"Germany's readiness to enter into peace negotiations, expressed once more by Your Excellency at this interview, as well as Your Excellency's statement in the Reichstag on the 29th inst., that Germany is ready for any peace that will guarantee her existence and future, have during the last few days been fairly thoroughly discussed in the New York papers, which particularly dwell on the words 'a peace guaranteeing our existence and future,' and agree unanimously as to the urgent desirability of a further and more exact formulation of the German peace conditions.

"The _New York Times_ says: 'All depends on what guarantees of the existence and the future of Germany are expected.' The paper goes on to ask how Germany could imagine her future a.s.sured from a territorial point of view, but points out in conclusion that these are only external details, and concludes, returning to its favorite theme, as follows: 'Deeper than all, fundamental in any discussion of peace, is the question of the German political ideals, of German _Machtpolitik_ and _Weltpolitik_, of Prussian militarism.'

... 'The fear, the practical certainty, that Von Bethmann-Hollweg's guarantees would be not merely guarantees of the existence and future of Germany, but of new and not distant wars with her, stands in the way of any serious discussion of his remarks.'

"The _Evening Sun_ remarks sarcastically that obviously no such guarantees as _Deutschland uber Alles_ should be given to any country.

Its verdict, too, is that: 'The peace that Germany craves still is a peace that will enable her to begin the next war in five or ten years, with a certainty of immediate victory and complete conquest of the overlordship of Europe, if not America.' The _Brooklyn Daily Eagle_ writes: 'If an inconclusive peace, a peace based upon the theory that the war is a draw, a peace fertile in the liabilities to future trouble, is not in the mind of the German Chancellor, what is in his mind? He should speak out. He will never have a better opportunity to be specific. The whole neutral world is listening, ready to give careful and intelligent consideration to his words.'

"More important than these and other utterances of the papers which follow in our enemies' wake is the trenchant leading article of the _World_, which on foreign questions generally expresses the point of view of the Administration. This paper says: 'If Germany is ready to end the war, the first thing for the Imperial Government to do is to make definite proposals for peace. Those proposals need not be made officially to the Allies, to the United States, or any other intermediary. They could be made to the world at large. The Chancellor could describe to the Reichstag the conditions under which Germany would regard her Existence and Future a.s.sured.' 'Germany began the war. It is proper that Germany should take the first steps towards ending the war, but something more than vague generalizations is necessary. At present there is nothing to talk about. There are no terms, not even extravagant and ridiculous terms, that can be discussed as a possible basis of settlement.

Thus far there has been no evidence of good faith in the repeated German professions of a desire for peace. In consequence n.o.body takes them seriously until there is at least a tentative proposal of terms. When that is made, the responsible Ministers of other belligerent Governments will be forced to meet the issue. Public opinion in Great Britain and France, no less than in Germany and Austria-Hungary, will have a chance to make itself heard. When peace comes it cannot be merely the peace of diplomats and of Governments. It must be a peace in which popular sentiment has the final word, and popular sentiment has no means of expression until there is something tangible to discuss.'

"The general impression left by the utterances of the American Press on the subject of peace is that on the one hand--apart from a small number of influential papers--it is anxious for peace, from which anxiety it is obvious that it intends to pa.s.s over the extravagant war aims so often heard from the Entente statesmen; but that on the other hand it cannot as yet find any practicable way of bringing about an early conclusion of peace, and also that it cannot see any advance in this direction in the last statements of Your Excellency, which only a few papers have discussed to any extent.

"The change in the direction of the Foreign Office has been discussed at comparative length in the leading articles of the important newspapers, which, as a rule, deal with European Ministerial changes only in their news columns--less with regard to the personality of the retiring Minister, who was not very well known here, than that of the new Secretary of State. The only paper which devoted a few friendly words to Herr von Jagow was the _New York Times_, which described him, in connection with his conferences with Baron Beyens and Sir Edward Goschen at the outbreak of war, as a 'Gentleman in War and Peace,' and also recognized his sympathetic att.i.tude during the negotiations on the submarine war controversy. Herr Zimmermann's appointment as Secretary of State, on the other hand, was greeted by many papers, and indeed by the Press in general--only a few papers were made somewhat uneasy by the news received lately by telegram, of his att.i.tude towards the question of armed merchantmen--with great applause. The tone of these comments must have been set by the flattering and sympathetic utterances of Amba.s.sador Gerard and the journalist Swope, on the subject of the new Secretary of State, and a longer article by Gilbert Hirsch published by the _New York Evening Post_ and other papers under the heading 'Our Friend Zimmermann.' The note struck by this article and by the German Press comments transmitted and printed everywhere over here, that Herr Zimmermann is a particularly warm friend of the United States was joyfully echoed by the whole American Press. Also the fact was everywhere emphasized that in Herr Zimmermann the important post of chief of the Foreign Office hitherto reserved for 'Prussian Junkerdom,' had been given to a member not of the diplomatic, but of the humbler consular service, and indeed, to a bourgeois. Here and there speculation was indulged in as to whether this appointment might not be interpreted as the first step towards a 'Liberal regime,'

in which a not unimportant section of the American Press still sees the future salvation of Germany and of the world.

"The announcement of autonomy for Poland is, to say the least of it, received with scepticism by the American Press which is comparatively well informed on the Polish question. The words of the virtuoso Paderewski, who is working here in the interests of the Polish sufferers through the war: 'This means only more suffering for my people; it means that another army will be raised, and that there will be more killing and more devastating,' were reproduced by many newspapers and regarded as an authoritative statement of what might be expected from the German-Austrian proclamations.

Many papers declared it to be simply a move to raise more recruits.

Others sarcastically pointed out that the proclamation left the most vital questions, such as the boundaries of the new State and its form of government, to be settled later. Only a few of the leading newspapers, among them the _New York Evening Post_ and the Philadelphia _North American_, allowed the Allied Governments a certain modic.u.m of recognition, for, as they pointed out, in no case could the heavy hand of Russia, which had so long oppressed the country, be forgotten. The Polish Press here was at first very reserved. Their point of view is represented by the following leading article of the weekly paper _Free Poland_, founded since the war and published by the Polish National Council of America: 'What the Poles desire is an independent Poland. The Powers have acknowledged Poland's right to live, but either with a limitation of independence or diminution of territory. The Russians would fain lop off eastern Galicia. And now the Germans grant Poland an autonomy, but without Posen, West Prussia, or Silesia, in return demanding a Polish army to take up their cause against Russia. Though this move on the part of Germany will at least draw the world's attention to the inalienable rights of Poland as a nation, and make of the Polish question an international one, yet it must not be forgotten that the Poles in Europe will vehemently protest against any curtailment of their national aims and aspirations.

"The impression, on the whole unfavorable, made by the Polish measures on the American Press was gradually in part balanced by the announcement that the Polish Jews had been recognized as an independent religious community. Since it was thought in many quarters that this might be taken to be the first step towards cultural and political emanc.i.p.ation of the Eastern Jews, it was discussed with great interest, in view of the strong influence exerted by the American Jewish community on an important section of the American Press, particularly that of New York.

"Finally, there remains to be examined the att.i.tude of the Press towards one question, in itself of a purely domestic, economic interest, but which promises to become of the most wide-reaching importance for foreign politics, namely, that of an embargo on corn.

The price of most articles of food has risen to such an abnormal height during the last few months that the _New York Sun_ can say without too great exaggeration, that if the war had lasted two more years the cost of living in Berlin and Vienna would have risen to the level of that of New York. In particular the serious position of the wheat market and the fairly certain prospect of an acute rise in the price of wheat in the course of the winter or next spring prompt the Press to constant discussion, the burden of which is the question whether the Government of the United States should or should not prohibit the exportation of corn. The opponents of such a measure, among which are the _World_, _New York Times_, _New York Evening Post_, _Journal of Commerce_, the Boston _Evening Transcript_, the Philadelphia _Public Ledger_, the Saint Louis _Globe-Democrat_, the _Pittsburg Post_, the Saint Paul _Pioneer Press_, the Indianapolis _News_ and many others, maintain that the supporters of the embargo, whose main object is to injure the Allies, represent the situation as much more threatening than it is in reality. The _World_ tries to console its readers by explaining that the high price of food represents the American people's contribution to the cost of the greatest war of destruction in the history of the world; while the _New York Times_ points out the danger of estranging the Allies through an embargo. The newspapers which are friendly to Germany, particularly the Hearst newspapers, and the Milwaukee _Free Press_, energetically urge an embargo on all articles of food, by which, as they more or less openly allow it to appear, England would be forced to make peace. But in addition a number of the most bitter opponents of Germany, for example the Philadelphia _Inquirer_, favor an early embargo for purely material reasons. It is to be expected that this question will be one of the first to come up at the opening of the approaching session of Congress, when the Press polemics of the opponents of the embargo, with the _arriere pensee_ of protecting England's interests and those of her Allies, should reach their climax."

CHAPTER XI

THE RUPTURE OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Before I received official notice of the opening of the unrestricted U-boat campaign, I had a further interview with Mr. House, concerning the peace activities of the President, and the telegram describing it which I sent to the Foreign Office, Berlin, is reproduced below:

CIPHER TELEGRAM NO. 212

"(Answer to Telegram No. 149 of the 7th January.)

"Washington, January 16th, 1917.

"Your Excellency's authority in regard to Mr. House duly availed of. He told me Wilson considered this p.r.o.nouncement of Imperial Government supremely valuable. As regards further developments of Wilson's efforts for peace, I can say nothing definite. This much only is certain, that at present moment President has no other thought than that of bringing about peace, and will endeavor to achieve this end with the utmost energy and all means in his power.

A further p.r.o.nouncement of Wilson's is expected almost immediately; it will probably take form of a communication to Congress. Apparently it will consist of an appeal to the American people to help him to enforce peace; in any case both he and House praise the Hearst Press article, which is written from that point of view. Whether means adopted will be to place an embargo on all exports is difficult to say. Maybe the threat of an embargo will be enough to force our enemies to a conference.

"From the above it is clear that we cannot afford to have any difficulties over the old U-boat question. As regards the question of armed merchant vessels, I hope to arrive at a _modus vivendi_.

But we must be careful not to act hastily and carelessly, so as not to create conflict before President has taken further steps.

Remarkable as this may sound to German ears, Wilson is regarded here very generally as pro-German. His Note was traced to our influence, and Gerard's speech strengthened this impression. This speech is in accordance with instructions which Mr. Gerard is receiving. Our present enemies have gone literally raving mad, and leave no stone unturned in order to put obstacles in Wilson's way. This explains the attacks against the President, as also the scurrilous attempt engineered by the Republicans to charge the Administration with Stock Exchange speculations. Without any justification, of course, my name also was mentioned in this regard. The German Emba.s.sy, as is well known, is held responsible for everything by our enemies in this country."

At the same time as the above telegram, I wrote the following report describing the prevailing political att.i.tude in Washington:

CIPHER REPORT

"Washington, 14th January, 1917.

"Ever since the Presidential election the political situation here has not changed. Apart from the question of ending the world-war, the public mind has not been constantly or earnestly concerned with any matter.

"Congress has dealt with the customary Budget proposals, and the fruitless negotiations about the Mexican question drag slowly on.

"Meanwhile, the att.i.tude towards ourselves, which after the _Suss.e.x_ incident took a decided turn for the good, has slowly improved.

This change in the public temper can be observed on all sides. It is true that it is only very slightly noticeable, if at all, in the Press, and our most rabid opponents are driven, owing to the general improvement in German-Americans' relations, to ever more violent attacks against us. Since President Wilson dispatched his Peace Note, our enemies' fury knows no bounds. Without exaggeration, it can be said that this note voices the spirit of almost the whole American people.

"Only Wall Street and the anti-German ring, as also their friends in the press, are dissatisfied and are endeavoring to put obstacles in the President's way. In these circles, which are always under English influence, the belief has taken root, that Mr. Wilson has fallen under German spell. The well-known anti-German Republican, Senator Lodge, boldly expressed this view in the Senate; but he could not prevent the Senate from voting in favor of Mr. Wilson's Peace Note, by a huge majority.

"The public mind is engaged princ.i.p.ally with the question why precisely the President dispatched his note immediately after the German offer of peace. It is well-known that this Note had been prepared for some time, and would have been sent off at Christmas, quite irrespective of our own proposals, although, in view of Mr. Wilson's inclination to temporize, and to treat all questions somewhat dilatorily, this is by no means certain. I believe that the President's princ.i.p.al motive was his pressing desire to play the role of mediator--a prospect which seemed to be imperilled if our enemies agreed to deal directly with us. This may possibly explain why that particular moment was chosen, for which our enemies regard Mr. Wilson so unfavorably. A cartoon published by that most anti-German paper, the _New York Herald_, depicts Mr. Wilson's dove of peace as a parrot, faithfully babbling out the German proposals.

"Apart from the choice of this particular moment for its expression, the President's desire to bring about peace is in any case very comprehensible, seeing that he was re-elected princ.i.p.ally on the basis of this programme. Furthermore, the Americans are genuinely alarmed by the extension of j.a.panese power in the Far East, and finally, since our Rumanian victories, Mr. Wilson has ultimately come to the conclusion that our enemies are no longer able to defeat us. One is constantly hearing the opinion expressed, both by members of the Cabinet and other friends of the President, who enjoy his confidence, that neither of the belligerent parties will now be able to achieve a decisive victory, and that further bloodshed is therefore useless.

"As already stated above, the anti-German party is doing its utmost to put every possible obstacle in Mr. Wilson's way, while the Press does not cease from repeating that the Peace Note is to be regarded as a menace against Germany. It is thus hoped to stiffen our enemies'

backs, by dazzling them with the expectation of America's entry into the war; much, too, is made of the argument--and this was particularly so in the Senate--that Mr. Wilson's intervention was imperilling the traditional policy of the United States, which rests primarily upon the Monroe Doctrine, and upon the principle of non-interference with European affairs. Finally, a scurrilous attempt has been made by the Republican party to attack Wilson in the flank, by getting a notorious Stock Exchange speculator publicly to proclaim that members of the Administration, who knew beforehand of Wilson's action, had taken advantage to speculate heavily upon it. As this man could, however, produce no proofs, he simply made himself ridiculous.

"I have already frequently called attention in my report to the fact that the prolonged war hysteria over here has created an atmosphere of gossip and t.i.ttle-tattle, which at other times would have been regarded as impossible. For instance, even quite responsible people believe that I have obtained for cash certain compromising letters of Wilson's in order to be able to get a hold over him by this means. Senator Lodge, in his own house, privately expressed the view that this was a credible rumor, and then turned it to account in the Senate. The President is so terribly put out by this and other similar machinations on the part of the Republicans, who refuse to grant him the fame of the peace-maker, that he recently kept away from a public festival, because Mr. Lodge was to be the princ.i.p.al speaker there.

"Owing to the incredible rumors which are bandied from mouth to mouth here, I regarded it as necessary to bring an action against one notorious swindler and blackmailer. I wanted to convince public opinion that the Emba.s.sy had nothing to fear. I intend doing the same thing in the case of all future attempts at blackmail, once we have got a clean slate in regard to all compromising questions.

Our enemies will, however, persist in leaving no stone unturned in order to cast a slur upon the Emba.s.sy, for their princ.i.p.al object is to succeed in bringing about my recall, or the rupture of diplomatic relations with Germany. Once they have accomplished this, they are convinced that it will be an easy matter to draw the United States into the war.

"As is well known, President Wilson received a reply from the Entente, in response to his peace move, which contained conditions utterly unacceptable to us. Messrs. Wilson and House regarded these conditions as 'bluff,' and were as convinced, as they had previously been, that the Entente would accede to a peace by arrangement. People frequently alluded in those days to the fact that in the last Anglo-American War of 1812-1814, the English, very shortly before the peace settlement, had proposed unacceptable peace terms which they suddenly allowed to drop later. I also believed, and believe still, that the Entente were perfectly well acquainted with the political situation in Germany, and wished by proposing such conditions to strike panic amongst us and compel us to declare an unrestricted U-boat war. The Entente never diverged from its one object, which was to draw the United States into the war, and thus to bring about a decision. Moreover, the negative reply sent to our Government by the Entente had sufficed to achieve this object; for the final resolution to declare an unrestricted U-boat war was formed before the peace conditions framed by the Entente became known in Berlin."

On the 19th of January I received official notice that the unrestricted U-boat campaign would begin on February 1st, and I was to give the American Government notice accordingly on the evening of the 31st January. After all that had happened, I could but regard this intimation as a declaration of war against the United States, and one which, in addition, put us in the wrong; because it put an end to the peace overtures made by Mr. Wilson, which had been started with our approval. I did my utmost to try to get the Berlin resolution cancelled, or at least to obtain a postponement of the date on which it was to come into force, and with this end in view I sent the following telegram to Berlin:

CIPHER TELEGRAM

"Washington, 19th January, 1917.

"War inevitable in view of the proposed action. Danger of rupture could be mitigated by the fixing of a definite interval of time, say one month, so that neutral vessels and pa.s.sengers may be spared, as any preliminary and timely warning seems impossible if present programme is carried out. I shall have to give the pa.s.sword for unnavigable German steamers on February 1st, as effect of carrying out of my instructions here will be like declaration of war, and strict guard will be kept. In any case an incident like that of the _Lusitania_ may be expected soon.

"If military reasons are not absolutely imperative, in view of my Telegram 212, postponement most urgently desirable. Wilson believes he can obtain peace on the basis of our proposed equal rights of all nations. House told me again yesterday, that Wilson proposed to take action very shortly, for in view of our declaration regarding future Peace League, etc., he regards prospects of a Peace Conference as favorable."

In my efforts to avoid a breach with the United States, the President helped me to the extent of making a communication to the Senate on January 22nd, which he personally read to them in solemn session. In this communication, Mr. Wilson exhaustively developed his programme of a "Peace without Conquest." As the President officially communicated this proposal to all the belligerent Powers on the same day, it was to be regarded as a fresh and most solemn step towards peace.

As, on the other hand, it is also a doc.u.ment which expresses most plainly Mr. Wilson's desires and mentions before his entry into the war, I quote it verbatim below. Those who read it to-day cannot help feeling that certainly no more scathing criticism of the Versailles Peace has ever been written,--a peace which contained all the signs of having been imposed upon the vanquished, and against which the President's communication was a warning.

"On the eighteenth of December last I addressed an identical note to the governments of the nations now at war requesting them to state, more definitely than they had yet been stated by either group of belligerents, the terms upon which they would deem it possible to make peace. I spoke on behalf of humanity and of the rights of all neutral nations like our own, many of whose most vital interests the war puts in constant jeopardy. The Central Powers united in a reply which stated merely that they were ready to meet their antagonists in conference to discuss terms of peace.

The Entente Powers have replied much more definitely and have stated, in general terms, indeed, but with sufficient definiteness to imply details the arrangements, guarantees, and acts of reparation which they deem to be the indispensable conditions of a satisfactory settlement. We are that much nearer a definite discussion of the peace which shall end the present war. We are that much nearer the discussion of the international concert which must thereafter hold the world at peace. In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. Every lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted.

"I have sought this opportunity to address you because I thought that I owed it to you, as the council a.s.sociated with me in the final determination of our international obligations, to disclose to you without reserve the thought and purpose that have been taking form in my mind in regard to the duty of our Government in the days to come when it will be necessary to lay afresh and upon a new plan the foundations of peace among the nations.

"It is inconceivable that the people of the United States should play no part in that great enterprise. To take part in such a service will be the opportunity for which they have sought to prepare themselves by the very principles and purposes of their polity and the approved practices of their Government ever since the days when they set up a new nation in the high and honorable hope that it might in all that it was and did show mankind the way to liberty. They cannot in honor withhold the service to which they are now about to be challenged.

They do not wish to withhold it. But they owe it to themselves and to the other nations of the world to state the conditions under which they will feel free to render it.