(_b._) _The New School Presbyterians._-(Rev. George Duffield, in Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1863.) Although Dr. Duffield objects to the language of the Old School Presbyterians in denying "free agency," and regarding man "as dest.i.tute of ability as a block of marble," he yet declares that the New School, as well as the Old, believe that in the unconverted state "man can do nothing morally good." Still, he adds, men can accept the offers of salvation made by Jesus Christ. But he positively denies that "man, in his natural state, independent of the gospel and Spirit of Christ, has ability _perfectly_ to obey _all_ the commandments of G.o.d." We suppose that most persons would agree with him in this statement.

(_c._) _The Old School in New England Theology._-(Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1863. Article by Professor Lawrence, East Windsor, Connecticut.) This writer contends that human inability is moral, and not natural-a distinction much dwelt upon by the Hopkinsians, but rejected by the Old School Presbyterians. This system differs from the Arminian or Methodist view in insisting that man has power enough to sin, though not enough to obey.

(_d._) _Hopkinsianism._-(Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1862.) The Hopkinsians profess to contend for free agency, in order to save responsibility. They adopt the ideas of Edwards on free agency. But freedom, with them, consists only in choice. Whatever we choose, we choose freely. The carnal man is as free in choosing evil as the spiritual man in choosing good. All real freedom in this system disappears in a juggle of words.

The result of this examination will show that the great body of the Orthodox, of all schools, continues to deny any real ability in the unregenerate man to do the will of G.o.d. They do not _say_ that "man has no power to do his duty," but that is the impression left by their teaching.

The distinction between natural and moral inability is insufficient; for it is as absurd to say that a man is unable not to sin, when you only mean that he chooses to sin, as it would he to say, when invited to eat your dinner, "I am unable to eat," meaning only that you were unwilling.

Besides, if inability is moral, it is in the will, and not in the nature, and so is not natural depravity at all. It is also making G.o.d unjust to teach that he considers us guilty for a misfortune. If we derive a corrupted nature from Adam, that is our misfortune, and not our fault, and G.o.d owes us not anger, but pity. Instead of punishing us, he should compensate us for this disaster.

Therefore the unreason, the want of logic, and the absence of any just view of G.o.d, appear, more or less, throughout these statements. For where there is no ability, there can be no guilt. Just as soon as man ceases to have the power to do right, he ceases to have the power to do wrong.

Inability and guilt, which are connected by all these creeds, logically exclude each other. If our nature is incapable of doing good, then it is incapable of committing sin. One or the other must be given up. Keep which you will, but you cannot keep both. We may be totally depraved by our nature; but then we cease to be sinners, and cease to be guilty. Or we may be going wholly wrong, and so be sinful, but then we have the power of going right.

This is the inconsistency in almost all Orthodox systems. By dwelling so much on human weakness, they destroy at last the sense of responsibility.

-- 12. Some further Features of Orthodox Theology concerning Human Sinfulness.

In the article in the Bibliotheca Sacra before referred to (April, 1863), by Edward A. Lawrence, D. D., Professor at East Windsor, Connecticut, on "The Old School in New England Theology," the writer gives the following account of the doctrines of this body concerning sin:-

"G.o.d created man a holy being. He was not merely innocent, as not having committed sin, not merely pure, as not inheriting any derived evil, but was positively holy in his very being." This, we suppose, must mean that he was inclined by nature to do right, rather than wrong. It was as natural for him to love G.o.d as for a fish to swim or a bird to fly.

Nothing less than this, certainly, would deserve to be called "holiness of being."

"The first man," says Professor Lawrence, "was the federal head of this race, representatively and by covenant, as no other father has been or can be with his children." This is ill.u.s.trated by the fact of a legal corporation, whose members are responsible in law for the actions of their agent.

Professor Lawrence explains the belief of the Old School in the imputation of Adam's sin thus: It was not the personal guilt of Adam which was imputed to his descendants, but "certain disastrous consequences." They, as well as he, became "subject to temporal and eternal death." The next consequence of Adam's sin we must give in Professor Lawrence's own language, in order not to misrepresent him. "The first evil disposition which led to the evil choice was not only confirmed in him as an individual, but also as a quality of human nature, and it reappears, successively, in each one of them." Imputation, therefore, means not the transfer of guilt, but of a corrupt nature. "It is not a sin to be born sinful; but the sin with which men are born is nevertheless sinful." Then follows this statement: "We are strictly guilty only for our own sin; but the sinfulness with which we are born is as really ours as if it originated in our own act."

This, again, is explained by defining guilt as liability to punishment on account of the acts of another, "as when the members of a corporation suffer from the ill management of its agent." This he calls corporate guilt.

The Old School doctrine, according to this writer, concerning sin, makes it a state rather than an act. It is not merely the act of disobedience, but the wrong bias of the will, out of which the act proceeds. He thinks it wrong to call "sin a nature," for neither the substance of the soul, nor its faculties, are sinful. The depravity of nature is not choice, so much as tendency which leads to choice. It is hereditary, being transmitted from father to son.

The old theology, therefore, predicates sinfulness of human nature; affirms sin to be a wrong state or bias of will; considers it to be hereditary; regards new-born infants as depraved, but thinks that those of them who die in infancy, before actual transgression, are renewed and saved by the blood of Christ; and considers temporal death as a part of the penalty of sin.

Upon this statement of the Old School doctrine, the following criticisms naturally occur:-

First. If original righteousness was holiness of nature, and not mere innocence; if it was a positive tendency to good, and not merely a state of indifference between good and evil; then, we ask, What produced the fall? What motive led to the commission of the first sin? If the nature of the first man was holy, there was nothing in it which could lead him to sin, and any external temptation addressed to such a nature must fall powerless before it. It would be like trying to tempt a fish to fly in the air, or like tempting a bird to go into the water. Even if the first man could have been induced by any deception or external influence to commit a wrong act, this would not be sinful, because there would be no sinful motive behind it. A wrong act proceeding from a holy nature is either an impossibility or a mere innocent mistake. Our first criticism, therefore, on the Old School doctrine of sin, is, that it makes Adam's fall an impossibility.

Second. As regards Adam's federal headship and the ill.u.s.tration of a corporation, we say, that the members of a corporation are not considered guilty in consequence of the acts of their agent, although they may suffer in consequence of these acts. If he commits forgery they may lose money thereby, but no one would think of calling them forgers. The sin of a parent may be visited upon his children to the third or fourth generation, but in their case it is neither punishment nor guilt, but only misfortune.

When Professor Lawrence, therefore, says, that "we are guilty for the sinfulness with which we are born, because it is really ours," he utters a moral absurdity, and strikes at the root of all moral distinctions. He says, "The sinfulness with which we are born is really ours;" but in what sense ours? Only as any congenital disease may be called _ours_. If a man is born with a tendency to consumption, blindness, lameness, he may say, "my lameness, my near-sightedness." But no one would suppose that he meant thereby to hold himself responsible for them, or to consider himself guilty because of them. It is absurd to speak of "corporate guilt." The corporate guilt, for example, of the stockholders of a bank, because of the crime of an absconding teller!

The natural objection to this ill.u.s.tration of a corporation is, that those who enter into a corporation do it by a free act, and make themselves voluntarily responsible. But _we_ did not consent that Adam should be our agent. We did not agree that if Adam should commit a single act of disobedience we should be born totally depraved, and liable to everlasting torments in consequence. Professor Lawrence replies, that it would have been impossible for G.o.d to ask our consent, and therefore, apparently he supposes that G.o.d took for granted that we would consent. This seems to be no answer to the objection. If it was impossible for G.o.d to obtain our consent, before we were born, to incur this awful danger, he was not compelled to expose us to it. It is an insult to the justice of the Almighty to a.s.sume that he could have done so.

Third. Professor Lawrence does not think it correct to say that "sin is a nature." But why not, if it be a universal and constant element, an original and permanent state of the soul? To say that human nature is sinful, but deny that sin is a nature, seems to be making a distinction without a difference. It is a disposition to sin born with the child. Now, say what we will, such a disposition to sin thus born with us is not guilt but misfortune. A just G.o.d will not hold us responsible for it, but will hold himself responsible to help us out of it. As a faithful Creator, he is bound to do so, and will do so.

It is common for theologians to deny all such a.s.sertions as these last.

They hold it irreverent to say that G.o.d owes anything to his creatures.

They acc.u.mulate responsibility upon man, but deny responsibility to G.o.d.

But in doing this they take from the Almighty all moral character.

Calvinism, especially, makes of the Deity infinite power and infinite will. But no blasphemy is worse than that which, though with the best intentions, virtually destroys the moral character of the Almighty, reducing him to an infinite will: that is, making of him an infinite tyrant. For the essence of tyranny is the union of power and will in a ruler, who recognizes no obligations towards his subjects.

The book of Job seems to have been written partly to refute this sort of Calvinism. The friends of Job were Calvinists in this sense. The sum of their argument was that, since G.o.d was all-powerful, therefore whatever he did must be right; and, since he punished Job, Job must be a sinner, and ought to confess his sin whether he saw it or not. This has been, in all ages, the substance of Calvinism-Jewish Calvinism, Mohammedan Calvinism, Christian Calvinism. It declares that we are bound to submit to G.o.d, not because he is good, but because he is powerful. But the answer of Job to his friends is a rebuke to the same spirit wherever shown. He asks them "if they will speak with unfairness for G.o.d," and "speak deceitfully for him," and "accept his person." He declares that if he could find G.o.d he would go before his throne and defend his own cause. "Would he contend with me with his mighty power? No! he would have regard unto me."

This is the sin of Calvinism, that it "accepts the person of the Almighty," a.s.suming that he has a right to do as he pleases with his creatures, and that they have no rights which he is bound to respect, except that of being punished. Thus it destroys the moral character of the Almighty.

Fourth. Professor Lawrence says, "It is the general belief of the Old School that those who die in infancy before actual transgression, are renewed and saved by the blood of Christ."

The power of infancy is wonderful. It can even break down the logic of Calvinism. Wordsworth was right in calling the infant-

"Mighty prophet! Seer blest!

On whom those truths do rest Which we are toiling all our lives to find."

Every kind of theology, however savage and bitter it may be against adult sinners, sending them into an eternal h.e.l.l without the least hesitation or remorse, hesitates and stammers when it comes to speak of little children.

Even the idolatrous Jews, sacrificing their children to Moloch in the valley of Hinnom, beat drums to drown their cries, which they could not bear to hear. Both schools of theology, Old and New, hasten to say that infants are not to be d.a.m.ned. But _why_ not, if they are born with a depraved nature, and die without being converted? Both the great schools of Presbyterian theology hold to the doctrine of the a.s.sembly's Catechism, which declares (chap. 6, -- 6), that "every sin, both original and actual, being a transgression of the righteous law of G.o.d, and contrary thereunto, doth, in its own nature, bring guilt upon the sinner, whereby he is bound over to the wrath of G.o.d." Therefore the infant who dies before he has exercised repentance and faith in Christ, is under the wrath of G.o.d.

Orthodoxy does not allow of repentance in the other life: how, then, can infants be saved according to Orthodoxy? Professor Lawrence can only reply, that it is _a general belief_ that they will be saved. The Catechism declares, less decidedly, that "elect infants" will be saved.

Dr. Whedon (Bibliotheca Sacra, April, 1862), on behalf of the Methodists, says, "That the dying infant is saved, and saved by the atonement, all agree." But _how_ he is saved, or what reason they have to think him saved, except their wish to believe it, no one can tell. Death, in fact, becomes to the infant a saving sacrament. As long as he lives he is believed unregenerate and unconverted. As soon as he dies he is considered ready for heaven. But he cannot be ready for heaven until he is regenerate; and after death there is no such thing as obtaining a new heart, and no opportunity for repentance. Logically, therefore, the infant is converted by the mere act of dying. We presume that no Orthodox theologians would a.s.sert this; and yet we really do not see how they can avoid the conclusion.

But why is it any worse for children to be d.a.m.ned in consequence of Adam's sin than for adults to be d.a.m.ned? Orthodoxy a.s.sures us that in consequence of Adam's sin we are born depraved. Dr. Duffield, stating and defending the doctrines of the New School Presbyterian Church (Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1863), says that Adam subjected his posterity to such a loss that they are born without any righteousness, are exposed to the consequences of his transgression, and all become sinners as soon as they are capable of it. He quotes with approbation from a protest of the New School minority, in the General a.s.sembly of 1837 (which he calls a doc.u.ment of great historic value), an a.s.sertion that "by reason of the sin of Adam, the race are treated as if they had sinned;" and from another doc.u.ment of the same school which says, that "we are all born with a tendency to sin, which makes it morally certain that we shall do so." Now, we do not see why it is any worse to send infants to h.e.l.l because of this depraved nature, than to send grown persons there who have sinned in consequence of possessing such a depraved nature. If it be said that adults have had an opportunity to repent, and have not accepted it, we reply, that to the ma.s.s of mankind no such opportunity is offered; that, where it is offered, no one has the power to accept it, except he be one of the elect; and that at all events, since infants are sure to be saved, and a very large proportion of adults are very likely to be lost, _death in infancy is the most desirable thing possible_. According to this doctrine, child-murder becomes almost a virtue.

The radical difficulty in all these theories consists in refusing to apply to G.o.d the same rules of justice which we apply to man. To do so implies no irreverence, but the highest reverence. There is nothing more honorable to the Almighty than to believe him to be actuated by the same great principles of right which he has written in our conscience and heart.

Those laws of eternal justice, so deeply engraven on the fleshly tables of the heart, are a revelation of the character of G.o.d himself. If we think to honor him by rejecting these intuitions of the reason, and by subst.i.tuting for this divine idea of a G.o.d of justice that of a being of arbitrary will, who is under no obligations to his creatures, we deeply dishonor the Almighty and fatally injure our own character. From this perverted view of G.o.d comes a cynical view of man. When we make _will_ supreme in G.o.d, we legitimate all tyranny and contempt from man to man.

Then comes the state of things described by Shakespeare:-

"Force should be right, or, rather, right and wrong (Between whose endless jar justice resides) Should lose their names, and so should justice too.

Then everything includes itself in power, Power into will, will into appet.i.te; And appet.i.te, a universal wolf, So doubly seconded with will and power, Must make perforce a universal prey, And, last, eat up himself."

_Shakespeare_, Troilus and Cressida.

CHAPTER VII. CONVERSION AND REGENERATION.

-- 1. Orthodoxy recognizes only two Conditions in which Man can be found.

Orthodoxy knows only two states in which man can be found. Man is either in the natural state, and then he is totally depraved; or he is in the supernatural state, in which the chain of sin has been broken. He is either impenitent or penitent, either unregenerated or regenerate, unconverted or converted, a sinner or a saint.

There is no gradation, no shading off, no twilight between this midnight gloom and midday splendor. To the common eye, and in the judgment of their friends and neighbors, the people who enter a church seem of all degrees of goodness; and every one has good and bad qualities mixed up together in his character. But, as the Orthodox minister looks at them from the pulpit, they instantly fall into two cla.s.ses, and become "my impenitent hearers," and "my penitent hearers."