40 Fleischmann's book compares favourably with those of other naturalists, in that he does not contrast "Moses" and natural science, as is customary, but has a deeper knowledge of the modern view of Genesis I. than is usually found among naturalists, whether of the "positive" or "negative" standpoint.

41 See also Wolff.

42 See C.C. Coe, "Nature versus Natural Selection," London, 1895.

Perhaps the most comprehensive, many-sided, critical a.n.a.lysis of the theory of natural selection. See also Herbert Spencer, "The Inadequacy of Natural Selection," 1893.

43 Leipzig, 1888, 1897, 1901. In part translated as "Organic Evolution." We are here mainly concerned with Vols. I. and III.

Later on we shall have to discuss Vol. II.

44 Wien, 1899.

45 See Wettstein, "Neolamarckism," Jena, 1902. See also Demoor, Ma.s.sart, Vandervelde, "L'Evolution regressive en Biologie et Sociologie," Paris, 1897. Bibliotheque scientific internationale, vol. lx.x.xv. This work is on the Lamarckian basis. It is original in applying Lamarckian principles to a theory of society.

46 Two vols., Leipzig, 1901 and 1902.

47 It remains open to question whether Eimer's explanation is sufficient in all cases, even those of the exaggeratedly deceptive copies of leaves or bark, or the colour of the environment. It is certainly not the sorry explanation in terms of "Variation and Selection," but that of a spontaneous imitation of the surroundings, that forces itself irresistibly upon us in this connection.

48 Jena, 1892 and 1895.

49 See Reinke, "Einleitung in die theoretische Biologie," 1901, especially pp. 463 onwards on "Phylogenetisches Bildungspotential."

von Wettstein (On direct adaptation), "Neolamarkismus," Jena, 1902.

_Cf._ "Wissensch-Beitrage zum 15 Jahresberichte (1902) der Philos.

Gesellschaft an der Universitat zu Wien: Vortrage und Besprechungen uber die Krisis der Darwinismus." M. Ka.s.sowitz, "Allgemeine Biologie," I. and II., 1899. O. Hertwig, "Entwicklung der Biologie im 19. Jahrhundert." Wiesner, "Elemente der wissenschaftlichen Botanik." (_cf._ especially III. "Biologie der Pflanzen"), and on p.

288 the summary of propositions which are very similar to those formulated later by Korschinsky. ("Auf Grund des den Organismen innewohnenden Vervollkommnungstriebes.")

50 See the particularly beautiful and suggestive experiments of Haberlandt: "Experimentelle Hervorrufung eines neuen Organs." In "Festschrift fur Schwendener," Berlin Borntraeger, 1899.

51 See "Nature," 1891, p. 441

52 See "Nature," 1891, p. 441.

53 The variation-increment of the selection theory ought to be a differential. But in many cases it is not so. As for instance in symmetrical correlated variation, &c. In the struggle for existence it is usually not advantages of organisation which are decisive, but the chance advantages of situation, though these have no "selective"

influence. The case of the tapeworm is ill.u.s.trative.

His work, "Die organischen Regulationen, Vorbereitungen zu einer Theorie des Lebens," 1901, is a systematic survey of ill.u.s.trations of the "autonomy" of vital processes. In his "a.n.a.lytischen Theorie der organischen Entwicklung," Leipzig, 1894, his special biological ("ontogenetic") views are still in process of development. But even here his sharp rejection of Darwinism is complete (see VI., Par. 3, on "the absurd a.s.sumption of a contingent character of morphogenesis"). It is not for nothing that the book is dedicated to Wigand and C. F. von Baer. He says that in regard to development we must "picture to ourselves external agents acting as stimuli and achieving transformations which have the character, not a.n.a.lysable as to its causes, of being adapted to their end, that is, capable of life." Incomplete, but very instructive too, are his discussions on the causal and the teleological outlook, the necessity for both, and the impossibility of eliminating the latter from the study of nature. In a series of subsequent works, Driesch has defined and strengthened this position, finally reaching the declaration: "Darwin belongs to history, just like that other curiosity of our century, the Hegelian philosophy. Both are variations on the theme, 'How to lead a whole generation by the nose!' " ("Biolog.

Zentralbl." 1896, p. 16). We are concerned with Driesch more particularly in Chapter IX.

54 See Driesch "Kritisches und Polemisches," Biol. Zentrabl., 1902, p.

187, Note 2.

55 "Naturwissenschaftliche Wochenschrift," xiv., p. 273.

56 See -- 70 and subsequent sections. Take, for instance, the sentences:-"Every production of material things and of their forms must be interpreted as possible in terms of purely mechanical laws,"

and the contrast: "Some products of material nature cannot be interpreted as possible in terms of purely mechanical laws."

57 To Aristotle the "Soul" (???? ??t??? Psyche, phytike) was in the first place a purely biological principle. But by means of his elastic formula of Potentiality and Actuality he was able to make the transition to the psychological with apparent ease. The biological is to him in "potentiality" what sensation, impulse, imagination are in "realisation." But the biological and the psychological are not related to one another as stages. Growth, form, development, &c., cannot be carried over through any "actualisatio" into sensation, consciousness and the like.

An essentially different question is, whether the biological may not be not indeed derivable from the psychological-that would be the same mistake-but dependent on, and conditioned by it, just as we regard the voluntary moving and directing of the body as dependent on it. An imaginative interpretation of the world will always take this course.

58 Of course all this still gives us no ground for drawing conclusions as to the correctness of the mechanistic theory, but only affords a reason for its power of persistence. Indeed, the very fact that, in investigating the problem of life, instinct directs us towards mechanical interpretations, should give added weight to the other fact, that among the ranks of naturalists themselves there constantly arise doubts and criticisms of the adequacy of this mode of interpretation, and that many of them go over more or less completely to the vitalistic point of view.

59 H. Helmholtz, "Ueber die Erhaltung der Kraft, eine physikalische Abhandlung," Berlin, 1847.

60 Max Verworn, "Die Biogenhypothese," Jena, 1903. _Cf._ criticisms by Czapek in the "Botanische Zeitung," No. 2, 1903, and by Loeb in the "Biologisches Zentralblatt," 1902.

61 Berlin, 1900. Edited by R. du Bois-Reymond.

62 Butschli, "Untersuchungen uber microscopische Schaume und das Protoplasma," Leipzig, 1892. _Cf._ Berthold, "Studien zur Protoplasmamechanik."

63 Rhumbler, "Zur Mechanik des Gastrulationvorganges ..." in "Archiv.

f. Entwicklungsmechanik," Bd. 14.

64 "Bewegung der lebendigen Substanz." Jena, 1892.

65 A short, very attractive description of these mechanical methods, and one which appeals particularly to us laymen because of its excellent ill.u.s.trations, is Dreyer's "Ziele und Wege biologischer Forschung" (Jena, 1892), especially the first part, "Die Flussigkeitsmechanik als eine Grundlage der organischen Form- und Gerust-Bildung." The astonishing and fascinating forms of Radiolarian frameworks and "skeletons" (the artistic appreciation of which was made possible to a wider public by Haeckel's "Kunstformen der Natur") are here made the subject of mechanical explanations, which are certainly in a high degree plausible.

_ 66 Cf._ Roux, "Archiv. fur Entwicklungsmechanik." The name sufficiently indicates the scope.

67 For a discussion of the difficulties and impossibilities of this theory see page 148 above.

68 "Preformation oder Epigenesis?" Outlines of a theory of the development of organisms. Jena, 1894. (Part I. of "Zeit- und Streit-fragen der Biologie.") Translated by P. Chalmers Mitch.e.l.l, "The Biological Problem of To-day."

69 In his earlier period. Later he rejects both preformation and epigenesis, as mechanical distortions of vital processes.

70 See also Lotze's interesting article "Instinct" in the same work.

71 Part II. of his "Zeit- und Streit-fragen der Biologie."

72 Second Edition, 1902.

73 In Vol. II. p. 139. 1898.

74 "General Physiology." Translated by Lee. London. 1899. P. 170.

75 As a remarkable instance and corroboration of this, we may refer to the ever-recurring, instinctive antipathy of deeply religious temperaments, from Augustine to Luther and Schleiermacher, to the Aristotelian mood and its conception of the world, and their sympathy with Plato's (mostly and especially in their "Platonised"

expressions). The clear-cut, luminous, conception of the world which expresses everything in terms of commensurable concepts is thoroughly Aristotelian. But it would be difficult to find a place in it for the peculiar element which lies at the root of all true devotional feeling, and which makes faith something more than the highest "reverence, love and trust."

76 "Arch. fur pathol. Anatomie und Physiologie," Bd. VIII. 1855.

77 Vol. IX., 1856.

78 The same is true even of crystals, "_omne crystallum e crystallo_."

_ 79 Cf._ "Ueber die Aufgabe der Naturwissenschaft," Jena, 1876.

"Naturwissenschaftliche Tatsachen und Probleme." "Physiologie und Entwicklungslehre," 1886, in the collection of the "Allgemeiner Vereins fur Deutsche Literatur." Also in the same collection, "Aus Natur- und Menschen-leben."

80 These ideas are not fully worked out, and they are disguised in poetic form-for instance, when even the play of flames is compared to vital processes. But if they be stripped of their poetic garb, they lead to the same conclusions to which one is always led when one approaches the problem unprejudiced by naturalistic or anthropomorphic preconceptions of the relation of the infinite to the finite, or the divine to the natural. If we exclude the materialistic or semi-materialistic position which regards teleological phenomena, vital processes, and even states of sensation and consciousness as the function of a "substance" or of matter, we can quite well speak of them as general "cosmo-organic"

functions of universal being, meaning that they occur of necessity wherever the proper conditions exist. According to the doctrine of potentiality and actuality, this is to say that all possible stages of the higher and highest phenomena are _semper et ubique_ potentially present in universal being, and that they become actual wherever the physical processes are far enough advanced to afford the necessary conditions.