It was the duty of the central Government to prevent as far as possible any abuse of the privileges which the laws of war allowed to the belligerents. "A Government is justly held responsible for the acts of its citizens," said Justice McLean of the United States Supreme Court, speaking of the Canadian insurrection of 1838. And he continued: "If this Government be unable or unwilling to restrain our citizens from acts of hostility against a friendly power, such power may hold this nation answerable and declare war against it."[58]

Clearly the responsibility for the proper restraint rested upon the President with reference to the incidents which occurred around New Orleans. The fact that forbidden acts committed within the jurisdiction of a State of the Union escape punishment within that State does not relieve the central government of responsibility to foreign governments for such acts. In view of this fact the citizens of the separate States should remember the consequences which may result from their acts. The warning of Justice McLean, speaking of the incident already cited, is to the point:

[Footnote 58: Citing Reg. _v_. Recorder of Wolverhampton, 18 Law T.

395-398; see also H.R., Doc. 568, 57 Cong., 1 Sess., p. 17.]

"Every citizen is ... bound by the regard he has for his country, by the reverence he has for its laws, and by the calamitous consequences of war, to exert his influence in suppressing the unlawful enterprises of our citizens against any foreign and friendly power." And he concludes: "History affords no example of a nation or people that uniformly took part in the internal commotions of other Governments which did not bring down ruin upon themselves. These pregnant examples should guard us against a similar policy, which must lead to a similar result."

In the end nothing came of the alleged unneutral conduct of the United States in the use which had been permitted of the port of New Orleans during the war. Had the South African Republic gained an international status claims for indemnity would probably have lain against the United States for a violation of its neutral duties. Had the Transvaal, recognized in war as a belligerent, become an independent State as the result of that war, such claims would doubtless have been honored and compensation been made upon equitable grounds. Had the opponent of Great Britain in the war been one of the recognized powers of the world such a use of territorial waters could not have been permitted without an effective protest having been made by the State which was injured. The Republics, however, were treated at the close of the war as conquered territory and their obligations taken over by the British Government.

Their rights as an independent State vanished when they failed to attain the end for which they fought.

The extreme generosity afterward displayed by Great Britain in the settlement of the claims of all citizens of the United States who had suffered by the war may possibly be explained by the benefits which the English forces were able to secure from the construction which was put upon American neutrality.

A resolution of the House of Representatives inquiring as to the treatment of citizens of the United States in the South African Republic brought out the fact that the number of those who claimed compensation was not large and that the British Government was willing to indemnify them.[59] The terms of settlement allowed to the United States were in marked contrast to those granted to other powers whose citizens or subjects had also presented claims for indemnity through their respective governments. This fact is evident from the transactions before the Deportation Claims Commission, the appointment of which was announced on April 8, 1901.

[Footnote 59: H. Res., 178, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.; also H.R., Doc. 618, 56 Cong., 1 Sess.]

The commission came together "for the purpose of investigating the claims to compensation which have been made or may be made by persons the subjects of various friendly powers in consequence of their deportation to Europe by the British military authorities in South Africa."[60] It was to be composed of five members, among them "R.K.

Loveday, Esq., formerly a member of the late South African Republic."

The commission was to meet in London to hear such cases as might be presented there and then proceed to South Africa with the purpose of continuing its investigations. Any further evidence that was considered necessary was to be taken on the return to London. It was announced that all claims should be filed on or before April 25, 1901, that claimants might appear either in person or by counsel, and that the different governments might represent the combined claims of their respective citizens or subjects.

[Footnote 60: For. Rel., 1901, pp. 216-222.]

Mr. R. Newton Crane appeared before the commission on the part of the United States. In all, fifteen claims were presented. Five of these were presented by persons who alleged that they were native-born citizens of the United States, although no evidence was furnished as to the date or place of their birth. Eight alleged that they were naturalized citizens, while there were two who could produce no evidence whatever of their status. Eight had been deported on the suspicion of having been concerned in the Johannesburg plot to murder Lord Roberts and other English officers; one had been imprisoned at Natal as a Boer spy; another was captured on the field of battle while serving, as he alleged, with a Red Cross ambulance corps attached to the Boer forces; three others were compelled to leave the country for various reasons, while two more could produce no evidence that they had been forcibly deported; on the contrary it appeared that they had left South Africa voluntarily and at their own expense. The whole amount claimed was $52,278.29 on account of actual losses alleged. The commission heard all claims by means of an _ex parte_ statement in each case, with the exception of two for which no statement had been presented. These last two had been mentioned as claimants by the Amba.s.sador of the United States on October 24, 1900, in a communication to Lord Landsdowne, the English Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and were so presented to the consideration of the commission.

In dealing with the cases the commission did not insist upon any technical formality in the way of proof. The plan followed was to allow the legal representative of the English Government an opportunity to explain why each individual had been deported. The several claimants were then permitted to put in evidence to clear themselves of these charges. After the claims had all been considered in this way the English representative announced the wish of his government to "agree with the representatives of the various governments upon a lump sum to be received by each of the powers in full satisfaction of the demands of their respective claimants," it being understood that the British Government "was not to be concerned as to how the sums so paid were allocated among the various claimants."[61] This proposal was accepted by the United States and by the other governments represented.

[Footnote 61: For. Rel., 1901, p. 221.]

With the announcement of the decision of the commissioners on October 28, 1901, Mr. Crane pointed out that it had been very difficult to determine the real merits of most of the claims. Difficulty had been experienced not only in ascertaining the real facts but in applying the principles of international law as well. Many of the facts alleged by the claimants were not substantiated, and it was only the considerate view taken by the British Government which made possible a settlement so favorable to the United States.

Holland put in a claim for 706,355 in behalf of 1139 persons who alleged that they were Dutch subjects, and received 5.3 per cent, of that amount, or 37,500, which was the highest actual award made, although the lowest percentage of the sum claimed. Germany received 30,000, or 12.22 per cent, of the amount claimed for 199 persons; Austria-Hungary 15,000, or 34.24 per cent, for 112 persons; Italy 12,000, or 28.52 per cent, for 113 persons; the United States 6,000, or 22.22 per cent, for 15 persons. But Mr. Crane called attention to the evident error of basing a calculation upon the relation the award in each case bears to the amount claimed. The amount claimed in most cases is not what the claimant thinks he is justly ent.i.tled to for the losses he has sustained, but is the amount which his "caprice or cupidity fixes as that which may possibly be allowed him."[62] Among the American claims a number included demands for "moral" damages, and these claims were larger than similar demands put in by citizens of other countries.

Even among the American claimants themselves there was a wide divergence in appraising their losses, actual as well as moral. Of three in the same occupation, the same employment, the same domestic surroundings, deported together, at about the same time, and under almost identical circ.u.mstances, one demanded $5,220, the second appraised his losses at $11,112.50, and the third estimated his losses at $50,000.

[Footnote 62: For. Rel., 1901, p. 221.]

With reference to the American claimants the conditions under which the persons were deported were practically the same, and there was little if any distinction as to social rank or grade of employment. Mr. Crane, therefore, seems justified in his conclusion that the idea conveyed by the percentage relation of the amount demanded to the amount actually awarded is misleading, and should not serve as a precedent without comment for similar claims in the future. A much fairer method for ascertaining what the award really amounts to is shown to be that of computing what average sum each claimant received, since the claimants were practically of one walk of life and employment and were deported under like conditions. Such a computation shows that the United States fared much better than any one of the other governments, the average sum received by each claimant being 428 11s. 5d., as compared with 150 15s. for Germany; 142 17s. 1d. for Russia; 133 18s. 6d. for Austria-Hungary; 133 6s. 8d. for Belgium; 125 for Norway and Sweden; and 106 3s. 10d. for Italy.

The 6,000 offered by the British Government as full compensation for all claims of citizens of the United States on account of wrongful arrest, imprisonment and deportation from South Africa up to October 26, 1901, was accepted by Secretary Hay. Only 4,000 had been originally offered, but the amount had afterward been increased to 6,000.

Throughout the negotiations the att.i.tude of the English Government was generous toward the United States. The claimants included good, bad and indifferent, some of whom were not ent.i.tled to compensation at all, since they were not citizens of the United States, while others had actually taken up arms against Great Britain. The average amount awarded to each alleged citizen of the United States was approximately $2000 as against $216 for each claimant of all other Governments taken together.

In a number of cases the claimants had contracted with local attorneys upon the basis of a contingent fee of 50 per cent, of whatever might be awarded. In one case the fee of the attorney presenting the claim amounted to $3750, although his services consisted in merely filing memorials which were not supported by a single word of proof of the a.s.sertions they contained, even after ample time had been given for the introduction of such proof. Mr. Crane, therefore, urged that in future similar claims should be presented directly by the citizens themselves without the intermediation of attorneys. In the present cases he said that his requests to the attorneys for the different claimants to furnish evidence to meet the accusations of the British Government against their clients had met with no response whatever. He felt justified in believing that these attorneys had either given up the presentation of the claims of their clients or that the latter were dead. It was accordingly suggested that in either case the United States would be justified in refusing to pay over to the attorneys such sums as might be allotted to their clients until the latter had been directly communicated with. In this way they would have the opportunity to confirm or withdraw any powers of attorney which they might have executed for the collection of their respective claims.

CHAPTER II.

THE NEUTRALITY OF EUROPEAN POWERS.

The att.i.tude of the European powers was generally observant of the requirements of neutrality in so far as governmental action could be proved. The frequent charges which Great Britain made that the Transvaal was recruiting forces in Europe were not proved against the States from which the recruits came. The numbers in the parties which perhaps actually joined the Boer forces were not large, and no formidable fitting out of an expedition or wholesale a.s.sistance was proved against any European government.

Germany, the power most nearly in touch with the Transvaal in South Africa with the exception of Portugal, early declared the governmental att.i.tude toward the struggle. The German consul-general at Cape Town on October 19, 1899, issued a proclamation enjoining all German subjects to hold aloof from partic.i.p.ation in the hostilities which Great Britain at that time had not recognized as belligerent in character. If insurgency be recognized as a distinct status falling short of belligerency, this was perhaps such a recognition, but it was in no sense an unfriendly act toward Great Britain. It was merely a warning to German subjects as to the manner in which they should conduct themselves under the circ.u.mstances. It did not recognize the Boers as belligerents in the international sense, but it warned German subjects that a condition of affairs existed which called for vigilance on their part in their conduct toward, the contestants. Later, when the British Government announced that the war would be recognized retroactively as ent.i.tled to full belligerent status, Germany declared the governmental att.i.tude to be that of strict neutrality in the contest. An attempt of the Boers to recruit in Damaraland was promptly stopped by the German officers in control, who were ordered to allow neither men nor horses to cross the border for the purposes of the war. All German steamship lines which held subventions from the Government were warned that if they were found carrying contraband they would thereby forfeit their privileges.

Stringent orders were also given by the different German ship companies to their agents in no case to ship contraband for the belligerents. The att.i.tude a.s.sumed by the German Government was not entirely in accord with the popular feeling in Germany. On October 5 a ma.s.s-meeting at Gottingen, before proceeding to the business for which the conference was called, proposed a resolution of sympathy for the Boers: "Not because the Boers are entirely in the right, but because we Germans must take sides against the English."[1] But despite popular sentiment, the position which had been taken by the Government seems to have been consistently maintained.

[Footnote 1: London Times, Weekly Ed., Oct. 5, 1899, p. 626, col. 2.]

In June, prior to the outbreak of war, President Kruger had been advised by the Dutch Minister for Foreign Affairs that the Transvaal should maintain a moderate att.i.tude in the discussion of the questions at issue with the British Government. The German Government, too, had advised the Republics to invite mediation, but at that time President Kruger declared that the moment had not yet come for applying for the mediation of America. The United States, it was considered by both Holland and Germany, could most successfully have undertaken the role of mediator from the fact that England would have been more likely to entertain proposals of the kind coming from Washington than from a European capital.

In December, 1900, Count Von Bulow, the German Imperial Chancellor, speaking of the neutral att.i.tude of Germany, declared that when President Kruger later attempted to secure arbitration it was not until feeling had become so heated that he was compelled to announce to the Dutch Government that it was not possible to arrange for arbitration.

The German Government, it was declared, regarded any appeal to a Great Power at that time as hopeless and as very dangerous to the Transvaal.

The German and the Dutch Governments each believed that President Kruger should not have rejected the English proposal then before him for a joint commission of inquiry.[2] The German Government had nothing for which to reproach itself in regard to the outbreak of war or with reference to the fate of the Republics. "Of course there are certain lengths to which we could not possibly go. We could not, in order to prevent the door from being slammed, let our own fingers be crushed between the door and the hinges; that would not have helped the Boers and would only have harmed ourselves,--and when the war had broken out it was impossible for us, in view of the general situation of the world and from the standpoint of German interests as a whole to adopt any att.i.tude except that of strict neutrality."[3] Continuing, Count Von Bulow pointed out the fact that the policy of a great country should not at a critical moment be governed by the dictates of feeling, but should be guided solely in accordance with the interests of the country, calmly and deliberately calculated.

[Footnote 2: The German Chancellor seems slightly in error in a.s.suming that the Transvaal _rejected_ the English proposal for a joint inquiry.

It will be remembered that immediately following the Bloemfontein Conference President Kruger had drafted a law considerably modifying the Transvaal demands in the conference, and later submitted the proposals of August 19, which he alleged had been" induced "by their implied acceptance on the part of the British agent. When these proposals lapsed from the fact of their non-acceptance by the British Government, he declared that he was ready to return to the discussion of the proposed joint commission of inquiry and was met by the English a.s.sertion that the condition of affairs no longer warranted a discussion of the original proposal for such a commission, and that Great Britain would have to formulate new demands to meet the altered conditions. The outbreak of war had forestalled these demands.]

[Footnote 3: Speech in Reichstag, London Times, Dec. 11, 1900, p. 5, col. 1.]

The possibility of mediation with Germany in the role of mediator was shown to have been made conditional upon the acceptance of such a step by both the parties to the contest, as otherwise it would not have been mediation but intervention, with the ultimate possibility of the exercise of force for the purpose of stopping the hostilities.

Intervention of that kind, involving the idea of coercion, was never considered by the German Government because of the general situation of the world and of special German interests. The idea of anything other than entirely peaceful and friendly intervention was not entertained by any power in considering the situation in South Africa. The German Chancellor declared that "even those Powers which academically ventilated the idea of peaceful mediation invariably and expressly laid stress upon the fact that they had no thought or intention of forcing England to accept peace against her will." He a.s.serted that the possibility of mediation was thus excluded since the preliminary condition of such a course was the consent of both parties to the conflict.

Count Von Bulow also called attention to the fact that the gentlest form of diplomatic inquiry made by the United States had been rejected by the English Government "officially and categorically in the most distinct manner possible." And speaking officially, he continued, "We therefore did what we could as a neutral Power and without imperilling direct German interests in order to prevent the outbreak of war. In particular we acted in the most straightforward manner toward the governments of the South African Republics inasmuch as from the first and in good time we left them in no doubt regarding the situation in Europe and also regarding our own neutrality in the event of war in South Africa. In both these regards we made matters clear to the two South African Republics and did so in good time."[4] The Chancellor seems to have fairly defined the position maintained by the German Government throughout the war, although popular feeling often clamored for official action in behalf of the Boers.

[Footnote 4: Speech in Reichstag, Dec. 10, 1900.]

A similar course was pursued by the French Government despite the fact that in France popular sympathy was more strongly in favor of the Transvaal than was the case in Germany. No official action, however, was taken which could involve France in complications in view of the declared neutral att.i.tude a.s.sumed at the beginning of the war. The administration at Paris ordered the prefects throughout the country to have removed from the official minutes the resolutions of sympathy for the Boers which had been adopted by the provincial councils. But opposed to the correct att.i.tude of the Government, popular feeling was manifested in different ways. A committee of ladies in Paris made a direct appeal to the French people. They declared: "We are not biased enemies of the British Nation ... but we have a horror of grasping financiers, the men of prey who have concocted in cold blood this rascally war. They have committed with premeditation a crime of _lese-humanite_, the greatest of crimes. May the blood which reddens the battle-fields of South Africa forever be upon their heads.... Yes, we are heart and soul with the Boers.... We admire them because old men and young women, even, are all fighting like heroes.... Alas! to be sure, there is no more a France, nor yet an America.... Ah! Ideal abode of the human conscience, founded by Socrates, sanctified by Christ, illuminated in flashes of lightning by the French Revolution, what has become of thee? There is no longer a common temple for civilized states. Our house is divided against itself and is falling asunder. Peace reigns everywhere save on the banks of the Vaal, but it is an armed peace, an odious peace, a poisoned peace which is eating us up and from which we are all dying."[5] Such hysterical outbursts in France were not taken seriously by the Government, and the feeling which inspired them was possibly more largely due to historic hatred of England than to the inherent justice of the Boer cause.

[Footnote 5: London Times, April 2, 1900, p. 5, col. 5.]

The Ninth Peace Conference, which was in session at Paris in the fall of 1900, without expressly a.s.suming the right of interfering in the affairs of a friendly nation further than to "emphatically affirm the unchangeable principles of international justice," adopted a resolution declaring that the responsibility for the war devastating South Africa fell upon that one of the two parties who repeatedly refused arbitration, that is, it was explained, upon the British Government; that the British Government, in ignoring the principles of right and justice, in refusing arbitration and in using menaces only too likely to bring about war in a dispute which might have been settled by judicial methods, had committed an outrage against the rights of nations calculated to r.e.t.a.r.d the pacific evolution of humanity; that the Governments represented at the Hague had taken no public measures to ensure respect for the resolutions which should have been regarded by them as an engagement of honor; that an appeal to public opinion on the subject of the Transvaal was advocated and sympathy and admiration were expressed for the English members of the conference.[6]

[Footnote 6: London Times, Oct. 3, 1900, p. 3, col. 3.]

The usual French att.i.tude toward Great Britain was expressed in these resolutions, but the conference was not prepared to go so far as to adopt a resolution proposed by a member from Belgium expressing the hope that the mistake of depriving the Republics of their independence would not be committed, and favoring an energetic appeal to the powers for intervention. The resolution was rejected by a large majority on the ground that it would be impolitic and naturally irritating to England and without much probability of favorable results being attained.

When the delegation of the Boers which was sent to appeal to the European Powers for action in behalf of the Republics reached Paris in July, 1900, the att.i.tude of the French Government was not altered, nor were the envoys encouraged to hope for intervention. They were received by the President but only in an informal and unofficial manner when presented by Dr. Leyds. When they reached Berlin in August neither the Emperor nor the Chancellor was in the city and consequently the visit had no official significance, but in St. Petersburg a more favorable reception awaited them. The Official Messenger announced on August 26 that Dr. Leyds had been received in audience by the Czar. This statement, coming as it did from the official organ of the Foreign Office, seemed to signify a full recognition of the accredited character of the delegation, and Dr. Leyds was referred to officially as "Minister of the South African Republic."[7] With the exception of the British Minister, he was received by all of the diplomatic corps, a courtesy which the members could not well have denied him, but as to practical results the mission to Russia amounted to nothing.

[Footnote 7: London Times, July 26, 1900.]

On their return to Germany the envoys received no official notice. The secret instructions which they had opened only upon reaching Milan were supposed to have contained certain communications which had been exchanged between the Governments of the Transvaal and Great Britain but which it was alleged had not been published in the Blue Books. This a.s.sertion of sinister motives on the part of Great Britain exerted little influence upon foreign governments in Europe. The delegation realized the impossibility of securing the interference of a concert of Powers or of any one State against the wishes of England. The mission of the Boers had been doomed to failure from the beginning.

The action of the Queen of Holland in receiving the delegation was generally understood as not of an unneutral character but as inspired by sympathy for a kindred people and a willingness to mediate though not to intervene. It was recognized that no nation whose interests were not directly concerned could afford to persist in offers of mediation in view of the fact that Great Britain had already intimated to the United States that such an offer could not be accepted. Although Holland refused to intervene, the att.i.tude a.s.sumed by the Dutch Government in other respects caused severe criticism in England. The chief circ.u.mstance which confirmed the opinion that Holland as a neutral State had not displayed a proper att.i.tude at Lorenzo Marques was the fact that after the visit of the envoys of the Transvaal the Hague Government had sent a man-of-war to the island of St. Helena, which was being used as a prison for the Boers who were transported from South Africa. This proceeding was viewed by England as officious from the fact that foreign men-of-war were not usually received at that port. Popular feeling saw in the despatch of the man-of-war an unfriendly act which might easily have led to difficulty. But the incident, aside from the benevolent character which Holland had given to the enforcement of her neutrality laws throughout the war, had no significance in international law. It was generally considered, however, that the feeling which England manifested with regard to the visit of the cruiser gave some ground for the suspicion that the British Government might have had something to conceal at St. Helena.

The general att.i.tude of Germany, France and Russia toward the Boer mission was guided by a policy of strict adherence to the neutral obligations a.s.sumed at the beginning of the war. These Powers in their official statements all followed such a course, realizing that it was demanded by a sound foreign policy. They considered the idea of intervention out of the question, although friendly interest for the Boers and for the peaceful purpose of their mission was evident.

From the beginning of the war the active duties of neutrality had fallen upon Portugal, since neither the Transvaal nor the Orange Free State possessed a seaport. Fifty miles of railway separated the Portuguese harbor of Lorenzo Marques in Delagoa Bay from the Transvaal border, and from this point the road continued to Pretoria. Lorenzo Marques being neutral could not be blockaded, but, being neutral, it was the duty of the Portuguese Government to observe the laws of neutrality. Great Britain alleged that a constant stream of supplies and recruits pa.s.sed over the Portuguese border to aid the Boer armies. The difficulty on the part of the English Government, however, was to prove that the goods were in fact on their way to a belligerent destination or that small parties of men were in reality organized bands of recruits for the fighting forces of the enemy. It was a.s.serted that the manner in which Portugal performed her neutral obligations, demanding an absolutely impartial treatment of both belligerents, made Delagoa Bay and the port of Lorenzo Marques more valuable to the Republics than would have been the case had they actually been in their possession.