necessary to have trades-unions to keep them from killing themselves. There is more fear that people will work too little rather than too much.

The real objection which trades-unionists feel to piece-work is that it gets the work done quickly, and thus tends, as they think, to take employment away from other men. But, as I have already explained, men do not work for the sake of working, but for the sake of what they produce, and the more men in general produce, the higher wages in general will be. Trades-unionists put forward their views on the ground of unselfishness. They would say that it is selfish of Tom to work so as to take away employment from d.i.c.k and Harry; but they overlook the thousands of Toms, d.i.c.ks, and Harrys in other employments who get small wages indeed, and who are perhaps prevented by their rules from earning more. If the nation as a whole is to be wealthy and happy, we must each of us work to the best of our powers, producing the wealth which we can best produce, and not grudging others a greater success, if Providence has given them superior powers. People can seldom produce wealth for themselves without spreading a greater benefit over society in general, by cheapening commodities and lightening toil.

#57. The Fallacy of Equality.# Workmen often show a dislike to allowing one man to earn more than another in the same shop, and at the same kind of work. This feeling is partly due to the mistaken notion that in doing more work than others he takes employment from them. It partly, however, arises from a dislike to see one man better off than his mates. This feeling is not confined to workmen. Any one who reflects upon the state of society must regret that the few are so rich, and the many so poor.

It might seem that the laws must be wrong which allow such differences to exist. It is needful to reflect, therefore, that such differences of wealth are not for the most part produced by the laws. All men, it has been said, are born free and equal; it is difficult to see how they can be born free, when, for many years after birth, they are helpless and dependent on their parents, and are properly under their governance. No doubt they ought to become free when grown up, but then they are seldom equal. One youth is stout, healthy and energetic; another puny and weak; one bright and intelligent; another dull and slow. Over these differences of body and mind the laws have no power. An Act of Parliament cannot make a weak frame strong. It follows that in after life some men must be capable of earning more than others. Out of every thousand men and women, too, there will be a few who are distinguished by remarkable talents or inventive genius. One man by patient labour and great sagacity invents a sewing machine, a telegraph, or a telephone, and he thus confers the greatest possible advantage upon other men for centuries after.

It is obviously to the advantage of everybody that those who are capable of benefiting society should be encouraged to do so by giving them all the reward possible, by patents, copyright, and the laws of property generally. To prevent or discourage a clever man in doing the best work he can, is certainly no benefit to other men. It tends to level all down to a low standard, and to r.e.t.a.r.d progress altogether. Every man, on the contrary, who is incited to work, and study, and invent to the utmost of his powers, not only earns welfare for himself, but confers welfare upon other people. He shows how wealth may be created abundantly, and how toil may be lessened. What is true of great ability and great inventions is true, also, of the smallest differences of power or the slightest improvements. If one bricklayer's labourer can carry up more bricks than another, why should he be prevented from doing it? The ability is his property, and it is for the benefit of all that he should be allowed to use it. If he finds a better way of carrying bricks, of course it should be adopted in preference to worse ways. The purpose of carrying bricks is to get them carried and benefit those who want houses. Everything which makes it difficult and expensive to build houses, causes people to be lodged worse than they otherwise would be. We can only get things made well and cheaply if every man does his best, and is incited to do so by gaining the reward of his excellence.

Every man then should not only be allowed, but should be encouraged to do and to earn all that he can; we must then allow the greatest inequalities of wealth; for a man who has once begun to grow rich, acquires capital, and experience, and means which enable him to earn more and more. Moreover, it is altogether false to suppose that, as a general rule, he does this by taking wealth from other people. On the contrary, by acc.u.mulating capital, by building, mills, warehouses, railways, docks, and by skilfully organising trades, he often enables thousands of men to produce wealth, and to earn wages to an extent before impossible. The profits of a capitalist are usually but a small fraction of what he pays in wages, and he cannot become rich without a.s.sisting many workmen to increase the value of their labour and to earn a comfortable subsistence.

CHAPTER IX.

CO-OPERATION, &c.

#58. Arbitration.# We have now considered at some length the evils arising from the present separation of interests between the employed and their employers. The next thing is to discuss the various attempts which have been made to remedy these evils, and to bring labour and capital into harmony with each other. In the first place, many people think that when any dispute takes place, arbitrators or judges should be appointed to hear all that can be said on both sides of the question, and then decide what the rate of wages is to be for some time to come.

No doubt a good deal may be said in favour of such a course, but it is nevertheless inconsistent with the principles of free labour and free trade. If the judges are to be real arbitrators, they must have power to compel obedience to their decision, so that they will destroy the liberty of the workman to work or not as he likes, and of the capitalist to deal freely with his own capital, and sell goods at whatever price suits the state of the market. If wages are to be arbitrarily settled in this way, there is no reason why the same thing should not be done with the prices of corn, iron, cotton, and other goods. But legislators have long since discovered the absurdity of attempting to fix prices by law.

These prices depend entirely upon supply and demand, and no one is really able to decide with certainty what will be the conditions of supply and demand a month or two hence. Government might almost as wisely legislate about the weather we are to have next summer as about the state of trade, which much depends upon the weather, or upon wars and accidents of various kinds, which no one can foresee. It is impossible, then, to fix prices and wages beforehand by any kind of law or compulsory decision. The matter is one of bargain, of buying and selling, and the employer must be at liberty to buy the labour required at the lowest price at which he can get it, and the labourers to sell their labour at the highest price they can get, both subject of course to the legal notice of a week or fortnight.

#59. Conciliation.# Though the compulsory fixing of wages is evidently objectionable, much good may be done by #conciliators#, who are men chosen to conduct a friendly discussion of the matters in dispute. The business is arranged in various ways; sometimes three or more delegates of the workmen meet an equal number of delegates from the masters, who place before the meeting such information as they think proper to give, and then endeavour to come to terms. In other cases the delegates lay their respective views before a man of sound and impartial judgment, who then endeavours to suggest terms to which both sides can accede. If the two parties previously engage that they will accept the decision of this conciliator or umpire, the arrangement differs little from arbitration, except that there is no legal power to compel compliance with the decision. Discredit has been thrown upon this form of conciliation by the fact that the workmen have in several instances refused to abide by the award of the umpire when given against them, and of course it cannot be expected that masters will accept adverse decisions as binding under such circ.u.mstances. Thus I am led to think that the conciliator should not attempt to be a judge; he should be merely an impartial friend of both sides, trying to remove misapprehension and hostile feelings, enlightening each party as to the views and reasons and demands of the other--acting, in short, as a go-between, and smoothing down the business as oil eases the movement of a machine. The final settlement must take the form of a voluntary bargain directly between the employers and employed, which will only have compulsory effect during the week or fortnight for which workmen usually enter into a legal agreement.

Conciliation may in this way do much good, but it cannot remove the causes of difference--it cannot make the men feel that their interest is one with the interest of their employers.

#60. Co-operation.# Among the measures proposed for improving the position of workmen, the best is co-operation, if we understand by this name #the uniting together of capital and labour#. The name co-operation is used indeed with various meanings, and some of the arrangements called by it have really nothing to do with what we are now considering.

#To co-operate means to work together# (Latin, _con_, together, and _operor_, to work). About thirty-five years ago some workmen of Rochdale, noticing the great profits made by shopkeepers in retail trade, resolved to work together by buying their own supplies wholesale, and distributing them amongst the members of the society which they established. They called this #a co-operative society#, and a great number of so-called co-operative stores have since been established.

Most of these are nothing but shops belonging to a society of purchasers, who agree to buy at the store and divide the profits. They have on the whole done a great deal of good by leading many men to save money and to take an interest in the management of affairs. The stores are also useful, because they compete with shopkeepers, and induce them to lower their prices and to treat their customers better. We frequently hear now of shops selling goods at #co-operative prices#.

But such co-operative societies have little or nothing to do with the subject of capital and labour. Commonly these stores are conducted less upon the true co-operative principle than ordinary shops. A shop is usually managed by the owner or by a man who has a large interest in its success, and has the best reasons for taking trouble. Co-operative stores, on the contrary, are often managed by men who are paid by salary or wages only, and have nothing to do with the profits and the capital of the concern.

#Real co-operation consists in making all those who work share in the profits.# At present a workman sells his labour for the best price he can get, and has nothing further to do with the results. If he does his work well, his master gets the benefit, and if he works badly his master is injured. It is true that he must not be very lazy or negligent for fear of being discharged; but if he takes care to be moderately careful and active, it is all that he need do for his own interests. No doubt it would be a good thing to reward the more active workmen with higher wages, and a wise employer endeavours to do this when he can, and to put the best workmen into the best places. But the trades-unions usually prevent it as far as they can, by insisting that men doing the same kind of work in the same place shall be paid alike. Moreover, as we have seen, many men are under the mistaken belief that if they work hard they decrease the demand for employment, and tend to take away the bread from their fellow-men. Thus it is not uncommon for workmen to study #how not to do the work too quickly#, instead of striving to make the most goods in the least time with the least trouble. Workmen do not see that what they produce forms in the long run their wages, so that if all workmen could be incited to activity and carefulness, wages would rise in all trades.

#61. Industrial Partnerships.# The best way of reconciling labour and capital would be to give every workman a share in the profits of his factory when trade is so prosperous as to allow of it. Charles Babbage proposed, in the year 1832, that a part of the wages of every person employed should depend on the profits of the employers. In recent years this has been tried in several large works, especially in Messrs.

Briggs' collieries, and in Messrs. Fox, Head & Co.'s iron-works. The arrangement generally made with the men was that the capitalists should first take enough of the profits to pay 10 per cent. interest on the capital, together with fair salaries for the managers as wages of superintendence, a sum to meet bad debts, the repairs and depreciation of the machinery, and all other ordinary causes of loss. Such profit as remained was then divided into two equal parts, one of which went to the employers, while the other was divided among the workpeople in proportion to the amounts of wages which they had received during the year. Many workmen under such a scheme found themselves at Christmas in possession of five or ten pounds, in addition to the ordinary wages of the trade received weekly during the year.

This kind of co-operation has been called #industrial partnership#, and, if it could be widely carried into effect, there would arise many advantages. The workmen, feeling that their Christmas bonuses depended upon the success of the works, would not favour idleness, and would have some inducement for preventing needless waste whether of time or materials. By degrees they would learn that #the best trades-union is a union with their employers#. Strikes and lockouts would be for the most part a thing of the past, because, if wages were too low, the balance-sheet would prove the fact at the end of the year, and half the surplus would go to the workmen. To be free from the danger of strikes would be a very great advantage to the employers, and any portion of profits which they might seem to give up would be more than repaid by the increased care and activity of the workmen. The employers would continue to manage the business entirely according to their own judgment, and they need not make their affairs or accounts known to the men. All that is requisite is that skilful accountants should examine the books at the end of the year, and certify the amount of profits due to the men. If this plan were thoroughly carried out, the men would feel that they were really working for themselves as much as for their masters, and the troubles which at present exist would be nearly unknown.

There are great difficulties in the way of this kind of co-operation: most capitalists do not like it, because they needlessly fear to make known their profits to their men, and they do not understand the advantages which would arise from a better state of things. The workmen also do not like the arrangement, because the trades-unions oppose co-operation, fearing that it will overthrow their own power. Where the scheme has been tried, it has usually succeeded well, until the men, urged by their trades-unions, refused to go on with it. Thus are people, through prejudice and want of knowledge, made blind to the best interests of themselves and the country.

It is to be feared, then, that industrial partnerships will not make much progress just at present, so great is the dislike to them felt both by trades-unions and by prejudiced employers. Nevertheless, the arrangement is in accordance with the principles of political economy, and it will probably be widely adopted by some future generation.

Already, indeed, many banks, mercantile firms, and public companies practically recognise the value of the principle, by giving bonuses or presents to their clerks at the end of a profitable year. A French railway company adopted this practice forty years ago, and as business falls more and more into the hands of companies whose profits are matters of general knowledge, there seems to be no reason whatever why the principle of industrial partnership should not be adopted. Somewhat the same principle is said to be carried into effect in the very extensive and successful newspaper business of Messrs. W. H. Smith & Son.

#62. Joint-Stock Co-operation.# Another mode of co-operation consists in working men saving up their wages until they have got small capitals, so that they can unite together and own the factories, machines, and materials with which they work. They then become their own capitalists and employers, and secure all the profit to themselves. Co-operative societies of this kind are simply Joint-Stock Companies, the shares of which are held by the men employed. Of course the shareholders must choose directors from among themselves, and they must also have managers to arrange the business. The managers and directors ought to be well paid for what they do, and have a considerable share of the profits, in order to make them interested in the success of the works, and therefore active and careful. Incompetent or negligent management will soon ruin the best business.

A great number of co-operative companies of this kind have been formed in the last twenty years in England, France, America, and elsewhere; but most of them have failed from want of good direction. The working-men shareholders do not generally understand what a great deal of skill and judgment is required in the conduct of a business; they are accustomed to see work going on as if it went of its own accord, but they do not see the constant anxiety and the careful calculation which is requisite to make the work profitable. Hence they usually fail to secure good managers, and they do not sufficiently trust those whom they appoint.

Moreover, many of the so-called co-operative companies are not really co-operative; they frequently employ men who are neither shareholders nor receivers of a share of profits, and they pay their managers by a small fixed salary. #Such co-operative societies are badly-managed joint-stock companies, and cannot be expected to succeed well.#

Another difficulty with such companies is, that they rarely have enough capital, and, when bad trade comes, they are unable to bear the losses which will sometimes occur for several years in succession. They can borrow money by the mortgage of the buildings and machinery belonging to the company, and this is usually done; but no banker will give credit to such companies without the security of fixed property. Thus they frequently fail when bad trade comes, and those who buy up their property cheaply reap advantage. It is to be hoped that at a future time all working-men will become capitalists on a small scale, and when education and experience have been acquired, co-operative factories of working-men may succeed. At present it would be better to leave the management of business in the hands of capitalists, who are not only experienced and clever men, but have the best reason to be careful and active, because their fortunes depend upon success.

#63. Providence.# It is most deeply to be regretted that the working-people of England will not, for the most part, see the necessity of saving a portion of their wages in order to have something to live upon when trade is bad, or when ill-health and misfortune come upon them. Too many working-men's families spend all that is earned while trade is brisk, and when employment fails they are as badly off as ever.

#There are several distinct reasons why every man or woman should save up some property when possible#:--

(1) It forms a provision in case of ill-health, accident, want of employment, or other misfortune; it is also wanted for support in old age, or for the helpless widow and orphans of a workman who dies early.

(2) It yields interest, and adds to a workman's income.

(3) It enables a man to go into trade, to buy good tools, and to enjoy good credit in case he sees an opportunity of setting up business on his own account.

No man and no woman, who is in the prime of life and earning fair wages, should spend the whole. Even an unmarried person will generally reach a time of life when, through ill health, old age, or other unavoidable causes, it is no longer possible to get a living. By that time enough ought to have been saved to avoid the need of charity or the degradation of the poor-house. When there is a wife and young family, the need of saving is evidently greater still. Every great storm, colliery explosion, or other great accident leaves a number of helpless children to be brought up by a struggling widow, or to go on the parish. No doubt people may meet with disasters so unexpected and so great that they cannot be blamed for not providing against them. A man who is blinded, or crippled, or otherwise disabled in early life, is a proper object of charity, but there would be plenty of benevolent inst.i.tutions to provide for such exceptional cases, if those who are more fortunate would provide properly for themselves.

It is often said that working men really cannot save out of the small wages they receive; the expenses of living are too great. We cannot deny that there are labourers, especially agricultural labourers in the South of England, whose wages will not do more than barely provide necessary food and clothing for their families. The weekly earnings of a family in some parts are not more than 12 or 15 shillings on the average of the year, and sometimes even less. Such people can hardly be expected to save. But this is not the case with the artisans and labourers in the manufacturing districts. They seldom earn less than a pound a week, and often two pounds. The boys and girls, and sometimes the mother of the family, also earn wages, so that when trade is brisk a family in Manchester or Leicester, or other manufacturing town, will get altogether 150 a year, or more. Some kinds of workmen, especially coal-hewers, and iron-puddlers, earn twice that amount in good years, and are in fact better paid than schoolmasters, ministers of religion, and upper clerks. It is idle to say that the better-paid working men cannot save, and though we cannot make any strict rule, it is probable that #all who earn more than a pound (five dollars, or 25 francs) a week, might save something#.

It is easy to prove this a.s.sertion by the fact that when a strike occurs, men voluntarily live on a half, or a third of their ordinary wages. Sometimes they will live for three or four months on 12 or 15 shillings a week, which is paid for their support by their trades-union, or by other unions, which subscribe money to a.s.sist them. It is quite common for workmen to pay #levies#, that is, almost compulsory subscriptions of a shilling or more a week, to be spent by other workmen who are #playing#, as it is called, during a long strike. n.o.body wishes working people to live on the half of their wages, but #if, for the purpose of carrying on struggles against their employers, they can spare these levies, it is evident that they could spare them for the purpose of saving#. Then, again, we know that the money spent on drink is enormous in amount; in this country it is about 140,000,000 a year, or about four pounds a year for every man, woman, and child. To say the least, half of this might be saved, with the greatest advantage to the health and morals of the savers, and thus the working cla.s.ses would be able to lay by an annual sum not much less than the revenue of the nation.

CHAPTER X.

TENURE OF LAND.