The aviators of the 11th Air Fleet arrived shortly after 1 p.m., sweeping in low from the east. The raid, numbering twenty-four twin-engine Mitsubishi G4M Betty medium bombers and sixteen Aichi Val dive-bombers, escorted by seventeen Zeros, came buzzing over Florida Island then dropped down low to the sea, the planes holding a tight formation with their shadows bounding over the wave tops. A timely warning from a coast.w.a.tcher had enabled Turner's amphibious force to get under way before the planes arrived. The cruisers and the destroyers were fanned out in an antiaircraft disposition that placed the cargomen at the center of a great circle of warships. Overhead, eight Wildcats from the Saratoga Saratoga piled in, joined by ten more from the piled in, joined by ten more from the Enterprise. Enterprise. Their combined fire was too much for the attackers. Just one Allied ship was damaged, the destroyer Their combined fire was too much for the attackers. Just one Allied ship was damaged, the destroyer Mugford, Mugford, hit in the after deck house with a bomb that took nineteen lives. hit in the after deck house with a bomb that took nineteen lives.

At noon the next day, the j.a.panese naval air corps staged an encore. Once again, given advance warning from an alert coast.w.a.tcher, the transports and their screen were maneuvering at battle speed when the air strike arrived. Approaching from the northwest in a loose, diamond formation, skimming over Florida Island and Tulagi, they hedge-hopped over the transports and broke up into smaller groups, looking for targets. Their orders were to strike the American carriers, suspected to be operating east of Tulagi. Their secondary target was the landing force. The latter was all they could find, and more than they could handle.

Kelly Turner's fleet, maneuvering in four columns abreast, led by his own flagship, the McCawley, McCawley, offered its a.s.sailants few opportunities except to die. Admiral Crutchley marveled at how the "magnificent curtain of bursting high explosive was put up and enemy aircraft were everywhere crashing in flames." Rear Admiral Norman Scott's flagship, the antiaircraft cruiser offered its a.s.sailants few opportunities except to die. Admiral Crutchley marveled at how the "magnificent curtain of bursting high explosive was put up and enemy aircraft were everywhere crashing in flames." Rear Admiral Norman Scott's flagship, the antiaircraft cruiser San Juan, San Juan, a sister of the a sister of the Atlanta, Atlanta, was built for the job, with a battery of sixteen five-inch guns arrayed in eight twin turrets. Her officers got good solutions and had plenty of time to train and aim. The heavy cruisers, including the was built for the job, with a battery of sixteen five-inch guns arrayed in eight twin turrets. Her officers got good solutions and had plenty of time to train and aim. The heavy cruisers, including the Astoria, Astoria, worked over the incoming planes with their older batteries. Planes with red meatball insignia plummeted to the sea, pancaked in single forward flips, caught wing to wave and cartwheeled into pieces, or struggled on by, drawing black contrails in steepening downward arcs. worked over the incoming planes with their older batteries. Planes with red meatball insignia plummeted to the sea, pancaked in single forward flips, caught wing to wave and cartwheeled into pieces, or struggled on by, drawing black contrails in steepening downward arcs.

While under attack, the Astoria Astoria's gunnery officer, Commander William H. Truesdell, found some time to explain the fine points of antiaircraft fire control to the journalist Joe James Custer during this live demonstration of the state of the working art. Technology was part of it, but the unpredictable way of the human heart was part of the system. Hearing one of his gunner's mates wheezing into a harmonica as the bullets flew-Be it ever so humble, there's no place like home-Truesdell chuckled and asked, "How can you beat those kids?"

The impact of the ship's defensive gunfire was terrific. When Custer returned to his stateroom, he found it a wreck: the telephone torn from the bulkhead, lightbulbs popped, personal effects scattered across the deck, including his chief weapon, his typewriter. The performance of the gunners was redeemed by the fact that most of the j.a.panese bombers ended their missions rather worse off than the journalist's cabin. Only five Bettys returned to base. It was a far cry from their devastating turn against the Royal Navy's heavies, the Prince of Wales Prince of Wales and and Repulse, Repulse, eight months before. eight months before.

Even with reliable warning, it was still a considerable trick to launch and vector fighter planes from aircraft carriers to intercept at the right place and time. As a result of the difficulties of communication and coordination among the carrier groups, the combat air patrol was paltry on the second day. A dozen and a half Wildcats, ten from the Enterprise Enterprise and eight from the and eight from the Saratoga, Saratoga, belatedly intercepted the j.a.panese and hara.s.sed them halfway back to their base in New Georgia. For the j.a.panese, the returns of their second air attack were meager: The destroyer belatedly intercepted the j.a.panese and hara.s.sed them halfway back to their base in New Georgia. For the j.a.panese, the returns of their second air attack were meager: The destroyer Jarvis Jarvis was. .h.i.t by a torpedo and the transport was. .h.i.t by a torpedo and the transport George F. Elliott George F. Elliott crash-dived by a damaged bomber, scuttled and left burning in the shallows off Tulagi. crash-dived by a damaged bomber, scuttled and left burning in the shallows off Tulagi.

The first two collisions of the Watchtower fleet with j.a.pan's world-beating naval airpower punctured the impression of invincibility the latter had earned over the past year. A number of j.a.panese bombers were seen to break off their attack and fly away to the north. "Either these are Army pilots, or the j.a.ps are down to their second team in the Navy," scoffed an Astoria Astoria officer. "I've never seen them that bad before. Those crack j.a.p Navy pilots-the ones we tangled with in the Coral Sea, and at Midway-they don't let up. Never. They come right at you, and they keep on coming until you get them or they get you. These punks-running away..." officer. "I've never seen them that bad before. Those crack j.a.p Navy pilots-the ones we tangled with in the Coral Sea, and at Midway-they don't let up. Never. They come right at you, and they keep on coming until you get them or they get you. These punks-running away..."

Joe Custer got a close look at their kind when he found himself appraising five enemy aviators in the water near the ship. Through a telescope he could see their husky forms, heads shaven, wearing ribbed inflatable life jackets. As the Astoria Astoria's sailors jeered them-"How do you like that, you j.a.p b.a.s.t.a.r.d!"-the skipper, Captain William G. Greenman, refused a request to turn the ship's twenty-millimeter guns on them. When a U.S. destroyer moved in to attempt rescue, the j.a.panese aviators pulled their sidearms and did it themselves.

At sunset, with the excitement of D-Day-plus-one waning, Task Force 62 reconfigured itself to confront the night. The carriers withdrew to their night patrol area south of Guadalca.n.a.l, out of range of enemy aircraft. At six thirty, Admiral Crutchley directed his heavy cruisers to take station guarding the two avenues into Savo Sound, on either side of Savo Island. The heavy cruisers Vincennes, Quincy, Vincennes, Quincy, and and Astoria, Astoria, escorted by three destroyers, patrolled the entrance east of Savo Island, under command of the escorted by three destroyers, patrolled the entrance east of Savo Island, under command of the Vincennes Vincennes skipper, Captain Frederick Riefkohl. The skipper, Captain Frederick Riefkohl. The Chicago, Chicago, joined by the HMAS joined by the HMAS Australia Australia and the HMAS and the HMAS Canberra, Canberra, watched the approach southwest of the island. The route into the sound from the east, through Sealark and Lengo channels, was defended by the watched the approach southwest of the island. The route into the sound from the east, through Sealark and Lengo channels, was defended by the San Juan, San Juan, Australian light cruiser Australian light cruiser Hobart, Hobart, and two destroyers. Closer to the transport anchorage, destroyers and destroyer-minesweepers guarded against incursions by submarines and torpedo boats. The destroyers and two destroyers. Closer to the transport anchorage, destroyers and destroyer-minesweepers guarded against incursions by submarines and torpedo boats. The destroyers Blue Blue and and Ralph Talbot Ralph Talbot were ordered to patrol north of Savo Island as early-warning radar pickets. were ordered to patrol north of Savo Island as early-warning radar pickets.

It was in the anticlimax of Sat.u.r.day, August 8, less than forty-eight hours after the first contact of American boots with enemy-occupied Oceania, that the most potent j.a.panese threat would become manifest. Even as Admiral Fletcher prepared to execute the most controversial decision he would make as commander of the Operation Watchtower expeditionary force, a flashing Imperial j.a.panese Navy sword was sliding out of a scabbard just over the horizon.

5.

Fly the Carriers KELLY TURNER, THE COMMANDER OF TASK FORCE 62, THE AMPHIBIOUS force, was forged from the same hard bra.s.s as his mentor, Ernest J. King, whom he had served as director of war plans in the war's first months. Turner was hard on subordinates, and carried himself with an edgy intensity. "Whenever he became disgusted," a sailor who knew him wrote, "he would emit a small spitting sound, stamp his foot lightly and say 'b.a.l.l.s!'" force, was forged from the same hard bra.s.s as his mentor, Ernest J. King, whom he had served as director of war plans in the war's first months. Turner was hard on subordinates, and carried himself with an edgy intensity. "Whenever he became disgusted," a sailor who knew him wrote, "he would emit a small spitting sound, stamp his foot lightly and say 'b.a.l.l.s!'"

But he could show warmth when he needed to. "I have seen him 'blow up' a junior officer and I was taken in," a magazine reporter said, "till I saw the look in his eye and the smile that finally came.... He is aware of men's sensitivities and he recognizes their abilities even when they occasionally annoy him. His men admit he is tough-he admits it himself-but they love to work for him."

Given the problems that plagued the supply effort at the beach, Turner was fortunate that ground resistance was so light. His cargo ships did not have enough men embarked to haul crates and equipment for forty-eight hours straight. Without the benefit of docks, cranes, or other cargo-handling facilities on the virgin beach, it was impossible to unload directly to sh.o.r.e. Small boats had to ferry the cargo in, and when they reached the beach, hundreds of them gunwale-to-gunwale, human hands did the heavy lifting. Beyond the backbreaking nature of the work itself was the problem of organization and triage. According to the commander of the transport Hunter Liggett, Hunter Liggett, "After dark, conditions reached a complete impa.s.se." It took waiting boats up to six hours for a chance to land. "After dark, conditions reached a complete impa.s.se." It took waiting boats up to six hours for a chance to land.

The tremors of the interservice argument that would define the first two weeks of the operation arrived quickly. "No small share of the blame for this delay," the commander continued, "which prolonged by nearly twenty-four hours the period when the ships lay in these dangerous waters, would seem to rest with the Marine Corps personnel and organization. The Marine Corps Pioneers, whose function it was to unload the boats and keep the beach clear, were far too few in numbers." An officer from the transport Barnett Barnett described men "lounging around under the palm trees eating coconuts, lying down shooting coconuts from the trees; also playing around and paddling about in rubber boats. All of these men were Marines that should have been unloading boats." Even Kelly Turner, whose fondness for his seagoing infantrymen was peerless, pointed to "a failure on the part of the First [Marine] Division to provide adequate and well organized unloading details on the beach. The Marine officers on my staff feel very strongly on these matters-as strongly as I do." described men "lounging around under the palm trees eating coconuts, lying down shooting coconuts from the trees; also playing around and paddling about in rubber boats. All of these men were Marines that should have been unloading boats." Even Kelly Turner, whose fondness for his seagoing infantrymen was peerless, pointed to "a failure on the part of the First [Marine] Division to provide adequate and well organized unloading details on the beach. The Marine officers on my staff feel very strongly on these matters-as strongly as I do."

Time was of the essence, but speed faced many obstacles. Many of the small craft used to bring in supplies were loaded so deeply by the head that they couldn't make it all the way up the beach. When their ramps were lowered, they filled with water and their straining engines drowned. Compounding the trouble was the way the big transports offsh.o.r.e had been loaded in Wellington: for commerce, efficiently and in volume, not for combat, enabling quick access to food and ammunition. In the Chesapeake Bay area and on the West Coast, the Navy was still establishing specialty schools to teach these skills to their beachmasters. At Guadalca.n.a.l, on-the-job training would have to suffice.

Early in the evening of August 8, in his flagship McCawley, McCawley, Turner was wrestling with these frustrations, minding the possibility of further attacks, when Frank Jack Fletcher did what Turner had been dreading for two weeks. In a message to Admiral Ghormley, Fletcher was requesting permission to withdraw his three aircraft carriers, now serving as Task Force 62's umbrella and shield, from their supporting positions near Guadalca.n.a.l. Turner was wrestling with these frustrations, minding the possibility of further attacks, when Frank Jack Fletcher did what Turner had been dreading for two weeks. In a message to Admiral Ghormley, Fletcher was requesting permission to withdraw his three aircraft carriers, now serving as Task Force 62's umbrella and shield, from their supporting positions near Guadalca.n.a.l.

The reasons Fletcher cited were various-that his F4F Wildcat fighter force had, after two days of action against j.a.panese bombers, been whittled from ninety-nine planes to seventy-eight; that his ships' fuel reserves were dwindling; and that the presence of torpedo-armed enemy aircraft posed a threat to his carriers. Fletcher's reasoning was never clear or consistent. When he asked Admiral Noyes, the tactical commander of the carrier force, for his opinion about a withdrawal, a shortage of fuel was not among his expressed concerns. But when Ghormley notified Nimitz of the decision, fuel was the only concern he mentioned.

Turner never forgot the contentious planning conference on the Saratoga, Saratoga, where he and General Vandegrift pushed for the carriers to remain on station through August 9. Fletcher's defenders say he only ever promised two days of air support-through August 8. Either way, the argument continued. Pa.s.sions about the use of the carriers ran so high that they even got to the gentlemanly Marine commander. Vandegrift would be moved, in his memoirs, to accuse Fletcher of rank cowardice: "This was the Koro [ where he and General Vandegrift pushed for the carriers to remain on station through August 9. Fletcher's defenders say he only ever promised two days of air support-through August 8. Either way, the argument continued. Pa.s.sions about the use of the carriers ran so high that they even got to the gentlemanly Marine commander. Vandegrift would be moved, in his memoirs, to accuse Fletcher of rank cowardice: "This was the Koro [Saratoga] conference relived, except that Fletcher was running away twelve hours earlier than he had already threatened during our unpleasant meeting. We all knew his fuel could not have been running low since he refueled in the Fijis."

Though Ghormley approved his request solely on the basis of a fuel shortage, Fletcher's carriers had enough fuel for several additional days at cruising speed. His destroyers were at about half capacity, with enough fuel for about thirty-six hours of high-speed operation. The larger ships on hand could have topped them off. Since he had yet to receive Fletcher's final operations plan, Ghormley had no independent knowledge of the actual risks to the carriers and felt bound to take Fletcher at his word. "All knew that the enemy could arrive in force and catch our Task Forces short of fuel," Ghormley wrote. "This had to be considered very seriously. When Fletcher, the man on the spot, informed me he had to withdraw for fuel, I approved. He knew his situation in detail; I did not."

Weeks earlier, in joining MacArthur's call to delay the invasion, Ghormley had expressed the need for a continuous presence by carrier aircraft. As MacArthur put it to King, "It is the opinion of the two commanders, arrived at independently and confirmed after discussion, that the initiation of this operation at this time without a reasonable a.s.surance of adequate air coverage during each phase would be attended with the gravest risk as has been thoroughly demonstrated by the j.a.panese reverses in the Coral Sea and at Midway." The Navy's successes were also cautionary tales. If "a.s.surance of adequate air coverage" was indeed essential, one might wonder why Ghormley did not more closely monitor the carriers' actual fuel needs or simply insist they stay on hand, within range of sh.o.r.e.

Fletcher was the most battle-seasoned senior officer in Operation Watchtower. The experience of combat had taught him its costs. At both Coral Sea and Midway he had had a great carrier, the Lexington Lexington and then the and then the Yorktown, Yorktown, sunk from under him. At a time when the Pacific carrier fleet numbered just four, three of which were a.s.signed to Watchtower, he was fearful of further losses. During the day, the sunk from under him. At a time when the Pacific carrier fleet numbered just four, three of which were a.s.signed to Watchtower, he was fearful of further losses. During the day, the Enterprise, Wasp, Enterprise, Wasp, and and Saratoga Saratoga operated from a position about twenty-five miles south of the eastern end of Guadalca.n.a.l. From there, naval aircraft on patrol were but a quick few minutes from the beaches. Though j.a.panese planes from Rabaul six hundred miles away would have little capacity to strike them even if they could find them, the danger posed by the j.a.panese carriers and submarines was considerable. The paramount question was whether the carriers were foremost in Fletcher's mind, or the overall operation. operated from a position about twenty-five miles south of the eastern end of Guadalca.n.a.l. From there, naval aircraft on patrol were but a quick few minutes from the beaches. Though j.a.panese planes from Rabaul six hundred miles away would have little capacity to strike them even if they could find them, the danger posed by the j.a.panese carriers and submarines was considerable. The paramount question was whether the carriers were foremost in Fletcher's mind, or the overall operation.

In his original July 2 operational order to Nimitz, King had specified the conditions under which the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) could order the carriers withdrawn. "The withdrawal of the naval attached units of the U.S. fleet may be ordered by the U.S. chiefs of staff upon completion of any particular phase of the operation upon completion of any particular phase of the operation in the event that (1) conditions develop which unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers (2) an emergency arises in other Pacific areas which dictates such withdrawal" (emphasis added). In King's view, completion of a particular phase of the operation-for instance, the landings-was a necessary precondition to a high-level decision to remove the carriers. Not even a serious threat to the carriers themselves excused their departure prior to the completion of a phase. Though it is unclear exactly what const.i.tuted a "phase," and while the criteria for a withdrawal ordered by the JCS were not the same as for one ordered by the tactical commander, it does seem unlikely that Admiral King ever envisioned a withdrawal before the initial unloading of supplies was done. The second precondition allowing the carriers' withdrawal-undue jeopardy to them-required that Fletcher view his losses of fighter planes and consumption of fuel, both rather predictable outcomes of operations, as excessive. in the event that (1) conditions develop which unduly jeopardize the aircraft carriers (2) an emergency arises in other Pacific areas which dictates such withdrawal" (emphasis added). In King's view, completion of a particular phase of the operation-for instance, the landings-was a necessary precondition to a high-level decision to remove the carriers. Not even a serious threat to the carriers themselves excused their departure prior to the completion of a phase. Though it is unclear exactly what const.i.tuted a "phase," and while the criteria for a withdrawal ordered by the JCS were not the same as for one ordered by the tactical commander, it does seem unlikely that Admiral King ever envisioned a withdrawal before the initial unloading of supplies was done. The second precondition allowing the carriers' withdrawal-undue jeopardy to them-required that Fletcher view his losses of fighter planes and consumption of fuel, both rather predictable outcomes of operations, as excessive.

Fletcher was said to be the only U.S. flag officer who understood that Watchtower would provoke the j.a.panese to a major naval counterattack. "His major job," wrote author Richard B. Frank, "was to win the carrier fleet action that would decide the fate of the Marines." If that was the case, it would have been reckless to risk his carriers before that threat actually appeared. He knew he would have to win that battle without ready reinforcement to make up his losses. No new carriers were due from the shipyards until late 1943.

A well-situated referee to the controversy over Fletcher's decision making was Marine colonel Melvin J. Maas. If his position on Fletcher's staff makes his sympathy for his boss unsurprising, his status as a leatherneck inclined him to balanced perspective. He believed the only way the j.a.panese could retake Guadalca.n.a.l was through a major amphibious counteroffensive. "Marines cannot be dislodged by bombers," Maas wrote. Because he saw the carriers as the key to preventing an enemy landing, he favored a withdrawal of the carriers, even at the expense of his brothers.

"To be able to intercept and defeat [j.a.panese troop landings], our carrier task forces must be fueled and away so as not to be trapped here.... By withdrawing to Noumea or Tongatabu, we can be in a position to intercept and pull a second Midway on their carriers. If, however, we stay on here and then, getting very low on fuel, withdraw to meet our tankers, and and if if they they should be torpedoed, our whole fleet would be caught helpless and would be cold meat for the j.a.ps, with a resultant loss of our fleet, 2/3 of our carriers, and we would lose Tulagi as well, with should be torpedoed, our whole fleet would be caught helpless and would be cold meat for the j.a.ps, with a resultant loss of our fleet, 2/3 of our carriers, and we would lose Tulagi as well, with all all the Marines there and perhaps all the transports. the Marines there and perhaps all the transports.

"It is true, Marines will take a pounding until their own air gets established (about ten days or so), but they can dig in, hole up, and wait. Extra losses are a localized localized operation. This is balanced against a potential operation. This is balanced against a potential National National tragedy. Loss of our fleet or one or more of these carriers is a real, worldwide tragedy." There is little doubt Fletcher's view of the situation off Guadalca.n.a.l took a serious accounting of the strategic significance of this scarcity of carrier power. tragedy. Loss of our fleet or one or more of these carriers is a real, worldwide tragedy." There is little doubt Fletcher's view of the situation off Guadalca.n.a.l took a serious accounting of the strategic significance of this scarcity of carrier power.

So would go the debate. The amphibious commanders met on the evening of August 8 to discuss what to do, Kelly Turner summoning Vandegrift and Crutchley to his flagship, the McCawley. McCawley. Vandegrift arrived by launch from the beach. Shortly after 9 p.m., Crutchley, the cruiser force commander, pulled his flagship, the heavy cruiser Vandegrift arrived by launch from the beach. Shortly after 9 p.m., Crutchley, the cruiser force commander, pulled his flagship, the heavy cruiser Australia, Australia, out of formation in the southwestern covering force and set course for Lunga Point. This left the other two cruisers in that force, the out of formation in the southwestern covering force and set course for Lunga Point. This left the other two cruisers in that force, the Chicago Chicago and the and the Canberra, Canberra, to guard that entrance to the sound. Crutchley left the commander of the to guard that entrance to the sound. Crutchley left the commander of the Chicago, Chicago, Captain Howard D. Bode, in interim command of his group. Captain Howard D. Bode, in interim command of his group.

The Australia Australia anch.o.r.ed off Lunga Point, and Crutchley took a whaleboat to the anch.o.r.ed off Lunga Point, and Crutchley took a whaleboat to the McCawley. McCawley. During the meeting, Vandegrift was struck by both Turner's and Crutchley's absolute physical weariness. There had been no break in the pressure they faced. Two days of air attacks and continuous difficulties with logistics ash.o.r.e had worn them down to the threshold of exhaustion. Turner announced a tentative decision that he had been reluctant to make: In view of Fletcher's withdrawal, he would remove the transports and all of the cargo ships from the area, too. They would leave at sunrise on the ninth. Turner asked Vandegrift if enough stores had been unloaded to last his forces for a while. He asked Crutchley whether the cruiser screen could hold for a day or two without the protection of carrier-based fighter planes. Turner heard their grumbling affirmations and let's-hope-sos and adjourned the meeting at eleven forty-five. During the meeting, Vandegrift was struck by both Turner's and Crutchley's absolute physical weariness. There had been no break in the pressure they faced. Two days of air attacks and continuous difficulties with logistics ash.o.r.e had worn them down to the threshold of exhaustion. Turner announced a tentative decision that he had been reluctant to make: In view of Fletcher's withdrawal, he would remove the transports and all of the cargo ships from the area, too. They would leave at sunrise on the ninth. Turner asked Vandegrift if enough stores had been unloaded to last his forces for a while. He asked Crutchley whether the cruiser screen could hold for a day or two without the protection of carrier-based fighter planes. Turner heard their grumbling affirmations and let's-hope-sos and adjourned the meeting at eleven forty-five.

As the commanders took leave of Turner's flagship, the enemy's torpedoes were already in the water.

6.

A Captain in the Fog IF COMMAND IS A LONELY MOUNTAIN, THERE WERE FEW PEAKS MORE desolate than Howard D. Bode, the captain of the desolate than Howard D. Bode, the captain of the Chicago. Chicago. Largely, it seemed, he liked it that way. It was common practice for a skipper to take all his meals alone in his cabin. This suited the ship's officers, because Bode's manner was insulting and intimidating when he was not entirely aloof. He visited the wardroom only for meetings, and his presence always chilled the company. Largely, it seemed, he liked it that way. It was common practice for a skipper to take all his meals alone in his cabin. This suited the ship's officers, because Bode's manner was insulting and intimidating when he was not entirely aloof. He visited the wardroom only for meetings, and his presence always chilled the company.

Bode could wield the chilling power by proxy. "His officers were scared to death of him," said his Marine orderly, Raymond Zarker. "The minute I would walk in there they would freeze, like a bunch of frightened rabbits." According to an officer who knew him on another ship, "he was short and stocky and to a young ensign the most staggering thing about him was that he let his hair grow long enough so that it hung down over the collar of his service dress whites. He used to stick one of his hands in his blouse in front and he postured a little like Napoleon postured and looked a little like I thought Napoleon was supposed to look."

On the Chicago, Chicago, officers who stood by their captain on watch and tried to be helpful did so at their peril. To give advice to a tyrant was to suggest his fallibility and offer oneself as a scapegoat should things go wrong. There were a few senior officers whom Bode outwardly respected, but he treated most of them in line with his whispered nicknames, "Captain Bligh" and "King Bode." Of the Pacific Fleet's eleven heavy cruisers, the officers who stood by their captain on watch and tried to be helpful did so at their peril. To give advice to a tyrant was to suggest his fallibility and offer oneself as a scapegoat should things go wrong. There were a few senior officers whom Bode outwardly respected, but he treated most of them in line with his whispered nicknames, "Captain Bligh" and "King Bode." Of the Pacific Fleet's eleven heavy cruisers, the Chicago Chicago ranked lowest for engineering performance, a fact that may have arisen in part from the unwillingness of his engineers to fudge fuel records-a technique sometimes used to mask actual consumption but which might well have invited a stickler's wrath. He was bound for flag rank, had shaped his career toward that goal ever since he had survived some unpleasantness as a senior midshipman at the Naval Academy: a disciplinary proceeding for hazing, all of it duly reported on the front page of the Sunday ranked lowest for engineering performance, a fact that may have arisen in part from the unwillingness of his engineers to fudge fuel records-a technique sometimes used to mask actual consumption but which might well have invited a stickler's wrath. He was bound for flag rank, had shaped his career toward that goal ever since he had survived some unpleasantness as a senior midshipman at the Naval Academy: a disciplinary proceeding for hazing, all of it duly reported on the front page of the Sunday New York Times. New York Times. It was mortifying, but it didn't hold him back. He was a star, bound to command task groups and wear gold stars. It was mortifying, but it didn't hold him back. He was a star, bound to command task groups and wear gold stars.

The scuttleb.u.t.t on the Chicago Chicago had it that Bode was from money. The son of a Cincinnati judge, he had married into the Dupont family and thus would have known the glamour of overseas capitals even had his prewar service as a naval attache not taken him around the world. In that capacity, and later as a section chief in the Office of Naval Intelligence, he had become an expert in foreign intelligence. When Bode urged the disclosure to Pearl Harbor's commander of certain evidence that the berthing locations of vessels within the base were under scrutiny by j.a.panese agents, he reportedly clashed with Admiral Turner-a gambit for only the stoutest of heart. Turner, it was said, shut him down. His next a.s.signment was to command the battleship had it that Bode was from money. The son of a Cincinnati judge, he had married into the Dupont family and thus would have known the glamour of overseas capitals even had his prewar service as a naval attache not taken him around the world. In that capacity, and later as a section chief in the Office of Naval Intelligence, he had become an expert in foreign intelligence. When Bode urged the disclosure to Pearl Harbor's commander of certain evidence that the berthing locations of vessels within the base were under scrutiny by j.a.panese agents, he reportedly clashed with Admiral Turner-a gambit for only the stoutest of heart. Turner, it was said, shut him down. His next a.s.signment was to command the battleship Oklahoma. Oklahoma. On December 7, it was only through chance that he was ash.o.r.e when Mitsubishi crosshairs found his ship. The On December 7, it was only through chance that he was ash.o.r.e when Mitsubishi crosshairs found his ship. The Oklahoma Oklahoma was heavily hit and capsized, killing almost half of her 864-man peacetime complement. Bode's absence spared his life. He and ten other men from the battleship transferred to the was heavily hit and capsized, killing almost half of her 864-man peacetime complement. Bode's absence spared his life. He and ten other men from the battleship transferred to the Chicago. Chicago.

On the night of August 8, when Admiral Crutchley took the Australia Australia out of the southwestern screening force to confer with Turner, he signaled the out of the southwestern screening force to confer with Turner, he signaled the Chicago Chicago by light, " by light, "TAKE CHARGE OF PATROL. I AM CLOSING CTF 62 AND MAY OR MAY NOT REJOIN YOU LATER." With mere hours between the end of the conference and the rise of dawn, when the Australia Australia and the other cruisers were supposed to go south to protect the transports, Crutchley saw no point in returning to his nighttime patrol station. And so Bode was alone again, in temporary command of a two-cruiser squadron guarding one of two routes into Savo Sound. The elevation to commodore-for-a-night was, he no doubt thought, a foretaste of duty to come. and the other cruisers were supposed to go south to protect the transports, Crutchley saw no point in returning to his nighttime patrol station. And so Bode was alone again, in temporary command of a two-cruiser squadron guarding one of two routes into Savo Sound. The elevation to commodore-for-a-night was, he no doubt thought, a foretaste of duty to come.

Bode had reckoned with the possibility of a ship-to-ship fight against the j.a.panese on the night of August 8. According to a sighting report from an Australian plane out of Milne Bay, New Guinea, the j.a.panese fleet was on the move. Recorded at ten twenty-five that morning but delivered near dusk, the report read: "AIRCRAFT REPORTS 3 CRUISERS 3 DESTROYERS 2 SEAPLANE TENDERS OR GUNBOATS 0549 S 15607 E COURSE 120 TRUE SPEED 15 KNOTS."

It was a curious report, vague as to ship type. When the Chicago Chicago's navigator plotted the coordinates of the enemy naval squadron, Bode's executive officer, Commander Cecil Adell, determined that it was too far away to reach the Chicago Chicago's patrol area before midmorning on the following day.

So it will be a quiet evening after all, Bode thought. Bode thought.

Because the narrow waters between Guadalca.n.a.l and Savo Island were poorly charted, Bode had elected not to take the lead as befitted his command. Bringing his six-hundred-foot-long heavy cruiser to the head of the truncated column would have required him to conduct a minuet of giants in perilously confined waters after dark.

The Chicago Chicago's crew was on the brink of exhaustion after several days at battle stations. As soon as one attack ended, a warning of the next one usually followed. There would be a warning this night as well, or a hint of a warning, but it would be cried only faintly, and no one would seem to hear it, or fathom it, until it was too late.

ADMIRAL MIKAWA WAS AWARE he had been spotted. One of his lookouts saw the plane that had betrayed him. Its appearance in the cloud gaps overhead persuaded him to reverse course in order to deceive the pilot that he was en route to Rabaul or Truk. But there was no need to fool an aviator who was already fooled. he had been spotted. One of his lookouts saw the plane that had betrayed him. Its appearance in the cloud gaps overhead persuaded him to reverse course in order to deceive the pilot that he was en route to Rabaul or Truk. But there was no need to fool an aviator who was already fooled.

The pilot of the plane, a New Zealander named William Stutt, reported to his base at Milne Bay that the ships scribing white lines in the waters of New Georgia Sound might include two seaplane tenders, or gunboats. These references to disparate ship types bewildered those receiving the report. Gunboats were not a recognized cla.s.s of modern warship, though the term might suggest a small combatant such as a PT boat. Seaplane tenders were rarely mistaken for surface combatants of any kind. The ambiguity served to mask the actual lethal nature of Mikawa's striking force. Knowing nothing of Operation Watchtower in any event, Stutt was not predisposed to alarm. His report languished for hours at his base, and then for hours more at Brisbane, and finally reached Turner and Crutchley between 6 and 7 p.m. With its reference to seaplane tenders, it failed to arouse the suspicions it ought to have. Turner surmised that the enemy's mission was to establish a seaplane base near Rekata Bay, off the northern tip of Santa Isabel Island.

Continuing to vary his course to mask his purpose, Mikawa ordered his cruisers to launch search planes to survey the waters ahead. Within a few hours their reports would come back. Off Guadalca.n.a.l: fifteen transports, a battleship, four cruisers, seven destroyers, and an "auxiliary carrier"; off Tulagi: two heavy cruisers, twelve destroyers, and three transports. At a quarter to five, Mikawa signaled the battle plan to each of the ships: "WE WILL PENETRATE SOUTH OF SAVO ISLAND AND TORPEDO THE ENEMY MAIN FORCE OFF GUADALCa.n.a.l. THEN WE WILL MOVE TOWARD THE FORWARD AREA AT TULAGI AND STRIKE WITH TORPEDOES AND GUNFIRE, AFTER WHICH WE WILL WITHDRAW TO THE NORTH OF SAVO ISLAND."

Mikawa knew nothing of Fletcher's plan to withdraw. His only sure evidence of the threat posed by U.S. carriers was the chatter of American pilots that his radiomen were intercepting. To avoid that threat, he would have to strike under cover of darkness. He calculated that as long as the fight began before 1:30 a.m., his force, on withdrawal, would be outside the range of U.S. carrier planes come daylight.

On came Mikawa's column at twenty-four knots, the flagship Chokai Chokai in the lead, followed at thirteen-hundred-yard intervals by the heavy cruisers in the lead, followed at thirteen-hundred-yard intervals by the heavy cruisers Kako, Kinugasa, Aoba, Furutaka, Kako, Kinugasa, Aoba, Furutaka, then the smaller then the smaller Tenryu, Yubari, Tenryu, Yubari, and and Yunagi. Yunagi. Preparing his lunge into the American anchorage, Mikawa ordered his commanders to jettison all flammables. From the signal yards of each ship rose long white battle streamers that whipped the air. Back at Truk, Admiral Ugaki spent the day relishing the thought of what was coming: "The Eighth Fleet is going to surprise the enemy in Guadalca.n.a.l tonight. Come on boys! Do your stuff!" Preparing his lunge into the American anchorage, Mikawa ordered his commanders to jettison all flammables. From the signal yards of each ship rose long white battle streamers that whipped the air. Back at Truk, Admiral Ugaki spent the day relishing the thought of what was coming: "The Eighth Fleet is going to surprise the enemy in Guadalca.n.a.l tonight. Come on boys! Do your stuff!"

THE HMAS CANBERRA CANBERRA led the led the Chicago Chicago in column with the destroyers in column with the destroyers Bagley Bagley and and Patterson Patterson along a northwest-to-southeast patrol line, reversing course by a column turn every forty-five minutes. To give the weary crews some relief, the ships were in what was known as Condition Two, a state of partial battle readiness that kept one of the cruisers' two forward turrets fully manned, and the after turret half manned. Bode was rea.s.sured to know that both Crutchley and Turner had received the same contact report he had. In Turner's judgment, the reference to seaplane tenders suggested the ships were bound for a quiet anchorage north of Guadalca.n.a.l where the j.a.panese had a seaplane base. As for the threat of enemy surface ships, Turner was unconcerned. He had told Crutchley that he was comfortable with the disposition of the cruisers to protect the anchorage. "I was satisfied with arrangements, and hoped that the enemy would attack," Turner later wrote. "I believed they would get a warm reception." While Turner was with Crutchley and Vandegrift, a j.a.panese aircraft-a floatplane from one of Mikawa's cruisers-revealed itself to spotters on the along a northwest-to-southeast patrol line, reversing course by a column turn every forty-five minutes. To give the weary crews some relief, the ships were in what was known as Condition Two, a state of partial battle readiness that kept one of the cruisers' two forward turrets fully manned, and the after turret half manned. Bode was rea.s.sured to know that both Crutchley and Turner had received the same contact report he had. In Turner's judgment, the reference to seaplane tenders suggested the ships were bound for a quiet anchorage north of Guadalca.n.a.l where the j.a.panese had a seaplane base. As for the threat of enemy surface ships, Turner was unconcerned. He had told Crutchley that he was comfortable with the disposition of the cruisers to protect the anchorage. "I was satisfied with arrangements, and hoped that the enemy would attack," Turner later wrote. "I believed they would get a warm reception." While Turner was with Crutchley and Vandegrift, a j.a.panese aircraft-a floatplane from one of Mikawa's cruisers-revealed itself to spotters on the Ralph Talbot, Ralph Talbot, running low, flying east over Savo Island. The destroyer announced, " running low, flying east over Savo Island. The destroyer announced, "WARNING-WARNING-PLANE OVER SAVO ISLAND HEADED EAST." The message was repeated on several radio frequencies. It shouldn't have been news. Word had arrived hours before from the San Juan, San Juan, leading three destroyers on patrol off Tulagi, that an unidentified plane had been sighted over Savo Island. The picket destroyer leading three destroyers on patrol off Tulagi, that an unidentified plane had been sighted over Savo Island. The picket destroyer Blue Blue saw it, too. That ship's gunnery officer asked his captain for permission to open fire, but since the plane was displaying running lights, it was deemed a friendly. The saw it, too. That ship's gunnery officer asked his captain for permission to open fire, but since the plane was displaying running lights, it was deemed a friendly. The Blue Blue's skipper feared that if he reported the plane by radio, he would only risk the j.a.panese detecting his ship's location by radio direction finder. Fear of using sensors and communications was widespread in the screening force. When Captain Bode retired to his cabin behind the pilothouse for a nap, confident no attack could come that night, he ordered his radar officer to turn off the Chicago Chicago's search radar for fear that j.a.panese ships might detect and trace the beams.

Rains were moving over the cloistered waters around Savo. Lightning flickered sporadically. It was 1:42 a.m. when the Chicago Chicago's lookouts reported orange flashes of light against Savo's shadow. To Bode and the men of the bridge watch, they looked like fires on the beach. A minute later, the plane that was lazing in circles overhead began dropping flares. Five blinding orbs burst well astern, near the transport anchorage off Tulagi.

From the destroyer Patterson Patterson ahead came a blinker signal, " ahead came a blinker signal, "WARNING-WARNING-STRANGE SHIPS ENTERING HARBOR." Out in the storm-lit sound, the forms of unidentified ships were dimly visible, approaching nearly head-on. The Patterson Patterson's battery barked, lofting star sh.e.l.ls, aiming to backlight the bogeys. The Chicago Chicago followed suit, but her phosphorous candles failed to light. Critical minutes pa.s.sed in the dark. The followed suit, but her phosphorous candles failed to light. Critical minutes pa.s.sed in the dark. The Bagley Bagley swung left, drew on the enemy, and fired four torpedoes from her starboard battery. Seeing targets against the glow of his star sh.e.l.ls, Commander Frank R. Walker ordered the swung left, drew on the enemy, and fired four torpedoes from her starboard battery. Seeing targets against the glow of his star sh.e.l.ls, Commander Frank R. Walker ordered the Patterson Patterson's helm left and shouted an order to launch torpedoes, but the crashes of her gun battery swallowed it. Then Bode heard a report of torpedoes in the water, inbound on several bearings.

Ahead, the Canberra Canberra was seen turning sharply to starboard when a cry came of a torpedo wake headed for the port bow. Bode ordered his rudder hard to port as the was seen turning sharply to starboard when a cry came of a torpedo wake headed for the port bow. Bode ordered his rudder hard to port as the Chicago Chicago's engineers, deep in the ship, labored to answer the bell to make full speed. Noticing a quick, bright exchange of gunfire to the west, Bode steered the Chicago Chicago on what he thought was "a good course for engaging both turrets and broadside." As his ship came to twenty-five knots, Bode was still seeking his enemy when, without fanfare or forewarning, the on what he thought was "a good course for engaging both turrets and broadside." As his ship came to twenty-five knots, Bode was still seeking his enemy when, without fanfare or forewarning, the Canberra Canberra was savaged by a concentrated barrage. More than thirty j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls struck the Australian heavy cruiser, killing her commander, Captain Frank E. Getting, and other senior officers. Almost at once both of her boiler rooms were destroyed, and with them died all power and light throughout ship. She was a floating nest of flame. was savaged by a concentrated barrage. More than thirty j.a.panese sh.e.l.ls struck the Australian heavy cruiser, killing her commander, Captain Frank E. Getting, and other senior officers. Almost at once both of her boiler rooms were destroyed, and with them died all power and light throughout ship. She was a floating nest of flame.

In this fleeting moment of contact, the Chicago Chicago never did fire her main battery. A sh.e.l.l struck the leg of her mainmast, killing two sailors, including the chief boatswain's mate, and wounding thirteen, including the exec, Commander Adell, who was. .h.i.t in the throat. A torpedo fired by the never did fire her main battery. A sh.e.l.l struck the leg of her mainmast, killing two sailors, including the chief boatswain's mate, and wounding thirteen, including the exec, Commander Adell, who was. .h.i.t in the throat. A torpedo fired by the Kako Kako struck the ship from starboard, clipping off part of the bow and vibrating the rest of the ship hard enough to disjoin the main battery director. Gunners on her five-inch secondary battery managed to train on and hit an enemy ship, the struck the ship from starboard, clipping off part of the bow and vibrating the rest of the ship hard enough to disjoin the main battery director. Gunners on her five-inch secondary battery managed to train on and hit an enemy ship, the Tenryu, Tenryu, killing twenty-three men. But the darkness hid the larger targets. Of the forty-four star sh.e.l.ls the killing twenty-three men. But the darkness hid the larger targets. Of the forty-four star sh.e.l.ls the Chicago Chicago lofted, all but six failed to light. As Bode struggled to decide what to do next, he neglected to report the encounter either to his absent superior, Crutchley, or to his colleague who would be up next in the shooting gallery, Captain Riefkohl in the lofted, all but six failed to light. As Bode struggled to decide what to do next, he neglected to report the encounter either to his absent superior, Crutchley, or to his colleague who would be up next in the shooting gallery, Captain Riefkohl in the Vincennes, Vincennes, flagship of the northern cruiser group. flagship of the northern cruiser group.

As the j.a.panese column steamed by, rounding Savo Island in a counterclockwise course and approaching Riefkohl's squadron, Bode continued west toward what he thought would be the arena of the princ.i.p.al fight. Afterward, the track charts of the battle would show with cruel clarity that this is not at all what Bode was accomplishing. The record would even suggest, to the uncharitable eyes of inquiring superiors, that the star skipper of the cruiser Chicago Chicago was in the grip of an emotion quite distinct from courage. was in the grip of an emotion quite distinct from courage.

On a night when the American fleet would need all the best virtues of its commanders, officers, and men to join together, Bode had committed the first in a swift acc.u.mulation of errors. Admiral Mikawa had won the draw and, continuing to the east, found Frederick Riefkohl's cruisers, majestic on patrol but no more alert than the wayward watchdogs of the southwestern force had been despite the spectacular catastrophe of the preceding four hundred seconds.

7.

The Martyring of Task Group 62.6 EAST OF SAVO, TWENTY MILES ASTERN OF CAPTAIN BODE'S WESTWARD-charging warship, the nighttime cloud cover was cast into gray relief by intermittent lightning and the distant flashing of gunfire. On a calm sea, the cruisers Vincennes, Quincy, Vincennes, Quincy, and and Astoria Astoria were tracing the northwesterly leg of a box-shaped patrol pattern five miles on a side. Their officers were alert to the light but unaware of its source. They did not know that a critical alarm had already been raised. were tracing the northwesterly leg of a box-shaped patrol pattern five miles on a side. Their officers were alert to the light but unaware of its source. They did not know that a critical alarm had already been raised.

Captain William Greenman of the Astoria Astoria was steaming as closely as he thought prudent to the was steaming as closely as he thought prudent to the Quincy Quincy ahead, in order to get maximum protection from his threadbare anti-submarine screen. With only two destroyers, the ahead, in order to get maximum protection from his threadbare anti-submarine screen. With only two destroyers, the Wilson Wilson and the and the Helm, Helm, leading them in the van, his greatest fear was submarine attack. On August 6, Nimitz had sent "ultra secret" warnings to all his Operation Watchtower commanders regarding the submarine threat. On the evening before the battle, Turner had instructed Crutchley to discontinue using his shipboard floatplanes to search the Slot for enemy ships. The undersea menace loomed largest. leading them in the van, his greatest fear was submarine attack. On August 6, Nimitz had sent "ultra secret" warnings to all his Operation Watchtower commanders regarding the submarine threat. On the evening before the battle, Turner had instructed Crutchley to discontinue using his shipboard floatplanes to search the Slot for enemy ships. The undersea menace loomed largest.

Now came a radio warning delivered by a destroyer from the southern screening group, the Patterson, Patterson, " "WARNING-WARNING-STRANGE SHIPS.... " What to make of this?

Transmitted at 1:47 a.m., the warning had been missed altogether by Captain Riefkohl in the Vincennes. Vincennes. The TBS frequency was clogged with commanders exchanging the administrivia of the midwatch. It had been burdened most of the night by the chatter of destroyer officers wondering how to approach the task of scuttling the transport The TBS frequency was clogged with commanders exchanging the administrivia of the midwatch. It had been burdened most of the night by the chatter of destroyer officers wondering how to approach the task of scuttling the transport George F. Elliott, George F. Elliott, hit in the afternoon air attack. Though the bridge watch on the hit in the afternoon air attack. Though the bridge watch on the Quincy Quincy received the warning and sounded general quarters, the reason for the alarm was not immediately conveyed to the ship's gunnery-control stations. received the warning and sounded general quarters, the reason for the alarm was not immediately conveyed to the ship's gunnery-control stations.

In the Astoria, Astoria, a petty officer named George L. Coleman, stationed in the plotting room beneath the bridge, trained his search radar to the west and reported a bogey approaching on the surface at twenty-nine miles. Though Savo Island's ma.s.s blocked the radar's field of vision within a twenty-five-degree arc off either sh.o.r.e, Coleman registered contacts and reported them to higher command. The fire-control radar was out of order at the time, but Coleman had faith in his longer-range search set. "The search radar was operating as well as it ever had," Ensign R. G. Heneberger, the a petty officer named George L. Coleman, stationed in the plotting room beneath the bridge, trained his search radar to the west and reported a bogey approaching on the surface at twenty-nine miles. Though Savo Island's ma.s.s blocked the radar's field of vision within a twenty-five-degree arc off either sh.o.r.e, Coleman registered contacts and reported them to higher command. The fire-control radar was out of order at the time, but Coleman had faith in his longer-range search set. "The search radar was operating as well as it ever had," Ensign R. G. Heneberger, the Astoria Astoria's radar officer, would write. When the officer-of-the-deck refused to sound general quarters, Coleman pressed his case. "The more I insisted that the enemy was out there, the more I got excited," Coleman wrote.

Still, the unfamiliar power of a new technology was seldom a match for a complacent human mind bent on ignoring it. "The OOD and the other officers tried to tell me that I had a double echo on my scope and that we had a destroyer in that area," Coleman said. He made such a nuisance of himself after his relief by the midwatch that someone finally threatened to send him to the brig if he didn't let the next watch settle in and do their jobs.

The first irrefutable sign that enemy ships were near came when searchlights fixed on Riefkohl's slumbering formation and a heavy salvo raised the seas just short of the Vincennes. Vincennes. No one, not even the officer whose duty it was to expect the worst, Riefkohl, believed a j.a.panese fleet could reach them before morning. No one, not even the officer whose duty it was to expect the worst, Riefkohl, believed a j.a.panese fleet could reach them before morning.

Sweeping the horizon through his gla.s.s, the executive officer of the Vincennes Vincennes spotted a glow of light and silhouettes on the water, about four miles on his port beam. The "great display of light" blooming in the haze was the product of the high halo of a star sh.e.l.l. The gunnery officer believed it was from the flash of American gunfire bombarding sh.o.r.e. The spotted a glow of light and silhouettes on the water, about four miles on his port beam. The "great display of light" blooming in the haze was the product of the high halo of a star sh.e.l.l. The gunnery officer believed it was from the flash of American gunfire bombarding sh.o.r.e. The Astoria Astoria's captain, Greenman, too, was fooled by the evidence before his eyes. When he was roused to a view of Bode's southern group dying in the dark, he said, "I didn't know they were sh.e.l.ling the beaches tonight," and returned to his cabin. But even when the shock of heavy underwater explosions came, the throes of Bode's squadron could too easily be dismissed by the most plausible explanation: the detonations of depth charges dropped by destroyers hunting submarines.

Captain Greenman was unaware of the discord in his pilothouse concerning purported radar contacts. Had he been awake, he might have heard through the open hatch the argument between one of the two quartermasters of the watch, Royal Radke, who heard a plane overhead and asked permission to pull the general alarm, and the officer-of-the-deck, a young lieutenant, who declared such an action the captain's prerogative. Radke wasn't standing on ceremony when a decision might determine life or death. Without further deliberation or entreaty, he pulled the red lever. Some would say that this act of insubordination ended up saving more than a few American lives.

Having dealt with Bode's force in summary violent fashion, the four j.a.panese cruisers-the Chokai Chokai leading the leading the Aoba, Kako, Aoba, Kako, and and Kinugasa Kinugasa-swept along to the northeast. The Kinugasa Kinugasa was still dealing fire at the ruined was still dealing fire at the ruined Canberra Canberra when the when the Chokai Chokai ahead fixed her searchlights on the ahead fixed her searchlights on the Astoria, Astoria, last in Captain Riefkohl's column, and eighty-two hundred yards, or four and a half miles, to the northeast. The last in Captain Riefkohl's column, and eighty-two hundred yards, or four and a half miles, to the northeast. The Aoba Aoba lit the lit the Quincy, Quincy, and the and the Kako Kako took the took the Vincennes. Vincennes.

Mikawa's gunners were turning their batteries on the American column when the lieutenant in the Astoria Astoria's main battery director, Carl Sander, found himself studying a strange cruiser through his spotting gla.s.ses. Recognizing foreign architecture, he shouted into the phones, "Action port! Load." "Action port! Load." As Sander coached the boxy bulk of his gun director onto the target, his gunnery officer, Lieutenant Commander Truesdell, in Sky Control high in the foremast, saw searchlights probing out of the darkness to port. He shouted, "Fire every d.a.m.n thing you got!" As Sander coached the boxy bulk of his gun director onto the target, his gunnery officer, Lieutenant Commander Truesdell, in Sky Control high in the foremast, saw searchlights probing out of the darkness to port. He shouted, "Fire every d.a.m.n thing you got!"

Awakened, Greenman reached the bridge shortly after Astoria Astoria had let loose her first salvo. "Who sounded the general alarm?" he demanded to know. "Who gave the order to commence firing?" Greenman thought the worst-not an enemy attack, but a blunder of fratricide. When the second salvo blew, the captain feared his gunners were firing into friendly ships. The quartermaster, Radke, was still catching h.e.l.l from the skipper when a report came that the five-inch-gun deck was on fire. Only when an experienced voice such as Truesdell's had confirmed that the ships illuminating them were hostile did Greenman let his gunners do their work. From that moment on, the had let loose her first salvo. "Who sounded the general alarm?" he demanded to know. "Who gave the order to commence firing?" Greenman thought the worst-not an enemy attack, but a blunder of fratricide. When the second salvo blew, the captain feared his gunners were firing into friendly ships. The quartermaster, Radke, was still catching h.e.l.l from the skipper when a report came that the five-inch-gun deck was on fire. Only when an experienced voice such as Truesdell's had confirmed that the ships illuminating them were hostile did Greenman let his gunners do their work. From that moment on, the Astoria Astoria roared. roared.

Feeling the lurching of the ship and watching yellow light flash through the slats of the porthole to his sleeping compartment, Joe Custer knew suddenly that he would not escape the battle unhurt. "It was there, as vivid and clear as though someone had told me," he wrote. For a moment he was frantic to know where the injury would strike him, but then he understood there was little use fretting over what he couldn't control. "I was suddenly cool and calm: What is to be, is to be."

Running to the weather deck, a radio department officer, Lieutenant Jack Gibson, was "surprised to see that we were fixed by a searchlight like a bug on a pin." Like her two consorts, the Vincennes Vincennes and the and the Quincy, Quincy, the the Astoria Astoria seemed to come to fighting life when her guns opened up. But enemy gunners were several turns ahead of the Americans in the cycle of loading, fire, and correction of aim. Two hundred yards ahead of the seemed to come to fighting life when her guns opened up. But enemy gunners were several turns ahead of the Americans in the cycle of loading, fire, and correction of aim. Two hundred yards ahead of the Astoria Astoria and five hundred yards to port, a tight group of splashes rose, short. The next group fell a hundred yards closer ahead, five hundred short. The and five hundred yards to port, a tight group of splashes rose, short. The next group fell a hundred yards closer ahead, five hundred short. The Astoria Astoria responded, and then a third salvo fell, directly abeam to port but still five hundred yards short. Tracking targets that were running on a course opposite her own, the responded, and then a third salvo fell, directly abeam to port but still five hundred yards short. Tracking targets that were running on a course opposite her own, the Astoria Astoria's director-controlled turrets swiveled aft until they hit the stops that kept them from blasting her own superstructure. The fourth salvo from the j.a.panese reached out three hundred yards closer aboard. Finally, after the fifth enemy salvo, Admiral Turner's old ship took one square amidships, in the aircraft hangar.

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Order of Battle-Battle of Savo Island [image]

Allied Task group 62.6 Rear Adm Victor A. C.

Crutchley, RN Radar Pickets Blue (DD) (DD) Ralph Talbot (DD) (DD) Southern Cruiser Group HMAS Australia Australia (CA) (CA) HMAS Canberra Canberra (CA) (CA) Chicago (CA) (CA) Bagley (DD) (DD) Patterson (DD) (DD) Northern Cruiser Group Vincennes (CA) (CA) Quincy (CA) (CA) Astoria (CA) (CA) Helm (DD) (DD) Wilson (DD) (DD) j.a.pan STRIKING FORCE.

Vice Adm Gunichi Mikawa Chokai (CA) (CA) Aoba (CA) (CA) Furutaka (CA) (CA) Kako (CA) (CA) Kinugasa (CA) (CA) Tenryu (CL) (CL) Yubari (CL) (CL) Yunagi (DD) (DD) [image]

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(Photo Credit: 7.1) There was a sublime absurdity to the process by which a U.S. warship roused itself to action. When the general quarters or battle stations alarm rang, men a.s.signed to a particular station on routine watch were replaced by men a.s.signed to that same station to do battle. The replacement of watch personnel by general quarters personnel was wholesale, including key people such as the supervisor of the watch, the officer-of-the-deck, the junior officer-of-the-deck, the helmsman, and all the talkers a.s.signed to the phones on the bridge. Every one of these people changed stations when the general alarm sounded. Though a well-drilled crew could complete the scramble within short minutes, the procedure ensured that officers and crew spent precious, perhaps decisive minutes scrambling, not fighting. It was like a game of musical chairs, begun precisely in that critical moment when seconds weighed most heavily and the marginal cost of a lapse was highest.

A gunner's mate standing watch in the forward antiaircraft director, known as Sky Forward, had a difficult course to run after the alarm sounded. He had to scramble down a warren of ladders and pa.s.sageways to the armory, retrieve the key to the five-inch magazine, run to the magazine, unlock it for the handling crew, then run back up to the flight deck and stand by to launch aircraft from the catapult. All of this had to be done in three minutes-"a stupid set up," an Astoria Asto