"(2) The responsibility for the payment of compensation for the American lives so lost.

"(3) The American demand that _all_ merchant ships should be warned by our submarines before being attacked.

"This demand was at first so worded as to imply that submarines, like other warships, had only the right of search.

"The Government, realizing that we could not make concessions on the above three points, had to be content with our admission that the case of the _Arabic_ should be regarded as exceptional. This very fast rendered it impossible to reach a similar settlement in the case of the _Lusitania_, in which no error on the part of the submarine commander concerned could be adduced. However, the Government seemed to be only too satisfied to have come so well out of their difficulties, and have no wish to raise any further obstacles because of the _Lusitania_ incident. This matter, as I have already had the honor to report, may now well be left to drag on indefinitely, and can be referred in the end to the Hague Tribunal after the war. Our Press should, therefore, be warned that further discussion of the controversy between Germany and America over the submarine campaign is undesirable."

(3) CIPHER

"Cedarhurst, October 20th, 1915.

"Your Excellency's last wireless requested me to render a report on the settlement of the _Arabic_ question. I have already complied with these instructions, and the doc.u.ments are now on their way to you, and should have reached you. However, it may be advisable to explain briefly the more important points of the matter.

"From the date of the sinking of the _Lusitania_, America has always been on the verge of breaking off diplomatic relations with us.

The German people, I am convinced, have no idea of the full danger of the situation, at least, if one may judge from our Press. On two occasions we were compelled to sacrifice individuals in order to avoid a breach, Dernburg and Dumba being our scapegoats. Their mistakes would under normal circ.u.mstances have been overlooked, but their removal was at the time necessary in order to give the American Government the opportunity of showing its strength without breaking off diplomatic relations with us.

"As I have more than once explained in my reports, no solution of the _Lusitania_ question, agreeable to the Americans, could be found, so long as we were not prepared to admit the responsibility of the Imperial Government for the disaster, or its obligation to make reparation, and so long as our views on the principles of submarine warfare differed from those held by the American Government.

"By dint of drawing out the negotiations as long as possible, and by the employment of all my persuasive powers, I succeeded in tiding over the moment of _acute_ tension. Then came the incident of the _Arabic_. My laboriously constructed diplomatic edifice came tumbling about my ears, and things looked blacker than ever. The American Government regarded the _Arabic_ incident most seriously, believing as they did that it was typical of the whole German policy _vis-a-vis_ America. They argued that either the whole affair had been prearranged as a manifestation of our intention to have our own way in the matter of submarine warfare, or else it was a blunder which could be dealt with in the ordinary course of diplomacy. Negotiation became possible when your Excellency notified this Government that satisfaction would be given in the event of the submarine commander being proved to have acted contrary to his instructions. Further negotiations followed on this basis, and it was finally agreed that we should admit the exceptional nature of the _Arabic_ case, without yielding our ground on the main points. Such agreement would have been impossible had President Wilson adhered to his previous position, but he wished to have done with the whole business, and could only do so by throwing dust in the eyes of the American public.

He hoped by these means to get rid of the _Lusitania_ incident unostentatiously, and told me, through one of his personal friends, 'to let it drift.' The idea at the back of his mind is that it shall be left to an international tribunal sitting after the war, to decide whether we shall pay compensation or not.

"The only really important question as regards the settlement of the _Arabic_ case, is whether it is worth while for us to risk a rupture of relations with the United States, for the sake of this affair. I still persist in my opinion, that it would infallibly have led us into a new war."

(4) CIPHER

"Washington, 1st November, 1915.

"Your Excellency's last wire on the matter of the submarine campaign raises two points of the highest importance.

"First, as to Wilson's policy of the 'freedom of the seas;' this has been the idea underlying all our recent negotiations over the submarine warfare. Our agreement with this policy has been constantly emphasized in all my conversations with leading men here; but it is of course necessary carefully to choose our moment for the public declaration of our agreement with Wilson's point of view, as people here naturally fear that if England believes us to be behind any agitation for the freedom of the seas she will resist it all the more firmly. I respectfully recommend, therefore, that we should leave Mr. Wilson to carry on his present controversy with England, for the present at all events, unaided. We shall lose nothing by so doing, and if an opportunity comes for our partic.i.p.ation, we can make use of it.

"After this expression of opinion, let me pa.s.s on to the second point I have always clearly stated here, that we reserve to ourselves full liberty of decision, if England refuses to receive our advances.

At present, now that the _Arabic_ case has been recognized as exceptional, this 'freedom' is only being encroached upon from one direction as we have undertaken not to sink pa.s.senger ships without warning, etc. By this undertaking we must abide, unless we wish to go to war with the United States of America. Any future destruction of pa.s.senger ships with Americans on board, especially if such took place without warning, and with the approval of the Imperial Government, would inevitably cause a rupture."

The political sky in the United States was thus becoming more propitious day by day; but our enemies' exertions for the purpose of undermining the present friendly relations, redoubled in proportion. The German Emba.s.sy became the chief object of attack, owing to the fact being clearly realized by our foes, that so long as its influence in Washington political circles remained unimpaired, no rupture of diplomatic relations could be hoped for. Entente diplomacy left no stone unturned which could be of service against us; lies, robbery, personal defamation, gossip, were all used to discredit us.

The conduct of a British officer on duty in Washington affords a good example of the unscrupulous policy of our foes. According to the evidence of Dr. Fuehr, this gentleman, now holding a high position in London, attempted in the early months of 1916 to corrupt a messenger of our Press Bureau in New York, one Alfred Hoff, whose daily duty it was to take newspaper cuttings to Councillor Albert's office. Two of his people stopped this boy in the street and invited him to the British Consular offices; here he was received by the Captain himself, who showed him a bag filled with bank notes and promised him a liberal reward, if he would undertake to obtain some letters from Dr. Fuehr's desk. Hoff pretended to fall in with this suggestion, but at once informed his employer of the incident.

The Captain then made a second effort to bribe Hoff by the promise of a money reward for every doc.u.ment from the Press Bureau, and also a ride in a motor for the letters which it was his duty to take from the Bureau to the German Emba.s.sy at Cedarhurst, during the coming summer. One of the British agents told Hoff that he would be well paid if he handed over the letters of Dr. Fuehr, which he often used to seal and frank, and also certain other doc.u.ments of a specially confidential nature. Dr. Fuehr finally put an end to this unsavory episode, which had been fully investigated by private detectives, by publishing a detailed account of the whole affair in the Hearst papers. At the same time he brought the matter before the Public Prosecutor, who, however, was unwilling to interfere in the matter unless it should be further discussed in the Press. This limited comprehension of duty Dr. Fuehr could hardly be expected to agree with.

During my encounters at this time with the Entente, I entirely lost any respect I may previously have felt for their moral character, which was reputed to be so high. I came then to realize that we could expect nothing better from them in the hour of our defeat, than a Peace of Versailles, which would make of no account all their earlier loftier professions. We, in Washington, were therefore, in duty bound, to strain every nerve to avert such a catastrophe to our country. Unfortunately the activities of the agents dispatched from home invariably deranged our plans in a most unfortunate manner, and, while affording our foes the desired opportunities for damaging our cause, achieved nothing of advantage in compensation. The English Secret Police, and all the detective agencies of the United States which were in their pay, were always at our heels, endeavoring to establish some collusion on the part of the German Emba.s.sy in these isolated cases of sabotage. However, all this subterranean plotting and counter-plotting was but so much lost labor. It was the decision on the policy of continuing or not continuing the submarine campaign which finally turned the scale.

At the beginning of August one of these agents managed to steal a portfolio of doc.u.ments from Councillor Albert while he was traveling on the New York elevated railway, and its contents were published in the _World_ from the 15th of August onwards. We always thought the perpetrator of this theft was an Entente agent, but it now appears from Senator Frelinghuysen's evidence before the Senate Committee of Enquiry on 13th July, 1919, that the guilty individual was really a member of the American Secret Police. It would certainly have been an unheard-of thing for an American agent to have robbed a member of the diplomatic corps and sold the proceeds of his deed to the Press. Probably what really happened was that the man was in the pay of the Entente. The investigations at the Senate Committee disclosed a number of cases of corruption and theft which the agents of the Entente did not scruple to use in their efforts to compromise and discredit the German Emba.s.sy; so this supposition is in itself by no means improbable. The affair was merely a storm in a tea-cup; the papers as published afforded no evidence of any action either illegal or dishonorable; otherwise the American Government would certainly have demanded the recall of Albert as they did later in other cases. The Press manufactured a considerable sensation out of the contents of the portfolio, but generally speaking the efforts of the Entente in this affair proved completely without effect.

The Entente agents, however, were more successful in their next attack, to which the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador fell a victim.

Dumba had already in the winter of 1914-15 recommended to me the American war correspondent James Archibald, who had been at the Austro-Hungarian Front, as having German sympathies. Thereupon I also recommended this gentleman in Berlin, where he was granted all facilities. In the Summer of 1915 Archibald returned to America, to lecture on his experiences. As he was anti-Entente, these lectures brought us financial profit, and therefore we paid Archibald's traveling expenses. At the beginning of September, 1915, he went once more to Europe, and dined on the eve of his departure with Dumba and myself on the roof-garden of the Ritz-Carlton Hotel in New York. By this means our personal connection with Archibald was openly recognized. The Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador, confiding in his character and his American nationality, gave him certain political reports which were not even in cipher, to take to Vienna.

Archibald had also offered to take papers to Berlin for me. I, however, declined with thanks, as I scented danger, and I would have warned Dumba also, if I had known that he intended to entrust dispatches to Archibald. The English seized the latter in Kirkwall and took away all his papers.

Since then I have never set eyes on Archibald, and I could not help suspecting that there was something uncanny about the case.

By arresting Archibald the English undoubtedly thought they would compromise me. I cannot prove that there was anything wrong with Archibald, but in all the circ.u.mstances he could easily have destroyed the papers, had he wished to do so. In the meanwhile a report was found among the dispatches of the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador transmitting to his Government a memorandum from the Hungarian journalist, Warm. In this note Warm recommended propaganda to induce a strike among the Hungarian workers in arms and munitions factories, and demanded money for this object.

The statement of Dumba's report that the Amba.s.sador had shown the suggestion to Captain von Papen, who had thought it very valuable, was very compromising for us.

The German Military Attache was therefore placed in an awkward position; the letter contained several other blazing indiscretions.

Thus, for instance, in one paper Dumba described President Wilson as self-willed, and von Papen in a letter to his wife spoke of the "imbecile Yankees."

As I previously mentioned, the position of the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador was much shaken by the Dumba-Bryan episode. His defence, that he had only forwarded the note of an Hungarian journalist, without identifying himself with it, was not favorably received by the American Government. A few days later his pa.s.sport was presented to him; at the same time the Entente granted him a safe conduct.

Previous to his departure from New York similar scenes took place to those which followed the sinking of the _Lusitania_.

The Hotel St. Regis, in which the Austro-Hungarian Amba.s.sador lived, was surrounded day and night by innumerable reporters.

When I called on him there to take leave of him, I had to make use of a back entrance to the hotel in order to avoid numerous impertinent questions. Dumba himself was followed at every step by reporters, who among other things often chased him for hours on end in motor-cars.

In the meanwhile Rintelen (mentioned in the fifth chapter) had been taken prisoner in England. Further, the case of Fay led to a disagreeable discussion in public, and lastly action was taken against the Hamburg-Amerika Line for supplying our squadron of cruisers with coal and provisions. Thus it was easy for the Entente agents to establish connection between these offenders and the Military and Naval Attaches of the German Emba.s.sy. How far these gentlemen were really implicated I did not know at the time, nor do I now. In this they must plead their own case. As far as I am concerned both gentlemen always denied that they in any way transgressed against the American law. It cannot, however, be denied that they were, in fact, compromised by their relations with these guilty parties; I do not think that anything beyond this can be authenticated.

Captain von Papen's reputation, therefore, suffered from the time of the Dumba-Archibald incident; both he and Captain Boy-Ed were constantly attacked in the anti-German Press, and accused of being behind every fire and every strike in any munition factory in the United States. The _New York Herald_ and the _Providence Journal_ took the leading parts in this business. At the same time a campaign was begun against the German-Americans, who were accused of being practically without exception disloyal citizens of the United States.

All the various incidents, accusations, so-called conspiracies, etc., were grist to the Entente's mill, and were exploited to the full. Congress was about to a.s.semble, and it was therefore to be expected that the Government would take steps to strengthen its position.

Mr. Lansing asked me on 1st December to call on him and informed me that the American Government had requested that von Papen and Boy-Ed should be recalled, as they were no longer _personoe gratoe!_

To my inquiry as to the reasons for this action, Lansing refused to reply; he merely remarked that any Government was within its rights in simply stating that a member of a diplomatic corps was not _persona grata_. In the course of further conversation, however, I discovered one thing at least, that Capt. Boy-Ed was supposed to have been conspiring with the Mexican General Huerta--an obviously baseless charge, considering that Boy-Ed had never made the acquaintance of the ex-President. It is true, however, that Rintelen had had dealings with Huerta, and it was known that Rintelen had received from Boy-Ed the sum of half a million dollars previously mentioned.

My first message--written in English--to Berlin on this affair ran as follows:

CIPHER MESSAGE

"Washington, 4th December, 1915.

"In an official Note of to-day's date American Government, as stated in previous conversations with me, request immediate recall of Military and Naval Attaches, on the ground of various facts brought to notice of Government, particularly implication of these Attaches in illegal and doubtful activities of certain individuals within United States. Government deeply regrets necessity for this step, and trusts Imperial Government will understand that no other course seems to them to be compatible with the interests of the two Governments and their reciprocal friendly relations."

I also telegraphed as follows to my Government on September 5th:

"Explanations of von Papen and Boy-Ed herewith as requested by Military and Naval Authorities:

"'State Department request my recall. Reasons for this given to Amba.s.sador. Case of Stegler and my two supposed meetings with Huerta.

Stegler case settled since March. Stegler in matter of his pa.s.s proved a liar. Had nothing to do with his transactions; not the least proof that I ever had; see my report No. 4605, March 20th, and others. I have never in my life met Huerta; I have never concerned myself with Mexican affairs in any way; I have never to my knowledge acted contrary to the interests or laws of the United States.

Conjectures and absurd newspaper stories about me result of English influence and money. Must therefore request my recall be considered unjustifiable.

"'BOY-EN.'

"'No illegal action can be laid to my charge; demand for recall unjustified. Importance of military interests of our enemies here renders necessary effective representation of Central Powers, so long as America officially neutral. Therefore it should be insisted on that American Government secure safe-conduct for my successor.