Money: Speech of Hon. John P. Jones, of Nevada, On the Free Coinage of Silver - Part 9
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Part 9

A pound of cotton that in 1873 cost the purchaser, in gold or silver, 16 cents, and which still commands 13 cents in silver bullion, will bring only 10 cents in gold.

A pound of cheese that in 1873 cost the purchaser 11-1/3 cents in gold or silver, and which now brings 12 cents in silver bullion, will bring only 9 cents in gold.

A barrel of flour which in 1873 cost the purchaser $6.60 in gold or silver, and which to-day commands $6.02 in silver bullion, will bring but $4.70 in gold.

A pound of b.u.t.ter that in 1873 brought 18.4 cents in gold or silver, and now commands 20.8 cents in silver bullion, will bring but 16.6 cents in gold.

Notwithstanding that 412-1/2 grains of uncoined silver will to-day buy as much of the leading articles of commerce as the coined gold dollar would buy in 1873, yet the advocates of the gold standard characterize it as a 72-cent dollar. Then the gold dollar of 1873 was a 72-cent dollar. If the gold dollar of to-day be an honest and equitable dollar, that of 1873, which was worth much less, was a swindling and dishonest one; and if gold continues to advance as it has been advancing, and with the declining output of that metal there is no reason why it should not, it will be but a short time before any other kind of dollar whose value may be equal to that of the present gold dollar will be stigmatized as a swindling 72-cent dollar. There never was a dollar coined that did not legally and practically contain 100 cents. But the creditors stigmatize a dollar of the value of the gold and silver dollar of 1873 as a 72-cent dollar. May not the debtors, with much more propriety, denounce the gold dollar of to-day as a 140-cent dollar?

According to the admissions of the royal commission of England, the gold dollar of to-day is to the producers of this country, measured by their products, already at a premium of between 30 and 40 per cent. over the gold dollar of 1873. The advocates of the gold standard have no sympathy with our farmers and manufacturers who have to pay, in commodities, a premium of 30 to 40 per cent. on gold, to meet their engagements, but express extreme anxiety at the bare possibility that a few importers might have to pay even a small premium in any form. They insist that the money system of a population of 65,000,000, shall, like an inverted pyramid, be made to rest upon its apex in order to enable a few importers, most of whom are residents of foreign countries, to make their payments abroad in gold.

Verily, Mr. President, the single gold standard is an expensive luxury for our people to maintain.

Those who deride silver as a money-metal indulge in feeble attempts at sarcasm by inquiring why we do not advocate the use of tin and bra.s.s as money. They speak and write as though the idea of using silver as money were a recent discovery or invention of people engaged in silver mining.

They also ignore the fact that the standard silver dollar of the United States, which, with much satisfaction, they stigmatize as a 72-cent dollar, requires a gold dollar to obtain it. It is worth a gold dollar in London, in Berlin, in Vienna, in Saint Petersburg, in Madrid, in Havana, and in all countries having commercial relations with the United States. It can at once be exchanged into the money of any country with only the slight deduction of cost of shipment to this country--as is the case in the United States with notes of the Bank of England, which are redeemable in gold.

Our silver dollar is not money in foreign countries--and it is to our advantage that it is not--for were it money anywhere else than in this country, we could not rely on its remaining here to maintain that steadiness of prices indispensable to prosperity. But if any of our silver dollars are found abroad, let no one suppose he can get them by tendering 412-1/2 grains of silver bullion for each dollar. He will find it will cost him precisely as much gold as it pa.s.ses for in the United States.

SOME EFFECTS OF THE RISE OF GOLD.

If a cotton planter in 1873 owed $10,000 he could then have paid it with 60,975 pounds of cotton. To-day, by reason of the increased command which gold has over commodities, it would take 101,010 pounds of cotton to pay that $10,000; not withstanding that the money in which the debtor has paid the interest has each year become more valuable than it was at the time he contracted to pay it.

The cotton manufacturer of the East who in 1873 owed $10,000 could then have paid it with 70,422 yards of uncolored cotton cloth; to-day owing to the rise in the value of gold it would require 147,059 yards to pay that debt, without taking into account the amount lost by the debtor in the greater sacrifice he had year by year to make to pay the interest.

The farmer of the North and West who in 1873 owed $10,000 could then have paid it with 8,733 bushels of wheat; to-day it would require 11,446 bushels of wheat to liquidate that debt, though he, too, has year by year been "cinched" through the progressive increase in the value of the money in which the interest has been paid. Or he could, in 1873, have paid his debt with 1,514 barrels of flour; to-day it would take 2,126 barrels of flour to pay the same debt.

The property of the country is fast pa.s.sing into the hands of the creditors, and if the iniquitous system is not reversed the condition of our American farmers will be that of the farmers of gold-standard countries. Instead of owning their farms they will be tenants and rent-payers--a condition but little in advance of that which prevailed in feudal days.

Machiavelli, describing a turbulent period in the history of Florence, said:

The people perished, but the brigands throve.

The brigandage of the Middle Ages, whether in Italy or elsewhere, was a criminal defiance of law, but it was pursued at some risk, and under manifest disadvantages. The brigand took his life in his hands. He knew that his calling was unlawful; and, although ruthless in his work, the method by which he exacted ransom of his occasional victim was less destructive to the prosperity of the community than the legalized brigandage of to-day by which, through a vicious system of money, the great ma.s.s of the people are despoiled of their property. The distinguishing characteristic of the brigandage of the nineteenth century is that it scrupulously observes all legal forms, and is conducted in the name of honor, honesty, good morals and "sound finance." Mortgages are foreclosed only in accordance with law, and the unearned increment which results from the increased and increasing value of the money is transferred from the debtor to the creditor, with punctilious regard for the statutes.

The demands of the brigand were enforced with guns and pistols; those of the creditor are enforced with bonds and mortgages; both exactions cruel and unjust, one by violence, the other by law. But, in the latter case, so indirect is the method of operation that many of those who are benefited by it are unaware of the perpetration of any wrong. So subtle is the process that the change seems to be only a change in the price of commodities, and thousands of men who would scorn consciously to exact from any one more than a just return for money loaned are beneficiaries of this vicious and ruinous system.

With regard to the great body of the working ma.s.ses it is sometimes said they have no cause for complaint, that their condition now is better than ever before.

But, Mr. President, it is not enough that men are better off than they have been. When we reflect that nine-tenths of the inventions and improvements const.i.tuting all the material features of the civilization of this century have been made by working men, it is manifest that they are ent.i.tled to much more of the comforts and convenience of life than are now accessible to them. By watchful, repeated, and aggressive efforts through their trade organizations, the working men in many branches have been enabled to keep wages from sinking, and occasionally to secure an advance; but, during a period of falling prices, what is gained in this way by those who are kept at work is lost to the working cla.s.s as a whole by the remission to idleness of part of their number.

The statisticians who seem to be employed by some propaganda to prove by figures that prosperity prevails, point exultantly to the fact that the wages of the working people seem constantly to have increased while prices are falling, and they cite this to prove that low prices are consistent with prosperity. They leave entirely out of the account the large numbers of workmen who of necessity are relegated to idleness on account of the lack of profit in business.

If you go into the workshops of any large manufacturing enterprise, while prices are low and lowering, and ask the managers what they now do when a strike occurs among the workmen, they will tell you they find it impossible to shut down, because they have contracts extending through time that they must fill, but, they add, "We pay the wages demanded and we reduce the number of the employed."

If there are a thousand workmen employed, getting $2 each per day, that would be a wage fund of $2,000 a day. If, when prices fall and business becomes dull, the employer should want to reduce the pay of each workman to $1.50 a day, and if the workmen, by striking, should prevent that decrease, and if, then, 25 per cent. of their number should be discharged, the loss to the working cla.s.s, as a body, and to the community at large, would be the same as though the wages were reduced to $1.50 a day. Until these people who present statistics can show us how many laborers are left out of employment there is no possibility of arriving at any correct conclusion as to what the wage fund is and how much wages are paid.

The loss to society is much greater when 25 per cent. of the people are unemployed than if all continued at work upon a 25 per cent. reduction of wages, because the relegation to idleness of 25 per cent. of the workmen reduces the producing force, and lessens correspondingly the aggregate annual production.

THE INTEREST OF THE MINING STATES IN THE REMONETIZATION OF SILVER.

Those who in the Senate and in the other House of Congress, represent mining const.i.tuencies are taunted with the selfish purpose of advancing the interests of their own States at the expense of those of the country. It is sought to discredit the State which I have the honor in part to represent on this floor, on the ground that the people, being largely silver miners, have a personal interest in the remonetization of silver.

The silver miners, Mr. President, need no defense here or elsewhere.

They have asked no favors from the Government, and ask none now. They are bold, adventurous, and self-reliant men, who have wandered across alkaline deserts, and over pathless mountains, braved the a.s.saults of hostile savages, the miasma of the Isthmus and the storms of the Cape, and have planted the flag of a high civilization on the western confines of this Republic. No more patriotic or public-spirited cla.s.s of citizens can be found within the borders of the Union. Their business is an honorable one. When they entered upon it they, in common with other citizens, had the warrant of time, and the authority of all writers and thinkers on political economy, for the belief that silver was, and would ever be, a money metal, ent.i.tled to that full credit which from time immemorial had been accorded to it. Silver, equally with gold, had been consecrated by all the ages to the money use, and was dedicated to such use by the Const.i.tution of the United States.

When the Const.i.tution declared that Congress should have power "to coin money and regulate the value thereof" and that "no State shall * * *

make anything but gold and silver coin a tender in payment of debts," it warranted the belief on the part of all who adopted the calling and undertook the business of mining, that gold and silver would continue to be money metals in the sense in which they had been for thousands of years in the past. The silver miners were warranted in presuming that when the Const.i.tution esteemed so highly the legal-tender function in the two metals, gold and silver, as that it prohibited the States from making anything a legal tender except coin of those two metals, it would not warrant the Congress of the United States in taking from one of those metals the power of legal tender and conferring that imperial function exclusively on the other. Silver mining is a business requiring for its successful prosecution skill, experience, and energy, while nine-tenths of the gold of the world has come from placers; requiring neither organization, capital, nor skilled labor.

The production of gold is much more a matter of accident and much more liable to fluctuation than is the case with silver. The silver miners therefore had a right to believe that so long as 23.22 grains of pure gold should be ent.i.tled to recognition as one dollar, 371.25 grains of pure silver would continue to be ent.i.tled to like recognition as one dollar, and would possess the legal-tender function as such, for the liquidation of all debts, public and private. On the strength of this warranty of the Const.i.tution, and of the unbroken experience of the ages, large sums of money were invested in mining property and in the employment of labor to develop the mines of the country. On the strength of this belief and conviction, shared in by all the people of the United States, that gold and silver would both remain the money metals of the world, debts to an enormous extent were incurred, and it was confidently believed that both metals would for all time be available for the payment of those debts.

The silver-miners had learned from the history of mining, as well as from hard and bitter experience, that the mines might at any moment cease to yield, in which case their occupation would be gone and the capital invested would be a total loss. But they did not suppose that the verdict of all time would be reversed, or that the implied warranty of the Const.i.tution of the United States would be disregarded. They did not believe that either one of the money metals would ever be demonetized. And if a doubt had entered their minds on that subject, they would naturally suppose that gold rather than silver would be demonetized, gold being too limited in quant.i.ty to answer alone the purposes of money in a rapidly advancing civilization; its yield being uncertain and capricious and the prospect of a continued and sufficient supply becoming less from year to year.

But, Mr. President, the degree of special interest which the mining States have in this measure is not to be compared with that of the other States of the Union.

According to the report of the Director of the Mint, the total quant.i.ty of silver produced in the United States in the eleven years from 1878 to 1888 inclusive was 406,210,000 fine ounces. According to the same authority the commercial value of that silver was $436,260,000, and the coinage value $525,145,000. A very simple process of arithmetic shows that the difference between the commercial and the coinage value of that silver was $88,885,000, or an average of $8,080,544 each year. a.s.suming that amount to have been the annual difference between the coinage and commercial value of silver for the five years preceding 1878, we must add to the $88,885,000 the sum of $40,402,220, making a total of $129,287,220 as the amount which the silver miners, not of Nevada but of the whole United States in the seventeen years ending 1889, lost by the demonetization of silver.

Having thus demonstrated in dollars and cents the degree of selfishness which, as is charged, is the motive of the miners in advocating the remonetization of silver, let us glance at the degree of selfishness which may be said to impel other cla.s.ses of the community to advocate the same cause.

THE INTEREST OF THE NON-MINING STATES IN REMONETIZATION.

The price of cotton for the year 1873, in gold or silver (then of equal power), was 16.4 cents per pound. The price in 1889 was 9.9 cents.

The yield of cotton for 1889 was 7,000,000 bales, or 3,500,000,000 pounds.

Had not silver been demonetized that cotton would have brought as good a price to-day as it did in 1873. At the price of 1873 the account would have stood 3,500,000,000 pounds, at 16.4 cents, $574,000,000. At the price of 1889 the account stands 3,500,000,000 pounds, at 9.9 cents, $345,500,000, showing a loss in debt-paying and tax-paying power on cotton alone (only one article of merchandise) in the single year 1889, by reason of the fall in prices caused by the demonetization of silver, of $227,500,000.

Having shown that the loss to the silver miners by the discount on silver for the seventeen years from 1873 to 1889 was less than $130,000,000, it will be seen that the loss in one single year to the cotton planters of the United States is greater by $90,000,000 than the total loss for the entire seventeen years to the silver miners of the country.

But inasmuch as the cotton crop of 1889 was exceptionally large, I will, for the purpose of my computation, discard it, and a.s.sume instead that an average yield for the years between 1873 and 1889 would be 5,000,000 bales per annum--which is a fair average and by no means high--5,000,000 bales, of 500 pounds each, are equal to 2,500,000,000 pounds.

At the price of 1873 the result of each year would be 2,500,000,000 pounds, at 16.4 cents, $410,000,000.

According to the figures given by the Bureau of Statistics the average price received each year of the seventeen was 13.1 cents per pound; 2,500,000,000 pounds, at 13.1 cents per pound, equal $327,000,000, showing a difference of $83,000,000; that being the average each separate year for seventeen years, or a total sum for the entire period of $1,411,000,000, which represents the loss in debt- and tax-paying power suffered by the cotton planters by reason of the demonetization of silver.

This is the enormous tribute which has been exacted of the cotton industry of this country in behalf of the gold "standard," and of those who, for their own pecuniary advantage, cunningly induced the Congress of the United States to demonetize silver. This is the sum which the planters of this country have lost in debt-paying and tax-paying power by that mad act of folly. As will be seen at a glance, it is a loss vastly in excess of that suffered by the silver States in the discount on the price of silver bullion.

So that, if the silver miners are taunted with having a personal interest in the success of the movement for the full remonetization of silver, the cotton planter must be placed in the same category, and with ten-fold more reason.

A like computation with regard to wheat will show a loss in debt-paying and tax-paying power of not less than $100,000,000 a year to the farmers of the North and West, by reason of the demonetization of silver--a total of $1,700,000,000 in the article of wheat alone in seventeen years.

Thus a loss, wholly unnecessary, of more than $3,000,000,000 in debt-paying and tax-paying power is shown to have been inflicted on the farmers and cotton planters of this country.

In comparison with this enormous loss to farmers and planters, how paltry is the loss of $8,000,000 a year suffered by the silver miners.

But, however large the direct loss to the debtors and to the country by reason of falling prices, the losses that are indirect are of infinitely greater magnitude, and stand out like a great mountain of wrong superimposed upon the most deserving cla.s.s in the community, whose interests it should be the paramount duty of Government to protect, a wrong more calamitous in its consequences than any of the mult.i.tudinous wrongs which a shrinking volume of money inflicts upon society.