370 " "Covert action programs": DNI Principles for Covert Action:1. Covert action should be employed only to support an overarching set of clearly defined, well articulated U.S. policy objectives.2. Covert action should not be employed for the purpose of circumventing a lack of U.S. public support for any particular overt policy.3. The secrecy and flexibility of covert action does not make it a substitute for overt diplomatic efforts, strategic communications, economic sanctions or incentives, or military action. It should be employed only as a complement to robust overt policy objectives and activities.4. Covert action to influence the short-term policies and actions of other governments should be routinely evaluated to ensure it is not undermining the development of stable, non-corrupt and representative governments that respect the human rights of their citizens, control their territory and borders, and resist aggression from their neighbors.5. Not every clandestine activity conducted by the U.S. government is or must be an unacknowledged covert action activity. For example, the Department of Defense, the Drug Enforcement Administration, the FBI and other elements can and do conduct activities that will be undertaken in the manner intended to minimize the likelihood of discovery, but those activities are not necessarily covert activities.6. Covert action programs should continually be considered for transition to non-covert activities, whether classified or unclassified.

371 Within several minutes Within several minutes: Jake Tapper, "Exclusive: President Obama to Replace Director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair," Political Punch Political Punch (blog), ABC News, (blog), ABC News, http://blogs.abcnews.com/politicalpunch/ 2010/05/exclusive-president-obama-to -replace-director-of-national-intelligence -dennis-blair.html.

371 It contained some disparaging and mocking comments It contained some disparaging and mocking comments: Michael Hastings, "The Runaway General," Rolling Stone Rolling Stone, June 25, 2010, http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/ news/17390/119236.

372 " "I believe that General McChrystal": Defense Secretary Gates Statement on McChrystal Profile, June 22, 2010, http://www.defense.gov/releases/.

373 " "Is removing the general from his position": White House press briefing by Robert Gibbs, June 22, 2010, http://www.whitehouse.gov.

373 Obama told me Obama told me: Interview with President Barack H. Obama, July 10, 2010. 373 At 1:43 At 1:43 P.M P.M. on Wednesday, June 23: President Obama, Remarks on the Resignation of General Stanley A. McChrystal as Commander of the NATO International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan, June 23, 2010, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2010/ DCPD-201000525.htm.

CHAPTER THIRTY-THREE The information in this chapter comes primarily from an on-the-record interview with President Obama.

375 In the interview I had with the president In the interview I had with the president: Interview with President Barack H. Obama, July 10, 2010. 375 This was the speech he gave This was the speech he gave: State Senator Barack Obama, "Against Going to War in Iraq," October 2, 2002, http://www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.asp?file=Obama-Speeches.ask&dn=Against%20Going%20to%20War%20with%20Iraq.

375 Isn't this undetermined cost Isn't this undetermined cost: Interview with President Barack H. Obama, July 10, 2010.

377 Near the end of the interview Near the end of the interview: Ibid.

378 " "For war was not just a military campaign": Rick Atkinson, The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 19431944 The Day of Battle: The War in Sicily and Italy, 19431944 (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), p. 121. (New York: Henry Holt, 2007), p. 121.

378 "I sympathize with this view," he said "I sympathize with this view," he said: Interview with President Barack H. Obama, July 10, 2010.

378 " "The instruments of war do have a role": President Obama, Remarks on Accepting the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo, Norway, December 10, 2010, http://www.gpoaccess.gov/presdocs/2009 /DCPD-200900985.htm.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This book is based almost entirely on my own reporting, interviews, a review of documents and meeting notes. I am deeply indebted to the reporters and authors who have covered the war in Afghanistan and the Obama administration. They blazed the trail. Their work and insights provide a significant and essential foundation.

I want to thank all sources, those named and those unnamed. These individuals often agreed to take the time to answer all my questions, provide me with notes and other written material, and give context to the scenes in this book. Without their help, the effort to make this a serious and authoritative history would have been impossible. I am grateful.

Alice Mayhew, my editor at Simon & Schuster for 38 years and 16 books, continues to offer wisdom that is shrewd, fair and always to the point. No one edits with more grace than Alice. Her devotion to revealing history in a clear, compelling way is a gift. She has my admiration and affection.

Jonathan Karp enthusiastically leapt into his new job as publisher at Simon & Schuster. He gave dozens of concrete suggestions and ideas that strengthened this book. Simon & Schuster and its authors are fortunate to have at the helm a publisher who immerses himself in the details of a manuscript. Simon & Schuster CEO Carolyn K. Reidy remains the kind of ally who all writers should have. My deepest appreciation also goes to Roger Labrie, senior editor; Elisa Rivlin, senior vice president and general counsel; Victoria Meyer, executive vice president of publicity; Tracey Guest, director of publicity; Jackie Seow, art director and jacket designer; Irene Kheradi, executive managing editor; Tristan Child, assistant managing editor; Karen Thompson, associate editor; Paul Dippolito, designer; Lisa Healy, senior production editor; Nancy Inglis, director of copyediting; John Wahler, associate director of production.

Josh Boak, Evelyn Duffy and I have profound gratitude for master copy editor Fred Chase, who came from Texas to join our team and work on his sixth book with me. Fred is a man of immense experience and common sense. His company, good humor, eye for detail and typographical saves make his help invaluable.

Many thanks to Barbara DeGennaro for indexing this book in such a short time.

Washington Post executive editor Marcus Brauchli has steered the institution I love with intelligence and courage. He possesses an eye for scoops, a competitive drive and the unflappable presence needed during this tumultuous time in the industry. Many thanks also to publisher Katharine Weymouth, whose pride in the work, mission and future of the newspaper is essential. executive editor Marcus Brauchli has steered the institution I love with intelligence and courage. He possesses an eye for scoops, a competitive drive and the unflappable presence needed during this tumultuous time in the industry. Many thanks also to publisher Katharine Weymouth, whose pride in the work, mission and future of the newspaper is essential.

Post chairman and CEO Don Graham is a stalwart friend. No media CEO could be more of a champion of journalism and journalists. He knows the importance of ensuring that independent voices are heard. chairman and CEO Don Graham is a stalwart friend. No media CEO could be more of a champion of journalism and journalists. He knows the importance of ensuring that independent voices are heard.

My friend Steve Luxenberg, associate editor, gave willingly of his ingenuity and judgment to help excerpt this book for The Washington Post The Washington Post, and he has my lasting gratitude.

Washington Post reporters and editors whose work on Afghanistan and Pakistan was of tremendous assistance include Karen De-Young, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, David Ignatius, Joby Warrick, Greg Jaffe, Joshua Partlow, Al Kamen, Walter Pincus, Scott Wilson, Anne E. Kornblut, Ann Scott Tyson, Pamela Constable, Griff Witte, Rama Lakshmi, Emily Wax, Karin Brulliard, Cameron Barr, Carlos Lozada and many others. A great deal of significant background and understanding came from others on the reporters and editors whose work on Afghanistan and Pakistan was of tremendous assistance include Karen De-Young, Rajiv Chandrasekaran, David Ignatius, Joby Warrick, Greg Jaffe, Joshua Partlow, Al Kamen, Walter Pincus, Scott Wilson, Anne E. Kornblut, Ann Scott Tyson, Pamela Constable, Griff Witte, Rama Lakshmi, Emily Wax, Karin Brulliard, Cameron Barr, Carlos Lozada and many others. A great deal of significant background and understanding came from others on the Post Post's foreign and national staffs. Special thanks to Rick Atkinson, Steve Coll and David Maraniss.

My appreciation also goes to Michel du Cille, Wendy Galietta and the rest of the Post Post's incomparable photo staff who supplied nearly all of the pictures used in this book.

I will always be indebted to my friend and mentor Ben Bradlee, whose exacting standards and enduring principles are a legacy for all who have passed through the Post Post's newsroom.

And special thanks to Carl Bernstein, a friend, colleague and source of endless ideas and insight.

I was also helped immeasurably by the reporting and analysis in The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal, the Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune, the Los Angeles Times, The New Yorker, Politico, Dawn Los Angeles Times, The New Yorker, Politico, Dawn (Pakistan), (Pakistan), The Nation The Nation (Pakistan), the Associated Press, and countless other news organizations both foreign and domestic. (Pakistan), the Associated Press, and countless other news organizations both foreign and domestic.

The following books were useful points of reference and would make for excellent further reading: The Accidental Guerrilla The Accidental Guerrilla by David Kilcullen; by David Kilcullen; Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice by David Galula; by David Galula; Decoding the Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field Decoding the Taliban: Insights from the Afghan Field edited by Antonio Giustozzi; edited by Antonio Giustozzi; Descent into Chaos Descent into Chaos by Ahmed Rashid; by Ahmed Rashid; Game Change Game Change by John Heilemann and Mark Halperin; by John Heilemann and Mark Halperin; Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The NeoTaliban Insurgency in Afghanistan Koran, Kalashnikov and Laptop: The NeoTaliban Insurgency in Afghanistan by Antonio Giustozzi; by Antonio Giustozzi; Lessons in Disaster Lessons in Disaster by Gordon M. Goldstein; by Gordon M. Goldstein; My Life with the Taliban My Life with the Taliban by Abdul Salam Zaeef; by Abdul Salam Zaeef; Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military by Husain Haqqani; by Husain Haqqani; The Promise The Promise by Jonathan Alter; and by Jonathan Alter; and The Search for Al Qaeda The Search for Al Qaeda by Bruce Riedel. by Bruce Riedel.

My assistants and I found the following blogs helpful as well: Abu Muqawama Abu Muqawama ( (http://www.cnas.org/blogs/abumuqawama); The AfPak Channel The AfPak Channel ( (http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/); At War At War ( (http://atwar.blogs.nytimes.com/); The Cable The Cable ( (http://thecable.foreignpolicy.com/); and Mike Allen's Playbook Mike Allen's Playbook ( (http://www.politico.com/playbook/).

Robert B. Barnett, my agent, attorney and friend, again proved indispensible. His counsel is always welcome and informed. Bob looks out for his authors and their interests with an unmatched zeal. Because he represents President Obama, Secretary of State Clinton and other political figures, he was not consulted on the contents of this book and did not see it until it was printed.

Josh, Evelyn and I are fortunate for the presence of Rosa Criollo and Jackie Crowe in our lives. Long days are shortened and challenges eased by their able assistance.

My elder daughter, Tali, spent a week in Washington reviewing the manuscript. Her smart recommendations helped make sometimes dense subject matter more understandable. Tali has a natural touch and feel for the written word. My younger daughter, Diana, is fast becoming a spirited and caring young woman and a highly readable writer in her own right. Both are joys in my life.

Elsa Walsh, my wife, lived through this book from the first interviews to the final proofs. Her advice has always proven enlightening, and her company an abiding comfort. She devoted an intense week to marking up drafts. This book-and my previous ones-are richer because of her. Elsa is the anchor of our family and the source of the love that matters.

ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Bob Woodward is an associate editor at The Washington Post The Washington Post, where he has worked for 39 years. He has shared in two Pulitzer Prizes, first for the Post Post's coverage of the Watergate scandal, and later for coverage of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. He has authored or coauthored eleven #1 national nonfiction bestsellers. He has two daughters, Tali and Diana, and lives in Washington, D.C., with his wife, writer Elsa Walsh.

"To quote a famous American," President Barack H. Obama told the author in an interview on July 10, 2010, "'War is hell.' And once the dogs of war are unleashed, you don't know where it's going to lead."

Vice President Joseph R. Biden opposed General McChrystal's request for 40,000 more troops, saying that progress in Afghanistan depended on reducing corruption. "If the government's a criminal syndicate a year from now, how will troops make a difference?"

James L. Jones, national security adviser, thought the Afghan War was central to international stability. "If we don't succeed here, organizations like NATO, by association the European Union, and the United Nations might be relegated to the dustbin of history."

Hillary Rodham Clinton, the secretary of state, endorsed the military's position during the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review. "If we don't come with an approach close to this, we shouldn't even try, because we'll just be wasting time, lives and money," she said.

Robert M. Gates, the secretary of defense, said during an Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review session, "We should have a plan that says 18 to 24 months. We will begin reducing our forces, thinning them out." Obama seized on this statement to set July 2011 as the date they would begin reducing U.S. forces.

Rahm I. Emanuel, Obama's chief of staff, saw the Afghanistan War as "political flypaper" and thought the military was boxing Obama in with public statements. "It's bullshit that between the chairman [Admiral Mullen] and Petraeus, everybody's come out and publicly endorsed the notion of more troops. The president hasn't even had a chance!"

Robert L. Gibbs, White House press secretary, said the July 2011 date Obama had announced to start drawing down U.S. forces in Afghanistan was etched in stone, and he had the chisel to prove it.

David M. Axelrod, the president's senior adviser, was wary of Hillary Clinton, Obama's chief rival in the presidential campaign. When Obama said he was considering her for a top cabinet post, Axelrod asked, "How could you trust Hillary?"

Thomas E. Donilon (far right), the deputy national security adviser, wanted to make sure the military understood and carried out the president's specific orders, so he worked with Obama to develop a six-page "terms sheet" detailing Obama's final orders.

John O. Brennan, the deputy national security adviser for counterterrorism, questioned ambitious plans for Afghanistan. "If you're talking about a completely uncorrupt government that delivers services to all of its people, that end state won't be achieved in my lifetime. That's why using terminology like 'success,' like 'victory' and 'win' complicates our task."

Army Lieutenant General Douglas E. Lute, Obama's coordinator for Afghanistan and Pakistan, told the president he didn't have to send 30,000 more troops because there were too many risks with the new strategy. "It still smells to me like a gamble," he said. "You shouldn't base this on sort of an unexpected windfall of luck."

Bruce O. Riedel, a former CIA analyst, was brought in to lead the early 2009 review of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy. He told the president that Pakistan was the central problem and al Qaeda remained as dangerous as it had been on September 10, 2001.

Benjamin Rhodes (left), deputy national security adviser for strategic communications, drafted the president's Afghanistan speeches. Denis Mc-Donough (right), a former Obama campaign aide who became chief of staff of the National Security Council in October 2009, was one of the president's most trusted advisers and attempted to enforce message discipline.

Mark W. Lippert, a key Obama foreign policy aide from Obama's Senate days, became National Security Council chief of staff. He left the White House after Jim Jones, the national security adviser, complained Lippert was trying to undermine him.

Antony J. Blinken, the vice president's national security adviser, was skeptical that the U.S. could succeed in Afghanistan and helped design an alternative to the military's strategy. "I don't know if they can ever pull this off," he said while visiting the war zone in early 2009. "How do you leave?"

Dennis C. Blair, who served as director of national intelligence until Obama fired him in May 2010, lacked the authority to challenge the CIA. "I think the CIA is fundamentally an organization that's like a really finely trained, not very smart, dangerous animal that needs to be controlled very closely by adults," he said.

Army General David H. Petraeus served as the commander of Central Command and then replaced General McChrystal as the Afghanistan commander. He said privately, "I don't think you win this war. I think you keep fighting. . . . This is the kind of fight we're in for the rest of our lives and probably our kids' lives."

Navy Admiral Michael G. Mullen, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was a tireless advocate for McChrystal's request for 40,000 more troops. When asked what he would do if McChrystal failed, Mullen said, "Then I've got to leave because I put him there."

Marine Corps General James E. Cartwright, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, drafted a 20,000-troop option requested by Vice President Biden. When Chairman Mullen refused to provide it to the White House, Cartwright said, "I'm just not in the business of withholding options. I have an oath, and when asked for advice I'm going to provide it.

In July 2008, then Senator Obama and General Petraeus, then Iraq commander, ride together in a helicopter there. Obama recalled telling Petraeus, "I expect you, as the commander of our forces in Iraq, to ask for everything you need and more to ensure your success. That's what you owe the troops who are under your command. My job, then, which in some ways is more difficult, is I've got to choose. Because I don't have infinite resources."

Army General Stanley A. McChrystal got 30,000 of the 40,000 troops he requested, but Obama later fired him because of derogatory comments the general and his staff made about civilian leadership in a controversial June 2010 Rolling Stone magazine article.

Leon Panetta, director of the CIA, told others that "no Democratic president can go against military advice, especially if he has asked for it. So just do it. Do what they said." He said the decision should have been made in a week.

Michael McConnell, a retired vice admiral who was director of national intelligence in the Bush administration, told President-elect Obama that sensitive intelligence was good on targets in Pakistan and Afghanistan. "They talk, we listen," he said. "They move, we observe. Given the opportunity, we react operationally."

Michael V. Hayden, a retired Air Force general and outgoing director of the CIA, warned that drone strikes against terrorists in Pakistan were not a long-term solution. "Unless you're prepared to do this forever," he told chief of staff Rahm Emanuel, "you have to change the facts on the ground."

Richard C. Holbrooke, special representative for Afghanistan and Pakistan, never made a personal connection with the president. A pessimistic Holbrooke concluded on the eve of Obama's decision to add 30,000 troops, "It can't work."

Karl W. Eikenberry, a retired Army lieutenant general who was the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, questioned a troop increase, alienating the military hierarchy.

Afghan President Hamid Karzai (left) was considered an unreliable partner by U.S. officials. "He's on his meds, he's off his meds," U.S. Ambassador Eikenberry said. Pakistani President Asif Ali Zardari (right) told the CIA to aggressively attack top al Qaeda leaders in his country. "Kill the seniors," he said. "Collateral damage worries you Americans. It does not worry me."

General Ashfaq Kayani, chief of staff of the Pakistani army, refused to take on all of the extremist Islamic groups in his country. Kayani had other priorities. "I'll be the first to admit, I'm India-centric," he said.

Senator Lindsey O. Graham, a Republican from South Carolina, advised General Petraeus on how to argue for more troops in Afghanistan. "If there is a number in your mind below which we can't succeed," he said, "don't ever create a scenario where that thought is lost. . . . One thing you've got to say, 'This is the fail-safe line right here.'"

The October 9, 2009, session of the Afghanistan-Pakistan strategy review, held in the White House Situation Room. Clockwise from President Obama: Retired General Jim Jones; Hillary Clinton; U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Susan E. Rice; retired Admiral Dennis Blair; Leon Panetta; Richard Holbrooke; General David Petraeus; Tom Donilon; Rahm Emanuel; Admiral Mike Mullen; Vice President Joe Biden. Pictured on the video screens are retired General Karl Eikenberry and General Stanley McChrystal (left) and U.S. Ambassador to Pakistan Anne W. Patterson (right).

"We can absorb a terrorist attack," President Obama told the author. "We'll do everything we can to prevent it, but even a 9/11, even the biggest attack ever, that ever took place on our soil, we absorbed it and we are stronger. . . . A potential game changer would be a nuclear weapon in the hands of terrorists, blowing up a major American city."

ALSO BY BOB WOODWARD

The War Within: A Secret White House History, 20062008

State of Denial

The Secret Man

(with a Reporter's Assessment by Carl Bernstein)

Plan of Attack

Bush at War

Maestro: Greenspan's Fed and the American Boom

Shadow: Five Presidents and the Legacy of Watergate

The Choice

The Agenda: Inside the Clinton White House

The Commanders