It was a raw, rainy night, and snow was falling. The bad weather of the first night out was worse than repeated. It seemed more like Michigan than Virginia. It was very dark. I do not believe that any man living could make a map of the camps which the two brigades occupied that night--the exact locations or even the relative positions of the various commands. I doubt if the actual partic.i.p.ants could point them out were they to visit the place. I know that at the time I had not the slightest knowledge on the subject and could not have told which way to go to find any one of them or even brigade or division headquarters. It looked like a case of "wisdom consists in taking care of yourself." We were on the north side of the Chickahominy and, with the bridges guarded, it would be difficult for the forces with which we had been contending during the day to get in on our night encampment. At least they could not well take us by surprise. But this made the position all the more vulnerable from the north. It was idle to suppose that Stuart's cavalry was doing nothing. It was as certain as anything could be that his enterprising hors.e.m.e.n were gathering on our track, urging their steeds to the death in an endeavor to stop the audacious career of the federal commander.

During the early evening it was known throughout the command that the general had not given up the hope of capturing the city and liberating the prisoners. A body of five hundred men led by Lieutenant Colonel Addison W. Preston of the First Vermont cavalry was to start out from our camp by the Mechanicsville road, charge in, release the prisoners and bring them out, Kilpatrick covering the movement with his entire command. The latter's official report says there were two bodies, one to be led by Preston, the other by Major Taylor of the First Maine cavalry.

The name of Preston was a guarantee that the dash, if made at all, would be bravely led. There was no more gallant officer in the whole cavalry corps.

The conditions were such as to make one wakeful and alert, if anything could. But the danger of yielding for an instant to the allurement of the drowsiness produced by the long ride without sleep was overpowering.

In an instant after getting under cover of the shelter tent I was emulating the seven sleepers. It is doubtful if the trump of Gabriel himself, had it sounded, could have awakened me. The a.s.surance that we were protected by pickets, and the order to go into camp having been given unaccompanied by any warning to be alert and on the watch for danger, had lulled me into such an absolutely false sense of security that I was for the time dead to all the surroundings. There was firing among the pickets. I did not hear it. A cannon boomed. I did not hear it. A second piece of artillery added to the tumult. I did not hear it.

Sh.e.l.ls hurtled through the trees, over the camp and the waves of sound did not disturb my ear. At last partial consciousness returned. There was a vague sense of something out of the usual order going on. Then I found that Barnhart and the orderly were pulling me out of the "pup"

tent by the heels. That sufficed. I was instantly wide awake. Barnhart was ordered to get his horse and mount the regiment. The orderly to saddle my horse and his own. In a few moments all hands were in the saddle. The regiment was wheeled by fours and moved a short distance to the right, more in the shadow and out of range of the sh.e.l.ls, and formed in line facing toward where the enemy was supposed to be, and held there awaiting orders. No orders to advance came, nor was any brigade line of battle formed. In a very short time a staff officer came riding fast and directed me to move out by fours on the road in rear of the alignment and follow the command which he said had gone and was retreating. He did not say what road it was nor whither it led. He then rode away. Wheeling into column the regiment was moved out on the road and, greatly confused as to the points of the compa.s.s, and not hearing or seeing anything of the column, turned in the wrong direction. The same staff officer soon overtook the head of the regiment and set us right. We had to countermarch and, as a matter of fact, were going towards the enemy instead of joining in the retreat. It was by mistake, however. We had gone probably an eighth of a mile before being stopped.

[Ill.u.s.tration: LEVANT W. BARNHART WILLIAM HULL]

The march then led back within sight of the camp which had been vacated.

As we pa.s.sed that point, far away in the distance among the trees, by the light of the abandoned fires, could be seen men flitting like specters through the places where the camps had been. They were presumably the enemy and apparently bent on plunder rather than conquest. It was a good time to give them a Roland for their Oliver but there did not seem to be a disposition to make a concerted attack or, in fact, any attack at all. Kilpatrick was in full retreat toward Old Church, abandoning his plan of a midnight attack on Richmond.

The force which made the attack on the camps was led by Wade Hampton who, as soon as he knew of the expedition, set out on the trail, picking up odds and ends of confederate cavalry when and where he could. He marched that day from Hanover Courthouse and says he came in sight of the camp fires near Atlee's Station and to his right on the Telegraph or Brook road. He must have been deceived as to the direction, for it is not possible that any portion of the main body could have been in camp on either of those roads. The camp he attacked was that of the Seventh Michigan which bore the brunt of it. This regiment lost a number of prisoners including the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Litchfield.

We must have marched at least a mile, perhaps more, when the column was overtaken. It was moving at a walk on the road leading to Old Church.

Finding myself in rear with no rear guard I detached three troops (A, E and G) and held them with sufficient interval to cover the retreat. When there was a halt they were formed in line across the road and facing to the rear with carbines loaded and at a "ready" to repel any attack, should one be made. Once when halted the tread of horses could be heard approaching.

"Halt! Who comes there?" was the challenge.

"Major Wells and a portion of the First Vermont cavalry," was the reply.

He advanced and was recognized and for the remainder of the night we jointly looked after the rear until a camping ground was found near Old Church about daylight the next morning.

An amusing thing happened after Barnhart and the orderly pulled me out of the tent. The orderly saddled my horse and after buckling on sword and belt I put my foot in stirrup and proceeded to mount. The saddle slipped off to the ground. In the excitement he had neglected to fasten the girths. I put the saddle on again and, making all tight, mounted and gave the horse the spur, when to my dismay he proved to be still tied to the tree. It was necessary to dismount, untie and adjust the halter. By this time it is needless to say I was getting "rattled." But the precautions taken made it easy to get the regiment into shape and keep it well in hand. The most regrettable thing about it all was that Sawyer did not rush his entire brigade to the support of the picket line. Had that been done, it is more than likely that Litchfield and his men might have been saved from capture, though I do not know how Hampton found them when he stole into their camp. If they were scattered about and asleep it would have been impossible to rally them and get them into line for effective resistance. On the other hand, had Sawyer with his other regiments, or Davies with his brigade, or both of them together made a concerted attack Hampton might have been worsted. But there was no attempt to make a fight. Hampton's attack caused consternation, forced a precipitate retreat, and led to the final abandonment of the objects of the expedition.

In a previous chapter I have sought to show that official reports are often meager, sometimes misleading. There has always been a good deal of mystery about this affair. There is mystery still, which careful reading of the official records does not dispel. Sawyer made no report; or, if he did it was not published. Few if any of the regimental commanders submitted reports. The Michigan brigade suffered its usual fate in that regard.

Kilpatrick's report as published says:

"The command was moved out on the road to Old Church, and placed in position and after considerable hard fighting repulsed the enemy and forced him back on the road to Hanover Courthouse."

Davies in his official report said:

"The enemy during the evening skirmished slightly with my pickets, and about 12 p.m., attacked the Second brigade in force. My command at once mounted and formed, but the Second brigade una.s.sisted repulsed the attack and I moved to the vicinity of Old Church."

Davies, it is seen, did not claim to have made any fight. He was ready and in position, but moved away to Old Church.

Wade Hampton, who led the attack, says:

"From Hanover Courthouse I marched to Hughes's Crossroads as I thought that would be the most likely place for the enemy to cross.

From that place I could see their camp fires in the direction of Atlee's Station as well as to my right on the Telegraph or Brook road. I determined to strike at the party near Atlee's and with that view moved down to the station, where we met the pickets of the enemy. I would not allow their fire to be returned, but quickly dismounted 100 men and supporting them with the cavalry, ordered Colonel Cheek (of the North Carolina brigade) to move steadily on the camp while two guns were opened on them at very short range. * * *

Kilpatrick immediately moved his division away at a gallop, leaving one wagon with horses. .h.i.tched to it, and one caisson full of ammunition. The enemy was a brigade strong here with two other brigades immediately in their rear."

From these extracts it will be seen how commanding officers, when they write their official reports of a night rencounter, are apt to draw on their imaginations for the facts. The stout fight put up by Kilpatrick, and the graphic account by Hampton of how he whipped three brigades with a handful of confederates hastily a.s.sembled, are equally mythical.

Davies's report gives a very accurate description of the affair. From this we find that he picketed toward Richmond and the Meadow bridges, taking care of the flanks and rear. The slight skirmishing with his pickets, of which he speaks, must have been with small bodies that came out from Richmond or which followed him from his position of the day on the Brook pike. It had no relation to Hampton's attack which was from the opposite direction and entirely distinct. To Sawyer it was left, it would appear, to look out for the front--that is, toward Ashland and Hanover Courthouse. Sawyer sent the Seventh Michigan out on picket, the outer line advanced as far as Atlee's Station.

When Hampton came in from Hughes's cross roads, he did not stop to skirmish with the videttes. He did not fire a shot but followed the pickets into the camp and opened with carbines and two pieces of artillery at close range. No arrangements appear to have been made to support the Seventh properly in the event of such an attack, which might have been foreseen. Sawyer should have reinforced the Seventh with his entire brigade. And it was equally inc.u.mbent on Kilpatrick to support Sawyer with Davies's brigade if he needed support. Neither of these things was done. Kilpatrick's artillery made no response to that of Hampton. The only order was to retreat. Hampton was not far away from the facts when he said that "Kilpatrick immediately moved his division off at a gallop." He did not move it "at a gallop." He moved it at a walk. But he moved "immediately." He did not stop to fight, and morning found him well on the way to the Pamunkey river. It was an unlucky event for poor Litchfield. He was held as a prisoner of war very nearly if not quite until the curtain had fallen on the final scene at Appomattox. I do not remember that he ever again had the privilege of commanding his regiment.

[Ill.u.s.tration: A.C. LITCHFIELD]

Kilpatrick's strategy was better than his tactics. His plan was bold in conception, but faulty in execution. It has been shown that he made a mistake in dividing his command; that he made another when he failed to order an immediate attack after his arrival before the city. His afterthought of sending Preston and Taylor, at midnight, in a snow storm, and on a night so dark that it would have been impossible to keep together, to be sure of the way, or to distinguish friend from foe, to do a thing which he hesitated to do in the daytime and with his entire force, would have been a more serious blunder than either. Of course, if Preston had started, it would have been with the determination to succeed or lose his life in the adventure. That was his reputation and his character as a soldier. But the services and lives of such men are too valuable to be wasted in futile attempts. It might have been glorious but it would not have been war.

To conclude this rambling description. In October, 1907, while attending the Jamestown exposition I met Colonel St. George Tucker, president of the exposition company and a well known scion of one of the first families of Virginia. The conversation turned to certain incidents of the civil war, among others some of those pertaining to the Kilpatrick raid. Colonel Tucker was at the time a boy ten years of age. Armed with a gun he was at a window in the second story of his father's house ready to do his part in repelling the "vandals" should they invade the streets of the city. This circ.u.mstance sheds light on the real situation. With the schoolboys banded together to defend their homes, and every house garrisoned in that way, not to mention the regular soldiers and the men who were on duty, it is quite certain that Richmond would have been an uncomfortable place that night for Preston and his little band of heroes. A man's house is his citadel and boys and women will fight to defend it.

From Old Church the command moved Wednesday to Tunstall's Station, and thence by way of New Kent Courthouse and Williamsburg to Yorktown. At Yorktown the various regiments took transports to Washington and from Washington marched back to their old camps around Stevensburg, no event of importance marking the journey. They arrived on the Rapidan about the middle of the month, having been absent two weeks. The men stood the experience better than the horses. The animals were weakened and worn out and the time remaining before the opening of active operations was hardly sufficient for their recuperation.

CHAPTER XVI

THE WILDERNESS CAMPAIGN

In the spring of 1864, the cavalry of the army of the Potomac was thoroughly reorganized. Pleasonton, who had been rather a staff officer of the general commanding the army than a real chief of cavalry, was retired and Sheridan took his place. Kilpatrick was sent to the west and James H. Wilson, an engineer officer, succeeded him in command of the Third division. Buford's old division, the First, was placed under Torbert, an infantry officer whose qualifications as a commander of cavalry were not remarkable. There were several of his subordinates who were both more capable and more deserving, notably Custer, Merritt and Thomas C. Devin. John Buford, the heroic, one of the ablest of all the generals of division, had succ.u.mbed to the exposures of the previous campaign. His death befell in December, 1863, on the very day when he received his commission as major-general, a richly deserved reward for his splendid and patriotic services in the Gettysburg and other campaigns. His death created a void which it was hard to fill. Gregg was the only one of the three old and tried division commanders who remained with the corps.

Of the generals of brigade, Merritt and Devin remained with their old division. Davies was transferred from the Third to the Second, and Custer's Michigan brigade became the First brigade of the First division, the general going with it.

Pleasonton who was sent to Rosecrans, in Missouri, although perhaps not, like his ill.u.s.trious successor, a cavalry chief of the first rank, had a brilliant record, and in the campaign of 1863 had performed most meritorious and effective service and certainly deserves a high place in the list of union leaders of that period. In all the campaigns of the year 1863, he acquitted himself with the highest credit and in many of the battles, notably at Chancellorsville, Middleburg and Brandy Station, he was an equal match for Stuart and his able lieutenants. If, in the readjustment incident to the a.s.sumption by General Grant of the chief command, Pleasonton could have been permitted to serve loyally under Sheridan, who was his junior in rank, it would, doubtless, have been better for both of them. He would have been obliged, to be sure, to crucify his ambition and waive his rank, but his name might have been linked with those of Gregg, and Merritt, and Custer in the record of "Little Phil's" picturesque marches from the Wilderness to the James; from Harper's Ferry to Cedar Creek; and from Winchester to Appomattox.

He left the army in whose achievements he had borne so honorable a part, and no opportunities for distinction came to him afterwards. Others wore the laurels that might have been his.

Soon after his arrival, General Sheridan reviewed the cavalry corps on the open ground near Culpeper. There were ten thousand mounted men in line, and when they broke into column to pa.s.s in review before the a.s.sembled generals of the army, it was a magnificent spectacle. To this day the writer's blood quickens in his veins and a flush of pardonable pride mantles his face whenever he recalls the circ.u.mstance of one of Custer's staff coming to his quarters after the parade, to convey with the general's compliments the pleasant information that General Sheridan had personally requested him to compliment the officers and men of the regiment, on its excellent appearance and soldierly bearing on the review. Only a short time before, General Kilpatrick had sent a similar message after seeing the regiment at brigade drill. How cheering these messages were; and how full of encouragement to the full performance of duty in the trying times that were close at hand! Life is not too full of such words of cheer, even when we do our best. It is not so much admiration as appreciation that one craves from his fellow men, especially from those who are by circ.u.mstance placed over him. But envy, and malice, and a mean, begrudging spirit often stand at the door to keep it out, when it would fain enter, bringing the sunshine with it.

There was nothing narrow or mean about Sheridan. Conscious of his own greatness, he was too broad to begrudge recognition to others. When a subordinate deserved commendation and Sheridan knew it, he always gave it.

Although the movement of the army of the Potomac, which initiated in Virginia the campaign of 1864 and resulted in the battle of the Wilderness, began on May 3, it was the morning of May 4, when the Wolverine troopers left their camp near Culpeper. The Second and Third divisions, as has been shown, had the honor of leading the advance and preceded the infantry, crossing at Ely's and Germanna fords, respectively, on the day before. The First division bivouacked on the north side of the river during the night of May 4. At three o'clock on the morning of May 5, the march was resumed and, crossing at Ely's ford, it moved to Chancellorsville, and was encamped that night at the "Furnaces," south of the Orange plank road, about midway between Wilderness Church and Todd's Tavern, in the rear of the left of the union lines.

Early on the morning of May 6, "boots and saddles" and "to horse"

summoned the brigade to arms; and at two o'clock a.m., it was on the march by the Furnace road toward the intersection of that highway with the Brock turnpike. Gregg was at Todd's Tavern, at the junction of the Catharpin and Brock roads. Custer was to be the connecting link between Gregg's division and Hanc.o.c.k's corps. Devin, with the Second brigade, was ordered to report to Custer. Wilson had been out the previous day on the Orange plank road and pike, beyond Parker's Store, where he encountered Stuart's cavalry and was roughly handled. While moving up in the darkness, we came upon the scattered troopers of the First Vermont cavalry, which for some time before the redistribution had been attached to the Michigan brigade, but was then in Chapman's brigade of Wilson's division. They were moving to the rear, and seemed much chagrined over their defeat and declared that they did not belong to the Third division, but were the "Eighth Michigan."

"Come along with us," said their old Michigan companions-in-arms.

"Wish we could," they replied.

Arriving at his destination before daylight, Custer posted his troops so as to be ready to meet the expected attack. Two troops, one from the First Michigan the other from the Sixth, commanded by Captain George R.

Maxwell and Captain Manning D. Birge, respectively, were sent well out on the Brock road to picket the front. The line of battle was formed in the woods, facing a cleared s.p.a.ce, beyond which dense timber served as a screen to prevent the enemy's approach from being discovered. The right was held by the First and Sixth Michigan, formed in two lines, regimental front, the Sixth in rear, the men standing "in place, rest"

in front of their horses. It was prolonged to the left by the Fifth and Seventh Michigan and Devin's brigade, composed of the Fourth, Sixth and Ninth New York and Seventeenth Pennsylvania regiments of cavalry. Devin, however, did not arrive on the ground until the battle was well under way. The right of the line was "in the air," so far as was at that time known, the infantry not being in sight.

The open field directly in front extended some 200 yards beyond our position, to the right, and it was, perhaps, 500 yards across it to the woods. The timber in which we formed extended from the rear clear around the right and across the front. In other words, the patch of open ground was enclosed on three sides, at least, by dense woods. The alignment faced in a westerly direction, and was back in the timber far enough to be hidden from the approaching foe. To the right and as it turned out, somewhat to the rear, lay the army of the Potomac, which had been battling with Lee all the previous day; and orders had been issued for the fighting to be resumed at five o'clock in the morning.

Thus we stood, prepared, in a state of expectancy, awaiting the sounds that were to summon us to battle.

The brigade band was posted near the left flank of the First Michigan.

General Custer, alert and wary, with a portion of his staff and escort, was out inspecting the picket line.

The horse artillery had not yet arrived.