APPENDIX. CRITICAL NOTICES.

In this Appendix we shall add a brief critical examination of certain recent works on points connected with our previous subjects. These criticisms will complete the discussion in these various directions, so far as s.p.a.ce will allow here. The largest part of what follows has been printed already, either in the "Christian Examiner," or in the "Monthly Journal of the American Unitarian a.s.sociation."

-- 1. On the Defence of Nescience in Theology, by Herbert Spencer and Henry L. Mansel.

Mr. Herbert Spencer, in his book called "First Principles," lays down the doctrine of theological nescience, as the final result of religious inquiry. In his chapter on "Ultimate Religious Ideas" he argues thus: The religious problem is, Whence comes the universe? In answer to this question only three statements are possible. It is self-existent. It was self-created. It was created by external agency. Now, none of these, says Spencer, is tenable. For, (1.) Self-existence means simply an existence without a beginning, and it is not possible to conceive of this. The conception of infinite past time is an impossibility. (2.) Self-creation is Pantheism. We can conceive, somewhat, of self-evolution, but not of a potential universe pa.s.sing into an actual one. (3.) The theistic hypothesis is equally inconceivable. For this is to suppose the world made as a workman makes a piece of furniture. We can conceive of this last, because the workman has the material given; he only adds form to the substance. To produce matter out of nothing is the real difficulty. No simile enables us to conceive of this production of matter out of nothing.

Again, says Spencer, s.p.a.ce is something, the non-existence of which is inconceivable; hence the creation of s.p.a.ce is inconceivable. And lastly, says Spencer, if G.o.d created the universe, the question returns, Whence came G.o.d? The same three answers recur. G.o.d was self-existent, or he was self-created, or he was created _ab extra_. The last theory is useless.

For it leads to an endless series of potential existences. So the theist returns to self-existence; which, however, says Spencer, is as inconceivable as a self-existent universe, involving the inconceivable idea of unlimited duration.

Nevertheless, continues Spencer, we are compelled to regard phenomena as effects of some cause. We must believe in a cause of that cause, till we reach a _first cause_. The First Cause must be infinite and absolute. He then follows Mansel in showing the contradiction between the two ideas.

But total negation is not the result,-only nescience. Atheism, Pantheism, and Theism agree in one belief, namely, that of a problem to be solved. An unknown G.o.d is the highest result of theology and of philosophy. "If religion and science are to be reconciled, the basis of the reconciliation must be their deepest, widest, and most certain of all facts-that the power which the universe manifests is utterly inscrutable."

Thus Mr. Spencer proposes to take back human thought eighteen centuries, and ignoring the conquests of Christian faith in civilization, theology, and morals, carries us to Athens, in the time of Paul, to worship at the altar of an unknown G.o.d. He makes a solitude in the soul, and calls it peace. He makes peace between religion and science, by commanding the first to surrender at discretion to the other. Science knows nothing of G.o.d; therefore theology must know nothing of G.o.d. But not so. Let each impart to the other that which it possesses, and which the other lacks.

Let science enlarge theology with the idea of law, and theology inform science with the idea of a living G.o.d.

It is not difficult to detect the fallacies in this argument of Spencer for religious nescience. His notion of conception is that of a purely sensible image. He a.s.sumes that we have no knowledge but sensible knowledge, and then easily infers that we do not know G.o.d. We can conceive, he says, of a rock on which we are standing, but not of the whole earth. No great magnitudes, he declares, can be conceived. The conception of infinite time is, therefore, an impossibility.

But it is clear to any one, not bound hand and foot by the a.s.sumptions of sensationalism, that it is just as easy to conceive of the whole globe of earth, as of the piece of it which we see. We cannot have _a visual image_ of the whole earth, indeed, but the mental conception of the globe is as distinct as that of the stone we throw from our hand. And so far from the conception of infinite duration being an impossibility, not to conceive of time and s.p.a.ce as infinite is the impossibility. It is impossible to imagine or conceive of the beginning of time, or the commencement of s.p.a.ce.

Looking at his trilemma concerning the universe, namely, that it was either, (1.) Self-existent, (2.) Self-created, or, (3.) Created by an external power, we say,-

1. The real objection to a self-existent universe, is not that we cannot conceive of existence without beginning. Nothing is easier than to conceive of an everlasting, unchanging universe, without beginning or end.

It is not existence, but change, that suggests cause. Phenomena, events, require us to believe in some power which produces them. Now, the events which take place in the universe suggest an intelligent, absolute, and central cause, that is, a cause combining supreme wisdom, power, and goodness. A self-existent universe is not inconceivable, but it is incredible.

2. Self-creation, he objects, is Pantheism. But this is no reason for denying it, since Pantheism may, for all we see at this stage of the argument, be the true explanation of the universe. The real objection to the hypothesis of a self-created universe (or of a self-created G.o.d), is that it involves the contradiction of something which exists and which does not exist at the same moment; at the moment of self-creation, the universe must exist in order to create, but must be non-existent in order to be created. A self-created universe, then, is not incredible because it involves Pantheism, but because it involves a contradiction.

3. He objects to the Theistic hypothesis, that we cannot conceive of the production of matter (more strictly, of substance) out of nothing. He adds that no simile can enable us to imagine it.

But I can produce, out of nothing, something visible, tangible, and audible. There is no motion and no sound. I move my arm by the power of will, and I produce both sound and motion. The motion of a body in s.p.a.ce is a material phenomenon; for whatever is perceived by the senses is material. We do then constantly perceive material phenomena created out of nothing, by human will.

His argument against the Theist, that s.p.a.ce could not have been created by G.o.d, since its non-existence is inconceivable, is much more plausible. But suppose we grant that s.p.a.ce, supposed to be a real existence, was not created in time. Does it follow from that, that it does not proceed from G.o.d? Not being an event in time, it does not require a cause; but being conceived of as a reality, it may have eternally proceeded from the divine will, and so not be independent of the Creator.

And as regards his trilemma concerning Deity, that also fails in the failure of his thesis that eternal duration is inconceivable. His argument against the self-existent Deity, only rests on that a.s.sumption which we have shown to be untenable.

But Mr. Spencer, who is not a theologian, is at this point reenforced by Mr. Mansel, on whose former work, "The Limits of Religious Thought," we proceed to offer some criticism. This also is an argument for nescience in theology, in the presumed interests of revelation. Mr. Martineau has ably shown the weakness and the dangerous tendency of this whole argument of Mansel, in an article to which we earnestly refer our readers.

The work of Mr. Mansel is a desperate attempt to save Orthodox doctrines from the objections of reason, not by replying to those objections and pointing out their fallacy, but by showing that similar objections can be brought against all religious belief. For example, when reason objects to the Trinity, that it is a contradiction, Mr. Mansel does not attempt to show that it is _not_ a contradiction, but argues that our belief in G.o.d is another contradiction of the same kind. His inference therefore is, that as we believe in G.o.d, notwithstanding the contradiction, we ought to believe in the Trinity also, notwithstanding the contradiction. If we believe one, we may believe both.

But this is a dangerous argument; since it is evident that one might reply, that there remains another alternative; which is, to believe _neither_. If Mr. Mansel succeeds in convincing his readers, the result may be a belief in the Trinity, or it may be a disbelief in G.o.d altogether; one of two things-either a return to Orthodoxy, or a departure from all religion. Either they will renounce reason in order to retain religion, or they will renounce religion in order to retain reason.

At the very best, also, the help which this argument offers us is to be paid for somewhat dearly. It proposes to save Orthodoxy by giving up the use of reason in religion. Mr. Mansel would say, "by giving up the unlimited use of reason;" but, as we shall presently see, this comes very much to the same thing at last.

What, then, is the nature of Mr. Mansel's argument? It is an argument founded upon Sir William Hamilton's philosophy of the Unconditioned. Now, this has been generally considered the weak side of Hamilton's system.

According to him, the unconditioned is inconceivable: in other words, of the Absolute and Infinite we have no conception at all. But this denies to man the power of conceiving of G.o.d, and so leads directly to Atheism. This charge has already been brought against Hamilton's philosophy, in various quarters; for example, in the "North British Review " for May, 1835. But we will not here attempt any examination of Hamilton's theory, but confine ourselves to Mr. Mansel.

The argument of Mansel is this (p. 75): "To conceive the Deity as he is, we must conceive him as First Cause, as Absolute, and as Infinite. By the First Cause is meant that which produces all things, and is itself produced of none; by the Absolute is meant that which exists in and by itself, having no necessary relation to any other being; by the Infinite is meant that which is free from all possible limitation."

Having thus defined the Deity as the First Cause, the Absolute, and the Infinite, Mansel goes on to show that these ideas are mutually contradictory and destructive. A First Cause necessarily supposes effects, and therefore cannot be absolute: nor can the Infinite be a person; for personality is a limitation. By a course of such arguments as these, Mansel endeavors to show that the reason is as incapable of conceiving G.o.d as it is of conceiving the Trinity, the Atonement, or any other Orthodox doctrine; and since we do not renounce our belief in G.o.d because of these contradictions, neither ought we, because of similar contradictions, to renounce our belief in the Trinity.

Such is the substance of Mansel's statement, though the arguments by which it is proved are varied with great ingenuity and to great extent. This course of thought is by no means original, either with Mr. Mansel or Sir William Hamilton. A far greater thinker than either of them (Immanuel Kant) had long before shown the logical contradictions of the understanding in what he called the Antinomies of the pure reason. But the important question is, If the reason contradicts itself thus in its conception of Deity, how are we to obtain a ground for our belief in G.o.d?

Mansel answers, "Through revelation; that is, through the direct declarations of Scripture." This he calls faith. We are to believe in a personal G.o.d on the ground of a Bible confirmed by miracles.

This result is so strange, that it may well seem incredible. Yet we cannot think that we have misrepresented the tendency of the argument; though, of course, we have given no ideas of the acuteness and flexibility of the reasoning, the extent of the knowledge, and mastery of logic, in this work. That such a position should be taken by a religious man, in the supposed interest of Christianity, is sufficiently strange; for it seems to us equally untenable in its grounds, unfounded in its statements, empty of insight, destructive in its results. We will add, very briefly, a few of the criticisms which occur to us.

The first thing which strikes us in the argument is, that everywhere it deals with words rather than with things. The whole object of the discussion concerns the meaning of terms, and it deals throughout with the relation of words to other words. It is an acute philological argument. We feel ourselves to be arguing about forms, and not about substances. Now, such arguments may confuse, but they cannot convince. We do not know, perhaps, what to say in reply; but we remain unsatisfied. One not used to logic may listen to an argument which shall conclusively prove that white is black; that nothing is greater than something; that a man who jumps from the top of the house can never reach the ground; but, though the thing is proved, he is not convinced. So, when Mr. Mansel proves to us that we cannot conceive of a Being who is at the same time Infinite and Personal, we are unable, perhaps, to reply to the argument; but we know it to be false, since we actually have the two conceptions in our mind.

We _do_ conceive of the Deity as an infinite personality. Of what use to tell us that we _cannot_ have an idea, when we know that we _do_ have it?

Mansel tells us that we cannot think the idea of the Infinite and Absolute. He says (p. 110), "The Absolute and the Infinite are thus, like the Inconceivable and Imperceptible, names indicating, not an object of thought or of consciousness at all, but the mere absence of the conditions under which consciousness is possible."

But, then, they are only words, with no meaning attached; and, if so, how can we argue about them at all? All argument must cease when we come to an unmeaning phrase; therefore the existence of Mr. Mansel's argument proves the falsehood of his a.s.sertion. Since he argues about the Infinite, it is evident that he has the idea of the Infinite in his mind.

Mr. Mansel agrees in principle wholly with the Atheists; for the Atheists do not say that G.o.d does not exist, or that G.o.d cannot exist, but that we cannot know that he exists. So says Mr. Holyoake, a leading modern Atheist. This is what Mansel also a.s.serts, only he goes farther than they, contending that the very idea of G.o.d is impossible to the human reason. It is true that he believes in G.o.d on grounds of revelation, which the Atheists do not; but he agrees with them in setting aside all natural and reasonable knowledge of Deity.

But how is it possible to obtain an idea of G.o.d from revelation, if we are before dest.i.tute of such an idea? When Paul preached to the Athenians, he addressed them as having already a true, though an imperfect, idea of G.o.d.

"Whom, therefore, ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you." But, if they had not already an idea of G.o.d, how could he have given them such an idea? Suppose that he works a miracle, and says, "This miracle proves that G.o.d has sent me to teach you." But, by the supposition, they know nothing about G.o.d; consequently, they have nothing by which to test the truth of a revelation professing to come from him. Neither miracles, nor the nature of the truth taught, nor the character of the teacher, avail anything as evidence of a revelation from a Being of whom we know nothing. Without a previous knowledge of G.o.d, only immediate revelation is possible.

Mr. Mansel, therefore, is one who, without a foundation, builds a house on the sand. He attempts to erect faith in G.o.d after taking away the foundation of reason. The apostles built revealed religion upon natural religion, revealed theology upon natural theology, according to the rule, "That is not first which is spiritual, but that which is natural; afterward that which is spiritual." Christ said, "Ye believe in G.o.d: believe also in me." Mr. Mansel reverses all this, and makes Christ say, "Ye believe in me: believe also in G.o.d."

But, even if it were possible to ascend to belief in G.o.d through belief in Christ, we must ask, Is not belief thought? If the mind cannot _think_ the Infinite, how can it believe the Infinite? Must we not apprehend a proposition before we can believe it? Does not the conception of a thing logically precede the belief of it? If it is impossible to apprehend the Absolute, if this is only an empty name, how is it possible to believe in the Absolute on grounds of revelation, or on any other grounds? A miracle cannot communicate to the mind an idea which is beyond its power of conception.

Mr. Mansel declares that our religious knowledge is _regulative_, but not _speculative_.

He lays great stress on this distinction: by which he means that we have ideas of the Deity sufficient to guide our practice, but not to satisfy our intellect; which tell us, not what G.o.d is in himself, but how he _wills_ that we should think of him. According to this view, all revelation is overturned, just as all natural religion has been previously overturned. Revelation does not reveal G.o.d on this theory. We have no knowledge of G.o.d in the gospel, any more than we had in nature. Instead of knowledge, we have only law. But this seems to despoil Christianity of its vital force. Christ says, "This is life eternal, to _know_ thee, the only true G.o.d." But Mr. Mansel tells us that such knowledge of G.o.d is impossible. Therefore, instead of the gospel, he gives us the law; for it is certain that his _regulative_ truths are simply moral precepts, addressed to the will, not to the intellect; capable of being obeyed, but not of being understood.

The radical error of Mansel seems to be this,-that his mind works only in the logical region belonging to the understanding, and is ignorant of those higher truths which are beheld by the reason. He has tried to find G.o.d by logical processes, and, of course, has failed. He therefore concludes that G.o.d cannot be known by the intellect. He has fully demonstrated that G.o.d cannot be comprehended by the logical understanding; and in this he has done a good work. But he has not shown that G.o.d cannot be known by the intuitive reason. The understanding comprehends: the reason apprehends. The understanding perceives the form: reason takes holds of the substance. The understanding sees how things are related to each other: the reason sees how things are in themselves. The understanding cannot, therefore, see the infinite and absolute; cannot apprehend substance or cause; knows nothing of the eternal. But the reason is as certain of cause as of effect; knows eternity as really as it knows time; it is as sure of the existence of spirit as it is of matter; and sees the infinite to be as real as the finite. Therefore, though we cannot comprehend G.o.d by logic, we can apprehend him by reason. We can be as sure of his being as we are of our own, and we are not obliged to explain away all those profound scriptures which teach us that the object and end of our being is to know G.o.d.

Since, therefore, Mr. Mansel's argument, with all its acuteness, learning, and honesty, tends directly to Atheism; since, by overturning the foundation of Christianity, it overturns Christianity itself; since it subst.i.tutes mere moral laws in place of the vital forces of the gospel,-it is no wonder that its positions have been rejected with much unanimity by the most eminent Orthodox scholars. Its defence of Orthodoxy costs too much. Leading thinkers of very different schools-for example, Mr.

Brownson, the Roman Catholic, in his "Quarterly Review;" Professor Hickok, the Presbyterian, in the "Bibliotheca Sacra;" and Mr. Maurice, of the Church of England, in an able pamphlet-have opposed with great force the arguments and conclusions of this volume. It is true that some Orthodox divines consider that Mr. Mansel has _demonstrated_ that the human consciousness is unequal to the speculative conception of a Being at once absolute, infinite, and personal, and seem gladly to have the aid of this book in defending the Trinity. But the more distinguished and experienced thinkers mentioned above are cautious of accepting the help of so dangerous an ally.

-- 2. On the Defence of Verbal Inspiration by Gaussen.

Following the declaration of the apostle Paul, that "the letter killeth,"

we have, in the text of this volume, set aside all the theories of the Bible which a.s.sume its absolute and literal infallibility. But within a few years, a work in defence of this doctrine has been published abroad, by an excellent man, M. Gaussen, of Geneva, and translated and republished in America by Rev. Dr. Kirk, of Boston. Such a work, coming from such sources, deserves some examination. We shall, therefore, show the course of argument followed in this book, and the reasons which lead us to consider its conclusions unsound, and its reasoning inadequate.

Inspiration, as defined by Gaussen, is "that inexplicable power which the divine Spirit formerly exercised over the authors of the Holy Scriptures, to guide them even in the employment of the words they were to use, and to preserve them from all error, as well as from every omission.