3. A relating, or synthetic, activity combining the selected elements into a new ideal representation.

USES OF IMAGINATION

=Imagination in Education.=--One important application of imagination in school work is found in connection with the various forms of constructive occupation. In such exercises, it is possible to have the child first build up ideally the picture of a particular object and then have him produce it through actual expression. For example, a cla.s.s which has been taught certain principles of cutting may be called upon to conceive an original design for some object, say a valentine. Here the child, before proceeding to produce the actual object, must select from his knowledge of valentines certain elements and interpret them in relation to his principles of cutting. This ideal representation of the intended object is, therefore, a process of active, or constructive, imagination. In composition, also, the various events and situations depicted may be ideal creations to which the child gives expression in language. In geography and nature study likewise, constant use must be made of the imagination in gaining a knowledge of objects which have never come within the actual experience of the child. In science there is a further appeal to the child's imagination. When, for instance, he studies such topics as the law of gravity, chemical affinity, etc., the imagination must fill in much that falls outside the sphere of actual observation. In history and literature, also, the student can enter into the life and action of the various scenes and events only by building up ideal representations of what is depicted through the words of the author.

=Imagination in Practical Life.=--In addition to the large use of constructive imagination in school work, this process will be found equally important in the after affairs of life. It is by use of the imagination that the workman is able to see the changes we desire made in the decoration of the room or in the shape of the flower-beds. It is by the use of imagination, also, that the general is able to outline the plan of campaign that shall lead his army to victory. Without imagination, therefore, the mind could not set up those practical aims toward the attainment of which most of life's effort is directed. In the dominion of conduct, also, imagination has its important part to play.

It is by viewing in his imagination the effect of the one course of action as compared with the other, that man finally decides what const.i.tutes the proper line of conduct. Even when indifferent as to his moral conduct, man pictures to himself what his friends may say and think of certain lines of action. For the enjoyment of life, also, the exercise of imagination has a place. It is by filling up the present with ideals and hopeful antic.i.p.ations for the future, that much of the monotony of our work-a-day hours is relieved.

=Development of Imagination.=--A prime condition of a creative imagination is evidently the possession of an abundance of mental materials which may be dissociated and re-combined into new mental products. These materials, of course, consist of the images and ideas retained by the mind from former experiences. One important result, therefore, of providing the young child with a rich store of images of sight, sound, touch, movement, etc., is that it provides his developing imagination with necessary materials. But the mere possession of abundant materials in the form of past images will not in itself develop the imagination. Here, as elsewhere, it is only by exercising imagination that ability to imagine can be developed. Opportunity for such an exercise of the imagination, moreover, may be given the child in various ways. As already noted, a chief function of play is that it stimulates the child to use his imagination in reconstructing the objects about him and clothing them with many fancied attributes. In supplementary reading and story work, also, the imagination is actively exercised in constructing the ideal situations, as they are being presented in words by the book or the teacher. Nature study, likewise, by bringing before the child the secret processes of nature, as noting, for instance, the life history of the b.u.t.terfly, the germination of seeds, etc., will call upon him to use his imagination in various ways.

On the other hand, to deprive a young child of all such opportunities will usually result in preventing a proper development of the imagination.

CHAPTER XXVIII

THINKING

=Nature of Thinking.=--In the study of general method, as well as in that of the foregoing mental processes, it has been taken for granted that our minds are capable of identifying different objects on the basis of some common feature or features. This tendency of the mind to identify objects and group individual things into cla.s.ses, depends upon its capacity to detect similarity and difference, or to make comparisons. When the mind, in identifying objects, events, qualities, etc., discovers certain relations between its various states, the process is especially known as that of thinking. In its technical sense, therefore, thought implies a more or less explicit apprehension of relation.

=Thinking Involved in all Conscious States.=--It is evident, however, that every mental process must involve thinking, or a grasping of relations. When, by my merely touching an object, my mind perceives it is an apple, this act of perception, as already seen, takes place because elements of former experience come back as a.s.sociated factors.

This implies, evidently, that the mind is here relating elements of its past experience with the present touch sensation. Perception of external objects, therefore, implies a grasping of relations. In the same way, if, in having an experience to-day, one recognizes it as identical with a former experience, he is equally grasping a relation. Every act of memory, therefore, implies thinking. Thus in all forms of knowledge the mind is apprehending relations; for no experience could have meaning for the mind except as it is discriminated from other experiences. In treating thinking as a distinct mental process, however, it is a.s.sumed that the objects of sense perception, memory, etc., are known as such, and that the mind here deals more directly with the relations in which ideas stand one to another. As a mental process, thinking appears in three somewhat distinct forms, known as conception, judgment, and reasoning.

CONCEPTION

=The Abstract Notion.=--It was seen that at least in adult life, the perception of any object, as this particular orange, horse, cow, etc., really includes a number of distinct images of quality synthesised into the unity of a particular idea or experience. Because of this union of a number of different sensible qualities in the notion of a single individual, the mind may limit its attention upon a particular quality, or characteristic, possessed by an object, and make this a distinct problem of attention. Thus the mind is able to form such notions as length, roundness, sweetness, heaviness, four-footedness, etc. When such an attribute is thought of as something distinct from the object, the mental image is especially known as an abstract idea, or notion, and the process as one of abstraction.

=The Cla.s.s Notion.=--One or more of such abstracted qualities may, moreover, be recognized as common to an indefinite number of objects.

For instance, in addition to its ability to abstract from the perception of a dog, the abstract notions four-footedness, hairy, barking, etc., the mind further gives them a general character by thinking of them as qualities common to an indefinite number of other possible individuals, namely, the cla.s.s four-footed, hairy, barking objects. Because the idea representing the quality or qualities is here accepted by the mind as a means of identifying a number of objects, the idea is spoken of as a cla.s.s notion, and the process as one of cla.s.sification, or generalization. Thus it appears that, through its ability to detect sameness and difference, or discover relations, the mind is able to form two somewhat different notions. By mentally abstracting any quality and regarding it as something distinct from the object, it obtains an abstract notion, as sweetness, bravery, hardness, etc.; by synthesising and symbolizing the images of certain qualities recognized in objects, it obtains a general, or cla.s.s, notion by which it may represent an indefinite number of individual things as, triangle, horse, desert, etc.

Thus abstract notions are supposed to represent qualities; cla.s.s notions, things. Because of its reference to a number of objects, the cla.s.s notion is spoken of especially as a general notion, and the process of forming the notion as one of generalization. These two types of notions are technically known as concepts, and the process of their formation as one of conception.

=Formal a.n.a.lysis of Process.=--At this point may be recalled what was stated in Chapter XV concerning the development of a cla.s.s notion.

Mention was there made of the theory that in the formation of such concepts, or cla.s.s notions, as cow, dog, desk, chair, adjective, etc., the mind must proceed through certain set stages as follows:

1. Comparison: The examination of a certain number of particular individuals in order to discover points of similarity and difference.

2. Abstraction: The distinguishing of certain characteristics common to the objects.

3. Generalization: The mental unification, or synthesis, of these common characteristics noted in different individuals into a cla.s.s notion represented by a name, or general term.

=But Conception is Involved in Perception.=--From what has been seen, however, it is evident that the development of our concepts does not proceed in any such formal way. If the mind perceives an individual object with any degree of clearness, it must recognize the object as possessing certain qualities. If, therefore, the child can perceive such an object as a dog, it implies that he recognizes it, say, as a hairy, four-footed creature. To recognize these qualities, however, signifies that the mind is able to think of them as something apart from the object, and the child thus has in a sense a general notion even while perceiving the particular dog. Whenever he pa.s.ses to the perception of another dog, he undoubtedly interprets this with the general ideas already obtained from this earlier percept of a dog. To say, therefore, that to gain a concept he compares the qualities found in several individual things is not strictly true, for if his first percept becomes a type by which he interprets other dogs, his first experience is already a concept. What happens is that as this concept is used to interpret other individuals, the person becomes more conscious of the fact that his early experience is applicable to an indefinite number of objects. So also, when an adult first perceives an individual thing, say the fruit of the guava, he must apprehend certain qualities in relation to the individual thing. Thereupon his idea of this particular object becomes in itself a copy for identifying other objects, or a symbol by which similar future impressions may be given meaning. In this sense the individual idea, or percept, will serve to identify other particular experiences. Such being the case, this early concept of the guava has evidently required no abstraction of qualities beyond apprehending them while perceiving the one example of the fruit. This, however, is but to say that the perception of the guava really implied conception.

=Comparison of Individuals Necessary for Correct Concepts.=--It is, of course, true that the correctness of the idea as a cla.s.s symbol can be verified only as we apply it in interpreting a number of such individual things. As the person meets a further number of individuals, he may even discover the presence of qualities not previously recognized. A child, for instance, may have a notion of the cla.s.s triangle long before he discovers that all triangles have the property of containing two right angles. When this happens, he will later modify his first concept by synthesising into it the newly discovered quality. Moreover, if certain features supposed to be common are later found to be accidental, if, for instance, a child's concept of the cla.s.s fish includes the quality _always living in water_, his meeting with a flying fish will not result in an utterly new concept, but rather in a modification of the present one. Thus the young child, who on seeing the Chinese diplomat, wished to know where he had his laundry, was not without a cla.s.s concept, although that concept was imperfect in at least one respect.

=Concept and Term.=--A point often discussed in connection with conception is whether a general notion can be formed without language.

By some it is argued that no concept could exist in the mind without the name, or general term. It was seen, however, that our first perception of any object becomes a sort of standard by which other similar experiences are intercepted, and is, therefore, general in character.

From this it is evident that a rudimentary type of conception exists prior to language. In the case of the young child, as he gains a mental image of his father, the experience evidently serves as a centre for interpreting other similar individuals. We may notice that as soon as he gains control of language, other men are called by the term papa. This does not imply an actual confusion in ident.i.ty, but his use of the term shows that the child interprets the new object through a crude concept denoted by the word papa. It is more than probable, moreover, that this crude concept developed as he became able to recognize his father, and had been used in interpreting other men before he obtained the term, papa. On the other hand, it is certain that the term, or cla.s.s name, is necessary to give the notion a definite place in consciousness.

FACTORS INVOLVED IN CONCEPT

It will appear from the foregoing that a concept presents the following factors for consideration:

1. The essential quality or qualities found in the individual things, and supposed to be abstracted sooner or later from the individuals.

2. The concept itself, the mental image or idea representative of the abstracted quality; or the unification of a number of abstracted qualities, when the general notion implies a synthesis of different qualities.

3. The general term, or name.

4. The objects themselves, which the mind can organize into a cla.s.s, because they are identified as possessing common characteristics. When, however, a single abstracted quality is taken as a symbol of a cla.s.s of objects, for example, when the quality bitterness becomes the symbol for the cla.s.s of bitter things, there can be no real distinction between the abstracted quality and the cla.s.s concept. In other words, to fix attention upon the quality bitterness as a quality distinct from the object in which it is found, is at the same time to give it a general character, recognizing it as something which may be found in a number of objects--the cla.s.s bitter things. Here the abstract term is in a sense a general notion representative of a whole cla.s.s of objects which agree in the possession of the quality.

=Intension of Concepts.=--Certain of our general notions are, however, much more complex than others. When a single attribute such as four-footedness is generalized to represent the cla.s.s four-footed objects, the notion itself is relatively simple. In other words, a single property is representative of the objects, and in apprehending the members of the cla.s.s all other properties they chance to possess may be left out of account. In many cases, however, the cla.s.s notion will evidently be much more complex. The notion dog, for instance, in addition to implying the characteristic four-footedness, may include such qualities as hairy, barking, watchful, fearless, etc. This greater or less degree of complexity of a general notion is spoken of as its intensity. The notion dog, for instance, is more intensive than the notion four-footed animals; the notion lawyer, than the notion man.

=Extension of Concepts.=--It is to be noted further that as a notion increases in intension it becomes limited to a smaller cla.s.s of objects.

From this standpoint, notions are said to differ in extension. The cla.s.s lawyer, for instance, is not so extensive as the cla.s.s man; nor the cla.s.s dog, as the cla.s.s four-footed objects. It will appear from the above that an abstract notion viewed as a sign of a cla.s.s of objects is distinguished by its extension, while a cla.s.s notion, so far as it implies a synthesis of several abstracted qualities, is marked rather by its intension.

AIMS OF CONCEPTUAL LESSONS

So far as school lessons aim to establish and develop correct cla.s.s notions in the minds of the pupils, three somewhat distinct types of work may be noted:

1. TO DEFINE CLa.s.sES

In some lessons no attempt is made to develop an utterly new cla.s.s notion, or concept; the pupils in fact may already know the cla.s.s of objects in a general way and be acquainted with many of their characteristics. The object of the lesson is, therefore, to render the concept more scientific by having it include the qualities which essentially mark it as a cla.s.s and especially separate it from other co-ordinate cla.s.ses. In studying the gra.s.shopper; for instance, in entomology, the purpose is not to give the child a notion of the insect in the ordinary sense of the term. This the pupil may already have. The purpose is rather to enable him to decide just what general characteristics distinguish this from other insects. The lesson may, therefore, leave out of consideration features which are common to all gra.s.shoppers, simply because they do not enter into a scientific differentiation of the cla.s.s.

2. TO ENLARGE A CONCEPT

In many lessons the aim seems to be chiefly to enlarge certain concepts by adding to their intensiveness. The pupil, for instance, has a scientific concept of a triangle, that is, one which enables him to distinguish a triangle from any other geometrical figure. He may, however, be led to see further that the three angles of every triangle equal two right angles. This is really having him discover a further attribute in relation to triangles, although this knowledge is not essential to the concept as a symbol of the members of the cla.s.s. In the same way, in grammar the pupil is taught certain attributes common to verbs, as mood and tense, although these are not essential attributes from the standpoint of distinguishing the verb as a special cla.s.s of words.

3. TO BUILD UP NEW CONCEPTS

=A. Presentation of Unknown Individuals.=--In many lessons the chief object seems to be, however, to build up a new concept in the mind of the child. This would be the case when the pupil is presented with a totally unknown object, say a platypus, and called upon to examine its characteristics. In such lessons two important facts should be noticed.

First, the child finds seemingly little difficulty in accepting a single individual as a type of a cla.s.s, and is able to carry away from the lesson a fairly scientific cla.s.s notion through a study of the one individual. In this regard the pupil but ill.u.s.trates what has been said of the ability of the child to use his early percepts as standards to interpret other individuals. The pupil is able the more easily to form this accurate notion, because he no doubt has already a store of abstract notions with which to interpret the presentation, and also because his interest and attention is directed into the proper channels by the teacher.

=B. Division of Known Cla.s.ses.=--A second common mode of developing new concepts in school work is in breaking up larger cla.s.ses into co-ordinate sub-cla.s.ses. This, of course, involves the developing of new concepts to cover these sub-cla.s.ses. In such cases, however, the new notions are merely modified forms of the higher cla.s.s notion. When, for example, the pupil gains general notions representative of the cla.s.ses, proper noun and common noun, the new terms merely add something to the intension of the more extensive term noun. This will be evident by considering the difference between the notions noun and proper noun.

Both agree in possessing the attribute _used to name_. The latter is more intensive, however, because it signifies _used to name a particular object_. Although in such cases the lesson seems in a sense to develop new general notions, they represent merely an adding to the intension of a notion already possessed by the child.

=Use of the Term.=--A further problem regarding the process of conception concerns the question of the significance of a name. When a person uses such a term as dog, whale, hepatica, guava, etc., to name a certain object, what is the exact sense, or meaning, in which the name is to be applied? A cla.s.s name, when applied scientifically to an object, is evidently supposed to denote the presence in it of certain essential characteristics which belong to the cla.s.s. It is clear, however, that the ordinary man rarely uses these names with any scientific precision. A man can point to an object and say that it is a horse, and yet be ignorant of many of the essential features of a horse.

In such cases, therefore, the use of the name merely shows that the person considers the object to belong to a certain cla.s.s, but is no guarantee that he is thinking of the essential qualities of the cla.s.s.

It might be said, therefore, that a cla.s.s term is used for two somewhat different purposes, either to denote the object merely, or to signify scientifically the attributes possessed by the object. It is in the second respect that danger of error in reasoning arises. So far as a name represents the attributes of a cla.s.s, it will signify for us just those attributes which we a.s.sociate with that cla.s.s. So long, therefore, as the word fish means to us an animal living in the water, we will include in the cla.s.s the whale, which really does not belong to the cla.s.s, and perhaps exclude from the cla.s.s the flying fish, although it is scientifically a member of the cla.s.s.