According to this pa.s.sage in Rom 2:14, we must understand f?s?? as referring to the good side of man's nature, and the same word in Eph. 2:3 as referring to the corrupt side of man's moral nature. The first refers to the "law of the mind;" the second, to the other "law in the members"

(Rom. 7:23). But there is another pa.s.sage (Gal. 2:15), which a.s.serts that the Jews by nature are not sinners, like the heathen. Now, as we can hardly suppose that the original instincts and innate tendencies of the Jewish child were radically good from birth, and essentially different from those of the heathen, and as such a supposition would contradict the whole argument of Paul in Rom. ch. 2, it is evident that f?s?? in Gal.

2:15 does not denote something original and innate. The meaning of this verse probably is, that the Jew from birth up, and by the mere fact of being born a Jew, came under the influences of a religious education, which preserved him from many forms of heathen depravity. The word, therefore, means in that pa.s.sage, not a Jew by nature, but a Jew by birth; and, if so, we are at liberty, if we choose, to ascribe the same meaning to the word in Ephesians, and to understand the text to teach that we were by birth placed under circ.u.mstances which tended necessarily to deprave the character.

This pa.s.sage, therefore, quoted by the writer, does not teach entire depravity by nature, but a partial depravity, either found in the hereditary tendencies and instincts, or acquired by means of the evil circ.u.mstances surrounding the child from his birth.

The second argument of the writer is, that the laws of mind compel us to refer sinful volitions to a sinful nature, as they compel us to refer qualities to a substance.

We admit that, where we see uniform and constant habits of action, we are compelled to refer these to a permanent character or state of being. If a man once in his life becomes intoxicated, we do not infer any habit of intemperance, or any vicious tendency; but if he is habitually intemperate, we are compelled, as the writer justly a.s.serts, to look beneath the separate single actions for one common principle and source.

But in a.s.suming that this source is a nature brought with us into the world, the writer seems to us to jump to a conclusion. It may be an acquired character, not an original nature. It may be an induced state of disease either of body or mind, a depravity which has commenced this side of childhood. We know that there are acquired habits both of mind and of body; otherwise, not only would it be impossible for a man to grow worse, but it would also be impossible for him to grow better, and there would be an end to all improvement and progress. Such an acquired character introduces unity into the subject of investigation, as completely as does an original nature, and therefore satisfies all the wants of the mind.

A precisely similar answer may be made to the writer's third argument, drawn from Christian experience. He is perfectly right, we think, in saying that the Christian is troubled, not merely, nor chiefly, by the recollection of single acts and volitions of evil, but in the evidence which they seem to give of a sinful state of mind and heart. He is right in considering any theory of moral evil shallow and inadequate which only takes into account sinful actions and sinful volitions. What earnest man, who has seriously set about correcting a fault, or improving his character, but has been obliged to say, "To will is present with me; but how to perform that which I will, I find not"? Every earnest effort shows us more plainly how deep the roots of evil run below the surface. We find a _law_ in the members warring against the law of the mind, and bringing us into captivity to the law of sin. This is the description which Paul gives of it. It is a _law_; that is, something regular, constant, permanent-a steady stress, a bias towards evil. The apostle, however, differs from the writer in placing this law, not in the will, but in the members; and also in stating that there is another law,-that of the mind,-which has a tendency towards good. In the unregenerate we understand him to teach that the law of evil is the stronger, and holds the man, the personal will, captive. In the regenerate, the reverse is the case. Nor does Paul teach that this sinful tendency is guilt. It is not "O _guilty_ man that I am!" but "O _wretched_ man that I am!"

Now, while we agree with the writer in rejecting as superficial and inadequate any theory of evil, whether emanating from our own denomination or from any other, which does not recognize this evil state or tendency lying below the volitions, we differ from him in that we think it not always a nature, but a character. He has not proved, nor begun to prove, that this dark ground of evil in man is always innate or original. It may or may not be; but the argument from Christian experience shows nothing of the sort.

The writer's fourth and remaining argument is, that the Church has, in all ages, believed in a sinful nature, as distinguished from conscious transgressions. If this were so, we admit that it should have weight in the inquiry; but we deny the fact so far, at least, as the sinful nature is concerned.(89)

The writer proceeds thus: "a.s.suming, then, that the fact of a sinful nature has been established, we pa.s.s to the second statement of St. Paul, that man is by nature a child of wrath. We pa.s.s from his statement that sin, in its ultimate form, is a nature, to his statement that this nature is guilt." If we have done justice to the writer's arguments,-and it has been our object to state them fairly, though briefly,-we submit that the fact of a sinful nature has not been established by them. He has shown that in man there is a tendency to evil running below the conscious, distinct volitions-that there is a permanent character, good or evil, which manifests itself, and becomes first apparent to ourselves, or to others, in these separate, spiritual exercises or actions. But that this stress either to good or evil, this law either of the mind or members, is original and inborn, is yet to be proved. Let us then consider the second point, namely, whether this character or nature, whichever it may be, is also guilt.

As the writer's first argument to prove a sinful nature was drawn from the Greek word f?s??, so his first argument to prove that nature guilt is derived from the Greek word ???? in the same pa.s.sage. "The apostle teaches," he says, "that sinful man is a child of wrath. Now, none but a guilty being can be the object of the righteous and holy displeasure of G.o.d." But this word, translated _wrath_, is confessedly used in other senses besides that of the divine anger or displeasure. It may mean the sufferings or punishments which come as the result of sin, in which sense it is used in Matt. 3:7, "Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?" and other places. This word is used in the pa.s.sage just quoted for some future evil; in John 3:36, for a present evil-"The wrath of G.o.d abides on him;" and in 1 Thess. 2:16, for a past evil-"For the wrath is come [lit. _has_ come] on them to the uttermost." It may mean the subjective feeling of guilt; the sense that we deserve the divine displeasure, which is removed by the a.s.surance of forgiveness. It may mean the state of alienation from G.o.d, which results by a law of the conscience from this sense of guilt-an alienation removed by the divine act by which G.o.d reconciles the sinner to himself. And the radical meaning, from which these secondary meanings flow, may be the essential antagonism existing between the holy nature of G.o.d and all evil. But whatever it means, it cannot intend anything like human anger. In the divine wrath there is neither selfishness nor pa.s.sion; and it must consist with an infinite love towards its object. The word, therefore, as used in Eph. 2:3, does not convey the idea of guilt, _a vi terminis_. It may mean as well, that this sinful tendency in man, manifesting itself in sinful actions, produces a state of estrangement or alienation between man and G.o.d. How far this is a guilty alienation, and how far it is evil and sorrowful, is not to be learned from the term itself.

But the main proof of the writer in support of his second position is found in the a.s.sertion, that this sinful tendency in man, out of which evil acts continually flow, is not a tendency of the physical nature, but of the will itself. He distinguishes the will proper from the mere faculty of single choices, and considers it to be a deeper power lying at the very centre of the soul, which determines the whole man with reference to some great and unlimited end of living. It is, in fact, the man himself-the person. For man, he a.s.serts, is not essentially intellect or feeling; but is essentially and at bottom a will, a self-determining creature. "His other faculties of knowing and feeling are grafted into this stock and root; and hence he is responsible from centre to circ.u.mference." He then affirms the will, thus defined, to be the responsible and guilty author of the sinful nature; being nothing more nor less than its constant and total determination to self as the ultimate end of living. This voluntary power, which is the man himself, has turned away from G.o.d and directed itself to self as an ultimate end; and this state of the will is the sinful nature of man.

We have no disposition to quarrel with the psychology of this statement.

We admit man to be essentially will, in the sense here described. He is essentially activity; an activity limited externally, by special organization and circ.u.mstances,-limited internally, by quant.i.ty of force, and knowledge.

Nor, again, do we deny that in the unregenerate state the will of man is directed to self rather than to G.o.d as its ultimate end; and that this is guilt, and in a certain sense total guilt. No man can serve two masters.

If he is obedient to one, he is necessarily disobedient to the other. This disobedience may, or may not, appear in act; but it is there in state. He whose ultimate end is self-gratification is always ready to sacrifice the will of G.o.d to his own. He whose ultimate end is G.o.d is always ready to sacrifice his own will. In this sense, the unregenerate man may be said to be wholly sinful; and he who is born of G.o.d, not to commit sin.

Thus much we grant; and the admission is a large one. But we must now object to the writer, that this is but one side of the question; and that he has omitted to see the other side. The sources of evil are not so simple as he seems to suppose; for man is a very complex being, and the world in which he lives is a very complex world. We therefore would inquire,-

What proof have we that this guilty direction of the will is a _nature_, in the sense claimed, i.e., something innate or original? Why may not the will have been turned gradually in this direction as we grow up, by enticements of pleasure; and why might not the will, in like manner, by means of wise culture, have been gradually directed to G.o.d?

Again: what proof have we that we are so wholly _unconscious_ of this direction of the will, as our author contends? That a great many of the acts of the will are unconscious acts, like the separate movements of the finger in a skilful pianist, or lifting of the feet in walking, we admit; and we are not responsible for these separate acts, but for the _preceding choice_, by means of which we determine to play the tune, or walk the mile. In like manner, the direction of the soul to self rather than to G.o.d may be moral evil; but is not moral guilt, until we become conscious of it, in a greater or less degree. Then, when partially or wholly awakened to the evil direction of the soul, if we allow ourselves to neglect this discovery, to turn away from the fact and forget it, on that conscious act presses the whole burden of guilt, and not on the unconscious volitions which may result from it. We say, therefore, in opposition to the writer, that though there may be depravity without consciousness of the depraved state, there cannot be guilt without consciousness of the evil choice, or, as the apostle says, "Sin is not imputed where there is no law."

Again: we totally dissent from the statement that this deep-lying will in man is unable to obey the commands, "Turn ye, turn ye from your evil way, for why will ye die?"-"Repent and be converted, that your sins may be blotted out,"-"Make you a new heart and a new spirit,"-"Choose you this day whom you will serve,"-"Believe in the Lord Jesus Christ and be saved."

The writer says, that "such a power as this, including so much, and running so deep, which is a determination of the whole soul, cannot, from the very nature of the case, be such a facile and easily managed power as that by which we resolve to do some particular thing in every-day life."

True: not _so_ easily managed; but can it not be managed at all? It may require _more_ self-examination to understand what the direction of the will is, and more concentration of thought and will, and more leaning on G.o.d's help; but _with_ all these are we able or not able to turn to G.o.d?

He says, the great main tendency of the will to self and sin as an ultimate end, though having a free and criminal origin, "is not to be reversed so easily." True, again; but why not _less_ easily? The writer speaks of the sinful will as a "total determination of itself to self;"

and asks "how the power that is to reverse all this process can possibly come out of the will thus shut up, and entirely swallowed in the process.

How is the process to destroy itself?" But what! Has man become _a process_? He is essentially will, but is this will blind mechanism? Has it not, according to our author's own theory, intelligence, conscience, affection, rooted into it? The moment that the writer begins to speak of the will, as unable to change its direction, he is compelled to conceive of it materially and mechanically, and not as the moral, responsible soul.

He says, "The human will becomes a current that becomes unmanageable simply because of its own momentum." And therefore, again, he is obliged to conceive of the whole voluntary power as lost, and lost before man was born; and he reduces all our real freedom to the original act of the will previous to birth, which took place when we were present in Adam's soul, and committed the first transgression with him.

This is plainly the denial of all human freedom since the fall of Adam. We bring into the world, according to the writer, a will wholly and inevitably bent to evil. We have no consciousness of this tendency, and if we were conscious of it we have no power to change it; but we yet are responsible for it, and guilty because of it, inasmuch as we began this state ourselves when all our souls were mystically present in the soul of Adam. Of this theory, we merely say now, that, if it be true, man is not _now_ guilty of any sin which he commits in his mortal life; for he is not now a free being. He is only responsible for the sin which he freely committed in Adam. He is no more responsible when we suppose his sin to proceed from his will, than when we suppose it to proceed from a depraved sensuous nature, or from involuntary ignorance, for he is no more free in the one case than in the other. He may be an infinitely depraved and infinitely miserable being, but he can in no true sense be called a _guilty_ being. Again we say, if this theory be true, it is an awful theory, and one which we cannot possibly reconcile with the justice or goodness, and still less with the fatherly character, of G.o.d. That G.o.d should so have const.i.tuted human nature that all the millions of the human race should have had this fatal opportunity of destroying themselves utterly, by one simultaneous act, in Adam, is, to say the least, an _awful_ theory to propound concerning our heavenly Father. We might put Christ's argument to any man not hardened by theological study, as it seems to us, with irresistible force. "What man is there among _you_, BEING A FATHER," who could do anything of this sort? But we know too well that all such appeals fall harmless from the sevenfold shield of a systematized theology.

Therefore we will only say further, concerning this theory, that, as being _apparently_ in direct conflict with the divine attributes as taught in the New Testament; as making man a mere process deprived of real freedom; as proving man not guilty for any sin committed in this life; and as thereby deadening the sense of responsibility, and showing that we cannot possibly obey the command, "Repent and turn to G.o.d,"-this theory of a sin committed in Adam _ought to have the amplest proof_ before we believe it.

We admit that it may be true, though opposed to all our ideas of G.o.d, man, and duty. But being thus opposed, it ought to be sustained by the most unanswerable arguments. If Jesus and his apostles have told us so plainly, we will believe it if we can. How is it, then? Not a word on the subject in the four Gospels. Not a text from the lips of Jesus which can be pretended to lay down any such theory. He does not even mention the name of Adam once in the Gospels, nor allude to him, except when speaking of marriage. This theory rests, not on anything contained in the Gospels, book of Acts, or Epistles of Peter, James, or John, but on two texts in two Epistles of Paul (Rom. 5:14; 1 Cor. 15:22). In the latter pa.s.sage Paul says not a word of Adam's sin, but only of his death,-the whole chapter treating, not of sin, but of death and the resurrection. This pa.s.sage, therefore, can hardly be considered a plain statement of the theory. The other, in Romans, is confessedly so far from plain, that it is difficult to make it agree with any theory; but the most evident meaning, to one who has no theory to support, is, that sin began with Adam, and the consequences of sin, which are moral and physical evil, began also with him; and as he thus set in motion a series of evil tendencies which we find in our organization, and which Paul elsewhere calls the law of the members, and a series of evil circ.u.mstances which we find around us in the world, both of which are the occasion of sin, we may trace back to him the commencement of human disobedience. If the pa.s.sage teaches anything more than this, it certainly does not teach it plainly or explicitly.

-- 4. Defence of Everlasting Punishment, by Dr. Nehemiah Adams and Dr. J.

P. Thompson.

Two defences of this dreadful doctrine have appeared within a few years-one by Rev. Nehemiah Adams, D. D. (chiefly known by his many and determined pleas for slavery), and the other by Dr. Thompson of New York.

We will first examine Dr. Adams's tract on "The Reasonableness of Eternal Future Punishment."

We have these three objections to it:-

I. It, throughout, denies the sovereignty of G.o.d.

II. It is, throughout, a system of naturalism.

III. It, throughout, ignores the central truth of the gospel.

It is our business to substantiate these a.s.sertions by sufficient proof.

1. The view taken in his tract, of G.o.d, cannot be true, because it conflicts with his supreme and sovereign deity.

Of course, this is to dethrone G.o.d. G.o.d, if not sovereign, is not G.o.d. Any view which disturbs, however remotely, the supremacy of the Deity, must be a relapse towards Pagan idolatry. We charge this tendency on the whole tenor of this tract. We affirm that it seriously impairs that confidence and strength which can only come from reliance on Omnipotence, and remands us to the terrors and narrowness of Polytheism: not consciously, of course, or intentionally, but by the logic of its ideas and the tendency of its argument.

According to Dr. Adams's view of the world, it is a scene of conflict between G.o.d and the Devil. The prize contended for is the souls of men.

G.o.d wishes to save them: the Devil wishes to d.a.m.n them. By immense efforts,-by the unparalleled sacrifice of himself on the cross,-G.o.d succeeds in saving a portion of this race, whom the Devil had plunged into fearful and desperate sin. As for the rest, He can do nothing with them, but must go away and leave them; escaping with the saved to some other region, where the sin and misery of the rest may be lost sight of.

The only divine supremacy which Dr. Adams admits is that of force. G.o.d is, on the whole, _stronger_ than the Devil; so that He can prevent him from carrying his ravages beyond certain limits. G.o.d can "hem in and overrule"

the power of sin; but he cannot conquer it. He has no complete power over the heart and will of men to become supreme there; but he has power over their conduct, and can restrain that within certain limits.

G.o.d's sovereignty, according to Dr. Adams, is only like that of a human government, and that, again, a weak one. A human government is strong when it is able to dispense with standing armies, with an omnipresent police, with prisons and dungeons: it is weak when its authority is only maintained by these. In the first case, it rests on the love of the people; in the other case, only on force.

Now, according to Dr. Adam's tract, G.o.d's sovereignty is essentially one of force. He is not sovereign by overcoming sin through his own holiness, but only by restraining its outbreaks by externally applied force. So far from conquering sin, he is represented as giving up all hope of conquering it. He has tried everything in his power, and has failed. He can do nothing more. Dr. Adams speaks of G.o.d's "having expended upon us all which the gospel of his grace includes," and of "the failure of that which is the brightness of his glory." Now, Dr. Adams says, "What G.o.d will probably do is, to go away and leave us," G.o.d says, according to the idea of this tract, "I will place all of you, who sin, in a world by yourselves, from which I and my friends will forever withdraw." In substance, He gives up, and acknowledges himself defeated. He is beaten by sin, which is more powerful than his gospel. Sin compels the Deity to compromise; to take some souls, and to leave others; to divide the universe,-love reigning in one part of it, hatred and wickedness in another.

2. The second objection to the doctrine of everlasting punishment, as taught in these works, is, that it is a system of pure materialism. It is naturalism, as opposed to supernaturalism. All its arguments from Scripture interpret Scripture according to its letter, and not according to its spirit. While much stress is laid on the word "eternal," no real eternity is believed in, or even conceived of. The fundamental law of religious knowledge-namely, that a man must be born of the Spirit in order to see the kingdom of G.o.d, and that spiritual things must be spiritually discerned-is wholly lost sight of. The spiritual world, with its bliss and its woe, is supposed to be a continuation of the natural world, instead of being its exact opposite. The same conditions of s.p.a.ce and time are supposed to prevail there as here. h.e.l.l is regarded by Dr. Adams as a large place, located in some remote part of the universe, where the sufferings and blasphemies of d.a.m.ned souls and devils will not disturb the sentimental happiness of himself and his pious companions. Eternity he regards as an enormous and quite inconceivable acc.u.mulation of time, instead of being the very negation of time. An unlimited quant.i.ty of days, months, and years, is his notion of eternity.

In like manner, all the arguments by which the school to which he belongs maintains this doctrine, are drawn from relations which exist in this world. Great use is made of the a.n.a.logies of human government. It is said that it would not be safe for the Deity to forgive sins on the simple condition of repentance, without an atonement, because it would not be safe for human governments to do so. The government of G.o.d is made wholly similar to the imperfect and ignorant governments of men. When we say that G.o.d, as described in the New Testament, is not a Being to inflict everlasting suffering hereafter, we are told that he inflicts suffering here; as though there were no essential distinction between the finite and the infinite, the temporal and the eternal. When we argue that G.o.d would not suspend the eternal destiny of a soul upon the conduct and the determination of a brief earthly life, we have instances given us of great risks to which we are exposed, and great evils which we may incur, in this world; as though there were no difference between a partial loss and total destruction. When we say that the justice of G.o.d will not permit him to punish everlastingly those who, like the heathen, have never known Christ, we have instances given of those who have ignorantly burned themselves or have fallen down precipices. In all such examples, these reasoners overlook the essential distinction between the finite and the infinite.

They forget that all finite evil can be made the means of a greater ultimate good, but that infinite evil cannot.

It is a curious fact, that those who are most Orthodox fall most easily into a very hard and dry naturalism. G.o.d is to them a king sitting on a throne in some far heaven outside of the world, not a spirit pervading it and sustaining it. He governs men from without by offering them rewards and threatening them with punishments, not by inward inspirations and influence. He teaches them from without by an outward Christ, an outward Bible, outward preachers, pulpits, creeds, Sabbaths, and churches; not by Christ formed within us, not by epistles and gospels written on the fleshly tables of the heart. The day of judgment is a particular time, when G.o.d shall sit on his throne, and all appear before him; not the perpetual spiritual sentence p.r.o.nounced in each human soul by the divine law. And so heaven is a place where there is to be some singing of psalms, and such amus.e.m.e.nts as are here considered proper in Orthodox families; h.e.l.l, another place, where souls are shut up, to suffer from physical fire, or at least from some external infliction. The doctrine taught by the Saviour in the first twelve verses of his first sermon, that the humble, the generous, the merciful, are already blessed, and have heaven now, does not appear to be at all comprehended. That heaven and h.e.l.l are in this world already; that truth, love, and use are its essence, whilst falsehood and selfishness are the essence of h.e.l.l,-these, though rudimental facts of Christianity, are commonly considered mere mysticism.

But those who do not see all this have not seen the kingdom of heaven, and must be born again, into a new world of spiritual ideas, in order to see it.

3. The third and princ.i.p.al argument against the doctrine of everlasting punishment is, that it is _inconsistent with the divine love to his creatures_. It is impossible for G.o.d to manifest love to a human being by inflicting everlasting torment upon him. It cannot do him good, because, according to this theory, the period of probation is past, and he has no power now to repent. As far, therefore, as the man himself is concerned, it is gratuitous suffering-torment inflicted without any purpose. It cannot be said that G.o.d has any love for the soul which he is treating in this way. He has cast it off. To that soul, nevermore, throughout the ages of an everlasting existence, shall G.o.d appear as a friend, but always as an enemy.

We sometimes hear of a father who disinherits a child in consequence of some act of disobedience. In one of the most touching tragedies in the English language, a father refuses to forgive his daughter who had married contrary to his wishes. He leaves her to starve, and refuses to forgive her or to see her. No one approves of this conduct in the parent. But every Orthodox man, who believes in everlasting punishment, attributes an infinitely greater cruelty to G.o.d; infinitely greater, because the obstinacy of the human parent endures only during a short life, but the severity of G.o.d endures forever.

The force of this objection is such, that Dr. Adams has felt obliged to add to his tract on "Everlasting Punishment" another tract upon the text, "G.o.d is love," endeavoring to show a consistency between the two. But he does this by subst.i.tuting something else in the place of the last. It is curious enough, that a master in Israel should have written a tract upon the "love" of G.o.d, and should have subst.i.tuted "benevolence" instead of it. In other words, instead of that fatherly love to every individual which is the essential fact revealed in the gospel, he gives us a general good-will towards the human race. Such a general benevolence he finds not inconsistent with the doctrine of everlasting punishment; for, if love be only general good-will, then, the greatest good of the greatest number being the object, there is nothing to complain of if a few are sacrificed for the sake of the rest. It is not, to be sure, easy to see how those who have safely reached glory, and are in no danger of relapse, can be benefited by the knowledge that their old neighbors and friends are in h.e.l.l; but there may be some benefit which is not apparent. By quietly subst.i.tuting, therefore, the idea of benevolence in the place of love, the difficulty may be evaded, which otherwise is unanswerable.

But what an entire confusion of ideas is this, which subst.i.tutes a general benevolence for a personal affection, good-will towards the race for love to the individual! It is, in fact, abolishing the idea of Father, and subst.i.tuting that of Ruler. The kind ruler, actuated by benevolence, desires the good of all his subjects; but he does not love them as individuals. But the father loves the child with a wholly different feeling. The tie is personal, not general. It is one of mutual knowledge and mutual dependence. We cannot love one whom we do not know; but we can exercise benevolence towards him very easily. Benevolence depends wholly on the character of the benevolent person; but love is drawn out by the object loved. I do not love my child because I am benevolent, but because it is my child. The infant draws forth a host of feelings, before unknown, in the mother's heart. She does not love her infant because she is a benevolent woman, but because the infant excites her love. A man is benevolent towards the sufferers in Kansas, whom he has never seen; but he does not love them. He loves his wife, but is not benevolent towards her.

Benevolence and love, therefore, are not only essentially different in their nature, origin, and manifestations, but so different as often to exclude each other.