After the Battle of Santa Cruz, the United States would have not a single operable carrier task force in the South Pacific until the Enterprise Enterprise could be repaired at Noumea and placed back into service. Task Force 17 was dissolved with the sinking of the could be repaired at Noumea and placed back into service. Task Force 17 was dissolved with the sinking of the Hornet. Hornet. And with the And with the Enterprise Enterprise going to the yard for repairs, the going to the yard for repairs, the South Dakota South Dakota was sent to join the was sent to join the Washington Washington in Task Force 64. in Task Force 64.

Having exhausted their carrier forces in the seas east of Guadalca.n.a.l on October 26, the opposing fleets returned to their bases to regroup. With Halsey's and Yamamoto's carriers sidelined for now, the question to be answered in the parry and thrust of the coming weeks was: Which side's surface combat fleet would step up and control the seas by night? No matter how gallantly men might fight on land, they would not hold on long if their Navy finally failed them. In a few short weeks, the greatest challenge yet to the American position on Guadalca.n.a.l would loom in the dark waters of Savo Sound.

24.

Secret History THE LULL IN THE LAST DAYS OF OCTOBER WAS A TIME FOR LICKING wounds. Following the collision of carrier forces off Santa Cruz, the tempo of action slowed to a pace that suited the languid tropical breeze. The flattops withdrew to their bases to tend to their many lacerations. Ash.o.r.e, the infantry had fought to a standstill as Vandegrift's men repulsed Hyakutake's haphazardly executed a.s.saults. Still, the persistence of the j.a.panese pressure on the airdrome from air, land, and sea exacted a toll from body and mind. wounds. Following the collision of carrier forces off Santa Cruz, the tempo of action slowed to a pace that suited the languid tropical breeze. The flattops withdrew to their bases to tend to their many lacerations. Ash.o.r.e, the infantry had fought to a standstill as Vandegrift's men repulsed Hyakutake's haphazardly executed a.s.saults. Still, the persistence of the j.a.panese pressure on the airdrome from air, land, and sea exacted a toll from body and mind.

By the end of the month, every one of the nineteen Dauntless pilots from the Saratoga Saratoga's Scouting Squadron 3-which had relocated to the island after their carrier was torpedoed on the last day of August-was a casualty, removed from the flying rotation because of illness, fatigue, health-threatening weight loss, or "nervous condition." For these same reasons squadron mechanics had lost the handle on record keeping and couldn't perform basic preventive maintenance on planes. They applied themselves only to actual malfunctions, but little could be done for their own breakdowns. The island made short work of all who were sent there, man and machine alike. General Geiger, the commander of Guadalca.n.a.l's air units, gave way to the strain, too. His chief of staff, Brigadier General Louis Woods, would replace him in a changing of the guard that saw the arrival of several new Marine air squadrons as well.

On October 27, Halsey ordered the San Francisco San Francisco and the and the Helena, Helena, escorted by several destroyers, to leave Task Force 64 and set course for Espiritu Santo, where they would escort three transports carrying reinforcements to Guadalca.n.a.l. Kelly Turner, having promised Vandegrift that the Marine commander's requests for support "have received most earnest attention," dispatched the fast transports escorted by several destroyers, to leave Task Force 64 and set course for Espiritu Santo, where they would escort three transports carrying reinforcements to Guadalca.n.a.l. Kelly Turner, having promised Vandegrift that the Marine commander's requests for support "have received most earnest attention," dispatched the fast transports Fuller Fuller and and Alchiba Alchiba from Noumea to ferry a load of heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores. The 155-millimeter guns, set to arrive on November 2, would boost the infantry's ability to counter the j.a.panese artillery that threatened Henderson Field from the surrounding hills. Another convoy carrying reinforcements from the 8th Marine Regiment would bolster Vandegrift's order of battle and enable him to take the offensive ash.o.r.e. from Noumea to ferry a load of heavy artillery, ammunition, and stores. The 155-millimeter guns, set to arrive on November 2, would boost the infantry's ability to counter the j.a.panese artillery that threatened Henderson Field from the surrounding hills. Another convoy carrying reinforcements from the 8th Marine Regiment would bolster Vandegrift's order of battle and enable him to take the offensive ash.o.r.e.

The detachment of these ships coincided with the dissolution of Admiral Ghormley's staff. Halsey's arrival at Noumea meant the replacement not just of Ghormley, but also of everyone else in his headquarters. Given the idiosyncrasies of Halsey's style, it was important for him to work with a handpicked team. It had been said only partly in jest that it took a certain type of sailor to serve well with Halsey: He didn't want anyone who didn't smoke, drink, or run around with women. Even if that were just playful rhetoric, it must have given a smile to Admiral King, whose wandering hands and eyes were well known to his peers. It certainly suited the first man from Ghormley's headquarters, Dan Callaghan, his gregarious chief of staff, to find a seagoing combat command under Halsey. Promoted from captain to rear admiral just days before Operation Watchtower began, Callaghan was a seadog at heart. Halsey sent him back to sea in the San Francisco, San Francisco, which Norman Scott had until a few days before made his working home. which Norman Scott had until a few days before made his working home.

Writing the commanders of his surface units on October 30, Halsey observed that "enemy offensives since September 15 have followed the same general pattern"-the carriers operating within a rectangle of sea northeast of Malaita and their reinforcement convoys tracking in through the Slot, descending from the north-northwest. He pointed out that two or three days' warning of an enemy naval force's approach was usually available, thanks to the combined efforts of coast.w.a.tchers, submarines, and long-range air search. He emphasized the importance of coordinating search efforts with follow-up air and naval attacks. "Submit comment and proposals by earliest air mail," he wrote.

Halsey had no way to know the full extent of the j.a.panese quandary. Increasingly, they were operating in a straitjacket zipped tight by the limitations on their supply and oil lifeline. The destroyers of the Tokyo Express made an average of six runs a month to ferry men, arms, and critical consumables to Guadalca.n.a.l's northern coast, the typical run consisting of six destroyer-transports and two destroyers as combat escorts. Their capacity was entirely inadequate. The 17th Army required far more than thirty-six destroyer loads a month. General Hyakutake's staff calculated its needs as 5 loads of supplies per night, or 150 every month. If the reinforcements of heavy weapons and supporting equipment were added to this, the necessary portage increased to eight hundred runs per month, plus twenty more from fuel-hungry seaplane tenders. As the historian Jonathan Parshall has calculated, that level of effort would have taken half of the Imperial Navy's monthly allotment of fuel. Measured in terms of tonnage delivered per unit of oil burned, cargo ships were thirty times as efficient as destroyer-transports. But use of the slow ships was fruitless as long as U.S. pilots controlled the skies of the Slot. It was a difficult problem: Without the heavier capacity of those larger vessels, Imperial ground forces would be unlikely to take the airfield.

The only feasible way the j.a.panese had to deprive their enemy of air superiority was to destroy Henderson Field's air group with bombardment from the sea. And by that same reasoning, the only way the Americans could prevent a repeat of the devastating nighttime ordeal of mid-October was by pressing their surface forces into the fight and seizing control of the night. The wartime "food chain" circled right back to the ancient art of ships grappling with one another on the sea.

Halsey continued to reshuffle his decks as October wound to a close. On the thirtieth, he ordered Norman Scott to take his small task force-the Atlanta Atlanta and four destroyers-and sh.e.l.l j.a.panese positions near Point Cruz in support of Marine units that were crossing the Matanikau River to secure Henderson Field's western flank. The fleet had to get its guns into the fight one way or another. and four destroyers-and sh.e.l.l j.a.panese positions near Point Cruz in support of Marine units that were crossing the Matanikau River to secure Henderson Field's western flank. The fleet had to get its guns into the fight one way or another.

IN A NOVEMBER 1 ARTICLE headlined, "Navies Manoeuvre for Big Stakes in Solomons," headlined, "Navies Manoeuvre for Big Stakes in Solomons," New York Times New York Times reporter Charles Hurd wrote, "In the end, one side or the other of the Guadalca.n.a.l contestants will be cut off from supplies.... They now look toward the sea for the next great phase in the contest. That sea and air battle may be fought at any hour or it may not occur for weeks. In any event, we probably will not know about it until the issue has been decided." reporter Charles Hurd wrote, "In the end, one side or the other of the Guadalca.n.a.l contestants will be cut off from supplies.... They now look toward the sea for the next great phase in the contest. That sea and air battle may be fought at any hour or it may not occur for weeks. In any event, we probably will not know about it until the issue has been decided."

Certainly they wouldn't if Admiral King had his way. He was no friend of the fourth estate. Hanson Baldwin, covering fleet maneuvers in Panama before the war, was chagrined to find the censors butchering one of his New York Times New York Times dispatches because it reported a commander's golf score. Now that a war was on, restrictions were far more severe. It had been said that King's preferred approach to press relations would be to remain silent until it was over, then announce, "We won." "So far as I'm concerned," King told a correspondent for dispatches because it reported a commander's golf score. Now that a war was on, restrictions were far more severe. It had been said that King's preferred approach to press relations would be to remain silent until it was over, then announce, "We won." "So far as I'm concerned," King told a correspondent for Collier's Collier's magazine, "information given the public is information which will almost certainly reach the enemy.... I have no intention of giving the enemy anything from which he can derive a shadow of aid and comfort. That's the way I am, that's the way I have always been, and that's the way I always will be." The secrecy was so tight that magazine, "information given the public is information which will almost certainly reach the enemy.... I have no intention of giving the enemy anything from which he can derive a shadow of aid and comfort. That's the way I am, that's the way I have always been, and that's the way I always will be." The secrecy was so tight that The New York Times The New York Times made it front-page news in mid-October when the Navy officially acknowledged having bases in the New Hebrides and the Fiji Islands. made it front-page news in mid-October when the Navy officially acknowledged having bases in the New Hebrides and the Fiji Islands.

A Chicago Tribune Chicago Tribune reporter named Stanley Johnson learned one of the war's most closely guarded secrets: the breaking of the j.a.panese code and the Navy's ability to follow j.a.panese fleet movements. In an account of Midway appearing in his paper, he revealed the names of partic.i.p.ating enemy ships-information that only Tokyo would have. Certain that this would betray the secret of its code-breaking success, the Navy brought charges against the paper, but didn't seem to have considered the consequences. When the reporter named Stanley Johnson learned one of the war's most closely guarded secrets: the breaking of the j.a.panese code and the Navy's ability to follow j.a.panese fleet movements. In an account of Midway appearing in his paper, he revealed the names of partic.i.p.ating enemy ships-information that only Tokyo would have. Certain that this would betray the secret of its code-breaking success, the Navy brought charges against the paper, but didn't seem to have considered the consequences. When the Tribune Tribune began editorializing about its persecution by the government-a complaint made plausible by the fact that Secretary Knox had been the publisher of its rival daily before the war-the Navy was unable to reply, since the grounds of its suit were sensitive state secrets. The possibility of a courtroom circus vanished when a grand jury refused to indict. began editorializing about its persecution by the government-a complaint made plausible by the fact that Secretary Knox had been the publisher of its rival daily before the war-the Navy was unable to reply, since the grounds of its suit were sensitive state secrets. The possibility of a courtroom circus vanished when a grand jury refused to indict.

A fog lay low over fleet operations for the first two months of the South Pacific campaign. Chester Nimitz was a master of showing grace and easy hospitality to reporters who visited him without revealing actual newsworthy information. The Navy insisted that everything was progressing well toward a major U.S. offensive that would push the j.a.panese back north. When news of the Battle of Savo Island finally broke in mid-October, and word followed a few weeks later that the carrier Wasp Wasp was lost, the Navy's credibility suffered. "So mismanaged was the Navy's handling of news releases, both as to timing and candor, that according to one informed source the American public grew to believe that the j.a.panese version of the Pearl Harbor story was more accurate than our own, making Tokyo's subsequent claims of success all the more plausible," wrote the historian Lloyd J. Graybar. was lost, the Navy's credibility suffered. "So mismanaged was the Navy's handling of news releases, both as to timing and candor, that according to one informed source the American public grew to believe that the j.a.panese version of the Pearl Harbor story was more accurate than our own, making Tokyo's subsequent claims of success all the more plausible," wrote the historian Lloyd J. Graybar.

Baldwin's October reporting got him invited to a November meeting of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Strategic Survey Committee, a "solemn conclave" held in the U.S. Public Health Service Building, across from the Navy Building on Const.i.tution Avenue. Baldwin was asked to take a seat at a long table with twenty-five or thirty officers of all services in dress uniforms and testify secretly to what he had seen on Guadalca.n.a.l. The hitch was that he could not tell his bosses at the Times Times about it. He agreed and entered the large meeting room as a witness to events at the front. about it. He agreed and entered the large meeting room as a witness to events at the front.

"I spoke more frankly, of course, than I was able to do in the pieces I'd written," Baldwin said. He described how the North Carolina North Carolina had been torpedoed and how, with but one battleship and one carrier in the theater at the time, "we were just hanging on by our teeth. When I said this about the ship damage and about the cruisers that had been lost at Savo, and I gave them the names of the cruisers in this secret meeting. A Navy captain stood up, violently angry, and said, 'I object to that, I object to that. This is top-secret information! Admiral King has given the strictest orders that no one is to know about this!' had been torpedoed and how, with but one battleship and one carrier in the theater at the time, "we were just hanging on by our teeth. When I said this about the ship damage and about the cruisers that had been lost at Savo, and I gave them the names of the cruisers in this secret meeting. A Navy captain stood up, violently angry, and said, 'I object to that, I object to that. This is top-secret information! Admiral King has given the strictest orders that no one is to know about this!'

"Well, of course," Baldwin told his antagonist, "I understand it's top-secret information. I haven't published the names of these ships or the exact losses or details and I don't expect to. I was asked to come down here in top secrecy and not even tell my paper about it, and I've done so." As the captain kept pressing his case, Baldwin gathered the impression that many of the officers who were there that day, sitting on a committee charged with advising the president on military matters, had no idea what had actually happened in the waters off Guadalca.n.a.l back in August. "That," Baldwin would say, "is a h.e.l.l of a way to run a war."

Change was already in the air. When Admiral Spruance first laid eyes on a copy of the Boise Boise's after-action report from the Battle of Cape Esperance, air-couriered to Pearl Harbor from Noumea, he gave it to Nimitz, who gave it to King, and all understood what a publicity bonanza it was. So began the process of legend building that would make some ships famous for things they never did, and leave others unknown despite their great deeds. A statement in the report that "the Boise Boise fired on six targets" was conflated in the press to the fired on six targets" was conflated in the press to the Boise Boise sinking six ships. A Navy publicist referred to the sinking six ships. A Navy publicist referred to the Boise Boise as a "one-ship task force." As a result of this hype, few would ever hear of Captain Hoover and the as a "one-ship task force." As a result of this hype, few would ever hear of Captain Hoover and the Helena, Helena, whose barrels flaked as much paint as the whose barrels flaked as much paint as the Boise Boise's had that night off Guadalca.n.a.l. When the Boise Boise reached the Philadelphia Navy Yard for repairs in late November, the public saw a living, breathing man-of-war baring her scars-and the accuracy of history was quickly a casualty. reached the Philadelphia Navy Yard for repairs in late November, the public saw a living, breathing man-of-war baring her scars-and the accuracy of history was quickly a casualty.

News of the Boise Boise's performance at Cape Esperance was released simultaneously with, and perhaps as an antidote to, the darker tale of the Battle of Savo Island. As reporters began to challenge the Navy Department's manipulations, King, in spite of himself, took a page from Nimitz's book. He began hosting meetings with newsmen at the Virginia home of his attorney and friend, Cornelius Bull. At the first such gathering, on November 6, King circulated among eight reporters, addressing rumors that operations at Guadalca.n.a.l were foundering and reb.u.t.ting the accusation that the Navy was stonewalling press inquiries. He defended his silence during the early phase of the operation on grounds of operational security. "There was every reason to believe that the j.a.panese did not know the extent of their success," he said. Breaking a personal oath, he drank alcohol with reporters. The four-hour soiree won them over. "They were for him 100 percent by the time they said good-bye," one partic.i.p.ant said. These "Sunday vesper services," as the scribes began calling them, would continue at Bull's home until 1944.

Elmer Davis, the head of the Office of War Information, felt it was essential to publicize the pathbreaking effort in the Solomons, but lamented, "There was no one in Washington who was seeing that the Navy got any credit for what it did, or telling the story in any way, shape or form." Soon, however, the pubic appet.i.te for tales from the combat zone would be too strong to ignore. If the press had to learn to stay out of the Navy's way and let it win a war, in time the Navy would learn to stay out of its own way and let its story be told.

25.

Turner's Choice LEAVING THEIR DAYS AS A CARRIER TASK FORCE ESCORT IN THEIR wake, relieved to be out of the submarine-haunted waters of Torpedo Junction, the men of the antiaircraft cruiser wake, relieved to be out of the submarine-haunted waters of Torpedo Junction, the men of the antiaircraft cruiser Atlanta Atlanta entered Sealark Channel, approached Lunga Point, and laid eyes on a new battlefield ash.o.r.e. "In the half dawn," Edward Corboy wrote, "we could see our planes landing and taking off with their lights on. Flashing sh.e.l.l bursts lighted the scene at intervals as the Marines and the j.a.ps traded early morning punches." entered Sealark Channel, approached Lunga Point, and laid eyes on a new battlefield ash.o.r.e. "In the half dawn," Edward Corboy wrote, "we could see our planes landing and taking off with their lights on. Flashing sh.e.l.l bursts lighted the scene at intervals as the Marines and the j.a.ps traded early morning punches."

A Marine major came aboard by motor launch to aid in gunfire spotting. When the Atlanta Atlanta cruised within range of enemy territory, she opened fire, aided by an Airacobra pilot, who circled overhead, diving to point out targets and radioing corrections to the ship. Norman Scott's squadron worked over the coastline from the Matanikau delta up to Ta.s.safaronga Point. By the time they were finished, the gray paint was peeled back from the cruised within range of enemy territory, she opened fire, aided by an Airacobra pilot, who circled overhead, diving to point out targets and radioing corrections to the ship. Norman Scott's squadron worked over the coastline from the Matanikau delta up to Ta.s.safaronga Point. By the time they were finished, the gray paint was peeled back from the Atlanta Atlanta's rifle bores, her fantail littered with five-inch sh.e.l.l cases and spent powder cans, and the known artillery emplacements and supply and ammunition dumps considerably less useful to the j.a.panese. As the deck force broke out the fire hoses to cool down the barrels, the major boarded a launch to return to sh.o.r.e. Tears welled in his eyes. "He couldn't thank us enough," Corboy said. "The raking we gave that coast made history in the Solomons."

Promised help by Halsey and expecting further reinforcements, General Vandegrift had issued an operation order on October 30 calling for an offensive push west of Henderson Field. Rising out of their defensive crouch and venturing into the west, his men would try to drive the j.a.panese beyond artillery range of the airfield and encircle any units dug in on the Matanikau River delta. On November 1, two battalions of the 5th Marines, well supported by artillery, crossed the Matanikau and tore into enemy positions. Thoroughly exhausted and beset by malaria, the j.a.panese melted against the onslaught. Vandegrift lacked the men both to hold his airfield perimeter and sustain a serious offensive, and that spared the remnants of the 2nd (Sendai) Division from a far worse fate.

The fleet, for its part, had multiple roles, each challenging in its own right: to cover and protect the supply lines to Guadalca.n.a.l, to throw gunfire in support of Marine positions ash.o.r.e, and to counter the expected thrust by enemy combat ships, submarines, or aircraft. Halsey gave Turner overall command of naval forces in the Guadalca.n.a.l area, and Callaghan and Scott command of the cruiser task forces that were haphazardly a.s.sembled from them. Kinkaid was replenishing in Noumea with the wounded Enterprise, Enterprise, while the battleships of Lee's Task Force 64 lurked south of Guadalca.n.a.l, out of range of j.a.panese air attacks. while the battleships of Lee's Task Force 64 lurked south of Guadalca.n.a.l, out of range of j.a.panese air attacks.

Still recovering from the carrier battle and pressured by the need to a.s.sign combat vessels to escort duty, Halsey did not concentrate his major surface warships in a striking force. He made do with what he had, peeling off the cruisers and destroyers escorting convoys as they came north and sending them out hunting. On November 4, as Vandegrift was pushing west along the coast, Turner ordered the San Francisco, San Francisco, the the Helena, Helena, and the destroyer and the destroyer Sterett Sterett to lash at j.a.panese positions. In four pa.s.ses along the sh.o.r.e, the to lash at j.a.panese positions. In four pa.s.ses along the sh.o.r.e, the Helena Helena put out more than twelve hundred rounds of six-inch fire, and four hundred rounds of five-inch. It was little more than a live-fire exercise, but it sufficed to get Dan Callaghan, in his flagship, the put out more than twelve hundred rounds of six-inch fire, and four hundred rounds of five-inch. It was little more than a live-fire exercise, but it sufficed to get Dan Callaghan, in his flagship, the San Francisco, San Francisco, acquainted with his tools. acquainted with his tools.

The j.a.panese seemed unnerved by this aggressive use of U.S. naval might. The Tokyo Express, stretched as it was, did not have the stomach to confront American cruisers without heavier support from the Combined Fleet. According to Turner, captured doc.u.ments and diaries suggested that the presence of U.S. warships at this time deterred the IJN from bringing in thousands more reinforcements for an attack on Henderson Field.

Its desperate position on Guadalca.n.a.l led the 17th Army to beseech the IJN for emergency reinforcements and support from the 11th Air Fleet. At first light on November 5, Admiral Tsukuhara's aviators swarmed aloft. The twenty-seven Bettys and two dozen Zeros were foiled from attacking by heavy cloud cover over the airfield. Naval forces had better luck. That night the light cruiser Tenryu Tenryu led fifteen destroyers to their unloading points off Ta.s.safaronga and Cape Esperance, where they dropped a regiment of troops, which promptly rallied to confront Vandegrift's advance. These men were just the first wave of a far more ambitious effort. U.S. snoopers monitoring radio transmissions from Truk and Rabaul had hints of a scheme that entailed forces much larger than the Tokyo Express runs did. Yamamoto was marshaling resources to deliver an entire division to the embattled island. led fifteen destroyers to their unloading points off Ta.s.safaronga and Cape Esperance, where they dropped a regiment of troops, which promptly rallied to confront Vandegrift's advance. These men were just the first wave of a far more ambitious effort. U.S. snoopers monitoring radio transmissions from Truk and Rabaul had hints of a scheme that entailed forces much larger than the Tokyo Express runs did. Yamamoto was marshaling resources to deliver an entire division to the embattled island.

The next day a coast.w.a.tcher in southern Bougainville reported thirty-three j.a.panese vessels off Shortland Island. Two days later, on November 8, another coast.w.a.tcher warned of a dozen transports steaming southeast through Buka Pa.s.sage, on the northern tip of Bougainville.

On November 8, Halsey landed on Henderson Field for a tour of ground zero in the ongoing campaign. He knew that an all-out enemy attempt to retake the island was near. As he considered his own next move, it was time for him to confront the consequences of his gamble off Santa Cruz a few weeks earlier. The decision to throw his only two carrier groups at a superior j.a.panese force had cost him the Hornet Hornet and made the damaged and made the damaged Enterprise Enterprise too valuable to lose. The inestimable value of that lone remaining carrier would keep Willis Lee's battleships, the too valuable to lose. The inestimable value of that lone remaining carrier would keep Willis Lee's battleships, the Washington Washington and the and the South Dakota, South Dakota, the most powerful available surface unit in the entire Pacific Fleet, tethered to the the most powerful available surface unit in the entire Pacific Fleet, tethered to the Enterprise Enterprise for protection. Once again, the marines ash.o.r.e would be left exposed for lack of robust carrier support. And once again, it would be the Navy's light forces that mustered to their defense. for protection. Once again, the marines ash.o.r.e would be left exposed for lack of robust carrier support. And once again, it would be the Navy's light forces that mustered to their defense.

Receiving Halsey for dinner, Vandegrift instructed his mess attendant to serve his superior the best meal possible. "I know we haven't got much, but make it good for the Admiral," he told them. On a disease-ridden mud pit of a battlefield, a can of Spam is four-star cuisine. Vandegrift's cook took some beans and dehydrated potatoes and added chunks of the canned meat to make a salty gray stew. He followed that coa.r.s.e course with slices of cooked Spam with boiled beans. A peach cobbler made from soggy canned fruit was dessert.

As the plates were cleared, Halsey said, "I'd like to compliment the cook on our dinner." So Vandegrift summoned a big, red-faced sergeant who appeared to have been pulled from the front lines for this special duty. Halsey said to him, "Son, I want to compliment you. That's as fine a dinner as I could have got in the Waldorf-Astoria. That soup was out of this world. I've never had Spam or meat cooked like that. And those beans were just right on the spot. That pie you had, that cobbler, why even my mother couldn't have made that." The sergeant grew redder and redder in the face as Halsey spoke, and finally all he could say was, "Aw, Admiral, horse...stuff."

That night a j.a.panese destroyer approached Guadalca.n.a.l's sh.o.r.eline and gave the South Pacific boss a sterner rebuke. Without any protection from his own fleet, Halsey found himself first embarra.s.sed, then gripped by rank fear as Henderson Field absorbed the barrage. "It wasn't the noise that kept me awake; it was fright," he would write. "I called myself yellow-and worse-and told myself, 'Go to sleep, you d.a.m.ned coward!' but it didn't do any good; I couldn't obey orders."

Three U.S. convoys were en route to Guadalca.n.a.l. Having returned to Espiritu Santo, where they hauled aboard new stocks of five-inch ammunition to replenish their depleted magazines, the men of the Atlanta Atlanta found themselves ordered back to sea. At 8:30 a.m. on November 9, with Norman Scott aboard as task force commander, the found themselves ordered back to sea. At 8:30 a.m. on November 9, with Norman Scott aboard as task force commander, the Atlanta Atlanta led four destroyers, the led four destroyers, the Aaron Ward, Fletcher, Lardner, Aaron Ward, Fletcher, Lardner, and and McCalla, McCalla, out of Espiritu Santo escorting three cargo ships. Before dawn on the tenth, another group left Espiritu Santo-the out of Espiritu Santo escorting three cargo ships. Before dawn on the tenth, another group left Espiritu Santo-the San Francisco, San Francisco, embarking Rear Admiral Callaghan and commanded by Captain Ca.s.sin Young, who had relieved Captain Charles H. McMorris with the heavy cruiser embarking Rear Admiral Callaghan and commanded by Captain Ca.s.sin Young, who had relieved Captain Charles H. McMorris with the heavy cruiser Pensacola, Pensacola, the the Helena, Helena, and the destroyers and the destroyers Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, Shaw, Gwin, Preston, Cushing, Laffey, Sterett, Shaw, Gwin, Preston, and and Buchanan. Buchanan. Admiral Turner himself was under way from Noumea leading a group labeled Task Force 67. His flagship, the transport Admiral Turner himself was under way from Noumea leading a group labeled Task Force 67. His flagship, the transport McCawley, McCawley, led the transports led the transports President Jackson, President Adams, President Jackson, President Adams, and and Crescent City, Crescent City, escorted by the cruisers escorted by the cruisers Portland Portland and and Juneau Juneau and the destroyers and the destroyers...o...b..nnon, Barton, O'Bannon, Barton, and and Monssen. Monssen. After the transports had safely reached anchorage, Turner decided to a.s.semble the cruisers and destroyers into a single striking force. After the transports had safely reached anchorage, Turner decided to a.s.semble the cruisers and destroyers into a single striking force.

On the morning of the eleventh, Scott's Atlanta Atlanta task force reached Guadalca.n.a.l, and its three transports started unloading troops near Lunga Point. After dark, Scott's warship escort joined Callaghan's. Turner's amphibs landed six thousand men, bringing the U.S. garrison on Guadalca.n.a.l to twenty-nine thousand. Halsey ordered the task force reached Guadalca.n.a.l, and its three transports started unloading troops near Lunga Point. After dark, Scott's warship escort joined Callaghan's. Turner's amphibs landed six thousand men, bringing the U.S. garrison on Guadalca.n.a.l to twenty-nine thousand. Halsey ordered the Pensacola Pensacola and two destroyers, the and two destroyers, the Preston Preston and and Gwin, Gwin, to return and fortify the to return and fortify the Enterprise Enterprise task force. That night the combined cruiser force swept Savo Sound but found nothing. At dawn on the twelfth, another group of transports arrived and anch.o.r.ed off Kuk.u.m. As these vessels came under fire from a j.a.panese sh.o.r.e battery after sunrise, the task force. That night the combined cruiser force swept Savo Sound but found nothing. At dawn on the twelfth, another group of transports arrived and anch.o.r.ed off Kuk.u.m. As these vessels came under fire from a j.a.panese sh.o.r.e battery after sunrise, the Helena, Shaw, Helena, Shaw, and and Barton Barton silenced it. silenced it.

The quiet of early morning was a surreal time, the sea gla.s.sy calm, the clear sky warmed by a bright sun. Inbound j.a.panese planes were still hundreds of miles away. On the Helena, Helena, blasting unseen targets ash.o.r.e, "The gunners fired as though at rehearsal-as though Guadalca.n.a.l were a target being towed past for their convenience," Chick Morris wrote. "For more than an hour our bombardment mowed down the island's coconut trees and drilled tunnels in the jungle. Seabee bulldozers might have done the job as well, but hardly with such fantastic speed. As the sh.e.l.ls burst upon impact, spraying shrapnel for yards around, we watched enemy troops scrambling in panic up the hillsides. We watched them die." The destroyers blasting unseen targets ash.o.r.e, "The gunners fired as though at rehearsal-as though Guadalca.n.a.l were a target being towed past for their convenience," Chick Morris wrote. "For more than an hour our bombardment mowed down the island's coconut trees and drilled tunnels in the jungle. Seabee bulldozers might have done the job as well, but hardly with such fantastic speed. As the sh.e.l.ls burst upon impact, spraying shrapnel for yards around, we watched enemy troops scrambling in panic up the hillsides. We watched them die." The destroyers Buchanan Buchanan and and Cushing Cushing razed the sh.o.r.eline westward, destroying several dozen small barges lying along the beach and enemy ammunition and supply dumps farther inland. razed the sh.o.r.eline westward, destroying several dozen small barges lying along the beach and enemy ammunition and supply dumps farther inland.

Valuable though this work was for the infantry, the Navy's greatest challenge lay at sea. And in Norman Scott, the fleet had the right man available to meet it. In the Battle of Cape Esperance, he had stared into the void of night, squinted at the flash of enemy powder, studied the silhouettes of unknown ships, and carried his force through to a victory. Though it wasn't a resounding victory, it had put vital seasoning into a man who was by nature already a fighter. Afterward, Scott had the sole claim to status as a victorious surface-force commander. He had absorbed the lessons of his experience and acted on them with a focused seriousness.

One lesson arrived swiftly: that war is the craft of putting ordnance on target decisively, and it is really nothing else. This lesson was being learned the world over in more than a dozen languages. The rigmarole of military life, after all, was designed in part to shape the character of men to respond effectively in that half second where a vital decision must rise instantly from habit. A ship full of pilothouse philosophers, sailors' lieutenants, and colorful China hands who inspire great fiction will lose a fight in an eye's blink to a quick, tight, fast-firing crew who snaps their weapons on target and delivers direct fire by the express route. The victors in every battle from Pearl Harbor to El Alamein to Stalingrad had learned this important truth, and now Admiral Scott was among them. On the other side of the world, the Wehrmacht was locked in a death grip with the Russians at Stalingrad. In North Africa, British forces were winning a decisive victory over the Afrika Korps at El Alamein. Such a turning point was soon to be at hand in the South Pacific.

Seasoned under fire and wise to how he might have won previous fights still more convincingly, Scott knew what tools worked best. Like Turner, he had had time to think through the lessons of experience against the Tokyo Express. "FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST j.a.p LIGHT FORCES," "FOR OPERATIONS AGAINST j.a.p LIGHT FORCES," Scott wrote Halsey on the eighth, Scott wrote Halsey on the eighth, "SUBMIT NECESSITY FOR GUNS LARGER THAN FIVE-INCH. j.a.p STRENGTH IN TORPEDOES NECESSITATES EARLY EFFECTIVE HITS WHICH CAN ONLY BE MADE BY LARGER GUNS. EFFECTIVENESS OF FIVE-INCH AA FOR SINKING DD IS DOUBTFUL. ATLANTA CARRIES ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT COMMON MARK 32. IN ORDER MAKE BEST USE OF OUR DOUBTFUL TORPEDOES DDS WITH TWO OR MORE MOUNTS SHOULD BE a.s.sIGNED STRIKING GROUPS." "SUBMIT NECESSITY FOR GUNS LARGER THAN FIVE-INCH. j.a.p STRENGTH IN TORPEDOES NECESSITATES EARLY EFFECTIVE HITS WHICH CAN ONLY BE MADE BY LARGER GUNS. EFFECTIVENESS OF FIVE-INCH AA FOR SINKING DD IS DOUBTFUL. ATLANTA CARRIES ONLY ABOUT 10 PERCENT COMMON MARK 32. IN ORDER MAKE BEST USE OF OUR DOUBTFUL TORPEDOES DDS WITH TWO OR MORE MOUNTS SHOULD BE a.s.sIGNED STRIKING GROUPS."

Good men had died for Scott to gain these insights. Given his emphasis on larger guns, he must have lamented the order that detached Pensacola Pensacola from the area. Having won at Cape Esperance largely on the blowtorching output of the from the area. Having won at Cape Esperance largely on the blowtorching output of the Helena Helena's and Boise Boise's six-inch batteries, he preferred heavy-gunned ships to antiaircraft cruisers. But the Pensacola Pensacola had her problems. The first of the new eight-inch-gunned cruisers built to treaty restrictions, she had a tendency to roll even in moderate seas, which compromised the accuracy of her guns. Her seams tended to pop whenever a full salvo was fired. So while the had her problems. The first of the new eight-inch-gunned cruisers built to treaty restrictions, she had a tendency to roll even in moderate seas, which compromised the accuracy of her guns. Her seams tended to pop whenever a full salvo was fired. So while the Juneau Juneau or the or the Atlanta Atlanta might have seemed better suited to protecting SOPAC's last aircraft carrier, the might have seemed better suited to protecting SOPAC's last aircraft carrier, the Pensacola Pensacola got that job and the antiaircraft cruisers were thrown into the line despite Scott's wishes. got that job and the antiaircraft cruisers were thrown into the line despite Scott's wishes.

The Atlanta Atlanta didn't have the additional s.p.a.ce that other flagships had for an admiral and his staff, but Scott didn't mind. "He spent a great deal of time on the bridge just as a unit commander does in a destroyer flagship," Lloyd Mustin, the didn't have the additional s.p.a.ce that other flagships had for an admiral and his staff, but Scott didn't mind. "He spent a great deal of time on the bridge just as a unit commander does in a destroyer flagship," Lloyd Mustin, the Atlanta Atlanta's a.s.sistant gunnery officer, said. "The captain's chair was in the traditional starboard corner of the pilot house. There was a similar chair on the port side. Admiral Scott inhabited that through many long hours, day and night. The officers of the deck spent hours with him in the pilothouse. Sitting inside the door to the bridge wing, feet up on a chair, he was accessible, friendly, and conversational. He discussed anything and everything." Typically an admiral kept his own staff apart from the captain's wardroom. But Scott didn't mind mingling with the leadership on his host flagship. "We were the eyes and ears of the captain of the ship. We were also Admiral Scott's eyes and ears when he was not on the bridge," Mustin said.

Then a dispatch came down from Kelly Turner's headquarters. It was a shocker. It said, in effect, that when Callaghan's and Scott's forces merged into a single force, to be designated Task Group 67.4, Scott would take second seat to Callaghan. Halsey was personally close to Scott. But because Callaghan had held the rank of rear admiral for fifteen days longer than Scott, tradition forced an absurd result: Callaghan, the chief of staff to a theater commander who had been removed for his lack of battle-mindedness, was relieving Scott, the only proven brawler in the American surface fleet admiralty, as officer in tactical command of the striking force.

When Callaghan served in the heavy cruiser New Orleans, New Orleans, he befriended a medical officer named Ross McIntire. When McIntire became President Franklin Roosevelt's personal physician, he recommended Callaghan as the president's naval aide. Receiving the a.s.signment to sh.o.r.e duty at a point when his advancement depended on gaining command of a major warship distressed Callaghan deeply, but he tried to make the best of it. In the spring of 1941, he pleaded for sea duty, and the president released him to command the he befriended a medical officer named Ross McIntire. When McIntire became President Franklin Roosevelt's personal physician, he recommended Callaghan as the president's naval aide. Receiving the a.s.signment to sh.o.r.e duty at a point when his advancement depended on gaining command of a major warship distressed Callaghan deeply, but he tried to make the best of it. In the spring of 1941, he pleaded for sea duty, and the president released him to command the San Francisco. San Francisco. A year later, he was ordered to serve as Ghormley's chief of staff. In October, the cycle seemed to repeat itself when Callaghan was cast loose after Halsey's arrival, and the best billet available to him-the nearest hull in the storm-was, once again, his old ship. A year later, he was ordered to serve as Ghormley's chief of staff. In October, the cycle seemed to repeat itself when Callaghan was cast loose after Halsey's arrival, and the best billet available to him-the nearest hull in the storm-was, once again, his old ship.

The news of his return to sea was met with joy in the San Francisco, San Francisco, where he had earned the nickname "Uncle Dan" for his collegial way. The men of Task Force 67's other heavy cruiser, the where he had earned the nickname "Uncle Dan" for his collegial way. The men of Task Force 67's other heavy cruiser, the Portland, Portland, were pleased, too, for Callaghan had once been their exec, a role in which he had achieved the nearly impossible: becoming popular in the always-difficult position of the captain's stern right hand. Oakland-born and San Franciscoeducated, Callaghan had turned prematurely gray, it was said, after a court-martial in 1915 (fully acquitted) for allegedly mismanaging some engine room equipment while serving as the engineering officer in the destroyer were pleased, too, for Callaghan had once been their exec, a role in which he had achieved the nearly impossible: becoming popular in the always-difficult position of the captain's stern right hand. Oakland-born and San Franciscoeducated, Callaghan had turned prematurely gray, it was said, after a court-martial in 1915 (fully acquitted) for allegedly mismanaging some engine room equipment while serving as the engineering officer in the destroyer Truxtun. Truxtun.

The news of his elevation now hit the Atlanta Atlanta hard. The crew, overjoyed when Scott came aboard with his flag, was deflated by his relief. The prestige of serving as flagship to a victorious admiral had been considerable. Now, though he would remain aboard, Scott would have nothing of substance to do but advise and consult (if ever asked) and follow Callaghan's orders. It would strike more than a few fighting sailors as a shame that the Navy was taking Scott's expensively earned curriculum of experience effectively out of circulation. hard. The crew, overjoyed when Scott came aboard with his flag, was deflated by his relief. The prestige of serving as flagship to a victorious admiral had been considerable. Now, though he would remain aboard, Scott would have nothing of substance to do but advise and consult (if ever asked) and follow Callaghan's orders. It would strike more than a few fighting sailors as a shame that the Navy was taking Scott's expensively earned curriculum of experience effectively out of circulation.

What didn't change as a result of Scott's replacement was the Atlanta Atlanta's a.s.signment to roam with the street fighters. Ironically enough, Scott himself probably wouldn't have kept her in the task force had he been in charge of its composition. In this stout company, an antiaircraft cruiser was as out of place as a fox in a pack of wolves.

AS THE AMERICANS were gathering, U.S. radio intelligence learned of large enemy naval forces gathering in the north. Back at Noumea after his visit to Henderson Field, Halsey studied the briefings of CINCPAC radio crypta.n.a.lysts. Nearly foiled because of changes the enemy had made in their code groups and call signs, they still made a fair appraisal of the naval forces Yamamoto had ordered into action at virtually the same time Halsey was dining with Vandegrift on November 8. In the coming days, the enemy's order of battle would be appraised in the aggregate as having two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and about thirty destroyers. This a.s.sessment was mostly accurate, though it overestimated the carrier power available to the j.a.panese and did not reveal the complicated deployment plan that Admiral Yamamoto had settled on. were gathering, U.S. radio intelligence learned of large enemy naval forces gathering in the north. Back at Noumea after his visit to Henderson Field, Halsey studied the briefings of CINCPAC radio crypta.n.a.lysts. Nearly foiled because of changes the enemy had made in their code groups and call signs, they still made a fair appraisal of the naval forces Yamamoto had ordered into action at virtually the same time Halsey was dining with Vandegrift on November 8. In the coming days, the enemy's order of battle would be appraised in the aggregate as having two carriers, four battleships, five heavy cruisers, and about thirty destroyers. This a.s.sessment was mostly accurate, though it overestimated the carrier power available to the j.a.panese and did not reveal the complicated deployment plan that Admiral Yamamoto had settled on.

Issued to his fleet on November 8, the j.a.panese operation order was designed to bring the eleven troop transports under Admiral Tanaka to unloading points off Ta.s.safaronga and Cape Esperance. Carrying seven thousand troops, twenty days of supplies for thirty thousand men, and loads of artillery ordnance, they were escorted by a dozen destroyers. Much farther to the east, standing sentinel for the transports, was a powerful element of the Combined Fleet known as the Advance Force, under Admiral Kondo. It contained the battleships Hiei, Kirishima, Kongo, Hiei, Kirishima, Kongo, and and Haruna, Haruna, three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers. Separately, Admiral Mikawa commanded a striking force with four heavy cruisers, the three heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and twenty-one destroyers. Separately, Admiral Mikawa commanded a striking force with four heavy cruisers, the Chokai, Kinugasa, k.u.mano, Chokai, Kinugasa, k.u.mano, and and Maya. Maya. Owing to battle damage and severe attrition to air groups, only one aircraft carrier, the Owing to battle damage and severe attrition to air groups, only one aircraft carrier, the Junyo, Junyo, was available to lend air cover to this major operation. The report also indicated a ma.s.sing of air strength at Buin, which would launch concentrated attacks three days before the landings. Though their troops were starving and their pilot ranks thinning, the j.a.panese had by no means given up on Guadalca.n.a.l. The heavy striking power of the j.a.panese battleship force was still to meet its match. was available to lend air cover to this major operation. The report also indicated a ma.s.sing of air strength at Buin, which would launch concentrated attacks three days before the landings. Though their troops were starving and their pilot ranks thinning, the j.a.panese had by no means given up on Guadalca.n.a.l. The heavy striking power of the j.a.panese battleship force was still to meet its match.

In the second week of November, the Guadalca.n.a.l campaign entered a kinetic new phase. In a letter to Callaghan concerning the future operations of Task Force 67, Turner had forecast the nature of the coming j.a.panese a.s.sault like a meteorologist: air attacks beginning on the tenth and continuing daily with increasing strength; the departure of a troop convoy from Buin with escorts; a separate sortie by battleships and cruisers to bombard Henderson Field; a strike by enemy carrier planes; and then the crowning blow, an amphibious landing near Cape Esperance or Koli Point, supported by another naval bombardment. The j.a.panese were a day or so behind the initial reports of this cycle, but they were coming, like a violent storm front that would not be turned aside.

How to array his available forces against the oncoming heavy surface group, arguably the most dangerous threat, was the most pressing decision Turner faced. Since no enemy transports had yet been sighted with it, he saw two possible purposes as to the j.a.panese mission: to attack his transports during the night, or to bombard Henderson Field and Vandegrift's infantry positions. Turner's options, then, were to keep his combatant ships close to the anchorage in order to guard his transports, or send them out to do battle in the open sea and keep the IJN's guns away from Henderson Field.

Seeing that control of the nighttime sea was vital, Turner made the latter choice. Rather than see to his own immediate safety, he detached Task Force 67's entire supporting cruiser force, stripping the transport anchorage of the major ships of its screen, and gave it all to Callaghan. This was a significant gamble, for Turner could well have kept the warships close to the landing area, protecting his anchorage. Clearly he had had time to consider the errors of the campaign's early days, when divided cruiser forces, deployed piecemeal in Savo Sound, had been dispatched with ease by a concentrated enemy flotilla. Improvision was always the order of the day. But the convergence of three separate convoys into the area all at once now offered an opportunity to concentrate. Turner wrote Callaghan, "It looks this time like the enemy is finally about to make an all-out effort against Cactus.... If you can really strike the enemy hard, it will be more important for you to do that than to protect my transports. Good luck to you, Dan. G.o.d bless all of you and give you strength."

Halsey was painfully aware that his only carrier, the Enterprise, Enterprise, would be without the use of her forward elevator until near the end of the month. Nonetheless, he knew that whatever airpower she could throw into the coming fight would be indispensable. Accordingly, on the morning of November 11, Halsey ordered the would be without the use of her forward elevator until near the end of the month. Nonetheless, he knew that whatever airpower she could throw into the coming fight would be indispensable. Accordingly, on the morning of November 11, Halsey ordered the Enterprise Enterprise task force to get north from Noumea with instructions to take positions two hundred miles south of San Cristobal and strike j.a.panese shipping near Guadalca.n.a.l. Given the poor state of repair of her forward elevator, it was risky to commit the task force to get north from Noumea with instructions to take positions two hundred miles south of San Cristobal and strike j.a.panese shipping near Guadalca.n.a.l. Given the poor state of repair of her forward elevator, it was risky to commit the Enterprise Enterprise into battle again, and this may be why Halsey's decision to send her north was too late to allow the carrier to be in position to strike enemy forces then en route south. He had briefly considered detaching her air group to Espiritu Santo. But could not afford to throw the dice as aggressively as he had at Santa Cruz, and he knew it. He held Admiral Lee's battleship group in the south with the into battle again, and this may be why Halsey's decision to send her north was too late to allow the carrier to be in position to strike enemy forces then en route south. He had briefly considered detaching her air group to Espiritu Santo. But could not afford to throw the dice as aggressively as he had at Santa Cruz, and he knew it. He held Admiral Lee's battleship group in the south with the Enterprise Enterprise for the time being, too. They were a powerful reserve. for the time being, too. They were a powerful reserve.

Turner's election to commit his entire combatant force for an open-sea encounter was the only practical possibility under the circ.u.mstances. As Hanson Baldwin informed the readers of The New York Times The New York Times as the lead-up to the Santa Cruz carrier battle, "We must establish local naval superiority around Guadalca.n.a.l.... This can be done only by the continuous use of surface craft; air power is also absolutely essential to this end, but, as we have seen, alone it is not enough, alone it cannot prevent the j.a.panese from constant nightly infiltration by sea into Guadalca.n.a.l." There was no other way to deflect an enemy surface force at night than to go all-in with the surface forces, whose "smashing offensive spirit," Baldwin wrote, was key to everything. If they prevailed, and if the destruction of the airfield was thereby prevented, the Cactus Air Force would be free to strike the stragglers at will during that morning sanctuary when even the earliest-rising j.a.panese planes would still be hours away. as the lead-up to the Santa Cruz carrier battle, "We must establish local naval superiority around Guadalca.n.a.l.... This can be done only by the continuous use of surface craft; air power is also absolutely essential to this end, but, as we have seen, alone it is not enough, alone it cannot prevent the j.a.panese from constant nightly infiltration by sea into Guadalca.n.a.l." There was no other way to deflect an enemy surface force at night than to go all-in with the surface forces, whose "smashing offensive spirit," Baldwin wrote, was key to everything. If they prevailed, and if the destruction of the airfield was thereby prevented, the Cactus Air Force would be free to strike the stragglers at will during that morning sanctuary when even the earliest-rising j.a.panese planes would still be hours away.

[image]

U.S. Navy Combat Task Forces in the South Pacific (as of November 12, 1942) [image]

TASK GROUP 67.4.

(Cruiser Support Group) Rear Adm. Daniel J. Callaghan San Francisco (CA) (CA) Portland (CA) (CA) Helena (CL) (CL) Atlanta (CLAA) (CLAA) Juneau (CLAA) (CLAA) Cushing (DD) (DD) Laffey (DD) (DD) Sterett (DD) (DD) O'Bannon (DD) (DD) Aaron Ward (DD) (DD) Barton (DD) (DD) Monssen (DD) (DD) Fletcher (DD) (DD) TASK FORCE 16.

(Carrier Task Force) Vice Adm. Thomas E. Kinkaid Enterprise (CV) (damaged) (CV) (damaged) Northampton (CA) (CA) Pensacola (CA) (CA) San Diego (CLAA) (CLAA) Morris (DD) (DD) Hughes (DD) (DD) Russell (DD) (DD) Clark (DD) (DD) Anderson (DD) (DD) TASK FORCE 64.

(Battleship Support Group) Rear Adm. Willis A. Lee Washington (BB) (BB) South Dakota (BB) (damaged) (BB) (damaged) Preston (DD) (DD) Gwin (DD) (DD) Benham (DD) (DD) Walke (DD) (DD) [image]

Now it would be Kelly Turner's turn to be a riverboat gambler. On Dan Callaghan's untested shoulders he would gamble his entire command.

26.

Suicide ON THE SAN FRANCISCO, SAN FRANCISCO, IT WAS LIKE OLD TIMES AGAIN. DAN IT WAS LIKE OLD TIMES AGAIN. DAN callaghan, the ship's former skipper, was aboard wearing the two stars of a rear admiral. Just as in old times, a callaghan, the ship's former skipper, was aboard wearing the two stars of a rear admiral. Just as in old times, a San Francisco San Francisco sailor named Eugene Tarrant found that he occupied the ideal place from which to observe Callaghan at work and in repose: right in his shadow. sailor named Eugene Tarrant found that he occupied the ideal place from which to observe Callaghan at work and in repose: right in his shadow.

No men on a ship were wiser to the way things worked than the sailors who stood invisibly in the wardroom's midst. The white-jacketed mess attendants and cooks-a lowly caste within S Division, which saw to the supply and sustenance of the crew-mostly were black enlistees. Like all enlisted men, they cultivated what sc.r.a.ps of control and power were left to them. The ladder of ranks and ratings had its peculiarities, with voids on middle rungs and true power residing at the bottom and the top.

Battleships and carriers had separate dining facilities for junior and senior officers. On cruisers, all the officers dined together except for the captain, who had his own cabin. When he was in command of the San Francisco, San Francisco, Callaghan made a practice of eating with his men. He used the wardroom to break down barriers and accelerate the growth of his young officers. The mess attendants and cooks had as good a view of the goings-on as anyone. Callaghan made a practice of eating with his men. He used the wardroom to break down barriers and accelerate the growth of his young officers. The mess attendants and cooks had as good a view of the goings-on as anyone.

On duty in the officers' galley, Tarrant found that he could raise the pantry door, which was designed like a dumbwaiter, and hear Callaghan talking with his staff in the next compartment. With access to high-level scuttleb.u.t.t, he sometimes found himself as well informed as the intelligence a.n.a.lysts at headquarters. "I heard about all the plans," Tarrant said. "They'd talk about what forces they were going up against, when they expected contact with the enemy, how they planned to deploy the fleet."

In the after-midnight morning of November 12, Admiral Turner informed Callaghan that patrol planes had reported two battleships or heavy cruisers, one cruiser, and six destroyers southbound at twenty-five knots, and within a day's run of Savo Sound. Tarrant was on duty when Callaghan received Turner's order to gather the disparate cruisers and destroyers from three task forces and take them into action against this threat.

At the news that a fight with battleships was brewing, Callaghan began pacing his flag bridge. He was heard mumbling that it was a fool's errand to take on ships three times the San Francisco San Francisco's size, and that it was a shame there was no time to confer again with Admiral Halsey. When the moment presented itself, Eugene Tarrant exercised the cook's prerogative and asked Callaghan if he really thought the mission was hopeless. As Tarrant recalled, the task force commander was candid. "He said to me, 'Yes it may be that. But we are going in.'"

The officer-of-the-deck for the first dog watch, Lieutenant Jack Bennett, listened to the admiral conversing with Captain Ca.s.sin Young as they stood on the starboard bridge wing. "The wind carried their voices to me as I paced the deck and I was able to clearly observe the demeanor of each," Bennett said. "They were discussing the unannounced fact that there were battleships in the Tokyo Express.... Captain Young...was in an understandably agitated state, sometimes waving his arms, as he remarked 'This is suicide.' Admiral Dan Callaghan replied, 'Yes I know, but we have to do it.'" As Bennett saw it, Callaghan was "calm, unemotional, resolute and perhaps resigned to his fate."

Rumors had a way of sweeping a ship like wildfire. Word spread through the San Francisco San Francisco that Callaghan deemed his orders a death sentence. "We were all prepared to die. There was just no doubt about it," said Joseph Whitt, a seaman first cla.s.s whose battle station was in turret one. "We could not survive against those battleships." that Callaghan deemed his orders a death sentence. "We were all prepared to die. There was just no doubt about it," said Joseph Whitt, a seaman first cla.s.s whose battle station was in turret one. "We could not survive against those battleships."

Callaghan was fifteen years old when, three days after Easter in 1906, the great earthquake struck San Francisco. In the chaos and wreckage, he had done what a teenager could to help the injured. His prep school, St. Ignatius, was destroyed. As the fires consumed the school and its church, one student thought that "all h.e.l.l seemed dancing with joy." For the rest of the term Callaghan was left to study Virgil and Dante in a makeshift cla.s.sroom amid the city's ruins while the Jesuits rebuilt their school. For the men of the San Francisco San Francisco and the rest of Task Force 67, it would begin that afternoon. Inbound now at twenty thousand feet, moving swifly toward the island, came a wave of twin-engine Betty bombers and thirty Zeros, fuel burning fast on half-empty tanks. and the rest of Task Force 67, it would begin that afternoon. Inbound now at twenty thousand feet, moving swifly toward the island, came a wave of twin-engine Betty bombers and thirty Zeros, fuel burning fast on half-empty tanks.

BELIEVING THAT U.S. CARRIER STRENGTH had been eliminated entirely in the Battle of Santa Cruz, Yamamoto planned to neutralize the last bastion of U.S. airpower in the theater, stubborn Henderson Field, with a onetwo punch of air attack and naval bombardment. The Bettys were first spied by a coast.w.a.tcher near Tonolei, on Buin, around 1 p.m. The air-search radar on Guadalca.n.a.l registered the bogeys when they were still more than a hundred miles out. That was enough time for Kelly Turner to get his transports under way in Savo Sound, where they could maneuver and make themselves much harder targets, and for Callaghan to herd his cruiser task force into a protective antiaircraft ring around them. had been eliminated entirely in the Battle of Santa Cruz, Yamamoto planned to neutralize the last bastion of U.S. airpower in the theater, stubborn Henderson Field, with a onetwo punch of air attack and naval bombardment. The Bettys were first spied by a coast.w.a.tcher near Tonolei, on Buin, around 1 p.m. The air-search radar on Guadalca.n.a.l registered the bogeys when they were still more than a hundred miles out. That was enough time for Kelly Turner to get his transports under way in Savo Sound, where they could maneuver and make themselves much harder targets, and for Callaghan to herd his cruiser task force into a protective antiaircraft ring around them.

Hiding above the cloud bottoms, the torpedo-armed bombers revealed themselves at the last minute, dropping down and buzzing Florida Island, throttles firewalled, descending steadily until they were right down on the water. U.S. fighter pilots were close in pursuit. Captain Joe Foss, leading a flight of eight Marine Wildcats and eight Army Airacobras, pushed over on them from twenty-nine thousand feet. The speed of his dive ripped loose the c.o.c.kpit hood of Foss's Wildcat. The Bettys divided into two groups and came in from the starboard beam of Turner's no