When we compare monophysitism with the system of Plotinus, several points of resemblance appear. There is first the impersonal character of the deity. Monophysitism was not a Trinitarian heresy, and the Catholic doctrine of the three persons in the G.o.dhead was the official creed of the heretical church. But their theologians refrained from laying emphasis upon the distinct personalities of Father, Son and Holy Ghost. Their sympathies were Sabellian to the core, and Sabellian heresies were constantly recurring within their communion. The impersonal Trinity, such as Plotinus taught, was thoroughly in keeping with their Christology. They lacked a clear conception of personality in the second Person of the Trinity. It was inevitable that they should overlook the same element in the incarnate Christ.

The Neo-Platonic view of matter finds its counterpart in monophysite theory. The monophysites, without formally denying its real existence, nursed a Manichean suspicion of it. It was, to them, the seat of illusion; it was an obstacle to spirit, the enemy of spiritual development. If not unreal, it was at any rate unworthy. The a.s.sociation of Christ with matter through His body and through His human nature was, in their eyes, a degradation of deity. That Christ took matter up into His being as a permanent element, that He dignified the body and glorified human faculties, these facts seemed to the monophysite mind improbable, and, if true, devoid of religious significance. It came natural to him to explain Christ's body as a phantom. He was prepared to regard the human nature as unsubstantial.

The mystic's view of matter, of sense and human existence characterises the whole monophysite outlook.

In the spirit of Plotinus the monophysites conceived the incarnation as the supreme example of the _unio mystica_. The _unio mystica_ was a state of rapture, abnormal and temporary in earthly experience, in which the ident.i.ty of the mystic was actually merged in the cosmic reason. The lower nature disappeared completely into the higher. It was absorption. This word "absorption" was in common use among the heretics. It was a trite saying among the first generation of the monophysites that "the human nature of Christ was absorbed in the divine, as a drop of honey in the ocean." They conceived His thought as lost in the universal reason, His will as surrendered to the will of G.o.d, His human affections as fused in the fire of divine feeling, His body as a phantom. They could not admit that He lived the real life of a real man. They could not see the value of such a life.

Neo-Platonism had paralysed their optic nerve. Thinkers such as the Christologians of Alexandria, imbued with the spirit of Neo-Platonism, had no motive for preserving the distinct subsistence of Christ's human nature. It was their boast that their Ideal had faced and overcome and trampled on the lower elements of His being. He was a proof from fact that body and sense and all that is distinctively human could be sublimated into the universal substance, which is the primary effluence of the Plotinian One. In a word, the incarnate Christ was, to them, the personification of the Neo-Platonist _unio mystica_.

We may conclude this comparison of monophysitism with Neo-Platonism by pointing out that the two systems had a similar bearing on the conduct of life. Neo-Platonism was a religion. Its speculative aspect was subordinate to its practical. A knowledge of the soul's position in creation and of its destiny laid the philosopher under strict obligation. Fasting and self-denial were essential preliminaries to the higher mystic practices. Ecstasy could not be reached until body and sense had been starved into complete submission. Monophysitism adopted this tradition, and made ascesis the central duty of the Christian life. The monophysite church became celebrated for the length and rigidity of its fasts. The monastic element dominated its communion. Indeed, it is hardly too much to say that the monophysite movement, on its external side, was an attempt to capture the Church for monastic principles. The heresy drew its inspiration from the cloister. The Christ of the monophysites had withdrawn from the market to the wilderness; so His followers must needs go out of the world to follow in His steps.

[1] Harnack, "History of Dogma," vol. iv. chap. ii. p. 160.

CHAPTER III

MONOPHYSITE DOCTRINE

The distinctive doctrine of monophysitism, that from which the name of the heresy is taken, is the a.s.sertion that there is but one nature, the divine nature, in Christ. There existed some difference of opinion among the monophysites as to whether any degree of reality might be ascribed to the human nature. Some were prepared to allow it conceptual reality; they would grant that Christ had been diphysite momentarily, that He was "out of two natures." But that admission is quite inadequate. It amounts to no more than the paltry concession that Christ's human nature before the incarnation is conceivable as a separate ent.i.ty. All monophysites united in condemning the diphysite doctrine that after the incarnation Christ was and is "in two natures."

Such a Christ they would not worship. It was "the image with two faces that the Council of Chalcedon had set up."[1] They adopted the Athanasian phrase, "One incarnate nature of G.o.d the Word," as their battle-cry.

Monophysitism can make out a strong _prima facie_ case. It is attractive at first sight. The heretical formula seems simpler and more natural than the catholic. The unity of nature appears a corollary of the unity of person. Human personality is ordinarily a.s.sumed to be monophysite; so it is natural to make the same a.s.sumption as to divine personality. The simplicity of the doctrine is, however, all on the surface. It will not bear examination. As a definition of Christian faith it is useless. It cannot account for the recorded facts of Christ's life. The facts of His body, of His mind, of His sufferings refuse to fit into it. It affords no foundation for belief in His transcendent work. No intelligible doctrine of redemption can be built upon it. It contains no germ of hope for mankind. Therefore the Church in the name of Christ and on behalf of humanity rejected it.

Although the heresy has been officially condemned, it should none the less be studied. It is improbable that any one in our time will defend the formula, or openly profess the doctrines that follow from it. But, though not recognised as such, it is an ever-present and instant menace to the Faith. Monophysite tendencies are inherent in religious thought. The metaphysical idea, on which it rests, still has a powerful hold over the human mind. Spiritually-minded men are especially liable to this form of error. It is a mistake to think that Christological questions were settled once and for all in the fifth century. Each generation has to settle them afresh. Accordingly, to exhibit the consequences of the monophysite formula, to show how wrong abstract ideas develop into wrong concrete ideas and falsify Christian practice, is a task of practical and present-day importance.

CLa.s.sIFICATION OF MONOPHYSITE ERRORS

Two cla.s.ses of erroneous beliefs result from a misconception of the relation between G.o.d and man in Christ. There arise, on the one hand, false opinions about the deity of Christ, and on the other, false opinions as to His manhood. We shall adopt this cla.s.sification as we investigate the doctrinal consequences of the monophysite formula. It is the method followed in one of the earliest systematic criticisms of the heresy. Leo's Tome, or letter to Flavian, contains a lucid statement of the catholic doctrine of the incarnation, and an acute a.n.a.lysis of the system of Eutyches, the heresiarch. He summarises the errors of Eutyches under two heads; there are two main counts in his indictment of the heresy. Eutyches, he contends, makes Jesus Christ "deus pa.s.sibilis et h.o.m.o falsus." Eutyches and his followers compromised both deity and humanity. The deity becomes pa.s.sible, the humanity unreal. All the monophysite misbeliefs can be cla.s.sified under one or other of these two heads.

THE CONCEPT "IMPa.s.sIBILITY" AS APPLIED TO DEITY

We shall take first those errors that compromise the nature of the deity, and shall preface our a.n.a.lysis by an explanation of the meaning of the term "deus impa.s.sibilis." The impa.s.sibility of G.o.d is the corner-stone of spiritual monotheism. Christianity owes it, as a philosophic doctrine, largely to Aristotle. He conceived deity as "actus purus," as the One who moves without being moved, a "causa sui."

The popular G.o.ds of Greece were pa.s.sible; they were possible objects of sense; they were acted on largely as man is acted on. They had a beginning, and were subject to many of the processes of time. They were swayed by human motives. They were, at times, angry, afraid, unsatisfied, ambitious, jealous. Aristotle gave to the world the conception of a transcendent G.o.d, a being who is real and yet is "without body, parts and pa.s.sions," who cannot receive idolatrous worship, and is not an object of sense. Impa.s.sibility was one of the highest attributes of this being. The attribute does not involve or imply absence of feeling. Originally it had no reference to feeling, in the psychological sense of that word. It certainly excludes incidentally the lower, specifically human feelings, feelings caused by external stimuli, feelings due to want or to lack of power. It does not exclude the higher affections from the deity. Even in the _noesis noeseos_ of Aristotle, there is room for the transcendent bliss of divine self-contemplation. Much more in the Christian G.o.d is there room for spontaneous feeling, springing from His own nature, the necessary concomitant of thought and will. Impa.s.sibility is a comprehensive attribute. Originally negative, it soon acquired a rich positive connotation. An impa.s.sible G.o.d is one who is outside s.p.a.ce and time. The attribute connotes creative power, eternity, infinity, permanence. A pa.s.sible G.o.d is corruptible, _i.e._ susceptible to the processes of becoming, change, and decay. If to-day theists have to be on their guard against debased conceptions of deity, in the plausible garb of an "invisible king," of a finite or suffering G.o.d, much more was such caution necessary in the early centuries of the Christian era.

Christians who came daily and hourly into contact with polytheistic beliefs and practices had to be very jealous for the concept of impa.s.sibility. It represented to them all that was distinctive in the highest region of their Faith.

Monophysitism, as we proceed to show, compromised this article of the Faith. Its adherents did not, perhaps, do so intentionally. In fact, the first generation of monophysites maintained that their definition safeguarded the impa.s.sibility. It was zeal for the honour of the Son of G.o.d that induced them to deny Him all contact with humanity. Their good intentions, however, could not permanently counteract the evil inherent in their system. In later generations the evil came to the surface. Theopaschitism, the doctrine that openly denies the impa.s.sibility of the G.o.dhead, flourished in the monophysite churches.

MONISM ENTAILS A DEBASED CONCEPTION OF DEITY

The metaphysical basis of monophysitism made this result inevitable.

Extremes meet. Extreme spirituality readily pa.s.ses into its opposite.

It cuts the ground from under its own feet. It soars beyond its powers, and falls into the mire of materialism. Ill.u.s.trations of this fact can be found in the history of philosophy. The Stoics, for instance, contrived to be both pantheists and materialists. Coming nearer to our own time, we find Hegelianism explained in diametrically opposite ways. After Hegel's death his disciples split into opposing camps; one party maintained that the real was spirit, the other that it was matter. Each party claimed the authority of the master for their view. The divergence is easy to explain. From spiritual monism it is a short step to materialistic monism. For the monist, all is on one level of being. He may by constant effort keep that level high. But gravity will act. We are more p.r.o.ne to degrade G.o.d to our level, than to rise to His. The same truth can be put _in abstracto_. Unless the relation between G.o.d and the world be preserved as a true relation, the higher term will sooner or later fall to the level of the lower, and be lost in it. This rule holds as well in movements of religious thought.

The monophysite strove for a lofty conception of deity but achieved a low one. He undermined the doctrine of impa.s.sibility by the very measures he took to secure it.

In the technical language of Christology the monophysites' debased conception of deity was a consequence of "confounding the natures."

Attributes and actions, belonging properly only to Christ's humanity, were ascribed recklessly to His divinity. The test phrase "theotokos,"

invaluable as a protest against Nestorianism, became a precedent for all sorts of doctrinal extravagancies. The famous addition to the Trisagion, "who wast crucified for us," which for a time won recognition as sound and catholic, was first made by the monophysite Bishop of Antioch.[2] Both these phrases have scriptural authority, and they are justified by the _communicatio idiomatum_. But they are liable to misuse and misinterpretation. All depended on how they were said and who said them. The monophysite meant one thing by them, the catholic another. The _arriere pensee_ of the monophysite gave them a wrong turn. He was always on the look-out for paradox in Christ's life. He emphasised such phrases as appeared to detract from the reality of His human experiences. He spoke of Christ as "ruling the universe when He lay in the manger," or as "directing the affairs of nations from the Cross." The catholic can approve these phrases; in the mouth of a monophysite they have a heretical sound. They suggest a pa.s.sible G.o.d; they degrade the infinite to the level of the finite.

The monophysite confounds the natures, and so he has no right to appeal to the _communicatio idiomatum_. Unless the _idiomata_ are admitted as such, unless they are preserved in their distinctness, there can be no _communicatio_ between them. If they are fused, they cannot act and react upon each other. The monophysite, by identifying the natures, forfeits the right to use the term "Theotokos" and the Trisagion addition. On his lips their inevitable implication is a finite suffering G.o.d.

MONOPHYSITISM AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE TRINITY

Monophysitism was not originally or _per se_ a Trinitarian heresy.

Equally with catholics and Nestorians its adherents accepted the Nicene definition. They professed to believe in one G.o.d in three co-equal persons. This belief, firmly held in all that it involves, would have kept them from attributing pa.s.sibility to the G.o.dhead, and ultimately have neutralised the errors of their Christology. But their Christology corrupted their theology. Abandoning all vital relation between G.o.d and man in Christ, they abandoned the relation in the G.o.dhead. The internal and external relations of the G.o.dhead are mutually dependent. If there be no trinity of persons, the incarnation is impossible. Were G.o.d a bare monad, He could not impart Himself and remain Himself. The fact that there are related persons in the deity is the only justification for the use of the phrases discussed in the previous paragraph. When the catholic says, "G.o.d was born, suffered, died," he is right, because his presupposition is right. When the monophysite uses the same words, he is wrong, because his presupposition is wrong. The catholic preserves in the background of his thought the distinction between the _ousia_ and the threefold _hypostasis_, between the essential G.o.dhead and the three persons. So he is in no danger of ascribing pa.s.sion to the essence or to the persons of Father or Holy Spirit. When he says "G.o.d was born," he is compressing two statements into one. He means "Christ was born, and Christ was G.o.d." Not in respect of what He has in common with the other persons of the Trinity, but in respect of His property of sonship did He lower Himself to the plane of suffering. The catholic holds not a suffering G.o.d, but a suffering divine person. He maintains an impa.s.sible G.o.d, but a pa.s.sible Christ. A dead G.o.d is a contradiction in terms; a Christ who died is the hope of humanity.

Monophysite theology became involved in further embarra.s.sments.

Unwillingness to attribute pa.s.sibility to G.o.d, coupled with the desire to remain in some sort trinitarians, forced many of the monophysites into the Sabellian position. Deity, they said in effect, did not suffer in the second person of the trinity, because there is no such person. The persons of the trinity are simply characters a.s.sumed by the monadic essence, or aspects under which men view it. On this showing, the Logos, who was incarnate, had no personal subsistence.

The relation between G.o.d and man ever remains impersonal. Christ, _qua_ divine, was only an aspect or effluence of deity. This, for the monophysite, was the one alternative to the doctrine of a pa.s.sible G.o.d.

He was faced with a desperate dilemma. If he retained his belief in a transcendent G.o.d, he must surrender belief in a triune G.o.d. He could choose between the two; but his Christology permitted no third choice.

For him, the only alternative to a finite G.o.d was a lone G.o.d. As a result monophysite theology oscillated between denial of the impa.s.sibility of G.o.d and denial of his three-fold personality. In either case the orthodox doctrine of the G.o.dhead was abandoned.

One of the stock questions propounded by the catholics to the monophysites was, "Was the trinity incomplete when the Son of G.o.d was on earth?" The question is crudely expressed, as it ignores the type of existence proper to spiritual personality; but it contains a sufficiently sound _ad hominem_ argument. The monophysite could not say "yes," or he would then be driven to a.s.sert a pa.s.sible G.o.d. If he said "no," his reply was tantamount to the a.s.sertion that the whole essence of the G.o.dhead was incarnate. The logic of this dilemma was so cogent that not a few monophysites succ.u.mbed to it, and adopted a position similar to that of the earlier Patripa.s.sianists. These seceded from the monophysite church, and founded an independent sect, called the Theopaschites. As often happens, the sect is, doctrinally, more representative than the parent body. The Theopaschites were the thinkers who had the courage to push the monophysite doctrines to their logical conclusions. Those who did not secede, unable to defend their own doctrinal position, retaliated with the counter-charge of tetratheism. This stroke was simply a confession of weakness. Monism was strangling their Christianity at every turn. Instead of breaking free from it, they pretended that their opponents were polytheists.

The catholic, however, was neither monist nor pluralist. The incarnation was not the addition of a fourth divine being to the trinity. The essence of the G.o.dhead remained complete, unchanged and impa.s.sible; while the hypostatic union of G.o.d and man in Christ made possible the a.s.sumption of a pa.s.sible nature by the person of the Son of G.o.d.

MONOPHYSITISM AND ISLAM--SABELLIANISM THE CONNECTING LINK

It is in place here to point out the somewhat intimate connection that existed between monophysitism and Islam. The monophysites held the outposts of the Empire. Mahomet came into contact with them, and it was probably from them that he formed his conception of Christian doctrine. The later history of the monophysite churches shows that they often secured a large measure of toleration at the hands of the Caliphs, while the diphysites were being rigorously persecuted. Lapses to Islam were not infrequent, and in some periods apostasy on a large scale occurred. Cases are on record even of monophysite patriarchs who abjured their faith and joined the followers of the Prophet. The connection between monophysitism and Islam was not fortuitous. There was a doctrinal affinity between them. Both systems were rigidly monotheistic. Both degraded the notion of deity by a perverse attempt to exalt it. Both cut redemption and mediation out of their religion.

The family likeness between the two systems does not extend beyond the realm of the doctrine of supreme deity. In other respects the religion of the sword and the religion of love have little or nothing in common.

Crescent and Cross are poles asunder. The monophysites as a body remained nominally and in intention Christians and trinitarians. But in the doctrinal area specified the resemblance holds. It could hardly be otherwise. Sabellian tendencies were always present and powerful in the monophysite communion, and Sabellianism is a long step in the direction of Islam. Sabellius taught in effect, "Allah is one." The three persons, for him, were only aspects of the one indivisible deity.

There are no distinct ent.i.ties corresponding to the names of Father, Son and Holy Spirit. Sabellianism is intimately a.s.sociated with monism in all its phases. Monophysitism being essentially monist could not escape the taint. Whether Sabellianism made the heretics monophysites, or monophysitism made them Sabellians, we need not inquire. The two creeds are bound up in the same bundle by the tie of monism. The relation of the Son to the Father and the relation of the Son to humanity are vitally connected. Misconception of the one relation entails misconception of the other. Denial of relation in the G.o.dhead goes hand in hand with denial of relation in Christ. If the theologian reduces the latter to bare unity, he does the same for the former.

Catholic Christology is thus a necessary deduction from trinitarian dogma. Nicaea necessitated Chalcedon. To safeguard the distinction of persons in the G.o.dhead, a distinction in the natures of Christ was essential. To preserve intact the latter distinction, the proprium of the Son and His personal subsistence had to be kept distinct from the proprium and subsistence of the Father.

THE CHRISTOLOGICAL ERRORS OF MONOPHYSITISM

We leave here the area of theology and come to that of Christology. We have exhibited the monophysite errors with respect to the doctrine of primal deity; we now proceed to a.n.a.lyse their views with respect to the incarnate Christ. The former subject leads the thinker into deep water; the layman is out of his depth in it; so it does not furnish material for a popular controversy. It is otherwise with the latter subject. Here the issue is narrowed to a point. It becomes a question of fact, namely, "Was Christ a real man?" The question and most of the answers given to it are readily intelligible, and they naturally gave rise to heated controversy. Theopaschitism is, as we have shown, a tendency inherent in the heresy, but one slow to come to the surface, and one easily counter-acted and suppressed by the personal piety of the monophysite. Its docetism, the a.s.sertion of the unreality of Christ's human nature, lies on the surface. No amount of personal piety can neutralise it. It has had, and still has, a crippling effect on the faith of devout Christians. Even where it is not carried to the length of formal heresy, it spreads a haze of unreality over the gospel story, and dulls the edge of belief.

The second count of Leo's charge against the monophysites was, it will be remembered, that their presentation of Christ made Him "h.o.m.o falsus." Under this heading "h.o.m.o falsus" may be cla.s.sed a wide group of erroneous tenets, ranging from the crudities of early docetism to the subtleties of Apollinarianism. We propose to sketch those of major importance. No attempt will be made to take them in their historical order or historical setting. Further, it is not implied that they all formed part of the official doctrine of the monophysite church. The standard of belief in that communion was constantly varying, and the history of its dogma would need a work to itself. We shall deal with those Christological errors, which, whether part of the official monophysite creed or not, are logical results of the monophysite formula.

Unreality may be predicated of Christ's human nature as a whole, or in respect of its parts. Consubstantiality with humanity may be denied of the whole of his human nature; or deficiency in one or other of the essential const.i.tuents of human nature may be alleged. We shall deal first with those errors that concern the entire nature, coming later to the errors in respect of one or more of its several parts.

Suspicion of the reality of Christ's human nature as a whole is characteristic of all monophysite thought. This suspicion, not always formulated or expressed, is everywhere present. If the monophysites admitted the fact of His true manhood, they denied or neglected the religious value of that fact. Their spurious spirituality rebelled against a dogma which seemed to tie the infinite down to a point in history. The fact that the Son of G.o.d lived a perfect human life contained no inspiration for them. They idealised the incarnation. It was not for them a historical event. This is a corollary to the proposition, maintained by their great champion, Philoxenus, that "no addition to His person took place." It is tantamount to saying that the union of divine and human in Christ is purely conceptual. When the monophysite faced the question, "What change in Christ did the incarnation effect?" his formula constrained him to reply, "It made no change." The deity of the person was not denied. The pre-existent Logos and the Christ who walked in Galilee were admittedly one and the same. The second person of the trinity and Jesus of Nazareth were one personality. If Bethlehem made no change in that personality, it was purposeless, and the import of the incarnation disappears.